You are here: / Environmental Law
,

IN THIS GROUNDWATER POLLUTION CASE, THE POLLUTION EXCLUSION IN THE INSURERS’ POLICIES APPLIED AND THE INSURERS ARE NOT OBLIGATED TO DEFEND AND INDEMNIFY THE INSURED OIL COMPANY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the pollution exclusion in the plaintiffs’ insurance policies applied and plaintiffs were not required to defend and indemnify the defendant, which allegedly caused a gasoline additive (MTBE) to pollute groundwater. The fact that the additive was a legal substance required by the EPA did not matter:

… [I]t is clear that even if MTBE was not a pollutant in the context of its use as a gasoline additive, it was a pollutant in the context of its release into groundwater … . * * *

Qualified pollution exclusions are characterized by an exception for pollution where the discharge or release of the pollutant is “sudden and accidental” … . The terms “sudden” and “accidental” each “have separate meanings, [both] of which must be established for the exception to nullify the pollution coverage exclusion” … .. “[T]he meaning of sudden in the pollution exclusion exception” has a “temporal quality” (id. [emphasis omitted]), which is only met where the discharge occurs “abruptly or within a short timespan, of a significant quantity of the pollutant sufficient to have some potentially damaging environmental effect” … .

Here, with respect to the plaintiffs’ … policies that contained qualified pollution exclusions, the defendant failed to meet its burden to “demonstrate a reasonable interpretation of the underlying complaint[s] potentially bringing the claims within the sudden and accidental discharge exception to exclusion of pollution coverage, or to show that extrinsic evidence exists that the discharge was in fact sudden and accidental” … . In other words, the type of pollution alleged, which occurred undetected over many years, was not sudden within the meaning of the applicable law … . St. Paul Fire & Mar. Ins. Co. v Getty Props. Corp., 2024 NY Slip Op 03510, Second Dept 6-26-24

Practice Point: A “pollution exclusion” in an insurance policy applies where, as here, the pollution occurs over years, as opposed to occurring suddenly and unexpectedly.

Practice Point: A substance can be legal and approved for use in gasoline by the EPA but constitute a “pollutant” when found in groundwater.

 

, , ,

THE NYC DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING PRESERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT TOOK THE “HARD LOOK” REQUIRED BY THE STATE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REVIEW ACT BEFORE APPROVING THE CONSTRUCTION OF SENIOR HOUSING ON GREEN SPACE (CT APP). ​

The Court of Appeals, over an extensive dissenting opinion, determined the NYC Department of Housing Preservation and Development (HPD) took the “hard look” required under the State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA) before approving the construction of a seven-story senior housing unit on land previously used by a tenant as a green space/sculpture garden which was open to the public:

This CPLR article 78 proceeding challenges a negative declaration issued by respondent New York City Department of Housing Preservation and Development (HPD) relating to development of affordable housing on a lot in the Nolita neighborhood of Manhattan. The property is owned by the City of New York and leased on a month-to-month basis since 1991 to a corporation owned by the late petitioner Allan Reiver … . Beginning in 2005, Reiver used the lot as a green space/sculpture garden accessible through his adjacent art gallery. After the City identified the lot as a potential site for affordable senior housing in 2013, Reiver opened the space to the public directly through a gate on Elizabeth Street. The garden is currently open for a limited number of hours per week and is operated and maintained by volunteers.

* * * The Court’s role is not “to weigh the desirability of any action or choose among alternatives,” but to ensure that “agencies will honor their mandate regarding environmental protection by complying strictly with prescribed procedures and giving reasoned consideration to all pertinent issues revealed in the process” … . In other words, “[w]hile judicial review must be meaningful, the courts may not substitute their judgment for that of the agency” … .

Here, HPD identified appropriate areas of concern, took the necessary “hard look,” and rationally determined that the project would not have a significant adverse impact on the environment. Matter of Elizabeth St. Garden, Inc. v City of New York, 2024 NY Slip Op 03321, Ct App 6-18-24

Practice Point: A court’s role under SEQRA is limited to determining whether the agency took a “hard look” at the adverse environmental effects of a construction project before approving it.

