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Violation of Probation Petition May Be Based Upon Hearsay

The Fourth Department determined that a “violation of probation” petition need not include non-hearsay allegation establishing every element of the violation charged:

…[A]lthough Family Court Act § 360.2 (2) specifically requires that VOP petitions in juvenile delinquency proceedings contain “[n]on[]hearsay allegations . . . establish[ing], if true, every violation charged,” there is no corresponding requirement in CPL article 410.  At most, CPL 410.70 (2) requires that the court “file or cause to be filed . . . a statement setting forth the condition or conditions of the sentence violated and a reasonable description of the time, place and manner in which the violation occurred.”There is no requirement that the statement contain nonhearsay allegations.

In any event, we agree with the People that, were there such a requirement in the CPL, the reasoning of Matter of Markim Q. (7 NY3d 405, 410-411) would apply such that the lack of nonhearsay allegations in the VOP petition would not constitute a jurisdictional defect. “A VOP petition, [unlike an original accusatory instrument], is not the foundation of the court’s jurisdiction. It does not commence a new proceeding, but is simply a new step in an existing one” (id. at 410). People v Julius, 175, KA 11-01384, 4th Dept. 3-15-13

 

 

 

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Court’s Failure to Inquire Further When It Was Not Clear Defendant’s Plea Was Knowing and Voluntary Required Vacation of Plea

In a criminal contempt (first degree) case, the Fourth Department determined defendant’s plea colloquy “negated essential elements of the crime to which he pleaded guilty inasmuch as his colloquy indicated that the order of protection was not issued pursuant to the statutory sections set forth in Penal Law [section] 215.51 (c), and that the predicate conviction was not based upon a violation of such an order of protection.”  In light of the colloquy, County Court had a duty to inquire further to make sure the plea was knowing and voluntary.  The plea was vacated. People v Coleman, 25, KA 09-01157, 4th Dept. 3-15-13

 

 

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Failure of Sentencing Court to Inform Defendant of Period of Post-Release Supervision Required Release after Sentence Served

The Department of Corrections cannot remedy a court’s failure to impose a period of post-release supervision.  In this case the prisoner’s habeas corpus petition was granted and the prisoner, who had served his sentence, was released.  The Fourth Department determined that the sentencing court’s statement—“the supervisory period under the violent felony offender sentencing statute will be five years, which means when you come out on parole, you will be on five years of parole at the conclusion of the ten-year sentence”—did not pronounce the period of post-release supervision as required by Criminal Procedure Law 380.20.  People ex rel Finch v Brown, 23, KAH 11-00862, 4th Dept. 3-15-13

 

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Records Sealed Pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law 160.50 Can Be Unsealed in “Dangerous Sex Offender” Proceeding Pursuant to Mental Health Law

In a proceeding which determined respondent was a dangerous sex offender requiring confinement, the court ordered the unsealing of records related to three rapes and two robberies for which respondent was indicted in 1968.  The convictions of one count of rape and one count of robbery had been overturned because respondent was found to have been incompetent at the time he pled guilty. In finding the records of the overturned convictions were properly unsealed, the First Department determined that Mental Health Law 10.08 (c), which provides that the State is entitled to all records relating to the respondent’s commission or alleged commission of a sex offense, supersedes Criminal Procedure Law 160.50, which requires that the record of a criminal proceeding that is terminated in favor of the accused be sealed.  State v John S., 2013 NY Slip Op 01622, 9530, 30051/09m 1st Dept. 3-14-13

 

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Taser or Stun Gun Is Not a “Dangerous Instrument” for Purposes of Burglary and Menacing Statutes; Court Must Articulate Specific Reasons for Shackling Defendant During Trial

Proof that the defendant threatened the complainant with a taser or stun gun was legally insufficient to establish the “dangerous instrument” element of burglary in the first degree and menacing in the second degree.  Although the Second Department determined it was harmless error, the Court also noted that it was error to shackle the defendant and put black bunting around the defense table, without also putting black bunting around the prosecution table. The jury, in that circumstance, may have inferred the bunting was designed to hide shackles.  “The federal constitution ‘forbids the use of visible shackles … unless that use is justified by an essential state interest … specific to the defendant on trial’ …”.  County Court, in this instance, failed to articulate on the record an adequate justification individualized to the defendant for the shackling … .  People v Morillo, 2013 NY Slip Op 01572, 2010-11438, Ind No 2052/09, 2nd Dept. 5-13-13

 

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Guilty Plea Precludes Appeal of Statutory Speedy Trial Violation But Not Constitutional Speedy Trial Violation

By pleading guilty a defendant forfeits appellate review of a claim that his statutory right to a speedy trial pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law 30.30 was violated. However, a defendant’s constitutional speedy trial claim survives both a guilty plea and a waiver of the right to appeal. People v Franco, 2013 NY Slip Op 01570, 2009-10119, Ind No 10795/07, 2nd Dept. 3-13-13

 

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Court Participation in Testimony Read-Back Is Error

Although the Second Department concluded it was harmless error, the Court noted that the trial court erred when it participated in reading back certain trial testimony to the jury.  The Court wrote:  “We take this opportunity to emphasize that ‘[w]hen, during a read-back of testimony, a trial judge assumes the role of a witness or inquiring counsel, he or she may unwittingly and erroneously convey to [the] jury that the court is aligned with the party or counsel whose role the court has assumed in the read-back’…”.  People v Facey, 2012 NY Slip Op 01568, 2012-11829, Ind No 9839/08, 2nd Dept. 3-13-13

 

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Strip Search After Controlled Buy Upheld

A warrantless search of “every part of [defendant’s] vehicle” as well as a strip search of the defendant was upheld by the Third Department.  The search of the vehicle was justified by the same evidence which provided probable cause for the arrest (a controlled drug purchase by a confidential informant).  And the strip search was justified by the failure to find narcotics or buy money in the preliminary vehicle search. “[A] strip search must be founded on a reasonable suspicion that the arrestee is concealing evidence underneath clothing and the search must be conducted in a reasonable manner… Some of the factors that may be considered in determining the reasonableness of such a search are the circumstances of the arrest, the defendant’s nervousness or unusual conduct, tips from informants, and ‘an itinerary suggestive of wrongdoing’…”.  People v Anderson, 104220, 104447, 3rd Dept. 3-7-13

STREET STOPS, SUPPRESSION, SUPPRESS, SEARCH

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“Plain View” Doctrine Does Not Require Certainty Seized Item Is Contraband

In affirming the denial of a suppression motion, the First Department determined that the chain of events observed by the arresting officer before the stop of defendant’s vehicle led to the proper application of the “plain view” doctrine for the seizure of contraband.  Defendant was seen going into a store (which was a frequent target of thieves) with a large empty bag and coming out of the store with the bag visibly heavier and fuller.  After a vehicle stop (the stop was not contested or discussed in the decision), the defendant gave answers to questions that contradicted what the officer had observed and the officer saw a large amount of over-the-counter medications in the bag.  In finding the seizure of the bag justified under the “plain view” doctrine, the Court said:  “The plain view doctrine does not require certainty or near certainty as to the incriminating nature of the items.  Instead, it ‘merely requires that the facts available to the officer would warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief …that certain items may be contraband or stolen property or useful as evidence of a crime; it does not demand any showing that such a belief be correct or more likely true than false.  A practical, nontechnical probability that incriminating evidence is involved is all that is required’ …”.  People v Taylor, 9439, 6265/10, 1st Dept. 3-7-13​

STREET STOPS, SUPPRESS, SEARCH

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Failure to Request Court-Permission to Re-Present Charges to a Grand Jury Is Reversible Error Which Survives a Guilty Plea

The First Department held that as long as the prosecutor presents evidence regarding potential charges to a grand jury, court-permission to re-present the charges is required.  “The critical question is whether the grand jury failed to indict after a full presentation of the case.”  The fact that the prosecutor “withdrew” the charges from the grand jury’s consideration, or allowed the grand jury to vote to “take no affirmative action” on them, is of no consequence.  The prosecutor’s failure to request and receive court-permission to re-present is a reversible error which survives a guilty plea.  People v Dinkins, 8603, 1443/10, 1st Dept. 3-5-13

 

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