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ALTHOUGH THE MAJORITY AFFIRMED DEFENDANT’S CONVICTION, THE TWO DISSENTERS WOULD HAVE DISMISSED THE INDICTMENT BECAUSE THE TESTIMONY OF THE POLICE OFFICERS AT THE SUPPRESSION HEARING DESCRIBING THE TRAFFIC STOP WAS NOT CREDIBLE (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, affirming defendant’s conviction, rejected the argument that the police officer’s testimony at the suppression hearing describing the traffic stop was incredible. The two-justice dissent disgreed:

From the dissent:

… [W]e conclude that “the significant inconsistencies and gaps in memory . . . [in] the testimony of the police officers who testified at the hearing bear negatively on their overall credibility” … . Neither of the two officers who testified could recall with clarity any of the details of their stop of the vehicle in which defendant was a passenger, with one officer acknowledging that the only thing that he could recall was that he “smelled mari[h]uana.” The officers disagreed whether that smell was of burnt or burning marihuana. Inasmuch as both officers testified that they each had conducted innumerable traffic stops where marihuana was involved, their inability to recall further details regarding this particular stop undermines the reliability of the officers’ testimony. We therefore conclude that, because the lapses in the officers’ memory of the stop render their testimony unworthy of belief, the People failed to meet their burden of coming forward with sufficient evidence to establish the legality of the police conduct in the first instance … . People v Stroud, 2021 NY Slip Op 07375, Fourth Dept 12-23-21

 

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FOR PURPOSES OF CLAIMANT’S ACTION FOR WRONGFUL CONVICTION AND IMPRISONMENT, THE TRIAL ORDER OF DISMISSAL IN THE CRIMINAL TRIAL WAS THE EQUIVALENT OF AN ACQUITTAL (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing the Court of Claims, determined the claimant was retried and acquitted on criminal charges within the meaning of the Court of Claims Act in this action seeking damages for wrongful conviction and imprisonment:

… [T]he court erred in determining that claimant “was not retried.” To the contrary, the record establishes that “a new trial was ordered” and held inasmuch as the jury was sworn, the parties made opening statements, the prosecution called various witnesses and, following the close of the prosecution’s case, the criminal court granted claimant’s motion for a trial order of dismissal … . …

… [T]he court erred in determining that a trial order of dismissal pursuant to CPL 290.10 was not the equivalent of a finding of not guilty, i.e., an acquittal, for purposes of Court of Claims Act § 8-b (3) (b) (ii). Considering the remedial purpose of the statute (see § 8-b [1]) and the fact that an acquittal is a “useful and relevant indicator of innocence” … , … [T]here is no meaningful distinction for purposes of a claimant’s threshold showing between an acquittal by a trier of fact due to failure to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt … and a trial order of dismissal due to legally insufficient evidence … . Owens v State of New York, 2021 NY Slip Op 07374, Fourth Dept 12-23-21

 

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PLAINTIFF WAS ACQUITTED OF CHARGES STEMMING FROM THE ALLEGED APPROPRIATION OF INSURANCE PROCEEDS DUE OTHER BENEFICIARIES AND THEN SUED TWO INSURANCE COMPANIES; THE CAUSES OF ACTION FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT, CONVERSION AND BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY DID NOT ACCRUE UPON ACQUITTAL AND WERE THERFORE TIME-BARRED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the causes of action that did not require plaintiff’s innocence in a criminal matter were time barred. Plaintiff was acquitted of charges stemming from the allegation she appropriated life insurance proceeds which were due to other beneficiaries. Plaintiff then sued two insurance companies alleging breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, and aiding and abetting breach of a fiduciary duty. None of those causes of action accrued upon plaintiff’s acquittal. All were therefore time-barred:

Contrary to … the court’s conclusion, those causes of action did not accrue at the time the criminal proceeding terminated. The termination of a criminal proceeding is relevant for claims for malicious prosecution and legal malpractice arising out of a criminal proceeding … . For those claims, a plaintiff is required to make a showing of innocence, and thus the claims do not accrue until the plaintiff can assert the element of his or her innocence on the criminal charges … . Plaintiff here does not need to assert her innocence on the criminal charges as an element of the causes of action for breach of contract, conversion, and breach of fiduciary duty … . Morrow v Brighthouse Life Ins. Co. of NY, 2021 NY Slip Op 07373, Fourth Dept 12-23-21

 

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THE SORA COURT SHOULD HAVE CONSIDERED THAT THE DEFENDANT DID NOT REOFFEND DURING AN EXTENDED TIME WHEN HE WAS NOT SUPERVISED AS A MITIGATING FACTOR WHICH MAY WARRANT A DOWNWARD DEPARTURE IN THIS SORA RISK-LEVEL PROCEEDING (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing (modifying) County Court, determined County Court should have considered whether a downward department from the risk-level guidelines was warranted. Defendant, through and oversight, with respect to a previous conviction, was not registered as a sex offender and did not reoffend despite the absence of supervision:

… [T]he fact that defendant was at liberty while unsupervised for an extended period of time without any reoffending conduct is a mitigating factor not adequately taken into account by the guidelines … , and it is undisputed that defendant established the existence of that mitigating factor by a preponderance of the evidence … .

In view of the [SORA] court’s conclusion, it did not exercise its discretion to determine whether the totality of the circumstances warrants a departure to avoid an overassessment of defendant’s dangerousness and risk of sexual recidivism. … [W]e reverse the order and remit the matter to County Court to make that determination … . People v Edwards,  2021 NY Slip Op 07359, Fourth Dept 12-23-21

 

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ALTHOUGH THE JUDGE IN THIS BENCH TRIAL DID NOT EXPLICITLY RULE ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR A TRIAL ORDER OF DISMISSAL, THE MAJORITY DETERMINED THE DENIAL OF THE MOTION WAS IMPLICIT IN THE VERDICT AND THEREFORE THE LEGAL INSUFFICIENCY ARGUMENT COULD BE CONSIDERED ON APPEAL; THE DISSENT DISAGREED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, over a dissent, determined the judge in this bench trial implicitly ruled on defendant’s motion for a trial order of dismissal when rendering the verdict. The dissent argued an explicit ruling on the motion was a necessary prerequisite to an appeal:

From the dissent:

… [D]uring the nonjury trial, the court expressly reserved decision on defendant’s motion for a trial order of dismissal. Although the Criminal Procedure Law requires a court to determine a motion on which it has reserved decision (see CPL 290.10 [1]; 320.20 [4]), the court here never again addressed that motion by name on the record. Rather, in rendering its verdict, the court stated merely that, “based upon the credible trial evidence, this [c]ourt finds the defendant guilty of . . . attempted assault in the second degree [because] there was legally sufficient proof that the defendant intended to cause the victim serious physical injury based upon his conduct, and [in] consideration of all the surrounding circumstances.”

In reaching the merits of defendant’s legal sufficiency contention, the majority tacitly concludes that the court implicitly denied defendant’s motion when it rendered its guilty verdict, likely due to the court’s reference to the “legally sufficient proof” supporting its finding of guilt. I respectfully disagree with this approach … . People v Dubois, 2021 NY Slip Op 07364, Third Dept 12-23-21

 

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FALSE ARREST AND FALSE IMPRISONMENT COMPLAINT PROPERLY DISMISSED AFTER A DEFENSE VERDICT; TWO JUSTICE DISSENT (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, over an extensive two-justice dissent, determined the false arrest and false imprisonment action was properly dismissed after a defense verdict at trial. The police were informed that plaintiff, who was walking away, was involved in an altercation. The officer stood in front of plaintiff to inquire. The plaintiff did not respond and walked into the officer. The officer then made a warrantless arrest for obstruction of justice:

We conclude that the officer’s act of “stepping in front of [plaintiff] in an attempt to engage him was a continuation of the officer’s own common-law right to inquire, not a seizure” … . …

… [W]hile “[a]n individual to whom a police officer addresses a question has a constitutional right not to respond” … , that person does not have the right to attempt to “walk through”—and thereby make physical contact with—the officer … . * * *

From the dissent:

… [T]he officer was not authorized to forcibly stop plaintiff and lacked probable cause to arrest plaintiff for obstructing governmental administration in the second degree for plaintiff’s purported obstruction of such an unauthorized forcible stop. Shaw v City of Rochester, 2021 NY Slip Op 07346, Fourth Dept 12-23-21

 

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THE REQUIREMENTS FOR AN APPEALABLE ORDER IN A SORA RISK-LEVEL PROCEEDING EXPLAINED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, withholding a decision on the merits of the SORA risk-level determination by County Court until the People enter and serve an appealable order, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Garry, explained the “appealable order” requirements for SORA proceedings:

Despite the statutory requirement that the court render a written SORA “order setting forth its determinations and the findings of fact and conclusions of law on which the determinations are based” (Correction Law § 168-n [3]), the lack of such orders is a recurring problem … . In some cases, as here, the court states during a bench decision that a so-ordered provision will be provided on the transcript but that does not occur … . In others, the court signs a standard form designating the defendant’s risk level classification without “so-ordered” language or specific findings and conclusions … . In each of these situations, this Court generally dismisses the appeal, as we must, because it is not properly before us due to the lack of an appealable order … . This creates a confusing situation in which no proper order exists regarding the defendant’s status under SORA (see Correction Law § 168-n [3]).

… Generally, in any civil case, upon a clerk’s entry of a written order, the prevailing party should serve a copy of the order, together with notice of entry, upon the losing party (see CPLR 2220 [b]; 5513 [a] … ). The losing party, once served with a copy of that entered order and notice of entry, has 30 days to take an appeal as of right (see CPLR 5513 [a]; see also Correction Law § 168-n [3]). Pursuant to SORA, “the district attorney, or his or her designee,” is statutorily required to appear at the SORA hearing on behalf of the state and bears the burden of proving the facts supporting the risk level determination being sought (Correction Law § 168-n [3]). Thus, the People bear the responsibility of ensuring that a written SORA order is entered and that notice of entry, along with a copy of that written order, is served on the defendant. People v Lane, 2021 NY Slip Op 07324, Third Dept 12-23-21

 

THE FOR CAUSE CHALLENGE TO A PROSPECTIVE JUROR WHO SAID HE WOULD BE INCLINED TO BELIEVE THE TESTIMONY OF POLICE OFFICERS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing defendant’s conviction, determined the for cause challenge to a juror who said he would tend to believe the testimony of police officers should have been granted, despite the assurances elicited by the judge:

… [T]he statement of the prospective juror during voir dire with respect to the credibility of the testimony of police officers or bias in favor of the police cast serious doubt on his ability to render an impartial verdict, and the prospective juror failed to provide “unequivocal assurance that [he could] set aside any bias and render an impartial verdict based on the evidence” … . Specifically, after the prospective juror stated that he was a former correction officer and had “a lot of friends and family members” in law enforcement, he agreed that he would “be inclined to give more credibility to an officer than [he] would a lay person,” explained that, based on his experiences, he found police to be “honest people,” and specifically described one of the officers who would later testify for the People as “an honest person.” Although the court inquired further of the prospective juror, we conclude that the prospective juror’s answers to the questions asked by the court were “insufficient to constitute . . . an unequivocal declaration” that he could set aside any bias and render an impartial verdict … . People v Harrison, 2021 NY Slip Op 07445, Fourth Dept 12-23-21

 

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THE JUDGE’S THREAT TO IMPOSE A MUCH HARSHER SENTENCE SHOULD THE DEFENDANT BE CONVICTED AT TRIAL AMOUNTED TO COERCION RENDERING THE PLEA INVOLUNTARY; ALTHOUGH THE ISSUE WAS NOT PRESERVED FOR APPEAL, THE PLEA WAS VACATED IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, vacating defendant’s guilty plea in the interest of justice, determined the judge’s threat to impose a much harsher sentence if the defendant were to be convicted at trial amounted to coercion:

During a court appearance at which County Court extended a plea offer that called for an aggregate sentence of 15 years to life imprisonment, the court informed defendant that “my policy is if a defendant gets convicted at trial, that means that individual has not accepted responsibility for the conduct that they’ve been convicted of, and . . . [i]n all likelihood the sentence [after trial] would not even be close to the 20 years [to life sought by the People], it would be much more — — many more years and you are looking at a potential [of] 100 years to life.” The court issued a virtually identical admonition at the next appearance, and defendant subsequently accepted the court’s offer of 15 years to life imprisonment.

… [T]he court’s statements during plea negotiations did “not amount to a description of the range of the potential sentences but, rather, they constitute[d] impermissible coercion, ‘rendering the plea involuntary and requiring its vacatur’ ” … . People v Goodwin, 2021 NY Slip Op 07418, Fourth Dept 12-23-21

 

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DEFENDANT’S FORMER APPELLATE COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO ARGUE DEFENDANT’S TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO MOVE TO DISMISS THE TIME-BARRED ENDANGERING-THE-WELFARE-OF-A-CHILD COUNTS; WRIT OF CORAM NOBIS GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined defendant’s former appellate counsel was ineffective for not arguing defendant’s trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to dismiss the misdemeanor endangering-the-welfare-of-child charges were time-barred. Therefore the writ of coram nobis was granted and the relevant counts were vacated:

The misdemeanors of which the defendant was convicted, two counts of endangering the welfare of a child, were barred by the statute of limitations. The defendant demonstrated that trial counsel was not seeking a compromise verdict from the jury and thus did not have a strategic reason for failing to move to dismiss the misdemeanor counts as time-barred. The two counts of endangering the welfare of a child were not lesser included offenses of the rape and burglary counts of which the defendant was also convicted. Further, when the Supreme Court told counsel that it was “not going to charge everything,” trial counsel did not request that the misdemeanors be submitted to the jury, and replied that the jury would “either believe that my client is a rapist, or not.” Then, during his summation, trial counsel’s sole argument was that the defendant was misidentified. There was no reasonable explanation for trial counsel’s “failure to raise a defense as clear-cut and completely dispositive as a statute of limitations” … . People v Louis, 2021 NY Slip Op 07307, Second Dept 12-22-21

 

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