 

,

THE ADIRONDACK PARK AGENCY PROPERLY ISSUED PERMITS FOR THE APPLICATION OF AN HERBICIDE IN LAKE GEORGE TO CONTROL AN INVASIVE AQUATIC PLANT (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Fisher, reversing Supreme Court, determined the Adirondack Park Agency (APA) properly issued permits for the application of an herbicide (ProcellaCOR EC) in Lake George to control an invasive aquatic plant called Eurasian watermilfoil (EWM). Supreme Court had granted the Article 78 petition and vacated the permits. Applying black letter administrative law, the Third Department found no basis to overturn the APA’s ruling. The opinion is too fact-specific and detailed to fairly summarize here:

… [W]here an agency’s determination was rendered without a fact-finding hearing, a court’s review is limited to “whether [the] determination was made in violation of lawful procedure, was affected by an error of law or was arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion” (CPLR 7803 [3] …). In performing such review, “[i]t is well settled that a court cannot substitute its view of the factual merits of a controversy for that of the administrative agency” … . And, when “the judgment of the agency involves factual evaluations in the area of the agency’s expertise and is supported by the record, such judgment must be accorded great weight and judicial deference” … . Indeed, “[i]f a determination is rational it must be sustained even if the court concludes that another result would also have been rational” … .

Although an agency acts arbitrarily and capriciously when it fails to conform to its own regulations, an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations is entitled to deference if that interpretation does not contradict the plain language of the regulations and is not irrational or unreasonable … . Matter of Lake George Assn. v NYS Adirondack Park Agency, 2024 NY Slip Op 02356, Third Dept 5-2-24

Practice Point: Black letter administrative law for the review of an agency’s determination when there was no fact-finding hearing was applied here. The Adirondack Park Agency’s issuance of permits for the application of an herbicide in Lake George was upheld.

 

, ,

PLAINTIFF WAS HIRED BY THE CITY TO INSTALL A SEWER AND DISCOVERED 45,000 TONS OF CONTAMINATED SOIL; DEFENDANT, WHO CAUSED THE CONTAMINATION, REFUSED TO REMEDIATE; PLAINTIFF, WHO REMEDIATED THE CONTAMINATION, STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR UNJUST ENRICHMENT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the unjust-enrichment cause of action should not have been dismissed. Plaintiff was hired by the city to install a sewer. Plaintiff discovered 45,000 tons of contaminated soil in the process. Defendant, who was responsible for the contamination, refused to remediate. Plaintiff remediated the contamination and sued defendant for the cost. There was no contract between plaintiff and defendant, so the breach of contract action was properly dismissed. However, the complaint stated a cause of action for unjust enrichment:

“To recover under a theory of unjust enrichment, a litigant must show that (1) the other party was enriched, (2) at that party’s expense, and (3) that it is against equity and good conscience to permit [the other party] to retain what is sought to be recovered” … . “‘[T]he essential inquiry in any action for unjust enrichment . . . is whether it is against equity and good conscience to permit the defendant to retain what is sought to be recovered'” … . “Although privity is not required for an unjust enrichment claim, a claim will not be supported if the connection between the parties is too attenuated” … .

Here, affording the complaint a liberal construction, we find that it sufficiently alleged that the defendant was unjustly enriched, at the plaintiff’s expense, by the plaintiff’s remediation of the contaminated soil, and that it would be against equity and good conscience to permit the defendant to retain what was sought to be recovered … . Bedford-Carp Constr., Inc. v Brooklyn Union Gas Co., 2023 NY Slip Op 04566, Second Dept 9-13-23

Practice Point: When there is no contract between the parties, the unjust-enrichment theory may be viable, as it was in this case.

 

,

THE FACT THAT THE CONTAMINATED AREA WHERE THE NEW CONSTRUCTION WAS TO BE LOCATED HAD BEEN REMEDIATED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION (DEC) WAS NOT ENOUGH TO ENSURE SAFETY WHEN THE SOIL IS DISTURBED FOR CONSTRUCTION; THE SEQRA REVIEW DID NOT TAKE THE REQUISITE HARD LOOK AT THE EFFECTS OF DISTURBING THE SOIL (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, over a two-justice dissent, determined the Plattsburgh Common Council, the lead agency responsible for review of a construction project pursuant to the State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA), did not take the requisite hard look at the potential danger associated with disturbing the contaminated soil which had been cleaned up and declared remediated by the Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC):

… Supreme Court correctly determined that, although the soil contamination was addressed, the ZBA (Zoning Board of Appeals) and Planning Board failed to take a hard look at this issue … . More specifically, the failure in providing mitigation measures for this environmental concern did not comply with the mandates of SEQRA … . Preliminarily, the Common Council, and thereafter the Planning Board and ZBA, properly relied on DEC correspondence in determining that the project site in its current form did not present adverse environmental impacts … . Here, however, it was inappropriate to determine that there would be no adverse environmental impacts when it was known that the contemplated site plan would necessarily disturb the contaminated soil … . * * * The fact that the brownfield remediation was successful at the time does not discharge the involved agency’s duty to take a hard look relative to the project … . Indeed, the citizens who may be impacted have the right to insist that the construction be done in an environmentally safe manner in accordance with SEQRA.  Matter of Boise v City of Plattsburgh, 2023 NY Slip Op 04338, Third Dept 8-17-23

Practice Point: Here the construction area had been contaminated and was successfully remediated by the DEC. But the SEQRA review required a hard look at the effects of disturbing the soil n the remediated area during construction. The review could not simply rely on the remediation-conclusions of the DEC.

 

,

THE OFFICE OF RENEWABLE ENERGY SITING (ORES) CONDUCTED A PROPER REVIEW BEFORE ISSUING THE CHALLENGED REGULATIONS CONCERNING THE SITING OF MAJOR RENEWABLE ENERGY FACILITIES (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Pritzker, determined that the Office of Renewable Energy Siting (ORES) had conducted a proper review before issuing regulations concerning the siting of major renewable energy facilities. The opinion is far too detailed to fairly summarize here:

… [P]etitioners — who include numerous municipalities, municipal corporations and private entities — commenced the instant combined proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 and action for declaratory judgment, seeking, among other things, to annul the regulations and direct ORES to engage in a proper SEQRA [State Environmental Quality Review Act] review. Specifically, petitioners alleged that, among other things, ORES: (1) mischaracterized the action as an unlisted action rather than a type I action; (2) failed to take a hard look at the environmental consequences of the regulations; (3) violated the home rule provision of the NY Constitution; and (4) violated the express terms of Executive Law § 94-c. * * *

… [W]e agree with petitioners’ threshold argument that ORES misclassified this action as unlisted, rather than type I. … … [T]he promulgation of the regulations should have been classified as a type I action that would carry the presumption of requiring preparation of an EIS [Environment Impact Statement] … . However, “a misclassification does not always lead to the annulment of the negative declaration if the lead agency conducts the equivalent of a type I review notwithstanding the misclassification” … , and, notably, “a type I action does not, per se, necessitate the filing of an EIS” … . * * *

A review of the vast record reveals that ORES took a thorough and hard look at the potential negative environmental impacts associated with the proposed regulations. Matter of Town of Copake v New York State Off. of Renewable Energy Siting, 2023 NY Slip Op 02721, Third Dept 5-18-23

Practice Point: The newly created Office of Renewable Energy Siting conducted a proper review before issuing the challenged regulations concerning the siting of major renewable energy facilities.

 

,

THE TOWN PLANNING BOARD COMPLIED WITH THE “HARD LOOK” REQUIREMENTS OF SEQRA AND PROPERLY GRANTED A SPECIAL USE PERMIT, CRITERIA EXPLAINED IN SOME DETAIL (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the town planning board complied with the State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA) and properly considered the criteria for a special use permit when it approved a project:

… [T]he Planning Board identified groundwater resources, noise, and scenic resources as relevant areas of environmental concern, took a hard look at them, and made a reasoned elaboration of the basis for its negative determination of significance. * * *

… [T]he record demonstrates that the Planning Board complied with Zoning Code § 143-117(A)(6) and (9), which required it to assess the “[a]dequacy of water supply and sewage disposal facilities,” and to provide the protection of “neighboring properties against noise, glare, unsightliness or other objectionable features.”

Lastly, “[a] use permitted by a special use permit is a use that has been found by the local legislative body to be appropriate for the zoning district and ‘in harmony with the general zoning plan and will not adversely affect the neighborhood'” … . Although the Planning Board “‘does not have the authority to waive or modify any conditions set forth in the ordinance'” … , “[t]he permit must be granted if the application satisfies the criteria set forth in the zoning law” … . Matter of Tampone v Town of Red Hook Planning Bd., 2023 NY Slip Op 02011, Second Dept 4-19-23

Practice Point: The Second Department explained the judicial-review criteria for a town planning board’s negative declaration under SEQRA and a town planning board’s compliance with the zoning code and special-use-permit requirements.

 

, ,

THE COURT’S INQUIRY ON MOTIONS TO DISMISS AN ARTICLE 78 PETITION, A COMPLAINT, AND/OR A REQUEST FOR A DECLARATORY JUDGMENT SHOULD RARELY GO BEYOND WHETHER, ASSUMING THE TRUTH OF THE ALLEGATIONS, A CAUSE OF ACTION HAS BEEN STATED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, noted that the inquiry on motions to dismiss should rarely go beyond determining whether a cause of action has been stated. The action here alleged violations of the Sewage Pollution Right to Know Act (ECL 17-0825-a):

“On a motion pursuant to CPLR 7804(f) to dismiss a petition, only the petition is to be considered, all of its allegations are to be deemed true, and the petitioner is to be accorded the benefit of every possible inference” … , On a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), “[c]ourts may consider extrinsic evidence outside of the pleading’s four corners to help determine whether the pleading party has a cause of action, as distinguished from whether the pleading simply states a cause of action” … . However, affidavits submitted by a movant “will almost never warrant dismissal under CPLR 3211 unless they establish conclusively that [petitioner] has no [claim or] cause of action” … . …

The petition/complaint also states a viable cause of action for declaratory relief. A motion to dismiss the complaint in an action for a declaratory judgment “‘presents for consideration only the issue of whether a cause of action for declaratory relief is set forth, not the question of whether the plaintiff is entitled to a favorable declaration'” … . Matter of Riverkeeper, Inc. v New York City Dept. of Envtl. Protection, 2023 NY Slip Op 01679, Second Dept 3-29-23

Practice Point: A court’s inquiry on motions to dismiss an Article 78 petition, a complaint and/or a request for declaratory judgment should rarely go beyond whether a cause of action has been stated.

