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THE PEOPLE DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE MIRANDA WARNINGS WERE READ TO DEFENDANT BEFORE HE WAS QUESTIONED; GUILTY PLEA VACATED; THERE WAS NO PROOF DEFENDANT WOULD HAVE PLED GUILTY IF SUPPRESSION HAD BEEN GRANTED, THEREFORE THE HARMLESS ERROR ANALYSIS WAS NOT APPLICABLE (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing County Court and vacating defendant’s guilty plea, determined defendant’s statement should have been suppressed:

… [T]he People rely on the investigator having talked to the trooper and, apparently, an inference that the trooper told the investigator that he read defendant his rights. However, the trooper did not testify to having read defendant his rights; he instead testified that he had no conversation with defendant. Although hearsay is admissible in suppression hearings … , this inference based on hearsay is insufficient for the People to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was advised of his Miranda rights before being questioned. The investigator did not actually testify to what he heard the trooper say during their out-of-court conversation — that is, the investigator did not actually offer hearsay evidence that the trooper read defendant his Miranda warnings. Even if the People had proven that fact, the investigator’s conclusory assertion that defendant waived his right to counsel supplied no facts from which County Court could have rationally concluded that defendant’s waiver of his right to counsel — or any of his other rights — was knowing, voluntary and intelligent … . …

[A]bsent proof that [the defendant] would have [pleaded guilty] even if his [or her] motion had been granted, harmless error analysis is inapplicable” … . People v Teixeira-Ingram, 2021 NY Slip Op 06575, Third Dept 11-24-21

 

THE BATSON CHALLENGE TO THE PROSECUTOR’S EXCLUSION OF A JUROR SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, NEW TRIAL ORDERED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing defendant’s conviction and ordering a new trial, determined defendant’s Batson challenge to the prosecutor’s exclusion of a juror should have been granted:

When providing a race-neutral reason for exercising a peremptory challenge as to S.K., the prosecutor stated that S.K. “is a school counselor and . . . when talking about how she would . . . settle disputes amongst two parties, indicated that she wanted to hear from both sides.” Defense counsel disputed this reason, and argued that the prosecutor did not exercise a peremptory challenge as to prospective white juror N.Z., a school counselor who “indicated that she would need to hear both stories” when working through a conflict between two children at work. The court then acknowledged that the prosecutor did not use a peremptory challenge as to N.Z., and that “[s]he is a white female.” The court denied the defendant’s Batson challenge. * * *

The defendant correctly contends that the court erred in finding that the prosecutor’s race-neutral reason for striking S.K. was not a pretext for discrimination. Here, the record demonstrates that the articulated race-neutral reasons for challenging S.K. were not applied equally to exclude a prospective juror, N.Z., who was not black and could have been challenged by the prosecutor for the same reasons. “Although the uneven application of race-neutral factors does not indicate pretext where the prosecution can articulate other legitimate reasons to justify the use of its challenges”… , the prosecution here failed to do so. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the nonracial bases advanced by the prosecutor for challenging S.K. were pretextual and “give[ ] rise to an inference of discriminatory intent” … . People v Johnson, 2021 NY Slip Op 06627, Second Dept 11-24-21

 

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IF QUESTIONING A DEFENDANT ABOUT WHERE HE/SHE LIVES SERVES AN ADMINISTRATIVE PURPOSE AND IS NOT A DISGUISED ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN INCRIMINATING INFORMATION, DEFENDANT’S ANSWER IS SUBJECT TO THE PEDIGREE EXCEPTION TO THE MIRANDA REQUIREMENT; DNA EVIDENCE GATHERED BY THE FORENSIC STATISTICAL TOOL (FST) SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED WITHOUT HOLDING A FRYE HEARING (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Fahey, reversing the Appellate Division, over a two-judge dissent, determined: (1) under the facts, the defendant’s answer to the police officer’s question regarding where he lived fell within the “pedigree exception” to the Miranda requirement (and therefore was not suppressible); and (2), the DNA evidence generated by the forensic statistical tool (FST) should not have been admitted without holding a Frye hearing:

We hold that the pedigree exception will not apply even if the pedigree question is reasonably related to police administrative concerns where, under the circumstances of the case, a reasonable person would conclude based on an objective analysis that the pedigree question was a “disguised attempt at investigatory interrogation” … . …

… [T]the pedigree questions were not a disguised attempt at investigatory interrogation … . … [T]he police asked defendant his name, date of birth, and where he lived immediately after their entry to the apartment, before the apartment had been searched and before any contraband had been found. The detective further testified that it is standard practice for all adults found at a location where a search warrant is executed to be handcuffed and asked these pedigree questions, regardless of whether contraband is found during the search. That defendant’s response ultimately turned out to be incriminating does not alter the conclusion that, at the time it was asked, the question was not a disguised attempt at investigatory interrogation by the police … . * * *

Williams [35 NY3d 24] contains our reasoning on the Frye issue with respect to the FST. …

… “FST is a proprietary program exclusively developed and controlled by OCME [New York City Office of Chief Medical Examiner],” and … the approval of the DNA Subcommittee was “no substitute for the scrutiny of the relevant scientific community” … . People v Wortham, 2021 NY Slip Op 06530, CtApp 11-23-21

 

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DEFENDANT’S CHALLENGE TO CERTIFICATION AS A SEX OFFENDER WAS FIRST RAISED IN THE APPELLATE DIVISION AND WAS NOT PRESERVED FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT OF APPEALS; THE ILLEGAL SENTENCE EXCEPTION TO THE PRESERVATION REQUIREMENT DOES NOT APPLY BECAUSE SORA CERTIFICATION IS NOT PART OF THE SENTENCE (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, reversing the Appellate Division, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Cannataro, over a two-judge dissent, determined the challenge to the legality of defendant’s certification as a sex offender, first raised on appeal to the Appellate Division, was not preserved and the illegal sentence exception to the preservation requirement did not apply:

Defendant thereafter pleaded guilty to … burglary in the first degree as a sexually motivated felony … . … [T]he court … advised defendant that he would have to register pursuant to SORA upon his release from prison. * * *

On appeal to the Appellate Division, defendant argued for the first time that his certification as a sex offender was unlawful because his crime of conviction is not an enumerated registerable sex offense under Correction Law § 168-a (2) (a). * * *

The Appellate Division agreed with defendant that under the “clear and unambiguous” language of Correction Law § 168-a (2) (a) “burglary in the first degree as a sexually motivated felony is not a registerable sex offense under SORA” … . * * *

“We have recognized ‘a narrow exception to the preservation rule’ where a court exceeds its powers and imposes a sentence that is illegal in a respect that is readily discernible from the trial record” … . However, “not all claims arising during a sentencing proceeding fall within the exception” … . * * *

… [S]ex offender certification is effectuated by the court pursuant to Correction Law § 168-d and is not addressed in either the Criminal Procedure Law or Title E of the Penal Law. … SORA certification is not part of a sentence and the illegal sentence exception to the preservation requirement does not apply to challenges to certification as a sex offender. People v Buyund, 2021 NY Slip Op 06529, CtApp 11-23-21

 

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DEFENDANT HAD BEEN TAKEN DOWN TO THE GROUND AND HANDCUFFED AT THE TIME THE BACKPACK HE WAS WEARING WAS SEARCHED; THE PEOPLE PRESENTED NO EVIDENCE OF EXIGENCY; THE SEARCH WAS THEREFORE UNJUSTIFIED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the People did not demonstrate exigent circumstances which justified the search of the backpack he was wearing. The defendant had been taken down to the ground and handcuffed at the time of the search:

At the suppression hearing, when questioned as to why he patted down defendant and the drawstring backpack, the officer merely responded “[f]or our safety.” * * *

Exigency justifying the search of a container incident to arrest is not established in the absence of some reasonable basis for the belief that the contents of the container might pose a danger to the arresting officers or that there is a legitimate concern for the preservation of evidence which might reasonably be thought to reside within the container … . …

The record does not contain evidence or testimony supporting a determination that the officer had objective reasonable grounds to believe that the drawstring backpack contained contents that would place his safety at risk or that he was concerned that the bag contained evidence that defendant could destroy. Thus, the circumstances did not suggest that any exigency required an immediate search … . People v Collins, 2021 NY Slip Op 06552, First Dept 11-23-21

 

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THE REMARKS MADE BY THE POLICE DURING THE INTERROGATION OF DEFENDANT SERVED TO NEGATE THE MIRANDA WARNINGS; INTERROGATION CONTINUED AFTER DEFENDANT ASSERTED HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL; THE ERRORS WERE DEEMED HARMLESS BECAUSE DEFENDANT WOULD HAVE BEEN CONVICTED EVEN IF THE STATEMENTS HAD BEEN SUPPRESSED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department determined questioning by the police effectively negated the Miranda warnings and questioning continued after defendant invoked his right to counsel. The errors were deemed harmless because the defendant would have been convicted even if the statements had been suppressed:

“Properly administered Miranda rights can be rendered inadequate and ineffective when they are contradicted by statements suggesting that there is a price for asserting the rights to remain silent or to counsel, such as foregoing ‘a valuable opportunity to speak with an assistant district attorney, to have [the] case[ ] investigated or to assert alibi defenses’ ” … . The police officer’s statement here improperly implied to defendant that the interrogation would be his “only opportunity to speak” … , and his advice that providing an explanation would benefit defendant effectively “implied that . . . defendant[‘s] words would be used to help [him], thus undoing the heart of the warning that anything [he] said could and would be used against [him]” … . * * *

… [A]bout 20 minutes into the interrogation, defendant expressly stated that he did not “want to talk about more of this[, i.e., the shooting]. That’s it.” … [D]efendant thereby unequivocally invoked his right to remain silent …  inasmuch as “[n]o reasonable police officer could have interpreted that statement as anything other than a desire not to talk to the police” … . Defendant’s responses to the police officers when they resumed the interrogation did not negate his prior unequivocal invocation of his right to remain silent because the police officers failed to reread the Miranda warnings to defendant before resuming the interrogation and therefore failed to scrupulously honor his right to remain silent … . People v Marrero, 2021 NY Slip Op 06510, Fourth Dept 11-19-21

 

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THE FACTS THAT THE PARKED CAR IN WHICH DEFENDANT WAS SITTING WITH TWO OTHERS WAS IN A HIGH CRIME AREA AND WAS NOT RUNNING DID NOT PROVIDE THE POLICE WITH AN ARTICULABLE, CREDIBLE REASON TO APPROACH THE CAR; THE EVIDENCE SUBSEQUENTLY SEIZED AND THE STATEMENTS SUBSEQUENTLY MADE SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, vacating defendant’s guilty plea and dismissing the indictment, determined the police did not have an articulable. credible reason for approaching the parked car defendant was sitting in. Therefore the evidence subsequently seized and the statements subsequently made should have been suppressed:

Where … “police officers approach a vehicle that is already parked and stationary, the only level of suspicion necessary to justify that approach is an articulable, credible reason for doing so, not necessarily indicative of criminality” … . The approach, however, “must be predicated on more than a hunch, whim, caprice or idle curiosity” … . Here, the officer testified at the suppression hearing that he and his partner approached the vehicle because the apartment complex at which it was parked was in a high crime area and because the vehicle was not running and had three occupants. The hearing record is devoid, however, of evidence that the officer was “aware of or observed conduct which provided a particularized reason to request information” from the occupants of the vehicle … . People v King, 2021 NY Slip Op 06499, Fourth Dept 11-19-21

 

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THE CO-GUARDIAN SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN REMOVED WITHOUT A HEARING; ALTHOUGH THE CO-GUARDIAN HAS A FELONY CONVICTION, SHE OBTAINED A CERTIFICATE OF RELIEF FROM DISABILITIES; THEREFORE, ALTHOUGH SURROGATE’S COURT CAN REMOVE THE CO-GUARDIAN IN THE EXERCISE OF DISCRETION, REMOVAL IS NOT AUTOMATIC (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Surrogate’s Court, determined the co-guardians’ petition to remove co-guardian respondent Suzette Bonerb should not have been granted without a hearing. Petitioner and Suzette Bonerb were previously appointed co-guardians of their adult child, Whitney Bonerb, and co-trustees of the Whitney Bonerb Credit Shelter Supplemental Needs Trust. Although respondent Suzette had been convicted of a felony, which would allow removal by Surrogate’s Court sua sponte, Suzette had been granted a certificate of relief from disabilities. Therefore a hearing was required:

… [T]he certificate does not prevent the Surrogate “from revoking [respondent’s appointments] in the exercise of its discretion (see Correction Law § 701 [3]); it merely preclude[s] the automatic revocation of” those appointments … . * * *

… [R]espondent conceded that she had been convicted of a felony, but established that she disclosed that fact in the applications for appointments and that she later obtained a certificate of relief from disabilities with respect to that felony (see Correction Law § 701). … [S]he contended that she had been advised by counsel that she was eligible to be appointed a fiduciary at the time when she signed the statement to that effect. Consequently, the Surrogate must make a credibility determination concerning those issues, and then exercise her discretion concerning whether respondent should be removed from her appointments … . Matter of Bonerb, 2021 NY Slip Op 06487, Fourth Dept 11-19-21

 

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A CHALLENGE TO THE VOLUNTARINESS OF A GUILTY PLEA SURVIVES A VALID WAIVER OF APPEAL; COUNTY COURT SHOULD HAVE HELD A HEARING ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO WITHDRAW THE GUILTY PLEA, MATTER REMITTED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, remitting the matter for a hearing, determined (1) a challenge to the voluntariness of a guilty survives a valid waiver of appeal, and (2) a hearing should have been held on defendant’s motion to withdraw the plea:

Because defendant’s challenge to the voluntariness of her plea would survive even a valid waiver of the right to appeal, we need not address the validity of that waiver … . We agree with defendant that County Court erred in denying her motion to withdraw her plea without a hearing because the record—specifically, defense counsel’s affidavit swearing that defendant’s plea was coerced—”raises a legitimate question as to the voluntariness of the plea” … . We therefore hold the case, reserve decision, and remit the matter to County Court to appoint new defense counsel and to rule on defendant’s motion to withdraw her plea following an evidentiary hearing. People v Gumpton, 2021 NY Slip Op 06519, Fourth Dept 11-19-21

 

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ITEMS SEIZED PURSUANT TO THE OVERBROAD SECTION OF THE SEARCH WARRANT, IF ANY, SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED, MATTER REMITTED FOR A RULING; THE SEARCH WARRANT APPLICATION PROVIDED PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE SEARCH, NOTWITHSTANDING THE INCLUSION OF INFORMATION PROVIDED BY AN ANONYMOUS INFORMANT WHICH DID NOT SATISFY THE AGUILAR-SPINELLI TEST (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department determined a portion of the search warrant was overbroad and remitted the case for a ruling on what evidence, if any, should be suppressed because it was seized based on the overbroad language. The Fourth Department also determined information provided by an anonymous informant, which was included in the search warrant application, did not satisfy the “Aguilar-Spinelli” test, but that the remaining information in the application provided probable cause. The search warrant was seeking stolen property alleged to have been located in defendant’s residence:

… [I]nsofar as the search warrant application was based on information provided by an anonymous informant, that information was insufficient to establish probable cause. The information in the application concerning the informant failed to “satisf[y] the two-part Aguilar-Spinelli test requiring a showing that the informant is reliable and has a basis of knowledge for the information imparted” … . Nevertheless, we conclude that the remaining information in the warrant application provided probable cause for the warrant … . …

… [P]art of the warrant is overbroad. “The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution provides that no warrants shall issue except those ‘particularly describing the place to be searched, and the . . . things to be seized’ (US Const 4th Amend). To meet the particularity requirement, the warrant’s directive must be ‘specific enough to leave no discretion to the executing officer’ ” … . Here, the warrant permitted the Troopers to search for, inter alia, “personal papers, . . . alcohol, . . . safes, . . . any communication and computers that are related to criminal activity, any . . . telephone records, cell phones that [may] contain evidence of a crime or illegal activity and any associated documentation related to any criminal activity.” Those parts of the warrant were overbroad and any evidence seized pursuant to them should have been suppressed … . People v Herron, 2021 NY Slip Op 06512, Fourth Dept 11-19-21

 

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