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DESCRIPTION OF OFFICE SOUGHT WAS SUFFICIENT, DESIGNATING PETITION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN INVALIDATED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the designating petition should not have been invalidated because the description of the office sought was sufficient:

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“Election Law § 6-132 (1) requires that each sheet of a designating petition state the public office or party position sought by the candidate'” … . Since many public offices and party positions are susceptible to a variety of descriptions, the ” description will be deemed adequate so long as the petition, read as a whole, is sufficiently informative . . . so as to preclude any reasonable probability of confusing or deceiving the signers, voters or board of elections'” … .

Here, the public office sought by Coll, Nassau County Legislator, 15th Legislative District, was described on the designating petition as “15th District Nassau County Legislature,” which was sufficiently informative so as to preclude any reasonable probability of confusing or deceiving the signers, voters, or board of elections … . Matter of Fochtman v Coll, 2017 NY Slip Op 06414, Second Dept 9-11-17

 

LECTION LAW (DESCRIPTION OF OFFICE SOUGHT WAS SUFFICIENT, DESIGNATING PETITION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN INVALIDATED (SECOND DEPT))/DESIGNATING PETITION (ELECTION LAW, DESCRIPTION OF OFFICE SOUGHT WAS SUFFICIENT, DESIGNATING PETITION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN INVALIDATED (SECOND DEPT))

DESIGNATING PETITION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN INVALIDATED, WIFE SIGNED FOR HUSBAND WHO WAS PRESENT, AT MOST ONLY THE ONE SIGNATURE SHOULD HAVE BEEN STRUCK, NOT THE ENTIRE PAGE OF SIGNATURES (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the designating petition should not have been invalidated. One of the signatories to the petition had apparently signed on her husband’s behalf because his hands were weak. The wife put her initials next to the signature and testified her husband had given her permission to sign and she had the authority to sign pursuant to a power of attorney. Supreme Court struck all signatures on the relevant page. The Fourth Department held that, at most, only the one signature should have been struck:

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… [T]he use of a proxy to sign the purported signatory’s name was apparent from the face of the petition sheet. Even assuming, arguendo, that the signature was invalid, we conclude that, in the absence of any hidden infirmity in the petition sheet or in the subscribing witness statement that would potentially “confuse, hinder, or delay any attempt to ascertain or to determine the identity, status, and address” of any signatory or witness … , the court improperly struck the entire page on which the signature appeared … . Only the invalid signature should have been stricken under the circumstances of this case, leaving respondent with 347 signatures, one more than the required 346 … . Matter of Van Der Water v Czarny, 2017 NY Slip Op 06408, Fourth Dept 9-6-17

ELECTION LAW (DESIGNATING PETITION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN INVALIDATED, WIFE SIGNED FOR HUSBAND WHO WAS PRESENT, AT MOST ONLY THE ONE SIGNATURE SHOULD HAVE BEEN STRUCK, NOT THE ENTIRE PAGE OF SIGNATURES (FOURTH DEPT))/DESIGNATING PETITION (ELECTION LAW, DESIGNATING PETITION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN INVALIDATED, WIFE SIGNED FOR HUSBAND WHO WAS PRESENT, AT MOST ONLY THE ONE SIGNATURE SHOULD HAVE BEEN STRUCK, NOT THE ENTIRE PAGE OF SIGNATURES (FOURTH DEPT))/SIGNATURES (ELECTION LAW, DESIGNATING PETITION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN INVALIDATED, WIFE SIGNED FOR HUSBAND WHO WAS PRESENT, AT MOST ONLY THE ONE SIGNATURE SHOULD HAVE BEEN STRUCK, NOT THE ENTIRE PAGE OF SIGNATURES (FOURTH DEPT))

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PETITION TO ADD MAYOR DE BLASIO AS A CANDIDATE PROPERLY DENIED, THE WORKING FAMILIES PARTY’S EXECUTIVE BOARD WAS A NECESSARY PARTY (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals determined the Working Families Party’s petition to add NYC Mayor Bill de Blasio as a mayoral candidate in a primary election was properly denied for failure to name the party’s Executive Board as a necessary party:

Necessary parties are those “who ought to be parties if complete relief is to be accorded between the persons who are parties to the action or who might be inequitably affected by a judgment in the action” (CPLR 1001[a]). Appellants rely on Matter of O’Brien v Seneca County Bd. of Elections (22 AD3d 1036, 1036 [4th Dept 2005]) and Matter of Seaman v Bird (176 AD2d 1061, 1062 [3d Dept 1991]), to argue that, because complete relief could be obtained from the Board of Elections, the Executive Board of the Working Families Party is not a necessary party. Their reliance is misplaced. Here, where petitioners assert that the Executive Board’s certificate of authorization was invalid under Election Law § 6-120, the Executive Board of the Working Families Party was a necessary party because a judgment on this issue could inequitably affect its interests. To the extent that there are other decisions to the contrary, they should not be followed. Matter of Morgan v de Blasio, 2017 NY Slip Op 06399, CtApp 8-31-17

ELECTION LAW (PETITION TO ADD MAYOR DE BLASIO AS A CANDIDATE PROPERLY DENIED, THE WORKING FAMILIES PARTY’S EXECUTIVE BOARD WAS A NECESSARY PARTY (CT APP))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (ELECTION LAW, PETITION TO ADD MAYOR DE BLASIO AS A CANDIDATE PROPERLY DENIED, THE WORKING FAMILIES PARTY’S EXECUTIVE BOARD WAS A NECESSARY PARTY (CT APP))

PETITIONERS HAD CAPACITY AND STANDING TO BRING AN ACTION SEEKING A DECLARATION RESPONDENTS VIOLATED THE ELECTION LAW AND COMPELLING REMEDIAL ACTION (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined petitioners did not have the authority under the Election Law to force a respondent to refund a $200,000 contribution to an election committee, but did have capacity and standing to bring an action seeking a declaration respondents violated the Election Law and compelling a respondent to amend its registration documents:

Contrary to Supreme Court’s conclusion, petitioners do not wholly lack the authority to commence this proceeding/action. A party lacks the authority to sue where he or she is without both capacity and standing to sue … . “Capacity to sue is a threshold matter allied with, but conceptually distinct from, the question of standing” …  Capacity “concerns a litigant’s power to appear and bring its grievance before the court” …  and may, in some circumstances, be granted by statute … . In contrast, “[s]tanding involves a determination of whether the party seeking relief has a sufficiently cognizable stake in the outcome so as to cast . . . the dispute in a form traditionally capable of judicial resolution” … . The concept of standing “is, at its foundation, aimed at advancing the judiciary’s self-imposed policy of restraint, which precludes the issuance of advisory opinions” … .

… [P]etitioners — five qualified voters who reside within … the 9th Assembly District — have been statutorily afforded a private right of action to seek a declaration that [responent] violated the Election Law and to compel [responents] to comply with the Election Law . Thus, petitioners have both capacity and standing to seek such relief. * * *

… Election Law § 14-126 (2) [does not] completely extinguish[] the private right of action granted in Election Law § 16-114 (3) so as to deprive petitioners of the authority to seek an order declaring that [respondent] violated Election Law § 14-107-a and compelling [respondent] to amend its registration documents. Matter of Lauder v Pellegrino, 2017 NY Slip Op 06337, Third Dept 8-24-17

 

ELECTION LAW (PETITIONERS HAD CAPACITY AND STANDING TO BRING AN ACTION SEEKING A DECLARATION RESPONDENTS’ VIOLATED THE ELECTION LAW AND COMPELLING REMEDIAL ACTION (THIRD DEPT))

AGGRIEVED CANDIDATE NOT BOUND BY STATUTORY DEADLINES FOR FILING OF OBJECTIONS TO DESIGNATING PETITIONS, RESPONDENT HAD ADEQUATE NOTICE OF THE OBJECTIONS, SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE DEEMED THE OBJECTIONS UNTIMELY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, found that the objection to a designating petition on the ground that 135 of the signers could not vote in the relevant district was not untimely. Because the designating petition did not have enough signers, it was invalid:

The Supreme Court denied the petition, inter alia, to invalidate the designating petition and dismissed the proceeding on the ground that the specifications of objections of the aggrieved candidate were served six days beyond the statutory deadline. The petitioners appeal.

The Supreme Court may entertain specific objections to signatures on a designating petition that were not asserted before a board of elections to the extent the respondent was given adequate notice of which signatures on his or her designating petition are being challenged and the grounds thereof … . Here, the court erred in concluding that the specifications of objections of the aggrieved candidate were untimely due to their being served six days beyond the statutory deadline. An aggrieved candidate is not bound by the strict time constraints governing the filing of objections set forth in Election Law § 6-154(2) … . The petition to invalidate the designating petition incorporated the objections and specifications of objections filed with the Board, and the respondent was served with the aggrieved candidate’s specifications of objections on the distinct ground she raised as to the signatures at issue several days before the matter was briefed and heard. As such, the respondent had adequate notice of the grounds for objecting to the signatures at issue to enable him to prepare his defense …. . Matter of Lancaster v Nicolas, 2017 NY Slip Op 06275, Second Dept 8-23-17

 

ELECTION LAW (AGGRIEVED CANDIDATE NOT BOUND BY STATUTORY DEADLINES FOR FILING OF OBJECTIONS TO DESIGNATING PETITIONS, RESPONDENT HAD ADEQUATE NOTICE OF THE OBJECTIONS, SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE DEEMED THE OBJECTIONS UNTIMELY (SECOND DEPT))/DESIGNATING PETITIONS  (AGGRIEVED CANDIDATE NOT BOUND BY STATUTORY DEADLINES FOR FILING OF OBJECTIONS TO DESIGNATING PETITIONS, RESPONDENT HAD ADEQUATE NOTICE OF THE OBJECTIONS, SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE DEEMED THE OBJECTIONS UNTIMELY (SECOND DEPT))/OBJECTIONS (ELECTION LAW, DESIGNATING PETITIONS, AGGRIEVED CANDIDATE NOT BOUND BY STATUTORY DEADLINES FOR FILING OF OBJECTIONS TO DESIGNATING PETITIONS, RESPONDENT HAD ADEQUATE NOTICE OF THE OBJECTIONS, SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE DEEMED THE OBJECTIONS UNTIMELY (SECOND DEPT))

FAILURE TO IDENTIFY A SPECIFIC VIOLATION OF THE ELECTION LAW OR PARTY RULE REQUIRED THE DISMISSAL OF THE PETITION, JUDICIAL INTERVENTION NOT WARRANTED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that petitioner, who sought to have the designating petition of a candidate for town justice declared invalid, did not allege the violation of the Election Law or a party rule. Therefore petitioner was not entitled to judicial intervention:

… [P]etitioner alleges that, at a meeting in April 2017, respondent Town of Greece Republican Committee (Town Committee) endorsed him to be a candidate for the office of Town of Greece Justice, but [*2]a designating petition was prepared that named Granville in place of him, despite the fact that Granville had not been endorsed or even nominated for that office at that meeting. Petitioner alleges that the Town Committee violated its own rules and the rules of respondent Monroe County Republican Committee in failing to circulate a designating petition naming him for the office….

… Petitioner, a member of the Republican Party, “had a bona fide claim” to be the Republican Party’s candidate for the office in question and has standing to challenge the Party’s compliance with its own rules … .

… Judicial intervention is warranted only upon ” a clear showing that a party or its leaders have violated th[e] [Election Law] or the party’s own rules adopted in accordance with law, or otherwise violat[ed] the rights of party members or the electorate’ ” … . Here, petitioner failed to identify any specific provision of the Election Law or rule of the Republican Party that was allegedly violated. Matter of Nitti v Reilich, 2017 NY Slip Op 06327, Fourth Dept 8-23-17

 

ELECTION LAW (FAILURE TO IDENTIFY A SPECIFIC VIOLATION OF THE ELECTION LAW OR PARTY RULE REQUIRED THE DISMISSAL OF THE PETITION, JUDICIAL INTERVENTION NOT WARRANTED (FOURTH DEPT))/JUDICIAL INTERVENTION (ELECTION LAW, FAILURE TO IDENTIFY A SPECIFIC VIOLATION OF THE ELECTION LAW OR PARTY RULE REQUIRED THE DISMISSAL OF THE PETITION, JUDICIAL INTERVENTION NOT WARRANTED (FOURTH DEPT))

PRINTED NAMES ARE NOT THE EQUIVALENT OF SIGNATURES, CERTIFICATES OF SUBSTITUTION DEEMED INVALID (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined the certificates of substitution designating candidates in a primary election were invalid. The problem was with the section which begins “We, the undersigned, hereby affirm that we constituted a majority of the vacancy committee referred to in the above certificate and that the statements in such certificate are true.” “Below this statement, the majority of the Committee members were required to sign their names before a notary public, but their names were instead printed … , followed by the signature and stamp of the notary public next to the jurat:”

The printed names of the Committee members here were not the equivalent of signatures establishing that they were attesting to the truth of the information contained in the certificates or that they constituted a majority of the Committee. Such deficiency was not a mere error in form … ; indeed, its practical effect was as though the affidavit explicitly required by statute was never filed. Moreover, the deficiency was not cured by the other sections of the certificates because even though the members’ signatures appeared in the first section, their signatures were not notarized and they did not attest to the accuracy of the information contained therein or represent that they constituted a majority of the Committee … . Notwithstanding respondents’ contention that the preprinted form provided by the Board is confusing, this does not relieve the Committee of its obligation to comply with the statutory requirements … . Accordingly, we conclude that Supreme Court properly invalidated the certificates of substitution for failure to comply with the requirements of Election Law § 6-148 (4). Matter of Harder v Kuhn, 2017 NY Slip Op 06338, Third Dept 8-23-17

ELECTION LAW (PRINTED NAMES ARE NOT THE EQUIVALENT OF SIGNATURES, CERTIFICATES OF SUBSTITUTION DEEMED INVALID (THIRD DEPT))/SIGNATURES (ELECTION LAW, PRINTED NAMES ARE NOT THE EQUIVALENT OF SIGNATURES, CERTIFICATES OF SUBSTITUTION DEEMED INVALID (THIRD DEPT))/CERTIFICATES OF SUBSTITUTION (ELECTION LAW, PRINTED NAMES ARE NOT THE EQUIVALENT OF SIGNATURES, CERTIFICATES OF SUBSTITUTION DEEMED INVALID (THIRD DEPT))

USE OF SIGNERS’ POST OFFICE BOX ADDRESSES ON THE DESIGNATING PETITION WAS PROPER (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the use of the signers’ post office box addresses on the designating petition was proper and did not warrant invalidation:

A candidate’s designating petition must set forth “the name of the signer, his or her residence address, town or city (except in the city of New York, the county), and the date when the signature is affixed” (Election Law § 6-130 … ; see Election Law § 6-140[1][a]). Pursuant to the Election Law, “residence” shall be deemed to mean “that place where a person maintains a fixed, permanent and principal home and to which he, wherever temporarily located, always intends to return,” but does not specify the manner in which such address shall be recorded, except that customary abbreviations may be used (Election Law § 1-104[22]; see Election Law § 6-134[5]). However, the Election Law also provides that “[a] signature on a petition sheet shall not be deemed invalid solely because the address provided is the post office address of the signer provided that proof that such address is the accepted address of such signer is provided to the board of elections no later than three days following the receipt of specific objections to such signature” (Election Law § 6-134[12]). In addition, the Election Law specifies that a voter’s registration record shall include, inter alia, both “[t]he residence address at which the voter claims to reside and post office address, if not the same” and “[t]he assembly district or ward and the election district in which such residence address is located” (Election Law § 5-500[4][d], [e]).

Here, the signers listed their post office addresses, which are the same addresses utilized by the BOE [Board of Elections] for mailing purposes. Further, the “walk lists” provided for the candidates’ use in canvassing contain those address designations. The BOE asserts that its records also contain a five-digit code identifying the town, ward, and district for each address and that the codes for the addresses in question indicate that, for polling purposes, the addresses at issue lie within the Town of Harrison. The designating petition sets forth “the signer[‘s]” residence addresses, within the geographical boundaries of the Town of Harrison. Thus, under the particular circumstances of this case, the BOE should not have sustained the objections to the signatures at issue … . Matter of Giordano v Westchester County Bd. of Elections, 2017 NY Slip Op 06272, Second Dept 8-23-17

 

ELECTION LAW (USE OF SIGNERS’ POST OFFICE BOX ADDRESSES ON THE DESIGNATING PETITION WAS PROPER (SECOND DEPT))/DESIGNATING PETITIONS (ELECTION LAW, USE OF SIGNERS’ POST OFFICE BOX ADDRESSES ON THE DESIGNATING PETITION WAS PROPER (SECOND DEPT))

PROCEEDING TO VALIDATE A DESIGNATING PETITION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED AS UNTIMELY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the proceeding to validate a designating petition should have been dismissed as untimely:

“A proceeding with respect to a petition shall be instituted within fourteen days after the last day to file the petition, or within three business days after the officer or board with whom or which such petition was filed, makes a determination of invalidity with respect to such petition, whichever is later” (Election Law § 16-102[2]). ” A petitioner raising a challenge under Election Law § 16-102 must commence the proceeding and complete service on all the necessary parties within the period prescribed by Election Law § 16-102(2)'” … . A petitioner in a special proceeding under Election Law article 16 is required to provide notice of the proceeding “as the court or justice shall direct” (Election Law § 16-116). The Court of Appeals has repeatedly interpreted the notice requirement of Election Law § 16-116 to ” call[ ] for delivery of the instrument of notice not later than on the last day on which the proceeding may be commenced'” … . Here, the parties agree that the last day to commence a proceeding to validate the subject designating petition was July 31, 2017. Thus, contrary to the court's finding, the petitioner was required both to file the petition to validate the designating petition and to serve all necessary parties on or before that date… . Since the petitioner failed to effect service on or before July 31, 2017, this proceeding was not timely commenced … . Matter of DeStefano v Borkowski, 2017 NY Slip Op 06269, Second Dept 8-23-17

ELECTION LAW (PROCEEDING TO VALIDATE A DESIGNATING PETITION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED AS UNTIMELY (SECOND DEPT))/DESIGNATING PETITION (ELECTION LAW, PROCEEDING TO VALIDATE A DESIGNATING PETITION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED AS UNTIMELY (SECOND DEPT))

DESIGNATING PETITION SHOULD HAVE BEEN INVALIDATED, OFFICE SOUGHT NOT SUFFICIENTLY DESCRIBED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined Supreme Court should have invalidated a designating petition because the office which was sought by the candidate was not sufficiently described:

Supreme Court erred in finding that the designating petition sufficiently described the office Larsen sought. “Election Law § 6-132(1) requires that each sheet of a designating petition state the public office or party position sought by the candidate'” … . Since many public offices and party positions are susceptible to a variety of descriptions, the “description will be deemed adequate so long as the petition, read as a whole, is sufficiently informative . . . so as to preclude any reasonable probability of confusing or deceiving the signers, voters or board of elections'” … .

Here, the candidates’ designating petition described the public office Larsen sought as “Town Board, Town of East Hampton,” but failed to specify the position Larsen sought to fill. Pursuant to Town Law § 60(1), every town board consists of “the supervisor” and “the town councilmen.” These are different public offices, and the candidates elected to each office serve terms of different lengths. By failing to specify the position Larsen sought, the candidates’ designating petition was not sufficiently informative so as to preclude the possibility of confusion … . Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted that branch of the petition which was to invalidate so much of the designating petition as pertained to Larsen. Matter of Bragman v Larsen, 2017 NY Slip Op 06267, Second Dept 8-23-17

ELECTION LAW (DESIGNATING PETITION SHOULD HAVE BEEN INVALIDATED, OFFICE SOUGHT NOT SUFFICIENTLY DESCRIBED (SECOND DEPT))/DESIGNATING PETITION (ELECTION LAW, DESIGNATING PETITION SHOULD HAVE BEEN INVALIDATED, OFFICE SOUGHT NOT SUFFICIENTLY DESCRIBED (SECOND DEPT))

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