 

,

PERMIT/ORDER ALLOWING DEVELOPMENT OF MARINAS ON LOWER SARANAC LAKE IN THE ADIRONDACK PARK ANNULLED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing the Adirondack Park Agency (APA), in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Ceresia, determined that the APA misapplied its wetlands regulations in issuing a permit for the development of marinas on Lower Saranac Lake in the Adirondack Park. The permit/order was therefore annulled. The opinion is too detailed and comprehensive to fairly summarize here:

LS Marina’s wetlands permit application required APA to evaluate the freshwater wetland at the Annex location and assign it a value rating between one and four, with one representing the highest value (see 9 NYCRR 578.5). The value rating is arrived at by first determining whether the wetland possesses any one or more of 24 different characteristics, each of which, in turn, has an assigned value of one through four (see 9 NYCRR 578.5 [a]-[x]). These 24 characteristics are grouped under six headings or categories, which APA refers to as “factors.” The wetland’s overall value is to be no lower than the highest value of any of its characteristics (see 9 NYCRR 578.6 [a]). Furthermore, as is relevant here, if the wetland has three or more characteristics with a value of two, which fall under “more than one factor,” this will raise the wetland’s value to one (9 NYCRR 578.6 [c]).

There is no dispute that the wetland at the Annex has three value-two characteristics, and that these three characteristics fall under two separate factors (see 9 NYCRR 578.5 [c], [g], [k]). Nevertheless, APA assigned the wetland an overall value of two rather than one … . … Therefore, APA should have assigned an overall value of one to the Annex wetland and should have analyzed the wetlands permit application accordingly (see 9 NYCRR 578.10 [a] [1]). Matter of Jorling v Adirondack Park Agency, 2023 NY Slip Op 01118, Third Dept 3-2-23

Practice Point: Here the Adirondack Park Agency misapplied its wetlands regulations with respect to a permit for the development of marinas on Lower Saranac Lake in the Adirondack Park. The permit/order was therefore annulled.

 

,

IN THIS OIL SPILL CLEAN UP SUIT AGAINST THE PROPERTY OWNER BROUGHT UNDER THE NAVIGATION LAW, THERE IS NO STATUTE PROHIBITING THE STATE FROM SEEKING INDEMNIFICATION FOR FUNDS EXPENDED FROM THE ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION PROGRAM FUND PURSUANT TO THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION LAW (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the complaint seeking reimbursement of oil spill clean up costs from the defendant property owner should not have been dismissed. Defendant argued the state could not seek reimbursement under the Navigation Law for funds expended from the Environmental Restoration Program Fund pursuant to the Environmental Conservation Law. The Third Department found no support for the argument in the statutes:

Nothing in the Navigation Law prohibits plaintiff from seeking indemnification for funds expended from sources other than the Oil Spill Fund. Moreover, the Environmental Conservation Law requires the state to seek recovery of the funds under any statute (see ECL 56-0507 [2]). * * *

… “[T]he state of New York and any of its political subdivisions or agents” (Navigation Law § 172 [14]). Additionally, the Legislature imposed strict liability against “[a]ny person who has discharged petroleum . . . without regard to fault, for all cleanup and removal costs and all direct and indirect damages, no matter by whom sustained” (Navigation Law § 181 [1] … ). The language of the statute does not limit recovery solely to the Oil Spill Fund. Rather, the fund simply serves as a possible means to effectuate the statute. “[B]arring plaintiff from seeking to hold defendant strictly liable for the [remediation] expenditures would thwart the plain language of Navigation Law § 181, as well as the express purposes of Navigation Law article 12 …”. State of New York v Alfa Laval Inc., 2023 NY Slip Op 01034, Third Dept 2-23-23

Practice Point: Here the state sought recovery of oil spill clean up costs from the defendant property owner. The defendant argued the state could not be indemnified for funds expended from the Environmental Restoration Program fund (pursuant to the Environmental Conservation Law) by suing under the Navigation Law, which has its own Oil Spill Fund. The Third Department found no such statutory restriction.

 

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy