You are here: / Environmental Law
, , ,

The Term “Release” (Re Hazardous Substances) Did Not Apply to Migration of Hazardous Substance to Neighbor’s Property Underground​

The Third Department determined there were two equally plausible interpretations of the term “sellers” as used in the contract, rendering the contract ambiguous.  Therefore, the motion to dismiss the complaint prior to discovery was properly denied. In addition, the Third Department determined that the term “release” (re: hazardous substances) did not extend to the migration of hazardous substances to neighboring properties under ground:

…[The provision] requires  indemnification  for environmental  claims  related  to, among other things, a “Release” of hazardous substances “at locations other than [500 Beech].” “Release”  is defined  to include  “any  spilling, leaking, pumping,  pouring,  emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting, dumping  or disposing of any Hazardous  Material  into  the  environment.” In its Canadian action, the neighbor alleged that contaminants – which would be classified as “Hazardous Materials” under the agreement – in the ground  at 500 Beech migrated into the soil and  groundwater at 606 Beech. There is no allegation that hazardous substances were spilled, leaked or otherwise disposed of directly onto the property at 606 Beech. Rather, the allegation is that the flow of underground water carried those substances from 500 Beech, where they had been spilled or leaked, to the neighboring property. Although the hazardous substances eventually wound up at 606 Beech, there is no support for an allegation that the “Release” of those substances occurred at a location other than 500 Beech. Vectron International, Inc, v Corning Oak Holding, Inc, 515408, 3rd Dept, 5-2-13

 

, ,

“Professional” Standard of Care Can Be Required Based Solely on Nature of Services Provided

The First Department noted that a “professional” standard of care could be required of a party solely by virtue of the nature of services rendered:

The court properly found that Impact had a professional duty independent of the parties’ agreements. Although Impact, an environmental consultant, was not subject to licensing requirements, public policy requires that it should be held to a “professional” standard of care, given the nature of its services … . Indeed, “[p]rofessionals . . . may be subject to tort liability for failure to exercise reasonable care, irrespective of their contractual duties” … .  Southern Wine & Spirits of Am, Inc v Impact Envtl Eng’g, PLLC, 2013 NY Slip Op o2i46, 9651, 650083/10, 1st Dept 3-28-13

 

, , ,

Owner/Officer of Company Can Be Personally Liable for Toxic Emissions Released by Company.

Plaintiffs brought an action for personal injuries and property damage allegedly caused by toxic emissions released by defendant Tonawanda Coke Corporation.  An owner and officer of Tonawanda Coke (Crane) moved to dismiss the cause of action suing him in an individual capacity.  In affirming the denial of that motion, the Fourth Department wrote:

Although “[a] corporate officer is not held liable for the negligence of the corporation merely because of his official relationship[,]” that officer will be held liable if it is established “that the officer was a participant in the wrongful conduct” … .Plaintiffs alleged in the first amended complaint that Crane was or should have been aware of the relevant environmental regulations, was ultimately responsible for reporting benzene emissions to the Environmental Protection Agency, and personally supervised and exercised control over Tonawanda Coke’s operations … .Thus, plaintiffs have alleged that Crane actively participated in the wrongful conduct by approving the policies that allegedly caused the environmental contamination … .   Abbot v Tonawanda Coke Corporation, et al, 155, CA 12-01384, Fourth Dept. 3-15-13

 

, ,

Standing to Seek Review of Site Plan Approval Based Upon Interest in Protecting the Ecological Health of a Body of Water Adjacent to Petitioner’s Property.

Petitioners had standing to seek review of a planning board’s site plan approval.  Petitioners, who lived one half mile from the site, alleged “direct harm, injury that is in some way different from that of the public at large … .  Their allegations that the approved construction project will harm their regular use, enjoyment, and interest in protecting the ecological health of Stony Brook Harbor, which is adjacent to their property, are sufficient to confer standing …”.  Matter of Shepherd vs Maddaloni, 2011-09750, Index No. 7867/11, Second Dept. 2-27-13

 

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy