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DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE IN FAILING TO INVESTIGATE FOUR WITNESSES WHO MAY HAVE CALLED INTO QUESTION THE EYEWITNESS’S ABILITY TO SEE THE SHOOTING AND THE DEFENDANT’S WHEREABOUTS AT THE TIME OF THE SHOOTING; DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO VACATE HIS CONVICTION ON INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE GROUNDS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing County Court, determined defendant’s motion to vacate his conviction, after a hearing, should have been granted on ineffective assistance grounds. Defense counsel was aware of three witnesses who called into question whether the eyewitness to the shooting was outside where she could have seen the shooting, or inside where she could not. In addition defense counsel was aware of an alibi witness. Defense counsel did not sufficiently investigate these witnesses:

… [T]he case against defendant centered, in part, upon the identification of him as the shooter by the eyewitness. The witnesses identified in the letter sent by the People would have cast further doubt on the eyewitness’ identification testimony, as well as whether she could have even seen the shooting. Yet, the record reflects that counsel made little efforts to reach out to these witnesses and minimal follow-up efforts.

Defendant also argues that he received ineffective assistance due to counsel’s failure to investigate an alibi witness. At the hearing, defendant’s uncle testified that defendant was with him in a house at the time of the shooting and that they were nowhere near the area where the shooting occurred. The uncle further stated that he was willing to testify at trial and left numerous voice messages for defendant’s counsel. Defendant’s counsel testified that she did not receive any voice messages from the uncle but recalled that the uncle would be an alibi witness. Other than stating in a conclusory manner that she was unable to locate the uncle, the record fails to show diligent attempts by counsel to reach him. The uncle’s testimony would have bolstered the defense by providing the jury with conflicting evidence as to defendant’s whereabouts at the time of the shooting. In our view, the failure to investigate this potential alibi defense and the witnesses who would have refuted the eyewitness’ location at the time of the shooting cannot be considered a reasonable trial strategy … . People v Lanier, 2021 NY Slip Op 01094, Third Dept 2-18-21

 

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THE SEARCH WARRANT DID NOT AUTHORIZE THE SEARCH OF DEFENDANT’S VEHICLES; SEIZED ITEMS PROPERLY SUPPRESSED (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Wilson, over a three-judge dissent, determined that the search warrant did not authorize the search of defendant’s vehicles and the items seized were properly suppressed:

The requirement that warrants must describe with particularity the places, vehicles, and persons to be searched is vital to judicial supervision of the warrant process … . Warrants “interpose the detached and independent judgment of a neutral Magistrate between the interested viewpoint of those engaged in ferreting out crime and potential encroachments on the sanctity and privacy of the individual” … . To further that role, our constitution assigns to the magistrate the tasks of evaluating whether probable cause exists to initiate a search and defining the subjects to be searched … .

The particularity requirement protects the magistrate’s determination regarding the permissible scope of the search. Thus, to be valid, a search warrant must be “specific enough to leave no discretion to the executing officer” … . So important is the role of the neutral and detached magistrate that we have in the past parted ways from federal constitutional jurisprudence when we believed that an emerging rule of federal constitutional law “dilute[s] . . . the requirements of judicial supervision in the warrant process” …

… The application contained no mention of the existence of the vehicles ultimately searched, much less evidence connecting them to any criminality. Indeed, the observed pattern, as described in the affidavit, was for Mr. Gordon [defendant] to proceed from the residence to the street and back, without detouring to any vehicles parked at the residence. … “[N]o observation was reported as to any movement of persons between the house and the [vehicles]” … that would substantiate a belief that the vehicles searched were utilized in the alleged criminal activity.

