Employment Law – Page 42 – New York Appellate Digest

EMPLOYEE WAS NOT ACTING WITHIN THE SCOPE OF HER EMPLOYMENT WHEN SHE ASSAULTED PLAINTIFF IN THE EMPLOYER’S PARKING LOT, SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS THIRD PARTY ASSAULT CASE PROPERLY GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department determined the employer’s motion for summary judgment in this third-party assault case was properly granted. After an employee (Hartfield) had been asked to leave for the day by the employer, the employee assaulted plaintiff in the parking lot. The doctrine of respondeat superior did not apply because the employee was not acting within the scope of her employment at the time of the assault:

… [D]efendant established as a matter of law that the doctrine of respondeat superior is inapplicable because Hartfield was not acting within the scope of her employment at the time of the assault. The doctrine of respondeat superior renders an employer “vicariously liable for the tortious acts of its employees only if those acts were committed in furtherance of the employer’s business and within the scope of employment”… .. Although the issue whether an employee is acting within the scope of his or her employment is generally a question of fact, summary judgment is appropriate “in a case such as this, in which the relevant facts are undisputed” … . Here, we conclude that defendant met its initial burden of establishing that Hartfield’s assault of plaintiff was not committed in furtherance of defendant’s business and was not within the scope of employment … . Stribing v Bill Gray’s Inc., 2018 NY Slip Op 07566, Fourth Dept 11-9-18

NEGLIGENCE (EMPLOYEE WAS NOT ACTING WITHIN THE SCOPE OF HER EMPLOYMENT WHEN SHE ASSAULTED PLAINTIFF IN THE EMPLOYER’S PARKING LOT, SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS THIRD PARTY ASSAULT CASE PROPERLY GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT))/EMPLOYMENT LAW (RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR, EMPLOYEE WAS NOT ACTING WITHIN THE SCOPE OF HER EMPLOYMENT WHEN SHE ASSAULTED PLAINTIFF IN THE EMPLOYER’S PARKING LOT, SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS THIRD PARTY ASSAULT CASE PROPERLY GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT))/BATTERY (EMPLOYMENT LAW, RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR, EMPLOYEE WAS NOT ACTING WITHIN THE SCOPE OF HER EMPLOYMENT WHEN SHE ASSAULTED PLAINTIFF IN THE EMPLOYER’S PARKING LOT, SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS THIRD PARTY ASSAULT CASE PROPERLY GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT))/RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR (NEGLIGENCE, BATTERY, EMPLOYEE WAS NOT ACTING WITHIN THE SCOPE OF HER EMPLOYMENT WHEN SHE ASSAULTED PLAINTIFF IN THE EMPLOYER’S PARKING LOT, SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS THIRD PARTY ASSAULT CASE PROPERLY GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT))/THIRD PARTY ASSAULT (EMPLOYMENT LAW, RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR, EMPLOYEE WAS NOT ACTING WITHIN THE SCOPE OF HER EMPLOYMENT WHEN SHE ASSAULTED PLAINTIFF IN THE EMPLOYER’S PARKING LOT, SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS THIRD PARTY ASSAULT CASE PROPERLY GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT))

November 9, 2018

Administrative Law, Constitutional Law, Employment Law

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH REGULATIONS PLACING HARD CAPS ON EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENDITURES BY HEALTHCARE PROVIDERS RECEIVING PUBLIC FUNDS PROPERLY PROMULGATED (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge DiFiore, over a two-judge dissent, determined that the hard caps imposed by Department of Health (DOH) regulations on the executive compensation and administrative expenditures by healthcare providers receiving public funds were properly promulgated. Another regulation which sought to impose a soft cap was deemed to have exceeded the regulatory powers of the DOH. The court’s anlaysis applied the Boreali factors which address the line between administrative rule-making and legislative policy-making (separation of powers):

In totality, following consideration of the Boreali factors, we are unconvinced that, in adopting the hard cap regulations, DOH exceeded its regulatory authority. The Legislature expressed a policy goal — that state healthcare funds should be expended in the most efficient and effective manner to maximize the quality and availability of public care — and the hard cap regulations, which focus exclusively on the appropriate use of state funds, are directly tied to that goal without improperly subverting it in favor of unrelated public policy interests … . * * *

… [T]he soft cap regulation cannot be said to here “fill in details of a broad policy.” Rather than determining the best way to regulate toward the legislative goal identified in its enabling legislation (i.e., using state funds to purchase affordable, quality care) with respect to the soft cap DOH appears to have envisioned an additional goal of limiting executive compensation as a matter of public policy and regulated to that end. Thus, we agree with the conclusion of the courts below that the soft cap regulation was promulgated in excess of DOH’s administrative authority. Matter of LeadingAge N.Y., Inc. v Shah, 2018 NY Slip Op 06965, CtApp 10-18-18

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH REGULATIONS PLACING HARD CAPS ON EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENDITURES BY HEALTHCARE PROVIDERS RECEIVING PUBLIC FUNDS PROPERLY PROMULGATED (CT APP))/CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (SEPARATION OF POWERS, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH REGULATIONS PLACING HARD CAPS ON EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENDITURES BY HEALTHCARE PROVIDERS RECEIVING PUBLIC FUNDS PROPERLY PROMULGATED (CT APP))/EMPLOYMENT LAW (EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH REGULATIONS PLACING HARD CAPS ON EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENDITURES BY HEALTHCARE PROVIDERS RECEIVING PUBLIC FUNDS PROPERLY PROMULGATED (CT APP))/EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (HEALTHCARE PROVIDERS, (DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH REGULATIONS PLACING HARD CAPS ON EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENDITURES BY HEALTHCARE PROVIDERS RECEIVING PUBLIC FUNDS PROPERLY PROMULGATED (CT APP))/BOREALI FACTORS (ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH REGULATIONS PLACING HARD CAPS ON EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENDITURES BY HEALTHCARE PROVIDERS RECEIVING PUBLIC FUNDS PROPERLY PROMULGATED (CT APP))/REGULATIONS (ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH REGULATIONS PLACING HARD CAPS ON EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENDITURES BY HEALTHCARE PROVIDERS RECEIVING PUBLIC FUNDS PROPERLY PROMULGATED (CT APP))/DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH (ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH REGULATIONS PLACING HARD CAPS ON EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENDITURES BY HEALTHCARE PROVIDERS RECEIVING PUBLIC FUNDS PROPERLY PROMULGATED (CT APP))

October 18, 2018

Administrative Law, Employment Law, Labor Law

APPRENTICES WHO WORK OUTSIDE THE THEIR APPRENTICESHIP TRAINING CANNOT BE PAID THE LOWER APPRENTICE RATES, HERE APPRENTICE GLAZIERS DOING IRONWORK WHEN INSTALLING STOREFRONTS MUST BE PAID AT THE HIGHER JOURNEY-LEVEL RATE (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, reversing the Appellate Division, determined that the prevailing wage provision of Labor Law 220 was properly interpreted by the Department of Labor (DOL) to mean that apprentices who work outside of their apprenticeship training cannot be paid at the lower apprenticeship rate. Here apprentice glaziers who were doing ironwork when installing storefronts must be paid higher journey-level rates for ironwork:

… [T]he DOL interprets Labor Law § 220 (3-e) to mean that apprentices employed on public work projects may be paid apprentice rates only if they are performing tasks within the trade classification (e.g., “glazier,” “ironworker”) that is the subject of the apprenticeship program in which they are enrolled. Apprentices who are performing tasks, in the installation of storefronts, curtain wall, and preglazed windows, that are classified as ironwork tasks may be paid the apprentice rate only if they are enrolled in an ironworker apprentice program (approved by the DOL), as opposed to a glazier apprentice program. Apprentices learning any trade other than ironwork, including those enrolled in a glazier apprenticeship program, must be paid journey-level ironworker prevailing wages and benefit rates if they are engaged in the parts of a work process that are classified as ironwork tasks. * * *

Given that Labor Law § 220 as a whole was “intended to prevent employers from cutting standards of construction work by hiring an excessive number of unskilled employees, and to ensure that learning-level workers receive approved, supervised training” … , it was rational for the DOL to conclude that section 220 (3-e) prohibits employers from diluting standards by hiring apprentices to perform tasks in trades for which they are not training. International Union of Painters & Allied Trades, Dist. Council No. 4 v New York State Dept. of Labor, 2018 NY Slip Op 06963, CtApp 10-18-18

EMPLOYMENT LAW (LABOR LAW, APPRENTICES WHO WORK OUTSIDE THE THEIR APPRENTICESHIP TRAINING CANNOT BE PAID THE LOWER APPRENTICE RATES, HERE APPRENTICE GLAZIERS DOING IRONWORK WHEN INSTALLING STOREFRONTS MUST BE PAID AT THE HIGHER JOURNEY-LEVEL RATE (CT APP))/LABOR LAW (APPRENTICES WHO WORK OUTSIDE THE THEIR APPRENTICESHIP TRAINING CANNOT BE PAID THE LOWER APPRENTICE RATES, HERE APPRENTICE GLAZIERS DOING IRONWORK WHEN INSTALLING STOREFRONTS MUST BE PAID AT THE HIGHER JOURNEY-LEVEL RATE (CT APP))/ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, APPRENTICES WHO WORK OUTSIDE THE THEIR APPRENTICESHIP TRAINING CANNOT BE PAID THE LOWER APPRENTICE RATES, HERE APPRENTICE GLAZIERS DOING IRONWORK WHEN INSTALLING STOREFRONTS MUST BE PAID AT THE HIGHER JOURNEY-LEVEL RATE (CT APP))/APPRENTICES (LABOR LAW, APPRENTICES WHO WORK OUTSIDE THE THEIR APPRENTICESHIP TRAINING CANNOT BE PAID THE LOWER APPRENTICE RATES, HERE APPRENTICE GLAZIERS DOING IRONWORK WHEN INSTALLING STOREFRONTS MUST BE PAID AT THE HIGHER JOURNEY-LEVEL RATE (CT APP))

October 18, 2018

Battery, Employment Law, Negligence

INSURANCE COMPANY NOT VICARIOUSLY LIABLE FOR AN ALLEGED CIVIL ASSAULT AND BATTERY BY A PRIVATE INVESTIGATOR, THE INVESTIGATOR WAS DEEMED A SUBCONTRACTOR, NOT AN EMPLOYEE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined the MetLife was not vicariously liable for an alleged civil assault and battery by a private investigator, who was deemed to be a subcontractor, not an employee of MetLife:

” The doctrine of respondeat superior renders a master vicariously liable for a tort committed by his [or her] servant within the scope of employment. Conversely, the general rule is that an employer who hires an independent contractor is not liable for the independent contractor’s negligent acts'” … . ” The determination of whether an employer-employee relationship exists turns on whether the alleged employer exercises control over the results produced, or the means used to achieve the results. Control over the means is the more important consideration'” … . However, “[i]ncidental control over the results produced without further indicia of control over the means employed to achieve the results will not constitute substantial evidence of an employer-employee relationship” … .

Here, the contract between MetLife and Scope provided that Scope’s “affiliates and agents” were “solely personnel of [Scope] and not MetLife,” and that Scope would have “full responsibility for the actions and omissions of all personnel employed by [Scope] or any agents who are involved in performing the Services and for any losses arising therefrom.” The contract likewise contained a clause in which Scope agreed to indemnify MetLife for, inter alia, losses resulting from “negligent or wrongful acts.” Although, as the plaintiffs point out, a rider to the contract sets forth “Minimum Standards” for private investigators employed by Scope, “[t]he requirement that the work be done properly is a condition just as readily required of an independent contractor as of an employee and not conclusive as to either” … . McHale v Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 2018 NY Slip Op 06895, Second Dept 10-17-18

