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THERE WAS NO PROOF IN THE RECORD SUPPORTING THE FINDING THAT THE MISSOURI CONVICTION WAS THE EQUIVALENT OF A NEW YORK FELONY; THEREFORE THE RISK-LEVEL ASSESSMENT WAS REDUCED BY 10 POINTS (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing County Court and remitting the matter, determined there was no proof in the record to support the finding that a Missouri conviction was the equivalent of a New York felony. The 15 points assessed for the foreign conviction was reduced to 5 points:

The Missouri statute under which defendant was convicted requires that a person “knowingly possesses a controlled substance” (Mo Ann Stat § 579.015 [1] … ), with no minimum drug quantity required … . Although criminal possession of a controlled substance is, most often, a felony in New York (see Penal Law §§ 220.21, 220.18, 220.16, 220.09, 220.06), the felony provisions all contain a weight element or require an intent to sell or a predicate conviction, whereas possession of a quantity of a controlled substance below the felony threshold constitutes a class A misdemeanor (see Penal Law § 220.03). Here, the facts and conduct underlying the Missouri conviction of criminal possession of a controlled substance are not in the record and, thus, it is unclear if the conduct underlying that conviction would constitute a felony in New York … . Accordingly, we are constrained to conclude that the record only supports the assessment of 5 points, not 15 points, under risk factor 9. Deducting 10 points from the total score of 110 results in a score of 100, placing defendant in the classification of a presumptive risk level two sex offender. However, the People expressly argued that, if defendant were found to be a risk level two sex offender, an upward departure would be warranted. In light of our holding that defendant is a presumptive risk level two sex offender, the matter must be remitted for County Court to consider whether an upward departure is warranted … . People v Smith, 2021 NY Slip Op 06403, Third Dept 11-18-21

 

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DEFENDANT WAS NOT INFORMED HIS GUILTY PLEA COULD RESULT IN DEPORTATION; THE ISSUE NEED NOT BE PRESERVED FOR APPEAL; MATTER REMITTED TO GIVE DEFENDANT THE OPPORTUNITY TO MOVE TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEA (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, remitting the matter to Supreme Court, determined defendant should be given the opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea because he was not informed of the possibility of deportation. The issue was not subject to the preservation requirement for appeal:

… [T]he defendant’s contention that his due process rights were violated due to the Supreme Court’s failure to warn him that his pleas could subject him to deportation is excepted from the requirement of preservation because the record does not demonstrate that the defendant was aware that he could be deported as a consequence of his pleas of guilty … . Indeed, here, the record shows that the court failed to address the possibility of deportation as a consequence of the defendant’s pleas of guilty … . Inasmuch as there is no indication in the record that the defendant was aware that he could be deported as a result of his pleas … , the defendant had no “practical ability” to object to the court’s comment about immigration consequences or to otherwise tell the court, if he chose, that he would not have pleaded guilty if he had known about the possibility of deportation … .

… [W]e remit the matters to the Supreme Court, Kings County, to afford the defendant an opportunity to move to vacate his pleas of guilty and for a report by the Supreme Court thereafter … . Any such motion shall be made by the defendant within 60 days after the date of this decision and order … . Upon such motion, the defendant will have the burden of establishing that there is a “reasonable probability” that he would not have pleaded guilty had the court warned him of the possibility of deportation … . People v Bamugo, 2021 NY Slip Op 06363, Second Dept 11-17,21

 

THE JURORS IN THIS ATTEMPTED ROBBERY CASE SAW AN INTERNET VIDEO OF DEFENDANT’S CODEFENDANT VIOLENTLY CAUSING A MAN’S DEATH; THE VIDEO HAD NOT BE INTRODUCED OR MENTIONED AT TRIAL; SUPREME COURT SHOULD HAVE GRANTED THE MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE VERDICT (FIRST DEPT). ​

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the defense motion to set aside the verdict based upon juror misconduct should have been granted. The trial court denied the motion after an extensive hearing. The jurors had seen an Internet video of defendant’s codefendant, Lopez, violently causing a man’s death:

“CPL 330.30 (2) authorizes a court to set aside a verdict on the ground of juror misconduct that ‘may have affected a substantial right of the defendant’ and ‘was not known to the defendant prior to the rendition of the verdict.’ If juror misconduct of the kind outlined in CPL 330.30 (2) is found, the court is not to engage in a separate harmless error analysis. However, ‘[a]bsent a showing of prejudice to a substantial right,’ CPL 330.30 (2) is not implicated in the first place. As such, ‘[e]ach case must be examined on its unique facts to determine the nature of the misconduct and the likelihood that prejudice was engendered'” … .

Here, the jurors observed an Internet video of defendant’s codefendant, Lopez, violently causing a man’s death. The video did not appear in evidence and there was no testimony or mention of the video at trial. The video created a substantial risk of prejudicing the verdict as it permitted jurors to perceive the codefendant as having a propensity for violence, and then to perceive that same propensity to apply to defendant through a guilt-by-association chain of reasoning. People v Santana, 2021 NY Slip Op 06329, First Dept 11-16-21

 

THE CUSTODIAL INTERFERENCE OFFENSES DID NOT TAKE PLACE IN ONTARIO COUNTY AND DID NOT HAVE A PARTICULAR EFFECT ON ONTARIO COUNTY; THEREFORE THE COURT DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION OVER THEM (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department determined the custodial interference offenses did not have a “particular effect” in Ontario County, therefore the court did not have jurisdiction over them:

… [I]t is undisputed that all elements of the crime of custodial interference in the first degree were committed outside of Ontario County, the People contend that Ontario County Court could exercise jurisdiction under the ” ‘injured forum’ ” provisions of CPL 20.40 (2) (c) … . That statute provides, in pertinent part, that “[a] person may be convicted in an appropriate criminal court of a particular county, of an offense of which the criminal courts of this state have jurisdiction pursuant to section 20.20, . . . when: . . . [e]ven though none of the conduct constituting such offense may have occurred within such county: . . . [s]uch conduct had, or was likely to have, a particular effect upon such county or a political subdivision or part thereof, and was performed with intent that it would, or with knowledge that it was likely to, have such particular effect therein” … . * * *

… [T]he conduct alleged in the counts of the indictment charging defendant with custodial interference in the first degree occurred outside Ontario County and did not have a materially harmful impact on the governmental processes or community welfare of Ontario County. That conduct impacted three people: the children and their mother, none of whom resided in Ontario County, and did not impact the community as a whole … . People v Roth, 2021 NY Slip Op 06257, Fourth Dept 11-12-21

 

SUPREME COURT SHOULD HAVE CONDUCTED A HEARING ON THE MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE VERDICT ALLEGING RACIAL BIAS AMONG JURORS (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, remitting the matter, determined defendant’s motion to set aside the verdict based upon juror misconduct should not have been denied without a hearing:

… [S]etting aside the verdict “is warranted where a juror had an undisclosed preexisting prejudice that would have resulted in his or her disqualification if it had been revealed during voir dire, such as an undisclosed, pretrial opinion of guilt against the defendant”… .

… [T]he court erred in denying defendant’s motion without a hearing because the sworn allegations in support of the motion, including the affidavits of two jurors, indicated that certain other jurors may have had undisclosed preexisting prejudices against people of defendant’s race that may have affected defendant’s substantial right to an impartial jury and fair trial … . … [A]s early as the evening following the verdict, the two jurors alleged in emails sent directly to the court that, during deliberations, certain other jurors directed racist comments at the defendants and that racial bias had played a role in the verdict. … [T]he detailed affidavits of the two jurors recounting specific instances of racist comments by certain other jurors did, in fact, allege that the verdict was influenced by racial bias against the defendants … . People v Woodard, 2021 NY Slip Op 06256, Fourth Dept 11-12-21

 

THE DWI COUNTS WERE INCLUSORY CONCURRENT COUNTS OF VEHICULAR MANSLAUGHTER WHICH MUST BE DISMISSED AS A MATTER OF LAW (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department noted that DWI is an inclusory concurrent count of vehicular manslaughter:

… [T]he DWI counts of which defendant was convicted are inclusory concurrent counts of vehicular manslaughter in the second degree , reconsideration . Thus, those DWI counts must be dismissed as a matter of law … . People v Conklin, 2021 NY Slip Op 06246, Fourth Dept 11-12-21

 

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THE $1000 FINE FOR THE DWI COUNT WAS HARSH AND EXCESSIVE; THE FAILURE TO IMPOSE A FINE FOR AGGRAVATED UNLICENSED OPERATION WAS ILLEGAL; REFUSING TO SUBMIT TO A BREATH TEST IS NOT A COGNIZABLE OFFENSE (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department determined: (1) the $1000 fine imposed for the driving while intoxicated count (in addition to a period of incarceration) was harsh and excessive; (2) the sentence for aggravated unlicensed operation was illegal; and (3) refusing to submit to a breath test is not a crime:

… [T]he sentence imposed on count two of the indictment is illegal because a fine of between $500 and $5,000 is mandatory upon a conviction of aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in the first degree, even where, as here, the court also imposes a sentence of incarceration (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 511 [3] [b] …). …

… [W]e note that the Appellate Term, Second Department, has repeatedly stated that a defendant’s “refusal to submit to a breath test did not establish a ‘cognizable offense’ ” … . We agree, and we therefore further modify the judgment by reversing that part convicting defendant of count four of the indictment, vacating the plea with respect to that count of the indictment and dismissing that count. People v Bembry, 2021 NY Slip Op 06235, Fourth Dept 11-21-21

 

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DEFENDANT’S WAIVER OF APPEAL WAS INVALID; UNWARNED STATEMENTS MADE DURING CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED; GUILTY PLEA VACATED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, vacating defendant’s guilty plea, determined defendant’s waiver of appeal was invalid and unwarned statements made by the defendant under custodial interrogation should have been suppressed. Defendant was interrogated about two missing college students. As the questioning proceeded it became apparent defendant was involved in the matter in some way, and eventually she revealed where the students were:

Defendant orally waived her right to appeal and executed a written waiver of the right to appeal. The language in the written waiver is inaccurate and misleading insofar as it purports to impose “an absolute bar to the taking of a direct appeal” and purports to deprive defendant of her “attendant rights to counsel and poor person relief, [as well as] all postconviction relief separate from the direct appeal” … . … A “waiver[] cannot be upheld . . . on the theory that the offending language can be ignored and that [it is] enforceable based on the court’s few correctly spoken terms” … . …

… [D]efendant was placed in a conference room and was questioned by an investigator from approximately 3:15 p.m. until 5:00 p.m. At 5:00 p.m., another investigator accompanied defendant to the bathroom, and the investigator continued questioning defendant. During that conversation, defendant made admissions demonstrating that she was more involved in the case than she had initially revealed, that she knew who was holding the students, and that one of the students had been shot. … At no time was she ever given Miranda warnings. People v Hughes, 2021 NY Slip Op 06231, Fourth Dept 11-12-21

 

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THE LEVEL-THREE RISK ASSESSMENT WAS NOT MANDATORY AND THE EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF A DOWNWARD DEPARTURE SHOULD HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED; ON REMAND WRITTEN FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ARE REQUIRED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the SORA court should not have considered the level three risk assessment mandatory and should have considered the evidence submitted in support of a downward department. On remand, the SORA court was directed to make findings of fact and conclusions of law in writing:

Where a “defendant’s prior felony conviction of a sex crime raised his [or her] presumptive risk level from level two to level three . . . , the [SORA] court is not mandated to apply the override but may, in appropriate circumstances, impose a lower risk level”… .

… Supreme Court, in its oral decision, incorrectly treated defendant’s presumptive level three classification as mandatory, and the court therefore never ruled on his downward departure application. We reject the People’s assertion that the court corrected that error in its subsequent written decision. … [T]he written decision explicitly “incorporates . . . [the] oral decision” and again failed to rule on defendant’s downward departure application. … [T]he “compelling evidence” line in the written decision merely summarized the findings of the Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders and was not  … an independent holding or ruling by the court. People v Douglas, 2021 NY Slip Op 06229, Fourth Dept 11-12-21

 

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THE SUPPRESSION COURT PROPERLY FOUND THE POLICE OFFICERS’ TESTIMONY ABOUT THE REASON FOR THE TRAFFIC STOP CREDIBLE; TWO DISSENTERS DISAGREED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, over a two-justice dissent, determined the suppression court properly deemed the police officers’ testimony about the reasons for the traffic stop credible. After a car chase and a foot chase, a weapon was seized from the vehicle and defendant was charged with criminal possession of a weapon second. The dissenters argued that the testimony of the police officers was not credible and therefore the People did not meet their burden to show the traffic stop was lawful:

… [W]e reject defendant’s … contention and the dissent’s assertion that the officers’ suppression hearing testimony should be discredited, and thus that the traffic stop should be deemed unlawful, because the officers failed to disclose that they… had a pretextual reason for stopping the vehicle based on information from a confidential informant conveyed to them by another officer in an earlier phone call. The officers acknowledged when the suppression hearing was reopened that they had failed to disclose in their reports or during their prior testimony that they had a pretextual reason for stopping the vehicle based on information from a confidential informant that a firearm may have been in the vehicle. Nonetheless, one of the officers offered a credible explanation for that initial nondisclosure and the other explained that, consistent with their prior testimony, the officers had not received a “call for service,” i.e., a citizen complaint via 911, prior to the traffic stop but, rather, had received a phone call from another officer. We conclude on this record that the officers’ testimony “was not so inherently incredible or improbable as to warrant disturbing the . . . court’s determination of credibility” after it was presented with the initial omissions and subsequent explanations … . People v Addison, 2021 NY Slip Op 06225, Fourth Dept 11-12-21

 

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