Nor do we believe that the warrant for Mr. Gordon’s “person” or “premises”—in the context of the factual allegations averred by the detectives—authorized a search of the vehicles. … [T]he mere presence of a vehicle seen at the sight of premises wherein the police suspect criminal activity to be occurring does not by itself provide probable cause to search the vehicle … . People v Gordon, 2021 NY Slip Op 01093, CtApp 2-18-21

 

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2016 REGULATIONS RESTRICTING ATTORNEY’S FEES FOR CLAIMS MADE TO THE OFFICE OF VICTIM SERVICES (OVS) ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE STATUTORY LANGUAGE (EXECUTIVE LAW) AND RATIONAL (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Stein, over a two-judge dissent and a concurrence, reversing the Appellate Division, determined that the Office of Victim Services (OVS) regulations limiting attorney’s fees for crime victim claimants were consistent with the statutory language and rational:

OVS regulations formerly provided that claimants had a “right to be represented . . . at all stages of a claim” … and, “[w]henever an award [was] made to a claimant who [was] represented by an attorney, [OVS was required to] approve a reasonable fee commensurate with the services rendered, up to $1,000,” unless the request for attorneys’ fees was premised on a claim “submitted without legal or factual basis” … . OVS acknowledges that this meant that attorneys’ fees, if reasonable, were available at all stages of a claim. However, effective January 13, 2016, OVS amended 9 NYCRR § 525.9 to provide that “[a]ny claimant . . . may choose to be represented before [OVS], at any stages of a claim, by an attorney-at-law . . . and/or before the Appellate Division upon judicial review of the office’s final determination,” but “only those fees incurred by a claimant during: (1) the administrative review for reconsideration of such decision . . . ; and/or (2) the judicial review of the final decision of [OVS] . . . may be considered for reimbursement” … .

OVS issued a regulatory impact statement indicating that the “purpose of th[e] rule change [wa]s to limit attorneys’ fees pursuant to article 22 of the Executive Law.” OVS stated that the amendments were “designed to conform the regulations to the enacting statute,” explaining that the prior regulations permitted claimants to recover attorneys’ fees that “far exceed[ed]” the “reasonable expenses” specified under Executive Law § 626 (1). OVS indicates that Victim Assistance Programs (VAPs) are federally funded with a state match, and it emphasized in its regulatory impact statement that it “fund[ed] 228 [VAPs] across New York State, distributing in excess of $35 million to these programs to assist and advocate on behalf of victims and claimants.” The required services provided by the VAPs include, among other things, “assist[ing] victims and/or claimants in completing and submitting OVS applications and assist[ing] claimants through the claim process.” OVS determined that the legislature did not intend that attorneys’ fees incurred in relation to assistance within the scope of services provided by VAPs would be considered reasonable under the statute. Matter of Juarez v New York State Off. of Victim Servs., 2021 NY Slip Op 01091, CtApp 2-18-21

 

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DEFENDANT, A MEMBER OF THE PROUD BOYS, WAS CONVICTED OF ATTEMPTED GANG ASSAULT OF A MEMBER OF ANTIFA; A BOOT IS A DANGEROUS INSTRUMENT; EXPERT TESTIMONY ON THE ANIMOSITY BETWEEN THE PROUD BOYS AND ANTIFA PROPERLY ALLOWED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department affirmed the conviction of a member of the Proud Boys for the attempted gang assault of an Antifa member. The court held that a boot may constitute a dangerous instrument within the meaning of the assault statutes. In addition, the First Department noted that the People were properly allowed to call an expert witness on extremist groups to explain the animosity between the Proud Boys and Antifa:

Defendants’ intent and attempt to cause physical injury were demonstrated by defendant Kinsman, who while wearing brown leather boots, repeatedly kicked the victim while she was still on the ground and after she had just been repeatedly kicked by another Proud Boy and by defendant Hare who punched the victim and also kicked her multiple times while he was wearing Doc Marten boots … . …

The court providently exercised its discretion in permitting the People to call an expert witness on extremist groups. Some background information regarding the ideology and past conduct of the Proud Boys was permissible to explain the preexisting animosity between the Proud Boys and Antifa at the time of the incident at issue … . … While some of the evidence regarding the Proud Boys’ practices, and in particular racist remarks made by the group’s founder, were immaterial to the issues at trial, and their potential for prejudice outweighed any probative value, the court issued a limiting instruction that the background information provided by the expert was not proof of the defendants’ mental states. People v Kinsman, 2021 NY Slip Op 01009, First Dept 2-15-21

 

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SNATCHING A PURSE DANGLING FROM THE VICTIM’S ARM DID NOT INVOVLE THE PHYSICAL FORCE NECESSARY FOR ROBBERY THIRD, RENDERING THE CONVICTION AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE; REDUCED TO PETIT LARCENY (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reducing defendant’s robbery 3rd conviction to petit larceny, determined that the physical force element was not involved rendering the conviction against the weight of the evidence:

Judgment * * * unanimously modified, on the facts and as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice, to the extent of reducing the robbery conviction to petit larceny and reducing the sentence on that conviction to time served …. .

Defendant’s conduct in snatching the purse that was dangling from the victim’s arm did not involve the physical force required to sustain a conviction of robbery (see People v Dobbs, 24 AD3d 1043 [3d Dept 2005]; People v Middleton, 212 AD2d 809, 810 [2d Dept 1995]; compare People v Santiago, 62 AD2d 572, 579 [2d Dept 1978], aff’d 48 NY2d 1023 [1980]). Accordingly, defendant’s conviction of robbery in the third degree was not supported by legally sufficient evidence, and that verdict was against the weight of the evidence … . People v Kourouma, 2021 NY Slip Op 01011, First Dept 2-16-21

 

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THE TRANSCRIBED RECORD IS WOEFULLY INCOMPLETE; DEFENDANT DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE RECORD COULD NOT BE RECONSTRUCTED; MATTER REMITTED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, holding the case and reserving decision, remitted the matter for reconstruction of the record which was missing several vital parts:

… [M]issing and otherwise defective transcripts from the trial preclude appellate review of defendant’s conviction. Indeed, the present state of the record on appeal is “deplorable” … inasmuch as it is missing, inter alia, three days of jury selection, opening statements, summations, final jury instructions, County Court’s handling of a jury note, and the verdict. In addition, the transcription of the testimony of some of the witnesses includes irregularities such as notations stating “omitted,” “untranscribable,” and “blah, blah,” and unintelligible strings of characters that appear to be in code. We reject defendant’s contention, however, that summary reversal and a new trial is the appropriate remedy at this point. The “loss of reporter’s minutes is rarely sufficient reason in itself for reversing a conviction” … . The Court of Appeals has held that “the right of a defendant to a fair appeal, or for that matter a fair trial, does not necessarily guarantee him [or her] a perfect trial or a perfect appeal” … . “To overcome the presumption of regularity, a defendant must show not only that minutes are missing, but also ‘that there were inadequate means from which it could be determined whether appealable and reviewable issues were present’ ” … . It is only when a defendant shows that a reconstruction is not possible that a defendant is entitled to summary reversal and a new trial … .

Here, we conclude that defendant failed to establish that alternative means to provide an adequate record are not available … .There is no indication that defendant’s former attorneys could not participate in a reconstruction hearing, despite the fact that one of them is now employed by the District Attorney’s Office. There is also no indication that the now-retired trial judge could not participate as well … . People v Meyers, 2021 NY Slip Op 00919, Fourth Dept 2-11-21

 

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ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT ACTED SUSPICIOUSLY THE POLICE DID NOT HAVE A REASONABLE SUSPICION HE WAS ENGAGED IN CRIMINAL ACTIVITY AT THE TIME DEFENDANT FLED; DEFENDANT’S SUPPRESSION MOTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing County Court, over a two-justice dissent, determined the police did not have reasonable suspicion defendant was involved in criminal activity at the time he fled and the police pursued him. Therefore his suppression motion (re: a discarded weapon and statements) should have been granted and the indictment dismissed. Defendant was a passenger in the back seat of a car stopped for a traffic infraction. When the occupants were asked to step out of the car, defendant ran:

… [T]he officers stopped the vehicle for a traffic infraction as opposed to a call related to a particular crime. Although defendant appeared to reach toward his waistband, he never touched his waistband and there was no other indication of a weapon, such as a bulge or the visible outline of a gun … . A suspect’s action in grabbing at his or her waistband, standing alone, is insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion of a crime … .

Defendant’s nervousness, use of a bottle cap, and “blading” do not provide additional specific circumstances indicating that defendant was engaged in criminal activity. There is no doubt that defendant engaged in furtive and suspicious activity and that his pattern of behavior, viewed as a whole, was suspicious, but there is nothing in this record to establish that the officers had a reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct to justify the pursuit … . People v Williams, 2021 NY Slip Op 00983, Fourth Dept 2-11-21

 

THE PEOPLE DID NOT OBTAIN PERMISSION TO PRESENT TO A SECOND GRAND JURY RENDERING THE SECOND INDICTMENT VOID (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing County Court, determined the indictment to which defendant plead guilty was void because the People did not obtain the court’s permission to present to a second grand jury after the first indictment was dismissed:

… [T]he People failed to seek leave pursuant to CPL 210.20 (4) to resubmit the matter to a second grand jury after County Court granted that part of defendant’s omnibus motion seeking to dismiss the original indictment as against him on the ground that the evidence before the first grand jury was legally insufficient. “[T]he failure to obtain leave of court to present a matter to a second grand jury, where required, deprives the grand jury of jurisdiction to hear the matter, thereby rendering the indictment void . . . , which, in turn, deprives the court of jurisdiction” … . Although, here, defendant failed to make a motion to dismiss the indictment issued by the second grand jury pursuant to CPL 210.20 (1), the failure of the People to obtain from the court authorization to submit the matter to the second grand jury deprived the second grand jury of jurisdiction to hear the matter, thereby rendering void the indictment issued by the second grand jury and depriving the court of jurisdiction, and the right to challenge a lack of jurisdiction cannot be waived by defendant … . Under these circumstances, we must dismiss the indictment issued by the second grand jury that is at issue on this appeal … . We note that there is no limit to the number of times that the People may resubmit a charge to a grand jury with leave pursuant to CPL 210.20 (4) … . People v Owens, 2021 NY Slip Op 00958, Fourth Dept 2-11-21

 

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THE TESTIMONY OF THE ACCOMPLICE WAS SUFFICIENTLY CORROBORATED; THE INDICTMENT WAS SUPPORTED BY LEGALLY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the indictment should not have been dismissed because there was sufficient corroboration of the testimony of an accomplice:

The People contend that County Court erred in determining that the grand jury testimony of defendant’s accomplice was not sufficiently corroborated. We agree. The corroboration requirement is satisfied by evidence that ” ‘tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the crime in such a way as may reasonably satisfy the jury that the accomplice is telling the truth’ ” … . Sufficient corroboration may be provided by evidence that ” ‘harmonize[s]’ ” with the accomplice testimony, i.e., when “read with the accomplice’s testimony, [it] makes it more likely that the defendant committed the offense” … .

Here, the accomplice’s testimony that, on a specific date, defendant and the accomplice had a telephone conversation regarding the alleged criminal conduct is corroborated by defendant’s cell phone records, which establish “that cell phone calls were made as the accomplice[] testified” … . The accomplice’s testimony is also corroborated by, among other things, the testimony of non-accomplices and the transcript of the criminal jury trial during which the charged offenses were allegedly committed  … . People v Baska, 2021 NY Slip Op 00947, Fourth Dept 2-11-21

 

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DEFENDANT WAS CONVICTED OF DIRECTING THE CODEFENDANT TO KILL; THE CODEFENDANT WAS ACQUITTED OF MURDER; THE VERDICTS WERE REPUGNANT; DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO OBJECT TO THE REPUGNANT VERDICTS (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing defendant’s conviction, determined defendant’s attorney was ineffective for failing to object to the repugnant verdict. Defendant was convicted of directing the codefendant to shoot and kill the victim. The codefendant was acquitted of the murder charge:

We agree with defendant … that he was denied meaningful representation at trial inasmuch as there is no reasonable and legitimate trial strategy for defense counsel’s failure to object to the repugnant verdicts  … . …

… “[A] conviction will be reversed [as repugnant] only in those instances where acquittal on one crime as charged to the jury is conclusive as to a necessary element of the other crime as charged, for which the guilty verdict was rendered” … . “The determination as to the repugnancy of the verdict is made solely on the basis of the trial court’s charge and not on the correctness of those instructions” … . The repugnancy doctrine also applies when one codefendant is convicted of a crime while another is acquitted of the same crime … . …

By acquitting the codefendant, the jury negated an essential element of the crime for which defendant was charged, i.e., that the codefendant committed the offense at defendant’s direction … . People v Jennings, 2021 NY Slip Op 00944, Fourth Dept 2-11-21

 

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