EMPLOYMENT LAW (INSURANCE COMPANY NOT VICARIOUSLY LIABLE FOR AN ALLEGED CIVIL ASSAULT AND BATTERY BY A PRIVATE INVESTIGATOR, THE INVESTIGATOR WAS DEEMED A SUBCONTRACTOR, NOT AN EMPLOYEE (SECOND DEPT))/NEGLIGENCE (EMPLOYMENT LAW, INSURANCE COMPANY NOT VICARIOUSLY LIABLE FOR AN ALLEGED CIVIL ASSAULT AND BATTERY BY A PRIVATE INVESTIGATOR, THE INVESTIGATOR WAS DEEMED A SUBCONTRACTOR, NOT AN EMPLOYEE (SECOND DEPT))/SUBCONTRACTORS (VICARIOUS LIABILITY, (INSURANCE COMPANY NOT VICARIOUSLY LIABLE FOR AN ALLEGED CIVIL ASSAULT AND BATTERY BY A PRIVATE INVESTIGATOR, THE INVESTIGATOR WAS DEEMED A SUBCONTRACTOR, NOT AN EMPLOYEE (SECOND DEPT))/VICARIOUS LIABILITY (EMPLOYMENT LAW, NEGLIGENCE, INSURANCE COMPANY NOT VICARIOUSLY LIABLE FOR AN ALLEGED CIVIL ASSAULT AND BATTERY BY A PRIVATE INVESTIGATOR, THE INVESTIGATOR WAS DEEMED A SUBCONTRACTOR, NOT AN EMPLOYEE (SECOND DEPT))THIRD PARTY ASSAULT (INSURANCE COMPANY NOT VICARIOUSLY LIABLE FOR AN ALLEGED CIVIL ASSAULT AND BATTERY BY A PRIVATE INVESTIGATOR, THE INVESTIGATOR WAS DEEMED A SUBCONTRACTOR, NOT AN EMPLOYEE (SECOND DEPT))/BATTERY (EMPLOYMENT LAW, INSURANCE COMPANY NOT VICARIOUSLY LIABLE FOR AN ALLEGED CIVIL ASSAULT AND BATTERY BY A PRIVATE INVESTIGATOR, THE INVESTIGATOR WAS DEEMED A SUBCONTRACTOR, NOT AN EMPLOYEE (SECOND DEPT))

October 17, 2018

Criminal Law, Employment Law, Municipal Law, Unemployment Insurance

CLAIMANT’S TERMINATION FROM HER EMPLOYMENT WITH THE CITY BASED UPON TWO DRIVING WHILE UNDER THE INFLUENCE CONVICTIONS DID NOT PRECLUDE HER FROM RECEIVING UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE BENEFITS (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined the fact that the claimant was terminated from her employment as a city tax assessor because of two drunk-driving-related crimes did not preclude her from eligibility for unemployment insurance, The drunk driving incidents had nothing to do with her job and there was evidence she could have continued doing her job even though her license had been suspended for 90 days:

The disciplinary determination was founded, in part, upon claimant's two convictions for driving while under the influence of alcohol and her resulting license suspension. Whether this amounted to disqualifying misconduct posed a factual question for the Board, “and not every mistake, exercise of poor judgment or discharge for cause will rise to the level of misconduct” … . …

The drunk driving incidents did not occur while claimant was working. Notably, possession of a valid driver's license was not listed among the qualifications necessary to hold the position of Sole Assessor and claimant testified that she was not advised that this was a requirement … . Claimant was not incarcerated as a result of her convictions and she testified that she was ready and able to fulfill her job duties notwithstanding the suspension of her driver's license … . Moreover, while claimant acknowledged that she occasionally did site visits, she testified that she could perform her duties while her license was temporarily suspended given that much of the data needed to compute the assessments had already been compiled and she could obtain a lot of the information online. Matter of Stack (City of Glens Falls–Commissioner of Labor), 2018 NY Slip Op 06840, Third Dept 10-11-18

UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE (CLAIMANT'S TERMINATION FROM HER EMPLOYMENT WITH THE CITY BASED UPON TWO DRIVING WHILE UNDER THE INFLUENCE CONVICTIONS DID NOT PRECLUDE HER FROM RECEIVING UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE BENEFITS (THIRD DEPT))/EMPLOYMENT LAW (CLAIMANT'S TERMINATION FROM HER EMPLOYMENT WITH THE CITY BASED UPON TWO DRIVING WHILE UNDER THE INFLUENCE CONVICTIONS DID NOT PRECLUDE HER FROM RECEIVING UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE BENEFITS (THIRD DEPT))/MUNICIPAL LAW (CLAIMANT'S TERMINATION FROM HER EMPLOYMENT WITH THE CITY BASED UPON TWO DRIVING WHILE UNDER THE INFLUENCE CONVICTIONS DID NOT PRECLUDE HER FROM RECEIVING UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE BENEFITS (THIRD DEPT))/CRIMINAL LAW (UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE, CLAIMANT'S TERMINATION FROM HER EMPLOYMENT WITH THE CITY BASED UPON TWO DRIVING WHILE UNDER THE INFLUENCE CONVICTIONS DID NOT PRECLUDE HER FROM RECEIVING UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE BENEFITS (THIRD DEPT))

October 11, 2018

Employment Law, Workers' Compensation

THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD PROPERLY FOUND CLAIMANT WAS AN EMPLOYEE OF A TRUCKING COMPANY AND A SPECIAL EMPLOYEE OF A COMPANY WITH WHICH THE TRUCKING COMPANY HAD A CONTRACT, THEREFORE THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION AWARD WAS PROPERLY SPLIT BETWEEN THEM (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined that claimant, a tractor trailer driver, was an employee of Eaton's Trucking Service and a special employee of Quality Carrier, with which Eaton had entered a contract. Therefore the Workers' Compensation Board properly found Eaton and Quality were each responsible for 50% of the workers' compensation awards:

… [W]e find that substantial evidence supports the Board's factual determination that claimant was a special employee of Quality … . Looking at “the underlying facts of the parties' relationship” … , the evidence established that Eaton and Quality had an arrangement whereby Eaton's drivers, including claimant, hauled products exclusively for Quality's customers and did so in furtherance of Quality's business, and that Eaton operated under Quality's logo and license without which Eaton could not have conducted its hauling operation. Their arrangement was the type of arrangement in which the “employee and equipment of [the] general employer were necessarily used and temporarily assigned to work for th[e] business” of the special employer, which has been recognized as creating a special employment relationship … . While Quality did not control the day-to-day oversight of claimant, this is not dispositive as Eaton and claimant operated entirely under Quality's authority and pursuant to its policies. As a result, Quality had sufficient control over the “details and ultimate result” of claimant's work, and Quality's working relationship with claimant was “sufficient in kind and degree so that [Quality] may be deemed [to be his] employer” … . Matter of Mitchell v Eaton's Trucking Serv., Inc., 2018 NY Slip Op 06839, Third Dept 10-11-18

WORKERS' COMPENSATION (THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD PROPERLY FOUND CLAIMANT WAS AN EMPLOYEE OF A TRUCKING COMPANY AND A SPECIAL EMPLOYEE OF A COMPANY WITH WHICH THE TRUCKING COMPANY HAD A CONTRACT, THEREFORE THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION AWARD WAS PROPERLY SPLIT BETWEEN THEM (THIRD DEPT))/EMPLOYMENT LAW (THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD PROPERLY FOUND CLAIMANT WAS AN EMPLOYEE OF A TRUCKING COMPANY AND A SPECIAL EMPLOYEE OF A COMPANY WITH WHICH THE TRUCKING COMPANY HAD A CONTRACT, THEREFORE THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION AWARD WAS PROPERLY SPLIT BETWEEN THEM (THIRD DEPT))/SPECIAL EMPLOYEE (THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD PROPERLY FOUND CLAIMANT WAS AN EMPLOYEE OF A TRUCKING COMPANY AND A SPECIAL EMPLOYEE OF A COMPANY WITH WHICH THE TRUCKING COMPANY HAD A CONTRACT, THEREFORE THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION AWARD WAS PROPERLY SPLIT BETWEEN THEM (THIRD DEPT))

October 11, 2018

Employment Law, Negligence

THERE IS A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE DRIVER WHO ALLEGEDLY INJURED PLAINTIFF WAS AN EMPLOYEE OR A SUBCONTRACTOR WITH RESPECT TO ONE OF THE THREE DEFENDANTS, THE OTHER TWO DEFENDANTS DEMONSTRATED THE DRIVER WAS NOT AN EMPLOYEE ENTITLING THEM TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, modifying Supreme Court, determined the summary judgment motions brought by two of the defendants in this traffic accident case should have been granted. There was a question of fact whether the driver (Koureichi) who allegedly injured the plaintiff was an employee or a subcontractor of defendant Hudson. But the other two defendants, Stop & Shop and Subcontracting Concepts (SCI), demonstrated Koureichi was not an employee:

As a general rule, an employer who hires an independent contractor, as distinguished from an employee or servant, is not liable for the negligent acts of the independent contractor … . Control of the method and means by which the work is to be done is the critical factor in determining whether one is an independent contractor or an employee for purposes of tort liability … . Factors relevant to assessing control include whether a worker (1) worked at [her or] his own convenience, (2) was free to engage in other employment, (3) received fringe benefits, (4) was on the employer's payroll, and (5) was on a fixed schedule … .

Contrary to Hudson's contention, the evidence it submitted in support of its motion, including, inter alia, a transcript of Koureichi's deposition testimony, did not eliminate all triable issues of fact as to whether Koureichi was an independent contractor when the accident occurred … . Among other things, the evidence submitted by Hudson indicated that Koureichi worked for Hudson six days per week, from 10:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m., that he was required to call a supervisor employed by Hudson if he could not report to work, that he wore a t-shirt provided by Hudson, for which he paid Hudson, which had “Same-Day Delivery” printed on it, and that he had a two-way radio provided by Hudson, for which Koureichi also paid Hudson. In light of Hudson's failure to establish its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, we agree with the Supreme Court's denial of Hudson's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it, without regard to the sufficiency of the plaintiffs' opposition papers … .

However, the Supreme Court should have granted Stop & Shop's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it. The evidence submitted by Stop & Shop established, prima facie, its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. That evidence included Koureichi's deposition testimony that he did not know the names of any of Stop & Shop's managers, that he had no contact with them, and that Stop & Shop's managers did not control the hours that he worked or how he made deliveries. That evidence established, prima facie, that Stop & Shop did not control the means and method of Koureichi's work. In opposition, the plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact.

The Supreme Court also erred in denying SCI's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it. The evidence submitted by SCI, including Koureichi's deposition testimony that he did not have any contact with anyone at SCI, and that he didn't know SCI's function, other than to issue his paychecks, established that SCI did not control the means and method of Koureichi's work, and therefore, established SCI's prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. In opposition, the plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact. Nachman v Koureichi, 2018 NY Slip Op 06752, Second Dept 10-10-18

NEGLIGENCE (EMPLOYMENT LAW, TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, THERE IS A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE DRIVER WHO ALLEGEDLY INJURED PLAINTIFF WAS AN EMPLOYEE OR A SUBCONTRACTOR WITH RESPECT TO ONE OF THE THREE DEFENDANTS, THE OTHER TWO DEFENDANTS DEMONSTRATED THE DRIVER WAS NOT AN EMPLOYEE ENTITLING THEM TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT))/EMPLOYMENT LAW (NEGLIGENCE, TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, THERE IS A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE DRIVER WHO ALLEGEDLY INJURED PLAINTIFF WAS AN EMPLOYEE OR A SUBCONTRACTOR WITH RESPECT TO ONE OF THE THREE DEFENDANTS, THE OTHER TWO DEFENDANTS DEMONSTRATED THE DRIVER WAS NOT AN EMPLOYEE ENTITLING THEM TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT))/TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS (NEGLIGENCE, EMPLOYMENT LAW, THERE IS A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE DRIVER WHO ALLEGEDLY INJURED PLAINTIFF WAS AN EMPLOYEE OR A SUBCONTRACTOR WITH RESPECT TO ONE OF THE THREE DEFENDANTS, THE OTHER TWO DEFENDANTS DEMONSTRATED THE DRIVER WAS NOT AN EMPLOYEE ENTITLING THEM TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT))/SUBCONTRACTORS (NEGLIGENCE, THERE IS A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE DRIVER WHO ALLEGEDLY INJURED PLAINTIFF WAS AN EMPLOYEE OR A SUBCONTRACTOR WITH RESPECT TO ONE OF THE THREE DEFENDANTS, THE OTHER TWO DEFENDANTS DEMONSTRATED THE DRIVER WAS NOT AN EMPLOYEE ENTITLING THEM TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT))

October 10, 2018

Employment Law, Municipal Law

PROBATIONARY CITY EMPLOYEE WAS NOT GIVEN SEVEN DAYS NOTICE OF HIS TERMINATION, REMEDY IS TO PAY THE EMPLOYEE FOR THE SEVEN DAYS (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined petitioner, a probationary city employee, was not given the requisite seven day's notice of termination. The remedy was to provide petitioner with seven days pay:

… [T]he petitioner correctly contends that, in terminating his employment, the City failed to comply with 4 NYCRR 4.5(b)(5)(iii). That regulation requires, among other things, that a probationer who is to be discharged from employment for unsatisfactory service receive written notice at least one week prior to termination (see 4 NYCRR 4.5[b][5][iii]). Here, the petitioner received written notice on the day his employment was terminated, and the City did not rebut the petitioner's assertion that he had not received oral notice prior to that date. Accordingly, it cannot be said that the City substantially complied with 4 NYCRR 4.5(b)(5)(iii)… .

Under the circumstances of this case, including that the petitioner was deprived of the required seven days' notice but was notified of his discharge prior to the expiration of his period of probation … , we deem it appropriate to award him the relief he has requested on appeal for the failure to comply with 4 NYCRR 4.5(b)(5)(iii), specifically, one day's pay, at the salary he was earning at the time of his discharge, for each of the seven days he was not provided the requisite notice … . The Court of Appeals has determined that such a remedy is appropriate in the analogous context in which a school authority fails to give a probationary teacher 30 days' written notice of termination, as required by Education Law § 3019-a … . Seven days of pay is what the petitioner would have received had the City complied with the applicable regulation by making the petitioner's discharge effective seven days after it provided the written notice. Matter of Santucci v City of Mount Vernon, 2018 NY Slip Op 06745, Second Dept 10-10-18

MUNICIPAL LAW (EMPLOYMENT LAW, PROBATIONARY CITY EMPLOYEE WAS NOT GIVEN SEVEN DAYS NOTICE OF HIS TERMINATION, REMEDY IS TO PAY THE EMPLOYEE FOR THE SEVEN DAYS (SECOND DEPT))/EMPLOYMENT LAW (MUNICIPAL LAW, PROBATIONARY CITY EMPLOYEE WAS NOT GIVEN SEVEN DAYS NOTICE OF HIS TERMINATION, REMEDY IS TO PAY THE EMPLOYEE FOR THE SEVEN DAYS (SECOND DEPT))

October 10, 2018

Education-School Law, Employment Law, Negligence

NEGLIGENT HIRING, TRAINING, SUPERVISION AND RETENTION CAUSES OF ACTION PROPERLY SURVIVED SUMMARY JUDGMENT, SCHOOL EMPLOYEE ALLEGEDLY SEXUALLY ABUSED A STUDENT, ACTIONS WERE VIABLE EVEN THOUGH THE ABUSE DID NOT OCCUR ON THE SCHOOL GROUNDS (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined defendant Department of Education's (DOE's) motion for summary judgment in this negligent hiring, training, retention and supervision action was properly denied. The suit alleged sexual abuse of plaintiff-student by a school employee (Denice). Although the abuse did not take place on school premises, it was preceded by inappropriate conduct in the school, including touching:

… [T]he DOE defendants failed to make a prima facie showing that the DOE was not negligent with respect to the hiring, retention, and supervision of Denice. The DOE defendants' own submissions in support of their motion for summary judgment raised a triable issue of fact as to whether the DOE took the appropriate measures to evaluate Denice's employment and fitness at the time he was allowed to intern at the school… . Moreover, there is a triable issue of fact as to whether the DOE had notice of the potential for harm to the infant plaintiff such that its alleged negligence in supervising and retaining Denice “placed [Denice] in a position to cause foreseeable harm” … .

Generally, liability may not be imposed upon school authorities where all of the improper acts against a student occurred off school premises and outside school hours … . Here, however, the DOE defendants' submissions demonstrated that, although the sexual abuse ultimately occurred in the infant plaintiff's home, it was preceded by time periods when the infant plaintiff was alone with Denice during school hours on a regular basis. During these times, Denice engaged in inappropriate behavior, including physical touching. Thus, triable issues of fact exist regarding, inter alia, whether the DOE knew or should have known of such behavior and Denice's propensity for sexual abuse … . Johansmeyer v New York City Dept. of Educ., 2018 NY Slip Op 06518, Second Dept 10-3-18\

NEGLIGENCE (NEGLIGENT HIRING, TRAINING, SUPERVISION AND RETENTION CAUSES OF ACTION PROPERLY SURVIVED SUMMARY JUDGMENT, SCHOOL EMPLOYEE ALLEGEDLY SEXUALLY ABUSED A STUDENT, ACTIONS WERE VIABLE EVEN THOUGH THE ABUSE DID NOT OCCUR ON THE SCHOOL GROUNDS (SECOND DEPT))/EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW (NEGLIGENT HIRING, TRAINING, SUPERVISION AND RETENTION CAUSES OF ACTION PROPERLY SURVIVED SUMMARY JUDGMENT, SCHOOL EMPLOYEE ALLEGEDLY SEXUALLY ABUSED A STUDENT, ACTIONS WERE VIABLE EVEN THOUGH THE ABUSE DID NOT OCCUR ON THE SCHOOL GROUNDS (SECOND DEPT))/EMPLOYMENT LAW (NEGLIGENT HIRING, TRAINING, SUPERVISION AND RETENTION CAUSES OF ACTION PROPERLY SURVIVED SUMMARY JUDGMENT, SCHOOL EMPLOYEE ALLEGEDLY SEXUALLY ABUSED A STUDENT, ACTIONS WERE VIABLE EVEN THOUGH THE ABUSE DID NOT OCCUR ON THE SCHOOL GROUNDS (SECOND DEPT)

October 3, 2018

Contract Law, Employment Law

THE FIRST EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT INCLUDED A FORUM SELECTION CLAUSE, THE SECOND AGREEMENT REQUIRED ARBITRATION, THE SECOND AGREEMENT SUPERSEDED THE FIRST (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that an agreement signed after the employment agreement superseded the employment agreement. Therefore the dispute was subject to arbitration based upon the second agreement:

After [plaintiff] and defendant Mirae Asset Securities (USA) Inc. had entered into an employment agreement which contained a forum selection clause, plaintiff executed a “Uniform Application for Securities Industry Registration or Transfer” (Form U-4), which contains an arbitration provision. We find that the Form U-4 supersedes the employment agreement and therefore that the parties' dispute must be arbitrated.

This dispute is governed by state contract law principles … . The first principle is that “a subsequent contract regarding the same matter will supersede the prior contract” … . The determination whether a subsequent agreement is superseding is fact-driven … . Plaintiff's execution of a valid U-4 Form constituted an agreement to limit his contractual remedies when he signed the U-4 Form… . The U-4 Form encompasses the same employment-related disputes as were addressed in the employment agreement. Thus, the forum selection clause was effectively extinguished … . Hyuncheol Hwang v Mirae Asset Sec. (USA) Inc., 2018 NY Slip Op 06485, First Dept 10-2-18

EMPLOYMENT LAW (THE FIRST EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT INCLUDED A FORUM SELECTION CLAUSE, THE SECOND AGREEMENT REQUIRED ARBITRATION, THE SECOND AGREEMENT SUPERSEDED THE FIRST (FIRST DEPT))/CONTRACT LAW (EMPLOYMENT LAW, THE FIRST EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT INCLUDED A FORUM SELECTION CLAUSE, THE SECOND AGREEMENT REQUIRED ARBITRATION, THE SECOND AGREEMENT SUPERSEDED THE FIRST (FIRST DEPT))/FORUM SELECTION CLAUSE (THE FIRST EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT INCLUDED A FORUM SELECTION CLAUSE, THE SECOND AGREEMENT REQUIRED ARBITRATION, THE SECOND AGREEMENT SUPERSEDED THE FIRST (FIRST DEPT))/ARBITRATION CLAUSE (THE FIRST EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT INCLUDED A FORUM SELECTION CLAUSE, THE SECOND AGREEMENT REQUIRED ARBITRATION, THE SECOND AGREEMENT SUPERSEDED THE FIRST (FIRST DEPT))

October 2, 2018