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AFTER FINDING THE ISSUE PRESENTED AN EXCEPTION TO THE MOOTNESS DOCTRINE, THE COURT DETERMINED THE STATE DID NOT ADEQUATELY ASSIST A SEX OFFENDER IS FINDING SUITABLE HOUSING UPON RELEASE.

The Third Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Garry, determined the Department of Corrections and Community Services (DOCCS) did not give the petitioner, an indigent sex offender who had completed his sentence, adequate assistance in finding housing in a residential treatment facility (RTF) upon release. Although petitioner had been provided RTF housing by the time the matter was heard, the Third Department reached the issue as an exception to the mootness doctrine. DOCCS’s insufficient assistance in finding RTF housing for released sex offenders was deemed a recurring problem that needed to be addressed:

We agree with petitioner that, due to the “recognized difficulty in securing acceptable housing” for persons subject to sex offender residency restrictions, there is a likelihood of repetition regarding individuals being placed in RTFs due to the failure to secure suitable housing … . Given the transitory purpose of RTFs and considering the lack of appellate precedent regarding challenges to RTF placements and programing, we further recognize that the phenomenon typically evades review … . Finally, we find the issues novel and substantial given that petitioner’s challenges concern whether RTFs are serving their distinct purpose, as contrasted with confinement facilities generally … . * * *

The feasibility and appropriateness of the specific means by which DOCCS may choose to provide affirmative assistance in locating housing to petitioner are, of course, discretionary and beyond the reach of judicial review unless they are shown to be irrational, arbitrary and capricious. Accordingly, we may not specify the particular actions that DOCCS should have taken. Nevertheless, its passive approach of leaving the primary obligation to locate housing to an individual confined in a medium security prison facility 100 miles from his family and community, without access to information or communication resources beyond that afforded to other prison inmates, falls far short of the spirit and purpose of the legislative obligation imposed upon DOCCS to assist in this process. Matter of Gonzalez v Annucci, 2017 NY Slip Op 02099, 3rd Dept 3-23-17

CRIMINAL LAW (AFTER FINDING THE ISSUE PRESENTED AN EXCEPTION TO THE MOOTNESS DOCTRINE, THE COURT DETERMINED THE STATE DID NOT ADEQUATELY ASSIST A SEX OFFENDER IS FINDING SUITABLE HOUSING UPON RELEASE)/SEX OFFENDERS (AFTER FINDING THE ISSUE PRESENTED AN EXCEPTION TO THE MOOTNESS DOCTRINE, THE COURT DETERMINED THE STATE DID NOT ADEQUATELY ASSIST A SEX OFFENDER IS FINDING SUITABLE HOUSING UPON RELEASE)/RESIDENTIAL TREATMENT FACILITY (SEX OFFENDERS, AFTER FINDING THE ISSUE PRESENTED AN EXCEPTION TO THE MOOTNESS DOCTRINE, THE COURT DETERMINED THE STATE DID NOT ADEQUATELY ASSIST A SEX OFFENDER IS FINDING SUITABLE HOUSING UPON RELEASE)/APPEALS (AFTER FINDING THE ISSUE PRESENTED AN EXCEPTION TO THE MOOTNESS DOCTRINE, THE COURT DETERMINED THE STATE DID NOT ADEQUATELY ASSIST A SEX OFFENDER IS FINDING SUITABLE HOUSING UPON RELEASE)

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WHETHER DEFENDANT MADE AN UNEQUIVOCAL REQUEST FOR COUNSEL IS A MIXED QUESTION OF LAW AND FACT WHICH CANNOT BE HEARD BY THE COURT OF APPEALS.

The Court of Appeals determined the issue whether defendant made an unequivocal request for counsel presented a mixed question of law and fact which cannot be heard by the Court of Appeals. People v Slocum, 2017 NY Slip Op 02089, CtApp 3-23-17

CRIMINAL LAW (WHETHER DEFENDANT MADE AN UNEQUIVOCAL REQUEST FOR COUNSEL IS A MIXED QUESTION OF LAW AND FACT WHICH CANNOT BE HEARD BY THE COURT OF APPEALS)/ATTORNEYS (CRIMINAL LAW, APPEALS, WHETHER DEFENDANT MADE AN UNEQUIVOCAL REQUEST FOR COUNSEL IS A MIXED QUESTION OF LAW AND FACT WHICH CANNOT BE HEARD BY THE COURT OF APPEALS)/APPEALS (CRIMINAL LAW, WHETHER DEFENDANT MADE AN UNEQUIVOCAL REQUEST FOR COUNSEL IS A MIXED QUESTION OF LAW AND FACT WHICH CANNOT BE HEARD BY THE COURT OF APPEALS)

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PROSECUTOR’S SUMMATION AMOUNTED TO MISCONDUCT, 911 CALL SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED AS PRESENT SENSE IMPRESSION OR AN EXCITED UTTERANCE, CROSS-EXAMINATION OF COMPLAINANT UNDULY RESTRICTED.

The Second Department, reversing defendant’s conviction, determined the prosecutor’s remarks in summation amounted to prosecutorial misconduct, a 911 call made by a non-testifying witness should not have been admitted as present sense impression or an excited utterance, and the cross-examination of the complainant was unduly restricted. With respect to the prosecutor’s summation, the court wrote:

Here, during summation, the prosecutor repeatedly engaged in improper conduct. For instance, the prosecutor vouched for the credibility of the People’s witnesses with regard to significant aspects of the People’s case by asserting, inter alia, that “the witnesses who came before you provided truthful testimony that makes sense,” that they gave the “kind of truthful and credible testimony that you can rely on,” and that one witness had “no reason . . . to be anything but truthful with the 911 operator” … . In describing a complainant, the prosecutor asserted that he was “exactly what you hoped to see from someone who had troubles with the law in their youth,” but had “changed [his] life” and now worked at an organization that helps “low-income people [obtain] health care,” which was a clear attempt to appeal to the sympathy of the jury … . To support the credibility of that same complainant, the prosecutor injected the integrity of the District Attorney’s office into the trial to downplay the severity of a past criminal charge he faced … . Further, the prosecutor denigrated the defense and undermined the defendant’s right to confront witnesses by implying that the complainants were victims of an overly long cross-examination and that one was a “saint” for answering so many questions … . Moreover, the prosecutor improperly used the defendant’s right to pretrial silence against him by arguing that he could not be a victim as he did not call 911 … . The cumulative effect of these improper comments deprived the defendant of a fair trial … . People v Casiano, 2017 NY Slip Op 02053, 2nd Dept 3-22-17

CRIMINAL LAW (PROSECUTOR’S SUMMATION AMOUNTED TO MISCONDUCT, 911 CALL SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED AS PRESENT SENSE IMPRESSION OR AN EXCITED UTTERANCE, CROSS-EXAMINATION OF COMPLAINANT UNDULY RESTRICTED)/ATTORNEYS (CRIMINAL LAW, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT, PROSECUTOR’S SUMMATION AMOUNTED TO MISCONDUCT, 911 CALL SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED AS PRESENT SENSE IMPRESSION OR AN EXCITED UTTERANCE, CROSS-EXAMINATION OF COMPLAINANT UNDULY RESTRICTED)/PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT (PROSECUTOR’S SUMMATION AMOUNTED TO MISCONDUCT, 911 CALL SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED AS PRESENT SENSE IMPRESSION OR AN EXCITED UTTERANCE, CROSS-EXAMINATION OF COMPLAINANT UNDULY RESTRICTED)/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, PROSECUTOR’S SUMMATION AMOUNTED TO MISCONDUCT, 911 CALL SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED AS PRESENT SENSE IMPRESSION OR AN EXCITED UTTERANCE, CROSS-EXAMINATION OF COMPLAINANT UNDULY RESTRICTED)/HEARSAY (CRIMINAL LAW, PROSECUTOR’S SUMMATION AMOUNTED TO MISCONDUCT, 911 CALL SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED AS PRESENT SENSE IMPRESSION OR AN EXCITED UTTERANCE, CROSS-EXAMINATION OF COMPLAINANT UNDULY RESTRICTED)/911 CALL (CRIMINAL LAW, PROSECUTOR’S SUMMATION AMOUNTED TO MISCONDUCT, 911 CALL SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED AS PRESENT SENSE IMPRESSION OR AN EXCITED UTTERANCE, CROSS-EXAMINATION OF COMPLAINANT UNDULY RESTRICTED

FIRST DEPT REDUCED DEFENDANT’S SORA RISK LEVEL FROM THREE TO TWO, BASED PRIMARILY UPON DEFENDANT’S USE OF EDUCATIONAL AND REHABILITATIVE RESOURCES WHILE IN PRISON.

The First Department took the unusual step of reducing defendant’s SORA risk level from three to two. Defendant committed a heinous rape 30 years ago when he was using drugs and alcohol. While in prison defendant earned two bachelor degrees and completed many therapeutic programs:

The Court of Appeals has enunciated a three-step process for determining whether to depart downward from a defendant’s presumptive risk level … . First, a court must decide whether the proffered mitigating circumstance or circumstances are “of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into account by the guidelines” … . Second, a court must determine whether the defendant seeking a downward departure has proven the existence of these alleged mitigating circumstances by a preponderance of the evidence … . If the defendant surmounts these first two steps, a court must then exercise its discretion and determine at the final third step, “whether the totality of the circumstances warrants a departure” …. .

Here, we find that, under this three-step analysis, a departure to level two is warranted. Initially, we note that defendant has met his burden of proving the existence of mitigating circumstances unaccounted for in the Guidelines by a preponderance of the evidence. Defendant’s remarkable rehabilitation and his pain and mobility problems constitute, in this case, the sort of “special circumstances” for which a downward departure is appropriate … . Moreover, defendant supported his application with a number of exhibits, including his degrees, his medical records, and his letters of recommendation. People v Williams, 2017 NY Slip Op 01988, 1st Dept 3-21-17

 

CRIMINAL LAW (FIRST DEPARTMENT REDUCED DEFENDANT’S SORA RISK LEVEL FROM THREE TO TWO, BASED PRIMARILY UPON DEFENDANT’S USE OF EDUCATIONAL AND REHABILITATIVE RESOURCES WHILE IN PRISON)/SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION ACT (SORA) (FIRST DEPARTMENT REDUCED DEFENDANT’S SORA RISK LEVEL FROM THREE TO TWO, BASED PRIMARILY UPON DEFENDANT’S USE OF EDUCATIONAL AND REHABILITATIVE RESOURCES WHILE IN PRISON)

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ALLOWING POLICE OFFICER TO TESTIFY ABOUT VICTIM’S IDENTIFICATION OF DEFENDANT AT A SHOWUP WAS NOT BOLSTERING, VICTIM’S STATEMENT WAS AN EXCITED UTTERANCE.

The First Department determined a police officer was properly allowed to testify the robbery victim identified defendant at a showup because the victim’s statement was an excited utterance:

At trial, the court properly permitted a police officer to testify that the victim of the … robbery identified defendant at a showup. This testimony was admissible, notwithstanding the general rule against third-party bolstering … , because the victim’s declaration qualified as an excited utterance. Shortly after the victim was robbed at gunpoint in his taxicab, he called 911 and was brought in a police vehicle to defendant, who was being detained. The victim immediately yelled, “[O]h my God[!] . . . [I]t is the same guy . . . . Thank God you caught him[!]” Under the circumstances, this identification was made “under the stress of excitement caused by an external event, and [was] not the product of studied reflection and possible fabrication” … . People v Everette, 2017 NY Slip Op 01962, 1st Dept 3-16-17

CRIMINAL LAW (EVIDENCE, ALLOWING POLICE OFFICER TO TESTIFY ABOUT VICTIM’S IDENTIFICATION OF DEFENDANT AT A SHOWUP WAS NOT BOLSTERING, VICTIM’S STATEMENT WAS AN EXCITED UTTERANCE)/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, ALLOWING POLICE OFFICER TO TESTIFY ABOUT VICTIM’S IDENTIFICATION OF DEFENDANT AT A SHOWUP WAS NOT BOLSTERING, VICTIM’S STATEMENT WAS AN EXCITED UTTERANCE)/HEARSAY (CRIMINAL LAW, ALLOWING POLICE OFFICER TO TESTIFY ABOUT VICTIM’S IDENTIFICATION OF DEFENDANT AT A SHOWUP WAS NOT BOLSTERING, VICTIM’S STATEMENT WAS AN EXCITED UTTERANCE)/BOLSTERING (CRIMINAL LAW, ALLOWING POLICE OFFICER TO TESTIFY ABOUT VICTIM’S IDENTIFICATION OF DEFENDANT AT A SHOWUP WAS NOT BOLSTERING, VICTIM’S STATEMENT WAS AN EXCITED UTTERANCE)/EXCITED UTTERANCE (CRIMINAL LAW, ALLOWING POLICE OFFICER TO TESTIFY ABOUT VICTIM’S IDENTIFICATION OF DEFENDANT AT A SHOWUP WAS NOT BOLSTERING, VICTIM’S STATEMENT WAS AN EXCITED UTTERANCE)/SHOWUP IDENTIFICATION CRIMINAL LAW, ALLOWING POLICE OFFICER TO TESTIFY ABOUT VICTIM’S IDENTIFICATION OF DEFENDANT AT A SHOWUP WAS NOT BOLSTERING, VICTIM’S STATEMENT WAS AN EXCITED UTTERANCE)/INDENTIFICATION (CRIMINAL LAW, ALLOWING POLICE OFFICER TO TESTIFY ABOUT VICTIM’S IDENTIFICATION OF DEFENDANT AT A SHOWUP WAS NOT BOLSTERING, VICTIM’S STATEMENT WAS AN EXCITED UTTERANCE)

DEFENDANT’S OMISSIONS, INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS AND LIES AFTER A ROUTINE TRAFFIC STOP JUSTIFIED THE CANINE SNIFF.

The Third Department, over a two-justice dissent, determined the motion to suppress cocaine discovered using a canine sniff after a traffic stop for tinted windows was properly denied. Enough information and inconsistencies came to the officers’ attention after the stop to warrant the dog sniff. Defendant was on parole but initially did not inform the officer of that fact, the stop was outside the county in which defendant was paroled, defendant lied about his cell phone being broken, etc.:

The prolonged diet of inconsistencies and lies provided by defendant about his travels, when coupled with his parole situation and his nervous demeanor throughout the encounter, combined to give the officers a “founded suspicion of criminality” … . This founded suspicion justified both the extension of the stop after its initial justification had been exhausted and the exterior canine sniff that followed … . … The alert gave the troopers probable cause to search the vehicle and recover the bookbag from the back seat that contained cocaine … . People v Banks, 2017 NY Slip Op 01916, 3rd Dept 3-16-17

CRIMINAL LAW (DEFENDANT’S OMISSIONS, INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS AND LIES AFTER A ROUTINE TRAFFIC STOP JUSTIFIED THE CANINE SNIFF)/SUPPRESSION (DEFENDANT’S OMISSIONS, INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS AND LIES AFTER A ROUTINE TRAFFIC STOP JUSTIFIED THE CANINE SNIFF)/TRAFFIC STOP (DEFENDANT’S OMISSIONS, INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS AND LIES AFTER A ROUTINE TRAFFIC STOP JUSTIFIED THE CANINE SNIFF)/CANINE SNIFF (DEFENDANT’S OMISSIONS, INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS AND LIES AFTER A ROUTINE TRAFFIC STOP JUSTIFIED THE CANINE SNIFF)

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NO NEED FOR ARRESTING OFFICER TO TESTIFY AT SUPPRESSION HEARING, INFERENCE OF MUTUAL COMMUNICATION APPLIED.

The First Department determined the arresting officer did not need to testify at the suppression hearing and explained the inference of mutual communication:

The arresting officer had probable cause to arrest defendant under the fellow officer rule because “the radio transmission [of] the undercover officer . . . provided details of the defendant’s race, sex, clothing, as well as his location and the fact that a positive buy’ had occurred” and defendant was the only person in the area who matched the description at the location … . Although the arresting officer did not testify at the suppression hearing, “the only rational explanation for how defendant came to be arrested . . . is that [the arresting officer] heard the radio communication [heard by the testifying officer] and apprehended defendant on that basis” … . The inference of mutual communication … does not turn on what kind of radios the officers were using, or how well the radios were working, but on the simple fact that, without hearing the radio transmission, the arresting officer would have had no way of knowing where to go or whom to arrest. People v Vidro, 2017 NY Slip Op 01975, 1st Dept 3-16-17

CRIMINAL LAW (NO NEED FOR ARRESTING OFFICER TO TESTIFY AT SUPPRESSION HEARING, INFERENCE OF MUTUAL COMMUNICATION APPLIED)/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, NO NEED FOR ARRESTING OFFICER TO TESTIFY AT SUPPRESSION HEARING, INFERENCE OF MUTUAL COMMUNICATION APPLIED)/MUTUAL COMMUNICATION , INFERENCE OF (CRIMINAL LAW, NO NEED FOR ARRESTING OFFICER TO TESTIFY AT SUPPRESSION HEARING, INFERENCE OF MUTUAL COMMUNICATION APPLIED)/SUPPRESSION (CRIMINAL LAW, EVIDENCE, NO NEED FOR ARRESTING OFFICER TO TESTIFY AT SUPPRESSION HEARING, INFERENCE OF MUTUAL COMMUNICATION APPLIED)

IT WAS THEORETICALLY POSSIBLE (ALTHOUGH HIGHLY UNLIKELY) THE TWO ASSAULT CONVICTIONS WERE BASED UPON THE SAME ACT, DEFENDANT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GIVEN CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES.

The Second Department determined defendant should have been sentenced concurrently for his two assault convictions. The victim was stabbed 20 times and his face was slashed. Defendant was convicted of two counts of assault first—intent to disfigure and intent to cause serious injury. It was not possible to determine whether the jury convicted on both counts based upon only the slashing of the victim’s face as opposed to two different acts:

We agree with the defendant’s contention. Pursuant to Penal Law § 70.25(2), concurrent sentences must be imposed “for two or more offenses committed through a single act or omission, or through an act or omission which in itself constituted one of the offenses and also was a material element of the other.” ” Thus, sentences [of imprisonment] imposed for two or more offenses may not run consecutively: (1) where a single act constitutes two offenses, or (2) where a single act constitutes one of the offenses and a material element of the other'” … . Nonetheless, ” trial courts retain consecutive sentence discretion when separate offenses are committed through separate acts, though they are part of a single transaction'” … .

Here, the People have failed to establish that the acts constituting the respective assault in the first degree convictions were separate and distinct from each other as required by the statute … . It is impossible to determine from the record whether the slashing of an “X” into the victim’s face, which formed the basis for the assault in the first degree “intent to disfigure another person seriously and permanently” conviction … , also formed the basis for the jury’s verdict of guilt on the assault in the first degree “intent to cause serious physical injury” conviction …  Thus, the People failed to establish that the acts constituting each of the two assault in the first degree convictions were separate and distinct from each other. People v Henderson, 2017 NY Slip Op 01885, 2nd Dept 3-15-17

 

CRIMINAL LAW (IT WAS THEORETICALLY POSSIBLE (ALTHOUGH HIGHLY UNLIKELY) THE TWO ASSAULT CONVICTIONS WERE BASED UPON THE SAME ACT, DEFENDANT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GIVEN CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES)/SENTENCING (IT WAS THEORETICALLY POSSIBLE (ALTHOUGH HIGHLY UNLIKELY) THE TWO ASSAULT CONVICTIONS WERE BASED UPON THE SAME ACT, DEFENDANT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GIVEN CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES)/CONCURRENT SENTENCES (IT WAS THEORETICALLY POSSIBLE (ALTHOUGH HIGHLY UNLIKELY) THE TWO ASSAULT CONVICTIONS WERE BASED UPON THE SAME ACT, DEFENDANT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GIVEN CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES)/CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES (IT WAS THEORETICALLY POSSIBLE (ALTHOUGH HIGHLY UNLIKELY) THE TWO ASSAULT CONVICTIONS WERE BASED UPON THE SAME ACT, DEFENDANT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GIVEN CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES)

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POSSIBILITY OF DEPORTATION NOT MENTIONED AT TIME OF GUILTY PLEA, MATTER REMITTED.

The Second Department sent the matter back for a report from Supreme Court because the possibility of deportation was not mentioned at the time of the guilty plea:

Here, the record does not demonstrate that the Supreme Court mentioned the possibility of deportation as a consequence of the defendant’s plea. Under the circumstances of this case, we remit the matter to the Supreme Court, Westchester County, to afford the defendant an opportunity to move to vacate his plea, and for a report by the Supreme Court thereafter. Any such motion shall be made by the defendant within 60 days after the date of this decision and order … , and, upon such motion, the defendant will have the burden of establishing that there is a “reasonable probability” that he would not have pleaded guilty had the court advised him of the possibility of deportation … . In its report to this Court, the Supreme Court shall state whether the defendant moved to vacate his plea of guilty, and if so, shall set forth its finding as to whether the defendant made the requisite showing or failed to make the requisite showing … . People v Agramonte, 2017 NY Slip Op 01876, 2nd Dept 3-15-17

CRIMINAL LAW (POSSIBILITY OF DEPORTATION NOT MENTIONED AT TIME OF GUILTY PLEA, MATTER REMITTED)/DEPORATION (CRIMINAL LAW, POSSIBILITY OF DEPORTATION NOT MENTIONED AT TIME OF GUILTY PLEA, MATTER REMITTED)

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911 CALL AND PRIOR CONSISTENT STATEMENT PROPERLY ADMITTED AS EXCITED UTTERANCES.

The Second Department determined a 911 call and a prior consistent statement were properly admitted as excited utterances:

… [T]he recording of the 911 call was properly admitted into evidence under the excited utterance and present sense impression exceptions to the hearsay rule, as the probative value of this evidence outweighed any prejudicial effect … .

The defendant contends that he was deprived of a fair trial when the prosecutor elicited testimony from a police officer and the victim’s niece regarding statements made by the victim’s son at the scene, which improperly bolstered the testimony of the victim’s son identifying the defendant as the shooter. … . If a proffered statement also meets the requirements to be admitted as an excited utterance, its admission would be proper, notwithstanding the characterization as a prior consistent statement … . Here, the Supreme Court properly admitted the testimony of the police officer and the victim’s niece concerning the statements of the victim’s son at the scene identifying the defendant as the shooter under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule, and that testimony did not constitute improper bolstering … . People v Chin, 2017 NY Slip Op 01880, 2nd Dept 3-15-17

 

CRIMINAL LAW (911 CALL AND PRIOR CONSISTENT STATEMENT PROPERLY ADMITTED AS EXCITED UTTERANCES)/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, 911 CALL AND PRIOR CONSISTENT STATEMENT PROPERLY ADMITTED AS EXCITED UTTERANCES)/HEARSAY (CRIMINAL LAW, 911 CALL AND PRIOR CONSISTENT STATEMENT PROPERLY ADMITTED AS EXCITED UTTERANCES)/EXCITED UTTERANCES (CRIMINAL LAW, 911 CALL AND PRIOR CONSISTENT STATEMENT PROPERLY ADMITTED AS EXCITED UTTERANCES)

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