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Miranda Violations Mandate Suppression.

A police officer approached defendant who was in a parked car. The officer smelled a “strong odor of unburnt marijuana coming from the defendant’s vehicle’s open window.”  The officer asked if the occupants of the vehicle had “anything illegal.”  The defendant produced a small bag of marijuana.  The officer then told the defendant to get out of the vehicle “as he was now under arrest for unlawful possession of marijuana.”  The officer searched the vehicle and found two bags of marijuana under the driver’s seat.  When he asked the defendant if the bags of marijuana were his, he said “yes.”  A gun was also recovered in the search.  The defendant was taken to the police station where he was read his Miranda rights for the first time and he declined to speak with the detective. Two hours later the arresting officer told the defendant that if no one confessed to owning the gun, everyone in the vehicle would be “equally charged.”  The defendant then asked to speak to the detective.  He was read his Miranda rights again and confessed to owning the gun.  The Second Department suppressed the marijuana and the gun—the marijuana because the defendant was in custody and had not been read his rights at the time he was asked about it—and the gun because defendant had initially refused to speak with the police thereby asserting his right to remain silent.  Subsequent questioning was not proper.  People vs. Jackson, 2011-05745, Ind. No. 10-00130 Second Dept. 2-20-13

DeBour, street stops

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any failure by defense counsel to move to suppress identification testimony did not rise to ineffective assistance.

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Smith, determined that defense counsel’s failure to move to suppress based upon a violation of Criminal Procedure Law 710.30, which requires notice of any identification of the defendant as the perpetrator, did not rise to ineffective assistance. Although the People provided notice of an identification of the defendant by the victim at a particular time, they did not provide notice of a subsequent identification by the victim a few minutes later after defendant was in custody:

Assuming that there was a section 710.30 violation, it might not have resulted in exclusion of the evidence in question. CPL 710.30 (2) provides for the possibility of late notice, and a belated suppression hearing, when the People show “good cause.” The belated notice and hearing may occur during the trial …, and if the trial court thought the People had made an excusable error it might have granted such a remedy here.

In short, it is not obvious that defendant’s counsel could have successfully sought preclusion of the evidence of the victim’s post-arrest identification under section 710.30. An argument for preclusion could have been made, but not an argument “so compelling that a failure to make it amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel” … . Counsel’s performance should not be “second-guessed with the clarity of hindsight” … . Any deficiency in her performance was not so great that it can support an ineffective assistance claim.

Nor has defendant shown any serious likelihood that he was prejudiced by trial counsel’s alleged error. Even if the trial court had precluded evidence of the victim’s post-arrest identification, the evidence against defendant would remain strong. People v Vasquez, 2013 NY Slip Op 01016 [20 NY3d 461], CtApp 2-19-13

 

 

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Breathalyzer Maintenance and Calibration Records are Nontestimonial/Vehicle Stop Based on Presence of College Sticker on Back Window Upheld –Judge Pigott , in a Dissent, Would Have Found the Vehicle Stop Unreasonable and Granted Suppression

The Court of Appeals determined the “records pertaining to the routine inspection, maintenance and calibration of breathalyzer machines can be offered as evidence in a criminal trial without producing the persons who created the records. …[S]uch records are nontestimonial…”  Judge Pigott agreed with that “Confrontation Clause analysis” but wrote a dissent about the nature of the vehicle stop that led to the DWI arrest. The suppression court had ruled that the stop was not supported by probable cause “but for … a Finger Lakes Community College sticker in the rear window…”.  Apparently such a sticker violates Vehicle and Traffic Law section 375 (1)(b)(i).  Judge Pigott noted that college stickers are common, the statute is rarely if ever enforced, and stopping a car because of a sticker is “not objectively reasonable.”  Judge Pigott would have suppressed the evidence which arose from the stop.  People vs Pealer, No. 9, CtApp 2-19-13

 

Judge’s Mistaken Belief Period of Post-Release Supervision Was Mandatory Required Resentencing.

Resentencing was required where the sentencing judge indicated the five-year post-release supervision was mandatory.  There was, however, an applicable exception to the five-year rule which the judge had the discretion to impose.  (Penal Law section 70.45 former [2]).  People vs Whitmore, 104652 Third Dept. 2-14-13

 

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Procedure for Modification of SORA Level.

The Third Department described the proper procedure for a petition for the modification of a SORA level pursuant to Correction Law section 168-o. Both an updated recommendation of the Board of Examiners and a hearing are required.  People vs Hazen, 514028 Third Dept. 2-14-13

 

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Because the “Identity” of the Perpetrator Was Not an Issue, Allowing Evidence of Prior Crimes to Prove Identity Was Reversible Error.

In a case based upon allegations the defendant assaulted his wife in a jealous rage, the trial judge allowed evidence of a prior crime to prove the “identity” of the perpetrator pursuant to the Molineux rule. The Second Department, in a prior decision, reversed the conviction finding that the perpetrator’s identity was not an issue in the case. After the initial reversal by the Second Department, the Court of Appeals, in turn, reversed the Second Department finding that the perpetrator’s identity had not been “conclusively established,” and sent the case back to determine if the identity exception was applicable to the facts. The Second Department stuck to its initial reasoning, finding that allowing the “prior crime” evidence on the issue of the perpetrator’s “identity” was an abuse of discretion because the prejudicial effect of the evidence outweighed its probative value. People vs Agina, 2005-11978, Ind. No. 1733/04 Second Dept. 2-13-13

 

Flight Provided Justification for Pursuit.

Because the defendant resembled a “mug shot” of a wanted person, the police had the right to approach him to request information. Because the defendant was in an area the wanted person was known to frequent, the police had the common-law right to inquire.  The defendant’s flight provided reasonable suspicion to pursue and stop him.  The defendant’s discarding of a gun during the chase, therefore, was not the result of improper police action.  People vs Barrow, 2011-030059, Ind. No. 1356/09 Second Dept. 2-13-13

DeBour, street stops

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SORA Hearing—Insufficient Proof of Drug or Alcohol Abuse

Proof was insufficient to demonstrate “drug or alcohol abuse” under the SORA guidelines.  The SORA assessment was therefore improper. People vs. Palmer, People vs Long, Nos. 14 & 15, CtApp, 2-12-13

 

Consecutive Nature of Sentence is Collateral Consequence of Conviction

…[T]he consecutive nature of defendant’s sentence pursuant to Penal Law [section] 70.25 (2-a) is a collateral consequence of his conviction. …[T]he failure of the trial court to address the impact of Penal Law [section] 70.25 (2-a) during the plea colloquy does not require vacatur of the plea.”  People vs Belliard, No. 5, CtApp 2-12-13

 

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Attorney Conflict Affected Defense Requiring Reversal.

The Fourth Department reversed defendant’s conviction because his attorney had a conflict of interest.  The attorney had represented someone who was heard on a recording talking to the defendant. The People sought to introduce the recording in evidence to prove defendant’s motive and intent for the charged burglary. The Fourth Department explained the procedure and criteria for determining whether such a conflict of interest requires reversal.  One of the criteria is that the conflict affect the conduct of the defense, which the Fourth Department found to have occurred in this case.  People vs McGillicuddy, 7 12-00530 Fourth Dept. 2-8-13

 

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