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POST-RELEASE SUPERVISION (PRS) CAN PROPERLY BE IMPOSED WHERE A DEFENDANT IS SENTENCED UNDER THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE SURVIVORS JUSTICE ACT (DVSJA); DEFENDANT WAIVED HER RIGHT TO APPEAL THE SENTENCE AS EXCESSIVE (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Rivera, determined five years post-release supervision (PRS) was properly imposed as part of defendant’s sentence and defendant waived the right to appeal her sentence as excessive. Defendant pled guilty to second-degree murder and was sentenced to ten years incarceration under the Domestic Violence Survivors Justice Act (DVSJA):​

Defendant does not challenge the carceral component of her sentence. Instead, she asserts that the court had no statutory authority to impose five years’ PRS on a defendant convicted of a class A felony and sentenced under the DVSJA. We may review defendant’s claim that her sentence is illegal even though, as we explain, her appeal waiver is valid … . However, defendant misinterprets the statutory scheme, and her claim boils down to a policy argument best suited for the legislature, not the judiciary. * * *

The legislative history of the DVSJA supports our straightforward reading of the Penal Law, and our conclusion that the legislature only intended to give judges discretion to reduce the periods of incarceration for certain defendants who are domestic violence survivors, not to wholly eliminate PRS in such cases … . * * *

… [T]he court specifically advised defendant that certain issues would survive the waiver, and counsel confirmed that they had reviewed those issues with defendant. The written waiver further clarified that, as explained in defendant’s conversation with the court and counsel, defendant was waiving any claim that her sentence is excessive. Under these circumstances, the Appellate Division properly concluded that defendant knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived her excessive sentence claim. People v Hernandez, 2025 NY Slip Op 05874, CtApp 10-23-25

Practice Point: Post-release supervision (PRS) can properly be imposed where a defendant is sentenced under the Domestic Violence Survivors Justice Act (DVSJA).

 

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THE DEFENSE WAS TIMELY PROVIDED WITH IMPEACHMENT INFORMATION REGARDING AN ARRESTING OFFICER; THE FACT THAT AN ADDITIONAL DOCUMENT WITH THAT INFORMATION WAS PROVIDED AFTER THE CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE (COC) WAS FILED, DID NOT RENDER THE PROSECUTION UNTIMELY (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Singas, over a two-judge dissent, determined the prosecution’s failure to turn over an Internal Affairs Bureau (IAB) report which was relevant to the credibility of one of the arresting officers (Congedo) before the filing of the certificate of compliance (COC) with the discovery timetable did not render the prosecution untimely. The opinion is fact-specific. The prosecution had timely alerted the defense to a federal lawsuit based on the alleged misbehavior of the arresting officer described in the IAB report. The majority concluded the allegations in the lawsuit constituted timely notice of the relevant information in the IAB report. The dissent disagreed because the report included information not referenced in the federal lawsuit:

… CPL 245.20 (1) (k) (iv) does not require production of a document just because it provides additional information not in other impeachment material. The question instead is whether the document “tends to . . . impeach the credibility of a testifying prosecution witness” …  Here, the IAB report does not. Our conclusion is not based on any prejudice analysis, but on application of the relevant statutory language. * * *

Because the IAB report did not contain any separate allegations of misconduct against Congedo nor any support for the amended complaint’s allegations as they pertained to Congedo, it did not have any “tend[ency] to . . . impeach” her credibility (CPL 245.20 [1] [k] [iv]). …

… [T]he IAB report itself has no impeachment value. This is not a prejudice consideration … . Rather, CPL 245.20 (1) (k) (iv)’s “tends to . . . impeach” standard inserts considerations of evidentiary value into the disclosure requirement itself. Nothing in CPL 245.20 (1) (k) (iv) additionally requires the People to disclose every single document referencing impeachment material subject to disclosure based solely on that reference. People v Fuentes, 2025 NY Slip Op 05872, CtApp 10-23-25

Practice Point: Re: discovery of information which may be used to impeach an arresting officer, the prosecution is not required to turn over every document which references the impeachment material. Here the defense was given timely notice of a federal lawsuit which included the impeachment material. The fact that a report which referenced the impeachment material was not turned over to the defense until after the certificate of compliance (COC) was filed did not invalidate the COC.

 

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AFTER BREAKING UP A FIGHT BETWEEN TWO MEN ON THE STREET AND HANDCUFFING THEM, THE POLICE QUESTIONED DEFENDANT WITHOUT GIVING THE MIRANDA WARNINGS; DEFENDANT’S ADMISSION HE HAD PUNCHED THE VICTIM SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED; THE ERROR WAS HARMLESS HOWEVER (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Cannataro, determined defendant was subjected to custodial interrogation when he was questioned on the street after he was handcuffed. Because the Miranda warnings were not given, defendant’s admission to punching the victim should have been suppressed. However the error was harmless in light of the other evidence, including a video. The police approached defendant and the victim, who were fighting, on the street. Both men were handcuffed and then questioned:

… [I]t is not dispositive that defendant was questioned in the immediate aftermath of the altercation, while the officers were still determining whether a crime had occurred—circumstances Supreme Court seemingly relied on in deeming the encounter a “classic case of investigatory questioning” that did not require Miranda warnings. Our case law draws no categorical distinction between interrogation and so-called investigatory questioning. Interrogation is almost definitionally investigatory in nature. And while we have recognized a “distinction between coercive interrogation and permissible street inquiry” … , the most salient difference between these categories is not when the questioning takes place, but the presence or absence of custody … . As we have explained, “routine police investigation of suspicious conduct on the street generally does not entail a significant deprivation of freedom which would require Miranda warnings” … . Absent “both the elements of police ‘custody’ and police ‘interrogation,’ ” there is no “constitutional requirement that the police recite interrogation warnings when they direct questions or comments at members of the public or solicit information and assistance” … . But where, as here, investigatory questions are directed to a person who is in custody, under circumstances police should know are likely to yield an incriminating response, Miranda warnings are required. People v Robinson, 2025 NY Slip Op 05871, CtApp 10-23-25

Practice Point: Here the police broke up a street fight, handcuffed both men, and then questioned them. Even though the police were still investigating what happened when defendant was questioned, defendant was “in custody” and was being “interrogated,” mandating the Miranda warnings.

 

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THE DEFENDANT, PERSONALLY, MUST BE GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO CONTROVERT THE PROSECUTION’S PREDICATE FELONY ALLLEGATIONS, AND TO CHALLENGE THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE PREDICATE FELONY SENTENCING SCHEME, EVEN WHEN DEFENSE COUNSEL CONCEDES THE ISSUE; MATTER REMITTED (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Rivera, remitted the matter to give defendant the opportunity to personally controvert the prosecution’s predicate felony allegations, and to challenge the constitutionality of the predicate felony sentencing scheme, despite the defense attorney’s concession of the issue:

… [D]efendant’s challenge to his sentence has merit. The court denied defendant his statutory right to personally controvert the prosecution’s predicate felony allegations when it refused to consider his specific challenge and instead accepted defense counsel’s concession of the issue. Since the court summarily declared defendant a predicate felon and imposed an enhanced sentence, we modify and remit to Supreme Court, where defendant may controvert the predicate felony allegations and have an opportunity to assert his separate constitutional challenge to the Criminal Procedure Law’s predicate felony sentencing scheme. * * *

… Based on the full text of CPL 400.15 (3) and its placement in the predicate sentencing statutory scheme, we conclude that a court must ask the defendant personally if they wish to controvert any allegations in the prosecution’s statement. A totality of factors support this conclusion. First, CPL 400.15 (3) requires that the defendant receive a copy of the statement and that the court ask them if they wish to controvert any allegation contained therein. This procedure thus mandates that the defendant personally has notice of the allegations against them and a corresponding opportunity to be heard. Second, CPL 400.15 (3) refers to the defendant using personal pronouns, which is a deviation from the rest of the statute’s impersonal diction … .

Third, given the significant consequences of the decision to controvert and the information relevant to making that decision, it is unlikely that the legislature intended for defense counsel to be able to refuse to controvert in the face of the defendant’s opposition, without any further inquiry by the court. Indeed, the failure to controvert results in an automatic sentence enhancement in the present case and in any future sentences and therefore has lifetime ramifications … . …

These factors, considered together, make clear that the term “defendant,” as written in CPL 400.15 (3), refers to the defendant personally. In these key ways, CPL 400.15 (3) differs from provisions of the CPL that refer to the “defendant” interchangeably with “the defense,” without additional language suggesting that the legislature requires a court to direct its inquiry to the defendant. People v Wright, 2025 NY Slip Op 05869, CtApp 10-23-25

Practice Point: A defendant, personally, must be given the opportunity to controvert the prosecution’s predicate felony allegations, and to challenge the constitutionality of the predicate felony sentencing scheme, even in the face of defense counsel’s concession of the issue. Here the matter was remitted for that purpose​.

 

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THE JUDGE READ THE WRONG DEFINITION OF THE CHARGED OFFENSE TO THE JURY; NEW TRIAL ON THAT CHARGE ORDERED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing defendant’s attempted robbery first degree conviction and ordering a new trial on that count, determined County Court provided the jury with the wrong definition of the offense:

Defendant was charged with attempted robbery in the first degree pursuant to Penal Law § 160.15 (2), defined as forcibly stealing property while armed with a deadly weapon. When the court instructed the jury on this count, it initially made reference to the requirement of being armed with a deadly weapon. However, when thereafter summarizing the elements of this crime, the court omitted the deadly weapon element and instead substituted in its place the element of causing serious physical injury to the victim, which is a different theory of robbery in the first degree … . This error was repeated by the court when the jury asked for the definitions of the crimes to be read back. Under these circumstances, the jury was left to consider an internally inconsistent definition of attempted robbery. Given that ” ‘the charge, read as a whole against the background of the evidence produced at trial, likely confused the jury regarding the correct rules to be applied in arriving at a decision’ ” … , the court’s error was not harmless and remittal for a new trial on this count is necessary … . People v Smith, 2025 NY Slip Op 05847, Third Dept 10-23-25

Practice Point: Here the judge’s reading the wrong definition of the charged offense to the jury required a new trial on that charge.

 

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THE PROOF OF ALL THE CHARGES, INCLUDING THE DEPRAVED INDIFFERENCE MURDER OF A TWO-YEAR-OLD CHILD, WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE CONVICTIONS; HOWEVER THE IMPROPER ADMISSION OF MOLINEUX EVIDENCE AND OTHER EVIDENTIARY ERRORS DEPRIVED DEFENDANT OF A FAIR TRIAL; NEW TRIAL ORDERED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing the conviction and ordering a new trial, determined that the proof was sufficient to support all the convictions, including depraved indifference murder of a two-year-old child. Defendant claimed the child fell from a bunk bed. But the injuries were catastrophic and included a depressed skull fracture. A new trial was required because of evidentiary errors by the judge, including the admission of prior crimes and bad acts as Molineux evidence:​

Prior to trial, County Court partially granted the People’s Molineux application to the extent of allowing testimony pertaining to defendant’s prior acts of domestic violence and aggression toward the mother, as well as his 2011 conviction of aggravated driving while intoxicated (hereinafter DWI) with a minor in the car. … The People elicited trial testimony from the mother about a December 2017 incident in which defendant became explosively angry while drinking and “trash[ed]” her house; however, “[n]othing was physical” on that occasion. The mother also testified about a January 2018 incident in which defendant was physically violent, revealing that he had repeatedly punched her in the face and in the arm on that occasion. The People were allowed to introduce photographs of the bruises the mother sustained during the January 2018 incident. The evidence regarding defendant’s DWI conviction was referenced during his interview at the Sheriff’s Department in connection with the underlying incident, which was published to the jury.

The December 2017 incident of aggression did not involve physical violence, as alleged here, and was not probative of any issue in this case … . … [T]he photographs depicting the mother’s injuries from the January 2018 incident should not have been admitted into evidence, as they provided the ]jury with a visualization of defendant’s past violent conduct and were extremely prejudicial in the context of a prosecution requiring proof that defendant acted with a level of depravity sufficient to sustain a conviction under Penal Law § 125.25 (4) … . … The evidence pertaining to defendant’s 2011 DWI conviction also should not have been admitted, as it was not probative of any issue in the case, did not fit within any recognized Molineux exception, and was unduly prejudicial since it involved a different child and tended to suggest to the jury that defendant was previously reckless with a minor in his care while consuming alcohol. Since the proof of defendant’s guilt was entirely circumstantial and was not overwhelming, these improper Molineux rulings cannot be considered harmless … . People v Bohn, 2025 NY Slip Op 05846, Third Dept 10-23-25

Practice Point: Consult this decision for insight into what is and what is not admissible prior crime and bad-act (Molineux) evidence in a murder trial.

