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DEFENDANT DID NOT HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD ON THE SEXUAL PREDATOR DESIGNATION WHICH THE JUDGE IMPOSED SUA SPONTE, DESIGNATION DELETED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined there defendant was not given the opportunity to be heard on whether he should be designated a sexual predator and deleted the designation:

… [T]he Supreme Court erred in, sua sponte, designating the defendant a sexual predator. Neither the Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders nor the People had recommended such a designation, and the defendant was never afforded an opportunity to be heard on the issue of whether he should be so designated (see Correction Law § 168-n[3]…). Accordingly, we modify the order so as to delete the provision thereof designating the defendant a sexual predator. People v Medina, 2018 NY Slip Op 07162, Second Dept 10-24-18

CRIMINAL LAW (DEFENDANT DID NOT HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD ON THE SEXUAL PREDATOR DESIGNATION WHICH THE JUDGE IMPOSED SUA SPONTE, DESIGNATION DELETED (SECOND DEPT))/SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION ACT (SORA) (DEFENDANT DID NOT HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD ON THE SEXUAL PREDATOR DESIGNATION WHICH THE JUDGE IMPOSED SUA SPONTE, DESIGNATION DELETED (SECOND DEPT))/SEXUAL PREDATOR (DEFENDANT DID NOT HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD ON THE SEXUAL PREDATOR DESIGNATION WHICH THE JUDGE IMPOSED SUA SPONTE, DESIGNATION DELETED (SECOND DEPT))

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IN THIS AGGRAVATED UNLICENSED OPERATION CASE, TESTIMONY THAT NOTICE OF THE REVOCATION OF DEFENDANT’S DRIVER’S LICENSE WAS MAILED TO HIM VIOLATED DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO CONFRONT THE WITNESSES AGAINST HIM BECAUSE THE TESTIMONY WAS NOT BASED UPON FIRST-HAND KNOWLEDGE (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing defendant’s conviction for aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle, determined that the testimony of a supervisor from the NYS Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV), alleging that notice of the revocation of defendant’s license was mailed to defendant, violated defendant’s right to confront the witnesses against him because the testimony was not based upon first hand knowledge:

To establish that the defendant operated a motor vehicle while knowing that his license was suspended or revoked, the People presented the testimony of a supervisor of the New York State Department of Motor Vehicles (hereinafter the DMV), who testified about the DMV’s process of mailing notices of revocation and/or suspension. The DMV supervisor testified that an order of suspension was mailed to the defendant in 1999, and she read into the record an affidavit, sworn to in 2012, which detailed the procedures related to mailing these notices and also stated, “upon information and belief,” that the notice was in fact mailed to the defendant in 1999. However, the DMV supervisor herself admittedly had no personal knowledge of the mailing to the defendant, and the People did not produce the original 1999 affidavit of mailing.

The Supreme Court should not have permitted this testimony, as it violated the defendant’s right of confrontation (see CPLR 4518[a]; CPL 60.10;… ) The defendant was never given the opportunity to cross-examine a DMV employee who was directly involved in sending out suspension notices and who had personal knowledge of defendant’s driving record. The DMV supervisor’s testimony was improperly allowed to establish an essential element of the crime. The court, in permitting this testimony, failed to ensure that the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right of confrontation was protected … . People v Stokeling, 2018 NY Slip Op 07158, Second Dept 10-24-18

CRIMINAL LAW (IN THIS AGGRAVATED UNLICENSED OPERATION CASE, TESTIMONY THAT NOTICE OF THE REVOCATION OF DEFENDANT’S DRIVER’S LICENSE WAS MAILED TO HIM VIOLATED DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO CONFRONT THE WITNESSES AGAINST HIM BECAUSE THE TESTIMONY WAS NOT BASED UPON FIRST-HAND KNOWLEDGE (SECOND DEPT))/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, IN THIS AGGRAVATED UNLICENSED OPERATION CASE, TESTIMONY THAT NOTICE OF THE REVOCATION OF DEFENDANT’S DRIVER’S LICENSE WAS MAILED TO HIM VIOLATED DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO CONFRONT THE WITNESSES AGAINST HIM BECAUSE THE TESTIMONY WAS NOT BASED UPON FIRST-HAND KNOWLEDGE (SECOND DEPT)/HEARSAY (CRIMINAL LAW, IN THIS AGGRAVATED UNLICENSED OPERATION CASE, TESTIMONY THAT NOTICE OF THE REVOCATION OF DEFENDANT’S DRIVER’S LICENSE WAS MAILED TO HIM VIOLATED DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO CONFRONT THE WITNESSES AGAINST HIM BECAUSE THE TESTIMONY WAS NOT BASED UPON FIRST-HAND KNOWLEDGE (SECOND DEPT))/HEARSAY (CRIMINAL LAW, IN THIS AGGRAVATED UNLICENSED OPERATION CASE, TESTIMONY THAT NOTICE OF THE REVOCATION OF DEFENDANT’S DRIVER’S LICENSE WAS MAILED TO HIM VIOLATED DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO CONFRONT THE WITNESSES AGAINST HIM BECAUSE THE TESTIMONY WAS NOT BASED UPON FIRST-HAND KNOWLEDGE (SECOND DEPT))/BUSINESS RECORDS EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE (CRIMINAL LAW, IN THIS AGGRAVATED UNLICENSED OPERATION CASE, TESTIMONY THAT NOTICE OF THE REVOCATION OF DEFENDANT’S DRIVER’S LICENSE WAS MAILED TO HIM VIOLATED DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO CONFRONT THE WITNESSES AGAINST HIM BECAUSE THE TESTIMONY WAS NOT BASED UPON FIRST-HAND KNOWLEDGE (SECOND DEPT))/VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW  (IN THIS AGGRAVATED UNLICENSED OPERATION CASE, TESTIMONY THAT NOTICE OF THE REVOCATION OF DEFENDANT’S DRIVER’S LICENSE WAS MAILED TO HIM VIOLATED DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO CONFRONT THE WITNESSES AGAINST HIM BECAUSE THE TESTIMONY WAS NOT BASED UPON FIRST-HAND KNOWLEDGE (SECOND DEPT))

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DETECTIVE WHO CONDUCTED THE LINEUP IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURE WAS AWARE DEFENDANT WAS REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL BUT DID NOT NOTIFY COUNSEL OF THE PROCEDURE, CONVICTIONS REVERSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing defendant’s convictions for two separate robberies which were tried together, determined that one of the lineup identification procedures violated defendant’s right to counsel. The detective who conducted the lineup was aware defendant had an attorney but did not notify the attorney of the impending lineup:

The detective who conducted the lineup violated the defendant’s right to counsel by failing to notify counsel of the lineup and afford counsel a reasonable opportunity to attend. As a general rule, a defendant does not have the right to counsel at a preaccusatory, investigatory lineup … . There are two exceptions. The first is when a defendant is actually represented by an attorney in the matter under investigation. That occurs when the defendant is, in fact, represented in the matter, and the police know, or can be charged with knowledge of that representation … . The second is when a defendant who is already in custody and represented by an attorney in an unrelated case invokes the right by requesting his or her attorney. In either case, “[o]nce the right to counsel has been triggered, the police may not proceed with the lineup without at least apprising the defendant’s lawyer of the situation and affording the lawyer a reasonable opportunity to appear. A specific request that the lineup not proceed until counsel is so notified need not be made” … .

… [T]he paramount consideration is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the jury’s decision to convict on the tainted counts influenced its verdict of guilt on the remaining counts in a meaningful way … . Here, we cannot conclude from the evidence presented that there was no such reasonable possibility. People v Johnson, 2018 NY Slip Op 07147, Second Dept 10-24-18

CRIMINAL LAW (LINEUPS, DETECTIVE WHO CONDUCTED THE LINEUP IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURE WAS AWARE DEFENDANT WAS REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL BUT DID NOT NOTIFY COUNSEL OF THE PROCEDURE, CONVICTIONS REVERSED (SECOND DEPT))/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, LINEUPS, DETECTIVE WHO CONDUCTED THE LINEUP IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURE WAS AWARE DEFENDANT WAS REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL BUT DID NOT NOTIFY COUNSEL OF THE PROCEDURE, CONVICTIONS REVERSED (SECOND DEPT))/ATTORNEYS (CRIMINAL LAW, LINEUPS, DETECTIVE WHO CONDUCTED THE LINEUP IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURE WAS AWARE DEFENDANT WAS REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL BUT DID NOT NOTIFY COUNSEL OF THE PROCEDURE, CONVICTIONS REVERSED (SECOND DEPT))/RIGHT TO COUNSEL (LINEUPS, DETECTIVE WHO CONDUCTED THE LINEUP IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURE WAS AWARE DEFENDANT WAS REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL BUT DID NOT NOTIFY COUNSEL OF THE PROCEDURE, CONVICTIONS REVERSED (SECOND DEPT))/LINEUPS (RIGHT TO COUNSEL, DETECTIVE WHO CONDUCTED THE LINEUP IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURE WAS AWARE DEFENDANT WAS REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL BUT DID NOT NOTIFY COUNSEL OF THE PROCEDURE, CONVICTIONS REVERSED (SECOND DEPT))

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DEFENDANT WAS TOLD MERELY THAT DEPORTATION WAS A PROBABILITY WHEN IT WAS MANDATORY, HE IS ENTITLED TO MOVE TO VACATE HIS GUILTY PLEA ON INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE GROUNDS (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined that defendant should be given the opportunity to move to vacate his guilty plea on ineffective assistance grounds. Although deportation was mandatory, defendant was told only that he may be deported:

Defendant was deprived of effective assistance of counsel when his counsel failed to advise him that his guilty plea to an aggravated felony would result in mandatory deportation, and instead merely advised him that his plea would have “immigration consequences,” would “impact his ability to stay in the country” and “will probably very well end up with [defendant] being deported from this country” … .

Defendant should be afforded the opportunity to move to vacate his plea upon a showing that there is a reasonable probability that he would not have pleaded guilty had he been made aware of the deportation consequences of his plea … , and we hold this appeal in abeyance for that purpose. People v Johnson, 2018 NY Slip Op 07072, First Dept 10-23-18

CRIMINAL LAW (DEPORTATION, DEFENDANT WAS TOLD MERELY THAT DEPORTATION WAS A PROBABILITY WHEN IT WAS MANDATORY, HE IS ENTITLED TO MOVE TO VACATE HIS GUILTY PLEA ON INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE GROUNDS (FIRST DEPT))/ATTORNEYS (CRIMINAL LAW, DEPORTATION, DEFENDANT WAS TOLD MERELY THAT DEPORTATION WAS A PROBABILITY WHEN IT WAS MANDATORY, HE IS ENTITLED TO MOVE TO VACATE HIS GUILTY PLEA ON INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE GROUNDS (FIRST DEPT))/INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE (DEPORTATION, DEFENDANT WAS TOLD MERELY THAT DEPORTATION WAS A PROBABILITY WHEN IT WAS MANDATORY, HE IS ENTITLED TO MOVE TO VACATE HIS GUILTY PLEA ON INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE GROUNDS (FIRST DEPT))/IMMIGRATION (CRIMINAL LAW, DEFENDANT WAS TOLD MERELY THAT DEPORTATION WAS A PROBABILITY WHEN IT WAS MANDATORY, HE IS ENTITLED TO MOVE TO VACATE HIS GUILTY PLEA ON INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE GROUNDS (FIRST DEPT))/GUILTY PLEA, MOTION TO VACATE (DEPORTATION, DEFENDANT WAS TOLD MERELY THAT DEPORTATION WAS A PROBABILITY WHEN IT WAS MANDATORY, HE IS ENTITLED TO MOVE TO VACATE HIS GUILTY PLEA ON INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE GROUNDS (FIRST DEPT))/DEPORTATION (CRIMINAL LAW, ATTORNEYS, DEFENDANT WAS TOLD MERELY THAT DEPORTATION WAS A PROBABILITY WHEN IT WAS MANDATORY, HE IS ENTITLED TO MOVE TO VACATE HIS GUILTY PLEA ON INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE GROUNDS (FIRST DEPT))

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DEFENDANT WAS TOLD MERELY THAT DEPORTATION WAS A POSSIBILITY WHEN IT WAS MANDATORY, HE IS ENTITLED TO MOVE TO VACATE HIS GUILTY PLEA ON INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE GROUNDS (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined defendant should be given the opportunity to move to vacate his guilty plea on ineffective assistance grounds because he was not adequately warned of the deportation consequences:

Defendant was deprived of effective assistance when his counsel failed to advise him that his guilty plea to an aggravated felony would result in mandatory deportation, and instead merely advised him that deportation was a possibility … .

Defendant should be afforded the opportunity to move to vacate his plea upon a showing that there is a reasonable probability that he would not have pleaded guilty had he been made aware of the deportation consequences of his plea (see id.), and we hold the appeal in abeyance for that purpose. People v Rodriguez, 2018 NY Slip Op 07061, First Dept 10-23-18

CRIMINAL LAW (DEPORTATION, DEFENDANT WAS TOLD MERELY THAT DEPORTATION WAS A POSSIBILITY WHEN IT WAS MANDATORY, HE IS ENTITLED TO MOVE TO VACATE HIS GUILTY PLEA ON INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE GROUNDS (FIRST DEPT))/ATTORNEYS (CRIMINAL LAW, DEPORTATION, DEFENDANT WAS TOLD MERELY THAT DEPORTATION WAS A POSSIBILITY WHEN IT WAS MANDATORY, HE IS ENTITLED TO MOVE TO VACATE HIS GUILTY PLEA ON INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE GROUNDS (FIRST DEPT))/INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE (DEPORTATION, DEFENDANT WAS TOLD MERELY THAT DEPORTATION WAS A POSSIBILITY WHEN IT WAS MANDATORY, HE IS ENTITLED TO MOVE TO VACATE HIS GUILTY PLEA ON INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE GROUNDS (FIRST DEPT))/IMMIGRATION (CRIMINAL LAW, DEFENDANT WAS TOLD MERELY THAT DEPORTATION WAS A POSSIBILITY WHEN IT WAS MANDATORY, HE IS ENTITLED TO MOVE TO VACATE HIS GUILTY PLEA ON INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE GROUNDS (FIRST DEPT))/GUILTY PLEA, MOTION TO VACATE (DEPORTATION, DEFENDANT WAS TOLD MERELY THAT DEPORTATION WAS A POSSIBILITY WHEN IT WAS MANDATORY, HE IS ENTITLED TO MOVE TO VACATE HIS GUILTY PLEA ON INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE GROUNDS (FIRST DEPT))/DEPORTATION (CRIMINAL LAW, ATTORNEYS, DEFENDANT WAS TOLD MERELY THAT DEPORTATION WAS A POSSIBILITY WHEN IT WAS MANDATORY, HE IS ENTITLED TO MOVE TO VACATE HIS GUILTY PLEA ON INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE GROUNDS (FIRST DEPT))

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MISSING THE DEADLINES FOR APPLYING FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL TO THE COURT OF APPEALS DOES NOT GIVE RISE TO A WRIT OF ERROR CORAM NOBIS OR AN EXCEPTION TO CPL 460.30 BASED UPON INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL OR A VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge DiFiore, over a two judge dissent, determined that missing the deadline for filing an application for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals does not deprive defendant of his or her constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel or due process. Therefore the defendant is not entitled to a writ of error coram nobis or an exception to the time limits in Criminal Procedure Law 460.30:

In People v Andrews (23 NY3d 605, 616 [2014]), we held that counsel’s failure to file a timely criminal leave application (CLA) to this Court within the thirty-day statutory time frame provided by CPL 460.10 (5) (a), or move pursuant to CPL 460.30 within the one-year grace period for an extension to cure the error, does not deprive a defendant of a constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel or due process under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. In the absence of a constitutional violation, a defendant cannot resort to coram nobis to abrogate the one-year time limitation on the remedy provided in CPL 460.30 for the improper conduct of his or her attorney in failing to file a timely CLA. We left open the question of whether a more protective rule should be recognized under the New York State Constitution (id. at 616). Today, we hold the same rule applies under article I, section 6 of the New York State Constitution. Thus, defendant is not entitled to a writ of error coram nobis to bypass the limitation set by the legislature in CPL 460.30 in which to file a CLA seeking leave to appeal to this Court. * * *

Given our history paralleling our jurisprudence with that of the federal courts in affording defendants meaningful review on appeals, and without any reason to deviate from that tradition today, we hold that there is no state constitutional right to legal representation on an application for leave to appeal to this Court. People v Grimes, 2018 NY Slip Op 07038, CtApp 10-23-18

