Criminal Law – Page 202 – New York Appellate Digest

DEFENDANT WAS NOT PROPERLY NOTIFIED OF THE ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF PROBATION AND THE FINDING THAT DEFENDANT VIOLATED A CONDITION WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing County Court, determined defendant was not properly notified of alleged violations of probation and the proof did not support a finding that defendant violated a condition of probation:

Where a violation of probation is alleged to have occurred, a written statement must be filed with the court and provided to defendant “setting forth the condition or conditions of the sentence violated and a reasonable description of the time, place and manner in which the violation occurred” (CPL 410.70 [2] …). Here, the details of the alleged violations in the uniform court report only included the that defendant violated condition 2, which required her to obey all state and federal laws, by engaging in conduct that led to her September 2015 and March 2016 arrests. Although a different section of the uniform court report summarizing defendant’s probation supervision referenced other incidents that County Court made findings with respect thereto, the uniform court report only alleged that defendant violated condition 2 of the terms of her probation (see CPL 410.70 [2]). Moreover, defendant’s probation officer acknowledged in her testimony that defendant was not charged in the uniform court report with violating conditions 8, 12 and 16. Notwithstanding the testimony that was allowed at the hearing with regard to conditions 8, 12 and 16, defendant was not provided with a written statement informing her that she was also being charged with violating these conditions of her probation. Accordingly, County Court’s finding that defendant violated these terms of her probation was improper (see CPL 410.70 [2]…). …

Condition 2 of the terms of defendant’s probation required her to obey all federal, state and local laws and notify her probation officer immediately if questioned or arrested by a law enforcement agency or if convicted of a new offense. In support of its allegation that defendant violated this condition, the People adduced the testimony of defendant’s probation officer who testified, in relevant part, that defendant notified her of both the September 2015 and March 2016 arrests and charges. Beyond the probation officer’s testimony that defendant had been arrested on two occasions, no additional evidence or proof was offered as to the underlying acts. Accordingly, County Court’s finding that defendant violated condition 2 of her probation was not supported by a preponderance of the evidence … . People v Johnson, 2019 NY Slip Op 05018, Third Dept 6-20-19

June 20, 2019

Appeals, Criminal Law, Evidence

THE PEOPLE DID NOT PROVE THE POLICE OFFICER DEFENDANT PUNCHED WAS ENGAGED IN A LAWFUL DUTY AT THE TIME OF THE ASSAULT, THE PEOPLE ARE HELD TO THE ‘HEAVIER BURDEN’ IN THE DEFINITION OF ‘LAWFUL DUTY’ PROVIDED TO THE JURY WITHOUT OBJECTION, DEFENDANT’S ASSAULT CONVICTION WAS AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department reversed defendant’s assault conviction. Defendant and his brother were sitting on an elevated subway grate when they were approached by two police officers. Defendant’s brother became angry, telling one of the officers to leave him alone and yelling. Defendant restrained his brother, telling him to calm down. At some point defendant suddenly punched one of the police officers. The jury was instructed that, to find the defendant guilty of a violation of Penal Law 120.05(3), the injured police officer must have been engaged in a lawful duty at the time of the assault. The definition of “lawful duty” provided to the jury included a “heavier burden” of proof, to which the People must be held because there was no objection to the instruction. Pursuant to the law as provided to the jury, defendant’s assault conviction was against the weight of the evidence:

Since the People failed to register any objection to the Supreme Court’s supplemental charge, they were bound to satisfy the heavier burden of proof contained therein … , and we must weigh the evidence in light of the elements of the crimes as charged to the jury without objection … .

The consistent testimony of the two police officers shows that they were not in the process of arresting the defendant when the assault occurred. Moreover, while the trial evidence establishes that the defendant’s brother was yelling profanities at the female officer and displaying irate behavior, neither of the officers testified that they intended at any time to arrest the defendant’s brother for any offense, or were attempting to do so at the time of the assault. Under these circumstances, and particularly in light of the highly specific supplemental charge given by the trial court on the meaning of “lawful duty,” the evidence was factually insufficient to prove that the female officer was engaged in a lawful duty, as that term was defined to the jury by the Supreme Court, at the time of the assault by the defendant … . People v Truluck, 2019 NY Slip Op 04969, Second Dept 6-19-19

June 19, 2019

Criminal Law, Evidence

THE ROBBERY VICTIM’S IDENTIFICATION OF DEFENDANT IN A PHOTO ARRAY AFTER THE POLICE HAD SHOWN THE ROBBERY VICTIM A CELL PHONE PHOTO DEPICTING THE DEFENDANT USING A TASER ON SOMEONE SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED, THE ROBBER HAD THREATENED THE VICTIM WITH A TASER (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing defendant’s conviction for one of two robberies charged in the indictment, determined the pretrial identification of the defendant by the robbery victim, Fisher, should have been suppressed. The police were given a cell phone found at the robbery scene. The robber had used a Taser in the Fisher robbery. In the cell phone was a photo of a man using a Taser on a person. Fisher told the police the man in the photo using a Taser was the man who robbed him. Fisher subsequently identified the defendant in a photo array. Even though Fisher’s in-court identification of defendant was deemed admissible, the suppression error was not harmless:

… [T]he procedure employed by the detective in showing Fisher the cell phone videos was a police-arranged identification procedure, even though the police did not arrange the content of the videos on the phone. The procedure by which Fisher viewed the videos occurred at the “deliberate direction of the State,” and not as a result of mere happenstance … . The People failed to meet their initial burden of establishing the reasonableness of the police conduct and the lack of any undue suggestiveness created by the video identification procedure. By showing Fisher the cell phone and telling him that the phone was recovered from the scene of the robbery, the detective suggested that the phone may belong to one of the perpetrators of the robbery. One of the videos portrayed an individual using a taser on someone else, which was similar to Fisher’s description of the circumstances of the robbery. Fisher identified the defendant’s photograph in a photo array only after he was shown the video. Further, contrary to the People’s contention, it cannot be said that the video did not single out or portray the individual with the taser in a negative light. The video portrayed the individual committing a violent criminal act against another person … . Accordingly, the court should have suppressed the video identification on the ground that the identification procedure was unduly suggestive. People v Jones, 2019 NY Slip Op 04966, Second Dept 6-19-19

June 19, 2019

Administrative Law, Criminal Law, Evidence

PETITIONER WAS 14 IN 1990 WHEN HE MURDERED A CLASSMATE AND THE CHILD SHE WAS BABYSITTING, THE PAROLE BOARD PROPERLY DENIED PAROLE FOR THE FIFTH TIME, THE RECORD DEMONSTRATES THE BOARD CONSIDERED ALL THE RELEVANT FACTORS AND DID NOT BASE THEIR DECISION SOLELY ON THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE OFFENSE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined the denial of parole to petitioner, who, in 1990, had killed a 15-year-old classmate, and the 17-month-old child she was babysitting, was not irrational. Although petitioner had made strong rehabilitative and educational efforts, the parole board properly considered all the relevant factors and did not make their decision on the basis of the seriousness of the offense alone:

We note that the literature in the record indicates that the effects of encephalitis could include “[a] lack of awareness and insensitivity” and a “lack of warmth and empathy.” We further note that the Parole Board found that the petitioner appeared to have a “disconnect” and that his remorse was “shallow.” Nevertheless, the interview record and the text of the subject determination establish that the requisite statutory factors were properly considered, and the record does not support the conclusion that the Parole Board’s determination evinces irrationality bordering on impropriety. Contrary to the petitioner’s contention, the Parole Board considered the petitioner’s “youth and its attendant characteristics in relationship to the commission of the crime[s] at issue” … , and did not base its determination solely upon the seriousness of the offenses … . In addition, the interview transcript indicates that the Parole Board took into account a number of other factors that reflected well on the petitioner, but determined that these factors did not outweigh the factors that militated against granting parole. The Parole Board was not required to give each factor equal weight and was entitled to place greater emphasis on the severity of the petitioner’s crimes … . Matter of Campbell v Stanford, 2019 NY Slip Op 04936, Second Dept 6-19-19

June 19, 2019

Criminal Law, Evidence

DEFENDANT CONSTRUCTIVELY POSSESSED STOLEN PROPERTY FOUND IN THE BOILER ROOM OF A GARAGE WHERE DEFENDANT AND TWO OTHERS WERE HIDING FROM THE POLICE AFTER A MUGGING; VICTIM WAS PROPERLY ALLOWED TO IDENTIFY THE DEFENDANT IN COURT, DESPITE THE SUPPRESSION OF THE SHOWUP IDENTIFICATION (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Tom, determined defendant was properly convicted of constructive possession of property taken during a mugging, even though defendant, although present, did not participate in the mugging and was acquitted of robbery. The First Department further held that the victim was properly allowed to identify the defendant at trial, despite the suppression of the showup identification. The defendant was convicted on the theory that he constructively possessed the stolen property which (apparently) was found in the locked boiler room of a garage where he and the other two men involved were found hiding by the police:

… [T]he People established, by clear and convincing evidence, that the victim had a basis for her in-court identification of defendant independent of a previously suppressed showup procedure. A number of factors support the independent source finding ,,, , even when viewed in the light of modern scientific knowledge regarding identifications. The victim had an unobstructed view of defendant and the other two perpetrators, under good lighting, at close range, and had sufficient time to observe them while she was being attacked. …

Defendant’s presence, his hiding in an oily sump pit inside with the two robbers, and his attempt to physically resist detention compel the conclusion that defendant manifested a consciousness of guilt. Police testimony thus clearly established that defendant had been a participant in the criminal venture and that he exercised dominion and control over the room where the perpetrators were essentially trapped in close proximity to the stolen property, and thereby exercised dominion and control over, and thus joint constructive possession of, the property itself. People v Santiago, 2019 NY Slip Op 04897, First Dept 6-18-19

June 18, 2019

Appeals, Criminal Law

ARGUMENT THAT PROBATION CONDITIONS ARE ILLEGAL SURVIVES A WAIVER OF APPEAL AND THE FAILURE TO PRESERVE THE ERROR (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department noted that defendant’s argument that the conditions of his probation were illegal survived a waiver of appeal and the failure to preserve the error:

Defendant further contends … that the court imposed several unlawful conditions of probation. Initially, we note that defendant’s contentions are not encompassed by the valid waiver of the right to appeal because they are based on challenges to the legality of the sentence … . Additionally, although defendant failed to preserve those contentions for our review, there is a “narrow exception to [the] preservation rule permitting appellate review when a sentence’s illegality is readily discernible from the trial record” … , and that exception encompasses a contention that a “probation condition is unlawful because it is not reasonably related to rehabilitation or is outside the authority of the court to impose” … . We conclude that, inasmuch as defendant’s challenges to the conditions of probation here “implicate the legality of defendant’s sentence and any illegality is evident on the face of the record, those claims are not barred by . . . defendant’s failure to preserve them” … . …

With respect to the merits, the People correctly concede that the court erred in barring defendant from all use of the internet. The statute provides that a sentencing “court may require that the defendant comply with a reasonable limitation on his or her use of the internet . . . provided that the court shall not prohibit such sentenced offender from using the internet in connection with education, lawful employment or search for lawful employment” … . People v Castaneda, 2019 NY Slip Op 04860, Fourth Dept 6-14-19

June 14, 2019

Criminal Law, Family Law

THE FAMILY OFFENSE PETITION DID NOT ALLEGE ALL THE ELEMENTS OF HARASSMENT SECOND DEGREE AND WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department determined the portion of the family-offense petition which charged harassment in the second degree was properly dismissed because it did not allege all the elements of the offense:

A person commits harassment in the second degree under Penal Law § 240.26 (3) when he or she, “with intent to harass, annoy or alarm another person[,] engages in a course of conduct or repeatedly commits acts which alarm or seriously annoy such other person and which serve no legitimate purpose” … . Thus, “[t]o be viable under the circumstances here, the [petition was] required to allege that respondent[, inter alia,] engaged in a course of conduct that did alarm or seriously annoy petitioner and the conduct served no legitimate purpose” … . Although the petition before us accuses respondent of engaging in a course of conduct that annoyed and alarmed petitioner, nowhere does it allege that respondent’s alleged course of conduct “serve[d] no legitimate purpose” (§ 240.26 [3]). Thus, the petition does not adequately plead an allegation that respondent committed harassment in the second degree under section 240.26 (3), and the court therefore properly dismissed the petition to that extent … . Matter of Rohrback v Monaco, 2019 NY Slip Op 04851, Fourth Dept 6-14-19

June 14, 2019

Appeals, Criminal Law

SENTENCING COURT MUST DIRECT THE MANNER IN WHICH RESTITUTION IS TO BE PAID, MATTER REMITTED, ISSUE SURVIVES A WAIVER OF APPEAL AND THE FAILURE TO PRESERVE THE ERROR (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department determined the sentencing court’s failure to direct how the restitution is to be paid required remittal. This illegal sentence issue is not foreclosed by a waiver of appeal or the failure to preserve the issue:

… [T]here is merit to defendant’s contention that the restitution component of his sentence must be vacated because the court failed to direct the manner of payment, in violation of CPL 420.10 (1). Defendant’s contention is a challenge to the legality of the sentence and thus survives his waiver of the right to appeal … and, based upon “the essential nature of the right to be sentenced as provided by law,” we review that contention notwithstanding defendant’s failure to raise it at sentencing … . Although we affirm the amount of restitution ordered by the court, we modify the judgment by vacating that part of the sentence ordering restitution … , and we remit the matter to County Court to fix the manner in which the restitution is to be paid. People v Lamagna, 2019 NY Slip Op 04849, Fourth Dept 6-14-19

June 14, 2019

Criminal Law, Evidence

PEOPLE FAILED TO PROVE THE VICTIM-AGE AND TIME-PERIOD ELEMENTS OF PREDATORY SEXUAL ASSAULT AGAINST A CHILD, CONVICTION REVERSED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing defendant’s conviction for predatory sexual assault against a child. Essentially the People did not present evidence to support the assaults occurred before the victim turned 13 or during a period of less than three months (statutory criteria):

Without narrowing the time frame, it is entirely possible that the testified-to instances of anal sexual conduct that allegedly occurred at that residence happened before the statute’s effective date or after the victim turned 13 years old. The People also failed to establish that the criminal conduct occurred over a period of time not less than three months in duration (see Penal Law §§ 130.96, 130.75 [1]). In short, there were no “markers” in the evidence at trial about when the conduct occurred that would allow the jury to conclude that defendant committed predatory sexual assault against a child at the relevant time … . People v Partridge, 2019 NY Slip Op 04848, Fourth Dept 6-14-19

June 14, 2019

Appeals, Criminal Law

2003 DEPRAVED INDIFFERENCE MURDER CONVICTION REVERSED, THE CASE WAS ON APPEAL WHEN THE COURT OF APPEALS DETERMINED AN INTENTIONAL MURDER OF A SINGLE VICTIM WITH A WEAPON DOES NOT MEET THE CRITERIA FOR DEPRAVED INDIFFERENCE MURDER (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department determined a 2003 murder depraved indifference murder conviction must be reversed because the case was on appeal when the law of depraved indifference murder was clarified to exclude the intentional murder of a single victim with a weapon:

… [W]e conclude that the evidence establishes that defendant accosted decedent, who was leaving a grocery store. Defendant, who told police investigators he had been informed that decedent had been sent by another man to injure defendant, confronted decedent, grabbed him by either his clothing or by a gold necklace that he was wearing, and dragged him across the street. A friend of decedent’s attempted to intervene at some point, at which time defendant displayed a weapon and attempted to shoot the friend, but the gun did not fire. Defendant struck decedent in the face with the handgun, and decedent’s friend ran to his car and drove it toward the location where defendant was with decedent. Defendant then fired the weapon approximately eight times. At least six of those shots hit decedent, including two shots that entered his back, and two shots hit the car that decedent’s friend was driving. …

In his motion for a trial order of dismissal with respect to the count of depraved indifference murder, defense counsel argued that defendant’s “conduct was intentional or it was nothing at all. If this isn’t intentional I don’t know what is.” Thus, the issue raised on this de novo appeal was presented to Supreme Court and is therefore preserved for our review.

Next, although defendant was convicted before the Court of Appeals decided People v Feingold (7 NY3d 288, 296 [2006]), which definitively stated for the first time that the depraved indifference element of depraved indifference murder is a culpable mental state rather than the circumstances under which the killing is committed, the People correctly concede that the Feingold standard applies to this appeal inasmuch as defendant’s direct appeal was pending when Feingold was decided … . People v Parris, 2019 NY Slip Op 04828, Fourth Dept 6-14-19

June 14, 2019

DEFENDANT WAS NOT PROPERLY NOTIFIED OF THE ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF PROBATION AND THE FINDING THAT DEFENDANT VIOLATED A CONDITION WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE (THIRD DEPT).

THE ROBBERY VICTIM’S IDENTIFICATION OF DEFENDANT IN A PHOTO ARRAY AFTER THE POLICE HAD SHOWN THE ROBBERY VICTIM A CELL PHONE PHOTO DEPICTING THE DEFENDANT USING A TASER ON SOMEONE SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED, THE ROBBER HAD THREATENED THE VICTIM WITH A TASER (SECOND DEPT).

DEFENDANT CONSTRUCTIVELY POSSESSED STOLEN PROPERTY FOUND IN THE BOILER ROOM OF A GARAGE WHERE DEFENDANT AND TWO OTHERS WERE HIDING FROM THE POLICE AFTER A MUGGING; VICTIM WAS PROPERLY ALLOWED TO IDENTIFY THE DEFENDANT IN COURT, DESPITE THE SUPPRESSION OF THE SHOWUP IDENTIFICATION (FIRST DEPT).

ARGUMENT THAT PROBATION CONDITIONS ARE ILLEGAL SURVIVES A WAIVER OF APPEAL AND THE FAILURE TO PRESERVE THE ERROR (FOURTH DEPT).

THE FAMILY OFFENSE PETITION DID NOT ALLEGE ALL THE ELEMENTS OF HARASSMENT SECOND DEGREE AND WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED (FOURTH DEPT).

SENTENCING COURT MUST DIRECT THE MANNER IN WHICH RESTITUTION IS TO BE PAID, MATTER REMITTED, ISSUE SURVIVES A WAIVER OF APPEAL AND THE FAILURE TO PRESERVE THE ERROR (FOURTH DEPT).

PEOPLE FAILED TO PROVE THE VICTIM-AGE AND TIME-PERIOD ELEMENTS OF PREDATORY SEXUAL ASSAULT AGAINST A CHILD, CONVICTION REVERSED (FOURTH DEPT).

2003 DEPRAVED INDIFFERENCE MURDER CONVICTION REVERSED, THE CASE WAS ON APPEAL WHEN THE COURT OF APPEALS DETERMINED AN INTENTIONAL MURDER OF A SINGLE VICTIM WITH A WEAPON DOES NOT MEET THE CRITERIA FOR DEPRAVED INDIFFERENCE MURDER (FOURTH DEPT).

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