 

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THE PEOPLE’S FAILURE TO TURN OVER TO THE DEFENSE A VIDEO CONTAINING IMPEACHMENT MATERIAL PRIOR TO FILING A CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE RENDERED THE CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE AND THE STATEMENT OF READINESS ILLUSORY; INDICTMENT DISMISSED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing defendant’s conviction and dismissing the indictment on speedy trial grounds, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Pritzker, determined the People were required to turn over a child advocacy center (CAC) video before filing a certificate of compliance (COC) and statement of readiness (SOR). The CAC video was not turned over until 20 days before trial:

… [T]he People conceded that the CAC video contained impeachment evidence based upon certain statements made by the victim … , and also that the CAC video had been turned over by the CAC to law enforcement and, as such, was in the People’s possession as of January 22, 2020 … . Despite this, the CAC video was not turned over to defendant until September 1, 2021, 20 days before trial, even though the People filed an earlier COC and SOR in October 2020. Specifically, the COC dated October 16, 2020 referenced an index detailing the materials that had been disclosed to defendant as of that date. This index reveals two compliance reports, one dated February 28, 2020 and the other dated October 1, 2020. As relevant here, the February 28, 2020 compliance report lists a document titled “CAC Chain of Custody – 01.22.2020.pdf” as having been turned over to defendant. There is no dispute that, while this chain of custody form for the CAC video was included in discovery, the video itself was not. * * *

… [H]ere, we are faced with a situation where the People certified, allegedly in good faith, that “the prosecutor has disclosed and made available all known material and information subject to discovery” … , despite knowing full well that they were intentionally withholding the CAC video. As such, we find that the People did not file the October 2020 COC in good faith as they did not make “all known material and information subject to discovery” available to defendant … . Further compounding their error, the People did not give defendant any notice of this withholding, either by withholding the CAC video and requesting a protective order … in the first instance, or, later, giving defendant notice that the CAC video was purportedly being withheld so as not to disclose any identifying information of the victim … . … [B]ecause we find that the October 2020 COC and SOR were illusory, the People did not validly announce readiness for trial until September 2021, which the People concede would be outside of the applicable six-month CPL 30.30 time frame. Thus, this Court must dismiss the indictment … . People v Mazelie, 2025 NY Slip Op 05849, Third Dept 10-23-25

Practice Point: Here the People’s failure to turn over impeachment evidence before filing the certificate of compliance rendered the certificate illusory and required dismissal of the indictment.

 

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DEFENDANT RAISED QUESTIONS ABOUT THE VOLUNTARINESS OF HIS PLEA TO FIRST DEGREE MURDER SUFFICIENT TO WARRANT A HEARING ON HIS MOTION TO VACATE THE JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing County Court, determined defendant had raised questions about the voluntariness of his plea to first degree murder (for killing his parents) which required a hearing on his motion to vacate his plea. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. In his motion to vacate his plea, defendant alleged his attorneys told him that the death penalty for first degree murder was going to be overturned and thereafter his sentence could be reduced. Defendant also alleged his guilty plea was induced in part by his cousin’s offer to pay him $10,000 if he pled guilty and renounced any claim to his parents’ estate:

According to defendant, after he had received the offer of payment, he remained reticent to accept the plea offer; however, by his telling, consideration of that payment together with his averment as to trial counsel’s misadvice of a potential reduced sentence ultimately persuaded him to accept the offer to plead guilty and be sentenced to life without parole. In support of that account, motion counsel and defendant’s investigator recounted trial counsel’s representation that defendant’s initial objection to accepting the plea offer diminished once the $10,000 payment had been offered. In support of defendant’s motion, he presented further evidence that $10,000 was paid to him after he entered his plea by way of two separate $5,000 checks, one of which was provided by his cousin. The evidence of that payment and the corresponding account that it influenced defendant’s deliberations as to whether to accept the plea, considered alongside the misadvice that he was purportedly provided, create an issue of fact as to whether he was subjected to something more “than the type of situational coercion faced by many defendants who are offered a plea deal” … .

All told, we find that defendant’s submissions in support of his motion are sufficient to raise an issue of fact warranting a hearing with respect to deficiencies in his representation … and the effect on the voluntariness of his plea … . …  With respect to both his claims, defendant bears the burden of establishing his entitlement to relief by a preponderance of the evidence (see CPL 440.30 [6]). As to his contention of deficient representation, defendant will bear the burden of proving that he was misadvised about the potential to have his sentence reduced in the future if he took the People’s plea offer and, but for that misadvice, there is a reasonable probability that he would have chosen to proceed to trial … . … [A]t this juncture the question “is whether defendant has made sufficient allegations to warrant an evidentiary hearing, not whether defendant has satisfied his burden of proof” … . People v Mower, 2025 NY Slip Op 05851, Third Dept 10-23-25

Practice Point: Consult this decision for insight into the allegations and proof which will be sufficient to require a hearing on whether defendant’s guilty plea was voluntarily entered in the context of a post-appeal motion to vacate the judgment of conviction.

 

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DEFENDANT WAS NOT NOTIFIED THAT IF HE FAILED TO PAY RESTITUTION HIS SENTENCE WOULD BE ENHANCED; ENHANCED SENTENCE VACATED AND AGREED-UPON SENTENCE IMPOSED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, vacating defendant’s enhanced sentence and imposing the agreed-upon sentence, determined defendant was not given notice that his failure to pay restitution would result in an enhanced sentence. The agreed sentence was 2 to 6 years and the enhanced sentence was 4 to 12 years:

Defendant argues that County Court erred in imposing a prison sentence in excess of that promised in the plea agreement and requests that this Court resentence him to the agreed-upon term of 2 to 6 years in prison, without remanding the matter to County Court. Defendant contends that while payment of restitution was contemplated prior to sentencing, County Court never advised him that if he failed to pay restitution by the sentencing date it could impose an enhanced prison sentence. We agree. Defendant’s argument survives his unchallenged appeal waiver … . However, given that the court’s enhanced sentence was pronounced at the very end of the sentencing proceeding, without advance warning that it was considering an enhanced sentence or even a clear finding that defendant had violated an express condition of the plea agreement, we find that he had no practical ability to raise an objection and, thus, preservation was not required … . Under settled law, “the violation of an explicit and objective plea condition that was accepted by the defendant can result in the imposition of an enhanced sentence, and, conversely, a sentencing court may not impose an enhanced sentence unless it has informed the defendant of specific conditions that the defendant must abide by or risk such enhancement, or give the defendant an opportunity to withdraw his or her plea before the enhanced sentence is imposed” … . People v Nestler, 2025 NY Slip Op 05852, Third Dept 10-23-25

Practice Point: Consult this decision for an explanation of the criteria which allow a judge to ignore an agreed-upon sentence and impose an enhanced sentence.​

 

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THE RECORD DID NOT DEMONSTRATE COMPLIANCE WITH THE WAIVER-OF-INDICTMENT PROCEDURE, A JURISDICTIONAL DEFECT; PLEA VACATED; PLEA TO A SUBSEQUENT INDICTMENT INDUCED BY A CONCURRENT SENTENCE PROMISE VACATED AS WELL (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing defendant’s convictions by guilty pleas, determined the failure to comply with the waiver-of-indictment procedure required vacation of the plea, as well as the vacation of a plea induced by a concurrent sentence promise:

The record fails to demonstrate compliance with CPL 195.20. There is no evidence that defendant signed the indictment waiver in open court when the plea was entered because it is not dated as the same day as the plea. The court’s order affirming compliance with CPL 195.10 and 195.20 is also not dated and the court did not confirm on the record that defendant signed the waiver or make any reference whatsoever to it at the time of the plea. …

The failure to comply with CPL 195.20 is a jurisdictional defect that requires reversal of the judgment of conviction and dismissal of the superior court information … .

… [D]ismissal of the information necessitates dismissal of defendant’s subsequent plea … . Defendant pleaded guilty to first-degree robbery in exchange for a sentence of five years’ incarceration and five years’ postrelease supervision, to run concurrently … . Where, as here, a defendant’s guilty plea is “induced by the understanding that the sentence would be concurrent with the sentence imposed for [the prior] conviction, since set aside, the plea must be vacated” … . People v Smith, 2025 NY Slip Op 05902, First Dept 10-23-25

Practice Point: Failure to comply with the waiver-of-indictment procedure is a jurisdictional defect requiring vacation of the plea. A plea to a subsequent indictment induced by a concurrent sentence promise must also be vacated.

 

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