You are here: / Criminal Law
, ,

MOTION TO VACATE CONVICTION PROPERLY DENIED WITHOUT A HEARING; DEFENDANT DID NOT PRESENT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF ACTUAL OR POTENTIAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST ON THE PART OF DEFENSE COUNSEL.

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge DiFiore, determined defendant's motion to set aside his conviction was properly denied without a hearing. Defendant's allegations of defense counsel's conflict of interest were deemed insufficient. Defendant alleged his lawyer represented both him and the District Attorney simultaneously:

CPL 440.30 requires that, where the motion to vacate a judgment of conviction “is based upon the existence or occurrence of facts,” sworn allegations thereof must be included in the motion papers (see CPL 440.30 [1] [a]). The sworn allegations can be based on personal knowledge or on information and belief, but in support of the latter, “the affiant must state the sources of such information and the grounds of such belief” (CPL 440.30 [1] [a]). The People “may” file an answer “denying or admitting any or all of the allegations” (see CPL 440.30 [1] [a]). The statute permits a court to deny the motion without a hearing in certain circumstances, including if it “is based upon the existence or occurrence of facts and the moving papers do not contain sworn allegations substantiating or tending to substantiate all the essential facts” (CPL 440.30 [4] [b]). * * *

Here, defendant's actual conflict claim consists of unsubstantiated and conclusory allegations of simultaneous representation. * * *

… [T]he statute is plain that the initial failure by a defendant to carry his or her burden of coming forward with sworn allegations substantiating the essential facts in the 440 motion does not shift the burden to the People in their responsive pleadings. * * *

To the extent defendant's allegations are sufficient to establish a potential conflict — based on the successive representation — his papers do not attempt to demonstrate that such a conflict operated on the defense. People v Wright, 2016 NY Slip Op 04440, CtApp 6-9-16

CRIMINAL LAW (MOTION TO VACATE CONVICTION PROPERLY DENIED WITHOUT A HEARING; DEFENDANT DID NOT PRESENT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF ACTUAL OR POTENTIAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST ON THE PART OF DEFENSE COUNSEL)/ATTORNEYS (CRIMINAL LAW, MOTION TO VACATE CONVICTION PROPERLY DENIED WITHOUT A HEARING; DEFENDANT DID NOT PRESENT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF ACTUAL OR POTENTIAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST ON THE PART OF DEFENSE COUNSEL)/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, MOTION TO VACATE CONVICTION PROPERLY DENIED WITHOUT A HEARING; DEFENDANT DID NOT PRESENT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF ACTUAL OR POTENTIAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST ON THE PART OF DEFENSE COUNSEL)

,

DETECTIVE ENTERED FENCED BACKYARD WITHOUT A WARRANT, SUPPRESSION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED.

The Second Department determined defendant’s suppression motion should have been granted.  The detective investigating a burglary entered the curtilage of defendant’s home without a warrant in the absence of exigent circumstances:

Here, in entering the defendant’s fenced-in rear yard by opening the gate and going through it, the detective entered the curtilage of the defendant’s home … . The People have failed to articulate any exigent circumstances justifying this intrusion and the ensuing warrantless arrest and search … . People v Avinger, 2016 NY Slip Op 04426, 2nd Dept 6-8-16

CRIMINAL LAW (DETECTIVE ENTERED FENCED BACKYARD WITHOUT A WARRANT, SUPPRESSION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED)/CURTILAGE (DETECTIVE ENTERED FENCED BACKYARD WITHOUT A WARRANT, SUPPRESSION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED)/SUPPRESSION (DETECTIVE ENTERED FENCED BACKYARD WITHOUT A WARRANT, SUPPRESSION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED)/SEARCH AND SEIZURE (DETECTIVE ENTERED FENCED BACKYARD WITHOUT A WARRANT, SUPPRESSION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED)/WARRANTLESS SEARCH (DETECTIVE ENTERED FENCED BACKYARD WITHOUT A WARRANT, SUPPRESSION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED)/EVIDENCE (DETECTIVE ENTERED FENCED BACKYARD WITHOUT A WARRANT, SUPPRESSION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED)

,

FEDERAL CONVICTION FOR FAILING TO REGISTER AS A SEX OFFENDER WAS NOT A QUALIFYING OFFENSE FOR A SORA RISK ANALYSIS; THEREFORE DEFENDANT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO A 15 POINT REDUCTION BECAUSE HE WAS SUBJECT TO POST-RELEASE SUPERVISION FOR THE FEDERAL OFFENSE.

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Gische, determined a federal conviction for failure to register as a sex offender was not a qualifying offense under the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA). Defendant had been convicted in Michigan of a qualifying offense, but was not subject to post-release supervision upon release. Where there is no post-release supervision, a defendant is assessed 15 points under the SORA risk analysis. Defendant argued that, because he was subject to federal post-release supervision for failure to register, the 15 points should not be assessed. The First Department held the only relevant offense was the Michigan offense, requiring the 15 point assessment. People v Reid, 2016 NY Slip Op 04366, 1st Dept 6-7-16

CRIMINAL LAW (FEDERAL CONVICTION FOR FAILING TO REGISTER AS A SEX OFFENDER WAS NOT A QUALIFYING OFFENSE FOR A SORA RISK ANALYSIS; THEREFORE DEFENDANT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO A 15 POINT REDUCTION BECAUSE HE WAS SUBJECT TO POST-RELEASE SUPERVISION FOR THE FEDERAL OFFENSE)/SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION ACT (SORA) (FEDERAL CONVICTION FOR FAILING TO REGISTER AS A SEX OFFENDER WAS NOT A QUALIFYING OFFENSE FOR A SORA RISK ANALYSIS; THEREFORE DEFENDANT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO A 15 POINT REDUCTION BECAUSE HE WAS SUBJECT TO POST-RELEASE SUPERVISION FOR THE FEDERAL OFFENSE)

, ,

IMPROPER TESTIMONY BY AN ADA ABOUT GRAND JURY PROCEDURE AND THE JUSTIFICATION DEFENSE, COUPLED WITH IMPROPER REFERENCES TO FACTS NOT IN EVIDENCE DURING THE PROSECUTOR’S SUMMATION, REQUIRED REVERSAL.

The First Department reversed defendant's conviction because the prosecutor improperly elicited testimony about the grand proceedings and the justification defense from an assistant district attorney (ADA) called as a prosecution witness. In addition, the prosecutor improperly referred to “facts” not in evidence during summation. The defendant was alleged to have fired at police officers who were pursuing him. The testimony of the ADA was elicited in anticipation of a defense the officers testified falsely in the grand jury to protect themselves from indictment for shooting defendant. However, the defendant never raised that defense. The ADA was improperly allowed to explain the justification defense (apparently to show the shooting by the officers was justified) and the grand jury procedure (apparently to demonstrate the grand jury found the officers credible):

Comments regarding grand jury composition and proceedings have repeatedly been held to be improper when made by a court, and the same rationale applies when made by a prosecutor … . * * *

By permitting the witness to instruct the jury on the law of justification during the People's case, and apply the law to the facts of this case, “the court improperly surrendered its nondelegable judicial responsibility” … . “The court's delegation of this critical judicial function to the [prosecutor-witness] significantly impaired the integrity of the proceedings and deprived the defendant of a fair trial” … . * * *

The prosecutor must “stay within the four corners of the evidence,” may not refer to matters not in evidence,” should not “call upon the jury to draw conclusions which are not fairly inferrable from the evidence,” or make arguments that “have no bearing on any legitimate issue in the case” … .

Here, on two separate occasions during his summation, the prosecutor did exactly that. People v Melendez, 2016 NY Slip Op 04328, 1st Dept 6-7-16

CRIMINAL LAW (IMPROPER TESTIMONY BY AN ADA ABOUT GRAND JURY PROCEDURE AND THE JUSTIFICATION DEFENSE, COUPLED WITH IMPROPER REFERENCES TO FACTS NOT IN EVIDENCE DURING THE PROSECUTOR'S SUMMATION, REQUIRED REVERSAL)/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, (IMPROPER TESTIMONY BY AN ADA ABOUT GRAND JURY PROCEDURE AND THE JUSTIFICATION DEFENSE, COUPLED WITH IMPROPER REFERENCES TO FACTS NOT IN EVIDENCE DURING THE PROSECUTOR'S SUMMATION, REQUIRED REVERSAL)/ATTORNEYS (IMPROPER TESTIMONY BY AN ADA ABOUT GRAND JURY PROCEDURE AND THE JUSTIFICATION DEFENSE, COUPLED WITH IMPROPER REFERENCES TO FACTS NOT IN EVIDENCE DURING THE PROSECUTOR'S SUMMATION, REQUIRED REVERSAL)/PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT (IMPROPER TESTIMONY BY AN ADA ABOUT GRAND JURY PROCEDURE AND THE JUSTIFICATION DEFENSE, COUPLED WITH IMPROPER REFERENCES TO FACTS NOT IN EVIDENCE DURING THE PROSECUTOR'S SUMMATION, REQUIRED REVERSAL)

,

ADMISSION OF THE RESULTS OF A MACHINE GENERATED BLOOD TEST WITHOUT THE TESTIMONY OF THE OPERATOR OF THE MACHINE DID NOT VIOLATE THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE.

The First Department determined the admission of a machine generated blood test for sexually transmitted disease, without the testimony of the technician who operated the machine, did not violate the confrontation clause. The court distinguished a recent Court of Appeals case, People v John, 2016 NY Slip Op 03208, which held an analyst who draws conclusions from raw data must testify before the relevant test results can be admitted:

The lab report at issue here was of the purely “machine generated” category, and the witness whose testimony defendant claims was required was, at best, a technician who tested the accuracy of the machine before placing the sample in it for testing. Under People v John and the U.S. Supreme Court cases on which it relies, the report generated by the machine should not be treated as testimonial, and the absence of testimony by the technician who calibrated the machine did not violate defendant’s Sixth Amendment right of confrontation. “[T]he testing and procedures employed . . . were neither discretionary nor based on opinion; nor did they concern the exercise of fallible human judgment over questions of cause and effect” … . In addition, contrary to defendant’s argument, the report did not directly link him to the crimes, since the “test results, standing alone, shed no light on the guilt of the accused” … , notwithstanding that they provided circumstantial evidence of guilt in light of other evidence. People v Alcivar, 2016 NY Slip Op 04329, 1st Dept 6-7-16

CRIMINAL LAW (ADMISSION OF THE RESULTS OF A MACHINE GENERATED BLOOD TEST WITHOUT THE TESTIMONY OF THE OPERATOR OF THE MACHINE DID NOT VIOLATE THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE)/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, ADMISSION OF THE RESULTS OF A MACHINE GENERATED BLOOD TEST WITHOUT THE TESTIMONY OF THE OPERATOR OF THE MACHINE DID NOT VIOLATE THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE)/CONFRONTATION CLAUSE (ADMISSION OF THE RESULTS OF A MACHINE GENERATED BLOOD TEST WITHOUT THE TESTIMONY OF THE OPERATOR OF THE MACHINE DID NOT VIOLATE THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE)/MACHINE GENERATED BLOOD TEST RESULTS (CRIMINAL LAW, ADMISSION OF THE RESULTS OF A MACHINE GENERATED BLOOD TEST WITHOUT THE TESTIMONY OF THE OPERATOR OF THE MACHINE DID NOT VIOLATE THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE)

,

SPECIAL PROSECUTOR HAS AUTHORITY TO BRING CRIMINAL ACTIONS IN LOCAL COURTS PURSUANT TO THE PROTECTION OF PEOPLE WITH SPECIAL NEEDS ACT.

The Court of Appeals, over an extensive two-judge dissent, determined, under the Executive Law, a special prosecutor has the authority to bring a criminal case in local court concerning the abuse of vulnerable persons pursuant to the “Protection of People with Special Needs Act.” Defendant unsuccessfully argued the Executive Law limited the power of the special prosecutor to criminal prosecutions in County and Supreme Court:

There is no indication from the statute that the special prosecutor’s powers are limited by section 552 (2) (c). That section merely sets forth the requirement that the special prosecutor consult with the district attorney of the pertinent county should the special prosecutor wish to appear in County Court or Supreme Court, or before the grand jury, for the purposes of managing or conducting before such court or grand jury a criminal action or proceeding involving the abuse or neglect of a vulnerable person. There is no indication that the statute governs proceedings in local courts at all. People v Davidson, 2016 NY Slip Op 04326, CtApp 6-7-16

 

CRIMINAL LAW (SPECIAL PROSECUTOR HAS AUTHORITY TO BRING CRIMINAL ACTIONS IN LOCAL COURTS PURSUANT TO THE PROTECTION OF PEOPLE WITH SPECIAL NEEDS ACT)/EXECUTIVE LAW (SPECIAL PROSECUTOR HAS AUTHORITY TO BRING CRIMINAL ACTIONS IN LOCAL COURTS PURSUANT TO THE PROTECTION OF PEOPLE WITH SPECIAL NEEDS ACT)/SOCIAL SERVICES LAW (SPECIAL PROSECUTOR HAS AUTHORITY TO BRING CRIMINAL ACTIONS IN LOCAL COURTS PURSUANT TO THE PROTECTION OF PEOPLE WITH SPECIAL NEEDS ACT)/VULNERABLE PERSONS (SPECIAL PROSECUTOR HAS AUTHORITY TO BRING CRIMINAL ACTIONS IN LOCAL COURTS PURSUANT TO THE PROTECTION OF PEOPLE WITH SPECIAL NEEDS ACT)/PROTECTION OF PERSONS WITH SPECIAL NEEDS ACT (SPECIAL PROSECUTOR HAS AUTHORITY TO BRING CRIMINAL ACTIONS IN LOCAL COURTS PURSUANT TO THE PROTECTION OF PEOPLE WITH SPECIAL NEEDS ACT)

,

FAILURE TO MOVE TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE AND FAILURE TO CHALLENGE A FRISK DID NOT CONSTITUTE INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Garcia, determined defense counsel's failure to make a motion to suppress, failure to contest a frisk of defendant's person, and brief statement at sentencing did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. The suppression motion would have had little chance of success, the failure to object to the frisk may have been part of a defense strategy and the non-frisk-related evidence was substantial, and the sentencing court was aware of the defendant's position through the pre-sentence report and defendant's statement at sentencing. With respect to the “defense strategy” and “no challenge to the frisk” issues, the court wrote:

Assuming a colorable challenge to the legality of the frisk incident to defendant's detention could be grounded in this record, as the Appellate Division noted, counsel may have made a legitimate strategic decision not to move to suppress … . On this record alone, we have no reason to discount the possible strategic explanations for counsel's decision. Because defendant “made no showing that counsel's failure to seek a suppression hearing was not premised on strategy,” his claim must be rejected … . In addition, because the remaining evidence demonstrated that defendant was in a vehicle containing a number of recently-stolen items, a challenge to the frisk would have had little to no effect on the outcome. People v Carver, 2016 NY Slip Op 04322, CtApp 6-7-16

CRIMINAL LAW (INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE, FAILURE TO MOVE TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE AND FAILURE TO CHALLENGE A FRISK DID NOT CONSTITUTE INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL)/ATTORNEYS (CRIMINAL LAW, FAILURE TO MOVE TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE AND FAILURE TO CHALLENGE A FRISK DID NOT CONSTITUTE INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL)/INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE (CRIMINAL LAW, FAILURE TO MOVE TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE AND FAILURE TO CHALLENGE A FRISK DID NOT CONSTITUTE INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL)

,

COURT’S FAILURE TO ORDER READBACK OF CROSS-EXAMINATION IN ADDITION TO DIRECT WAS NOT A MODE OF PROCEEDINGS ERROR, PRESERVATION REQUIRED.