CRIMINAL LAW (MISSING THE DEADLINES FOR APPLYING FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL TO THE COURT OF APPEALS DOES NOT GIVE RISE TO A WRIT OF ERROR CORAM NOBIS OR AN EXCEPTION TO CPL 460.30 BASED UPON INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL OR A VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS (CT APP))/APPEALS (CRIMINAL LAW, MISSING THE DEADLINES FOR APPLYING FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL TO THE COURT OF APPEALS DOES NOT GIVE RISE TO A WRIT OF ERROR CORAM NOBIS OR AN EXCEPTION TO CPL 460.30 BASED UPON INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL OR A VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS (CT APP))/ATTORNEYS (CRIMINAL LAW, APPEALS, MISSING THE DEADLINES FOR APPLYING FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL TO THE COURT OF APPEALS DOES NOT GIVE RISE TO A WRIT OF ERROR CORAM NOBIS OR AN EXCEPTION TO CPL 460.30 BASED UPON INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL OR A VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS (CT APP))/RIGHT TO COUNSEL (APPEALS, MISSING THE DEADLINES FOR APPLYING FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL TO THE COURT OF APPEALS DOES NOT GIVE RISE TO A WRIT OF ERROR CORAM NOBIS OR AN EXCEPTION TO CPL 460.30 BASED UPON INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL OR A VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS (CT APP))/CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (CRIMINAL LAW, APPEALS, MISSING THE DEADLINES FOR APPLYING FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL TO THE COURT OF APPEALS DOES NOT GIVE RISE TO A WRIT OF ERROR CORAM NOBIS OR AN EXCEPTION TO CPL 460.30 BASED UPON INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL OR A VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS (CT APP))/CORAM NOBIS (MISSING THE DEADLINES FOR APPLYING FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL TO THE COURT OF APPEALS DOES NOT GIVE RISE TO A WRIT OF ERROR CORAM NOBIS OR AN EXCEPTION TO CPL 460.30 BASED UPON INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL OR A VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS (CT APP))/INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE (APPEALS, MISSING THE DEADLINES FOR APPLYING FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL TO THE COURT OF APPEALS DOES NOT GIVE RISE TO A WRIT OF ERROR CORAM NOBIS OR AN EXCEPTION TO CPL 460.30 BASED UPON INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL OR A VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS (CT APP))

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THE DENIAL OF DEFENDANT’S PETITION FOR A DE NOVO JURY TRIAL TO DETERMINE WHETHER HE IS MENTALLY ILL IS APPEALABLE AS OF RIGHT AND THE PETITION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, AN EXCEPTION TO THE MOOTNESS DOCTRINE APPLIED AND DEFENSE COUNSEL’S STATEMENTS AND THE DEFENSE EXPERT’S TESTIMONY AT THE HEARING TO THE EFFECT DEFENDANT WAS MENTALLY ILL DID NOT CONSTITUTE A WAIVER OF THE DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO A DE NOVO TRIAL (FIRST DEPT).

he First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant’s petition requesting a de novo jury trial on whether defendant is mentally ill should have been granted. The First Department held that the exception to the mootness doctrine applied to allow appeal, the denial of the petition was appealable as of right, and the remarks of defense counsel and the testimony of the defense expert at the hearing to the effect defendant is mentally ill did not waive defendant’s right to a trial de novo:

This case satisfies the exception to the mootness doctrine because there is “(1) a likelihood of repetition, either between the parties or among other members of the public; (2) a phenomenon typically evading review; and (3) a showing of significant or important questions not previously passed on, i.e., substantial and novel issues” … . Commitment and retention proceedings generally involve orders of short duration, which typically evade review … . Moreover, the issue before us is substantial, as it requires us to decide whether statements by defendant’s counsel and his expert could operate to deprive a defendant of his statutory right to demand a jury trial de novo on the “basic liberty issue” of whether he can be confined … . …

… [T]there can be no serious dispute that the order of the motion court, which denied defendant the opportunity to present his case before a jury, as provided for under CPL 330.20(16), affected a substantial right. * * * Since the motion court’s order affected a substantial right of defendant, we hold that his appeal is properly before us as one taken as of right under CPLR 5701(a)(2)(v). * * *

Here, defendant timely expressed his dissatisfaction with a recommitment order that was based on a threshold finding that he had a mental illness. Once defendant met those core requirements, he was entitled to a de novo trial at which a jury would decide whether he was mentally ill based on the evidence then existing. Matter of New York State Off. of Mental Health v Marco G., 2018 NY Slip Op 06998, First Dept 10-18-18

CRIMINAL LAW (CPL 330.20, MENTAL ILLNESS, THE DENIAL OF DEFENDANT’S PETITION FOR A DE NOVO JURY TRIAL TO DETERMINE WHETHER HE IS MENTALLY ILL IS APPEALABLE AS OF RIGHT AND THE PETITION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, AN EXCEPTION TO THE MOOTNESS DOCTRINE APPLIED AND DEFENSE COUNSEL’S STATEMENTS AND THE DEFENSE EXPERT’S TESTIMONY AT THE HEARING TO THE EFFECT DEFENDANT WAS MENTALLY ILL DID NOT CONSTITUTE A WAIVER OF THE DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO A DE NOVO TRIAL (FIRST DEPT))/APPEALS (CRIMINAL LAW, MENTAL ILLNESS, THE DENIAL OF DEFENDANT’S PETITION FOR A DE NOVO JURY TRIAL TO DETERMINE WHETHER HE IS MENTALLY ILL IS APPEALABLE AS OF RIGHT AND THE PETITION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, AN EXCEPTION TO THE MOOTNESS DOCTRINE APPLIED AND DEFENSE COUNSEL’S STATEMENTS AND THE DEFENSE EXPERT’S TESTIMONY AT THE HEARING TO THE EFFECT DEFENDANT WAS MENTALLY ILL DID NOT CONSTITUTE A WAIVER OF THE DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO A DE NOVO TRIAL (FIRST DEPT))/MENTAL HYGIENE LAW (CRIMINAL LAW, MENTAL ILLNESS, THE DENIAL OF DEFENDANT’S PETITION FOR A DE NOVO JURY TRIAL TO DETERMINE WHETHER HE IS MENTALLY ILL IS APPEALABLE AS OF RIGHT AND THE PETITION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, AN EXCEPTION TO THE MOOTNESS DOCTRINE APPLIED AND DEFENSE COUNSEL’S STATEMENTS AND THE DEFENSE EXPERT’S TESTIMONY AT THE HEARING TO THE EFFECT DEFENDANT WAS MENTALLY ILL DID NOT CONSTITUTE A WAIVER OF THE DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO A DE NOVO TRIAL (FIRST DEPT))/MOOTNESS DOCTRINE (APPEALS, CRIMINAL LAW, CPL 330.20, MENTAL ILLNESS, THE DENIAL OF DEFENDANT’S PETITION FOR A DE NOVO JURY TRIAL TO DETERMINE WHETHER HE IS MENTALLY ILL IS APPEALABLE AS OF RIGHT AND THE PETITION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, AN EXCEPTION TO THE MOOTNESS DOCTRINE APPLIED AND DEFENSE COUNSEL’S STATEMENTS AND THE DEFENSE EXPERT’S TESTIMONY AT THE HEARING TO THE EFFECT DEFENDANT WAS MENTALLY ILL DID NOT CONSTITUTE A WAIVER OF THE DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO A DE NOVO TRIAL (FIRST DEPT))

NO EVIDENCE ROBBERY VICTIM SAW A FIREARM, ROBBERY FIRST CONVICTION VACATED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing the robbery first conviction, over a partial dissent, determined that there was no evidence the victim saw a firearm:

… [T]he evidence did not establish the element of display of what appeared to be a firearm … . The robbery was accomplished by assaulting the victim and taking his wallet. Although an eyewitness saw the display of what appeared to be a firearm, there was no evidence that the victim ever saw it … . People v Allende, 2018 NY Slip Op 06967, First Dept 10-18-18

CRIMINAL LAW (NO EVIDENCE ROBBERY VICTIM SAW A FIREARM, ROBBERY FIRST CONVICTION VACATED (FIRST DEPT))/ROBBERY (NO EVIDENCE ROBBERY VICTIM SAW A FIREARM, ROBBERY FIRST CONVICTION VACATED (FIRST DEPT))

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PEOPLE’S REQUEST FOR AN UPWARD DEPARTURE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined the People’s request for an upward departure in this SORA risk assessment proceeding should not have been granted:

An upward departure is permitted only if the court concludes, upon clear and convincing evidence, “that there exists an aggravating . . . factor of a kind, or to a degree, not otherwise adequately taken into account by the guidelines” … . In determining whether an upward departure is permissible and, if permissible, appropriate, a SORA court must engage in a three-step inquiry. First, the court must determine whether the People have articulated, as a matter of law, a legitimate aggravating factor. Next, the court must determine whether the People have established, by clear and convincing evidence, the facts supporting the presence of that factor in the case before it. Upon the People’s satisfaction of these two requirements, an upward departure becomes discretionary. If, upon examining all of the circumstances relevant to the offender’s risk of reoffense and danger to the community, the court concludes that the presumptive risk level would result in an underassessment of the risk or danger of reoffense, it may upwardly depart … . If, however, the People do not satisfy the first two requirements, the court does not have the discretion to depart from the presumptive risk level… .

In this case, the People failed at the hearing to identify “an aggravating . . . factor of a kind, or to a degree, not otherwise adequately taken into account by the guidelines” … . Specifically, the defendant’s abuse of trust within a family relationship is already adequately accounted for by the Guidelines … . People v Mota, 2018 NY Slip Op 06950, Second Dept 10-18-18

CRIMINAL LAW (SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION ACT (SORA) PEOPLE’S REQUEST FOR AN UPWARD DEPARTURE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION ACT (SORA) (PEOPLE’S REQUEST FOR AN UPWARD DEPARTURE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))

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ADJUDICATED JUVENILE DELINQUENT NOT ELIGIBLE FOR SPECIAL IMMIGRANT JUVENILE STATUS (SIJS) (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Rivera, over an extensive dissent, determined that an adjudicated juvenile delinquent was not eligible for special immigrant juvenile status (SIJS):

On the instant appeal, this Court is presented with the issue of whether the Family Court properly denied the renewed motion of Keanu S. (hereinafter the child) for the issuance of an order declaring that he is dependent on the Family Court and making specific findings so as to enable him to petition the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services for special immigrant juvenile status pursuant to 8 USC § 1101(a)(27)(J). Specifically, the Family Court rejected the child’s contention that he was dependent upon a juvenile court, within the meaning of 8 USC § 1101(a)(27)(J)(i), by virtue of his placement in the custody of the Commissioner of Social Services of the City of New York following his adjudication as a juvenile delinquent. … [W]e agree with the Family Court’s determination and conclude that such a placement does not satisfy the requirement of dependency under the statute. * * *

We hold that the child herein is not an intended beneficiary of the SIJS provisions. He was not placed in the custody of the Commissioner of Social Services due to his status as an abused, neglected, or abandoned child. Instead, he was placed in the custody of the Commissioner of Social Services after committing acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted serious crimes. His violent acts and misconduct have resulted in painful and terrible consequences to his victims. In fact, even while under probation, his encounters with the law persisted. In effect, the child attempts to utilize his wrongdoings and the resultant juvenile delinquency adjudication as a conduit or a vehicle to meet the dependency requirement for SIJS. Such a determination is in conflict with the primary intent of Congress in enacting the SIJS scheme, namely, to protect abused, neglected, and abandoned immigrant children. We cannot fathom that Congress envisioned, intended, or proposed that a child could satisfy this requirement by committing acts which, if committed by adults, would constitute crimes, so as to warrant a court’s involvement or the legal commitment to an individual appointed by a state or juvenile court. Matter of Keanu S., 2018 NY Slip Op 06918, Second Dept 10-17-18

FAMILY LAW (ADJUDICATED JUVENILE DELINQUENT NOT ELIGIBLE FOR SPECIAL IMMIGRANT JUVENILE STATUS (SIJS) (SECOND DEPT))/IMMIGRATION LAW (FAMILY LAW, ADJUDICATED JUVENILE DELINQUENT NOT ELIGIBLE FOR SPECIAL IMMIGRANT JUVENILE STATUS (SIJS) (SECOND DEPT))/CRIMINAL LAW (FAMILY LAW, ADJUDICATED JUVENILE DELINQUENT NOT ELIGIBLE FOR SPECIAL IMMIGRANT JUVENILE STATUS (SIJS) (SECOND DEPT))/SPECIAL IMMIGRANT JUVENILE STATUS (SIJS)  ADJUDICATED JUVENILE DELINQUENT NOT ELIGIBLE FOR SPECIAL IMMIGRANT JUVENILE STATUS (SIJS) (SECOND DEPT))/JUVENILE DELINQUENT (FAMILY LAW, SPECIAL IMMIGRANT JUVENILE STATUS, ADJUDICATED JUVENILE DELINQUENT NOT ELIGIBLE FOR SPECIAL IMMIGRANT JUVENILE STATUS (SIJS) (SECOND DEPT))

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