The Court of Appeals, reversing the Appellate Division, determined (1) the trial court properly notified all parties of the contents of a jury note, and (2), the response to the jury note, in which only the direct testimony of a witness was read back, was not a mode of proceedings error. Therefore the failure to read the cross-examination was an error which must be preserved for appellate review (no preservation here):

Counsel had meaningful notice of the precise content of the jury's note and was in the courtroom as the readback was conducted. Counsel was therefore aware that the court had failed to read the witness's cross-examination testimony. Counsel's knowledge of the precise content of the note and of the court's actual response, or lack thereof, removes the claimed error from the very narrow class of mode of proceedings errors for which preservation is not required … . “[C]ounsel's silence at a time when any error by the court could have been obviated by timely objection renders the claim unpreserved and unreviewable here” … . People v Morris, 2016 NY Slip Op 04327, CtApp 6-7-16

CRIMINAL LAW (COURT'S FAILURE TO ORDER READBACK OF CROSS-EXAMINATION IN ADDITION TO DIRECT WAS NOT A MODE OF PROCEEDINGS ERROR, PRESERVATION REQUIRED)/APPEALS (COURT'S FAILURE TO ORDER READBACK OF CROSS-EXAMINATION IN ADDITION TO DIRECT WAS NOT A MODE OF PROCEEDINGS ERROR, PRESERVATION REQUIRED)/MODE OF PROCEEDINGS ERROR  (COURT'S FAILURE TO ORDER READBACK OF CROSS-EXAMINATION IN ADDITION TO DIRECT WAS NOT A MODE OF PROCEEDINGS ERROR, PRESERVATION REQUIRED)/PRESERVATION OF ERROR (COURT'S FAILURE TO ORDER READBACK OF CROSS-EXAMINATION IN ADDITION TO DIRECT WAS NOT A MODE OF PROCEEDINGS ERROR, PRESERVATION REQUIRED)

,

PRE-SENTENCE INCARCERATION, AS PART OF A PLEA AGREEMENT, DID NOT RENDER THE SUBSEQUENT SENTENCE ILLEGAL, THEREFORE OBJECTION TO SENTENCE WAS SUBJECT TO THE PRESERVATION REQUIREMENT; CRITERIA FOR OUTLEY HEARING EXPLAINED.

The Court of Appeals, over an extensive dissenting opinion, determined defendant failed to preserve an objection to his sentence because he did not move to withdraw his plea or otherwise object prior to the imposition of sentence. As part of a plea deal, defendant was required to complete six months in jail, followed by a period of time during which he was not arrested. Defendant completed the jail time but was subsequently arrested. Because of the arrest, the plea deal was not available and defendant was sentenced accordingly. The Court of Appeals held that the narrow exception to the preservation requirement for an illegal sentence did not apply to these facts. The jail-time was deemed to be a “pre-sentence” condition and could not, therefore, be deemed an illegal sentence. The court further explained the criterial for an Outley hearing to determine the validity of an arrest which violates a condition for a plea deal:

Here, defendant's sentence was premised on a violation of an admittedly lawful presentence condition – he could not be arrested – and the issue of the propriety of the plea could certainly have been raised prior to sentencing. Thus, defendant's challenge to the presentencing incarceration, which was not part of the sentence, is subject to the preservation rule … . * * *

[At the Outley hearing] the judge heard testimony from the complainant and the arresting officer. Defendant also testified that the complainant had been the aggressor and had attacked him. The judge found that there was a legitimate basis for defendant's arrest, implicitly rejecting defendant's version of events, and that finding was adopted by the sentencing court. Thus, because defendant was given an opportunity to testify to his exculpatory explanation, and his testimony was evidently discredited by the court, the nature of the inquiry was sufficient under our Outley standard. People v Reynolds, 2016 NY Slip Op 04323, CtApp 6-7-16

CRIMINAL LAW (PRE-SENTENCE INCARCERATION, AS PART OF A PLEA AGREEMENT, DID NOT RENDER THE SUBSEQUENT SENTENCE ILLEGAL, THEREFORE OBJECTION TO SENTENCE WAS SUBJECT TO THE PRESERVATION REQUIREMENT; CRITERIA FOR OUTLEY HEARING EXPLAINED)/APPEALS (PRE-SENTENCE INCARCERATION, AS PART OF A PLEA AGREEMENT, DID NOT RENDER THE SUBSEQUENT SENTENCE ILLEGAL, THEREFORE OBJECTION TO SENTENCE WAS SUBJECT TO THE PRESERVATION REQUIREMENT)/SENTENCING (PRE-SENTENCE INCARCERATION, AS PART OF A PLEA AGREEMENT, DID NOT RENDER THE SUBSEQUENT SENTENCE ILLEGAL, THEREFORE OBJECTION TO SENTENCE WAS SUBJECT TO THE PRESERVATION REQUIREMENT; CRITERIA FOR OUTLEY HEARING EXPLAINED)/OUTLEY HEARING (CRITERIA FOR OUTLEY HEARING EXPLAINED)

,

FAILURE TO RESPOND TO JURY NOTES AFTER COUNSEL HAD BEEN MADE AWARE OF THE CONTENTS OF THE NOTES AND THE JUDGE’S PROPOSED RESPONSES WAS NOT A MODE OF PROCEEDINGS ERROR, PRESERVATION REQUIRED.

The Court of Appeals, reversing the Appellate Division, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Fahey, over a dissenting opinion, determined the trial judge's acceptance of the verdict without answering three jury notes was not a mode of proceedings error. Because there was no objection to the failure to answer the jury notes, the error was not preserved. The notes had been marked as court exhibits, had been read verbatim to counsel and counsel were aware of the court's proposed responses. The note indicating a verdict had been reached was sent out before the court was able to answer:

Criminal Procedure Law § 310.30 imposes two responsibilities on trial courts upon receipt of a substantive note from a deliberating jury: the court must provide counsel with meaningful notice of the content of the note, and the court must provide a meaningful response to the jury … . A trial court's failure to fulfill its first responsibility — meaningful notice to counsel — falls within the narrow class of mode of proceedings errors for which preservation is not required … . On this appeal, we consider whether the preservation rule applies when counsel unquestionably had meaningful notice of the jury's substantive inquiries, but the trial court did not respond to those inquiries before accepting the verdict. We hold that where counsel has meaningful notice of the content of a jury note and of the trial court's response, or lack thereof, to that note, the court's alleged violation of the meaningful response requirement does not constitute a mode of proceedings error, and counsel is required to preserve any claim of error for appellate review. People v Mack, 2016 NY Slip Op 04321, CtApp 6-7-16

CRIMINAL LAW (FAILURE TO RESPOND TO JURY NOTES AFTER COUNSEL HAD BEEN MADE AWARE OF THE CONTENTS OF THE NOTES AND THE JUDGE'S PROPOSED RESPONSES WAS NOT A MODE OF PROCEEDINGS ERROR, PRESERVATION REQUIRED)/APPEALS (CRIMINAL LAW, FAILURE TO RESPOND TO JURY NOTES AFTER COUNSEL HAD BEEN MADE AWARE OF THE CONTENTS OF THE NOTES AND THE JUDGE'S PROPOSED RESPONSES WAS NOT A MODE OF PROCEEDINGS ERROR, PRESERVATION REQUIRED)/MODE OF PROCEEDINGS ERROR (FAILURE TO RESPOND TO JURY NOTES AFTER COUNSEL HAD BEEN MADE AWARE OF THE CONTENTS OF THE NOTES AND THE JUDGE'S PROPOSED RESPONSES WAS NOT A MODE OF PROCEEDINGS ERROR, PRESERVATION REQUIRED)/JURY NOTES (CRIMINAL LAW, FAILURE TO RESPOND TO JURY NOTES AFTER COUNSEL HAD BEEN MADE AWARE OF THE CONTENTS OF THE NOTES AND THE JUDGE'S PROPOSED RESPONSES WAS NOT A MODE OF PROCEEDINGS ERROR, PRESERVATION REQUIRED)/PRESERVATION OF ERROR (CRIMINAL LAW, FAILURE TO RESPOND TO JURY NOTES AFTER COUNSEL HAD BEEN MADE AWARE OF THE CONTENTS OF THE NOTES AND THE JUDGE'S PROPOSED RESPONSES WAS NOT A MODE OF PROCEEDINGS ERROR, PRESERVATION REQUIRED)

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy