You are here: / Contract Law
, ,

PLAINTIFF PREVAILED IN THIS BREACH OF CONTRACT ACTION; HOWEVER, ABSENT A CONTRACT PROVISION, OR A STATUTE OR COURT RULE ALLOWING THE AWARD, PLAINTIFF WAS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY’S FEES (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff should not have been awarded attorney’s fees in this breach of contract action because the contract did not so provide:

“New York follows the general rule that attorney’s fees are incidents of litigation and a prevailing party may not collect them from the loser unless an award is authorized by agreement between the parties, statute, or court rule” … . “It is not uncommon, however, for parties to a contract to include a promise by one party to hold the other harmless for a particular loss or damage and counsel fees are but another form of damage which may be indemnified in this way” … . “When a party is under no legal duty to indemnify, a contract assuming that obligation must be strictly construed to avoid reading into it a duty which the parties did not intend to be assumed” … .

Here, the contract did not provide for the recovery of attorneys’ fees that resulted from the instant litigation, and the plaintiff failed to establish that a statute or court rule would entitle her to an award of attorneys’ fees. Wolf v Vestra SPV3, LLC, 2024 NY Slip Op 06232, Second Dept 12-11-24

Practice Point: The general rule in New York is, absent a contract provision or a statute or court rule allowing the award of attorney’s fees, the winner of a lawsuit cannot collect attorney’s fees from the loser.

 

, ,

THERE WAS A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE TIME-OF-THE-ESSENCE CLOSING DATE SET IN SELLER’S LETTER PROVIDED SUFFICIENT TIME FOR BUYER TO CLOSE; THEREFORE SELLER WAS NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT REQUIRING SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE; CRITERIA EXPLAINED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined there was a question of fact whether the time-of-the-essence closing date set in a letter from seller’s counsel allowed sufficient time for the buyer to close. Therefore the seller was not entitled to summary judgment requiring specific performance based on the buyer’s failure to appear:

“Where there is an indefinite adjournment of the closing date specified in the contract of sale, some affirmative act has to be taken by one party before it can claim the other party is in default; that is, one party has to fix a time by which the other must perform, and it must inform the other that if it does not perform by that date, it will be considered in default” … . “The notice setting a new date for the closing must (1) give clear, distinct, and unequivocal notice that time is of the essence, (2) give the other party a reasonable time in which to act, and (3) inform the other party that if he [or she] does not perform by the designated date, he [or she] will be considered in default” … . “It does not matter that the date is unilaterally set, and what constitutes a reasonable time for performance depends upon the facts and circumstances of the particular case” … . “Included within a court’s determination of reasonableness are the nature and object of the contract, the previous conduct of the parties, the presence or absence of good faith, the experience of the parties and the possibility of prejudice or hardship to either one, as well as the specific number of days provided for performance” … . “‘[T]he question of what constitutes a reasonable time is usually a question of fact'” … . Fink v 218 Hamilton, LLC, 2024 NY Slip Op 06026, Second Dept 12-4-24

Practice Point: Consult this decision for an explanation of the law surrounding setting an enforceable time-of-the-essence date for the closing.

 

, ,

ALTHOUGH THE GUARANTEES REQUIRED THAT THE TENANT SURRENDER THE PREMISES IN THE CONDITION DESCRIBED BY THE LEASE, THE GUARANTEES DID NOT INCORPORATE THE LEASE OR EXPRESSLY REQUIRE COMPLIANCE WITH THE SURRENDER TERMS OF THE LEASE; THEREFORE THE TENANT’S FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE SURRENDER TERMS OF THE LEASE DID NOT TRIGGER THE GUARANTORS’ OBLIGATIONS (FIRST DEPT). ​

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the language of the guarantees controlled and the guarantors were relieved of responsibility for the tenant’s rent payments when the tenant surrendered the property in compliance with the terms of the guarantees. Although the guarantees referred to surrendering the premises in the condition required by the lease, the guarantees did not incorporate the lease or expressly require compliance with the surrender terms of the lease. Therefore the tenant’s failure to comply with the surrender terms of the lease did not trigger any obligation on the part of the guarantors:

… [T]he guarantees expressly limit defendants’ liability to the terms contained therein, which, as relevant here, only require that tenant surrender the premises in compliance with the surrender provisions set forth in the guarantees. While the guarantees mandated tenant surrender the premises in the condition required by the terms of the lease, they do not incorporate the terms of the underlying lease by reference … or expressly require that tenant’s surrender of the premises be performed pursuant to the terms of the lease … .

Therefore, while tenant was required to obtain written consent of the surrender from plaintiff under the lease, the motion court improperly determined that tenant’s failure to do so precluded the guarantors’ avoidance of liability for unpaid rent after tenant’s surrender … . ROC-Lafayette Assoc., LLC v Sturm, 2024 NY Slip Op 06016, Frist Dept 12-3-24

Practice Point: The language of a guarantee is strictly construed. Here the guarantees required surrender of the premises in the condition described by the lease but did not incorporate the lease or expressly require compliance with the surrender terms of the lease. Therefore the tenant’s failure to comply with the surrender terms of the lease did not trigger the guarantors’ responsibility for the tenant’s rent payments. The tenant had fully complied with the surrender terms in the guarantees.

 

, ,

IN THIS FIRE-DAMAGE CASE, THE INSURANCE POLICY IMPOSED A TWO-YEAR LIMITATION PERIOD; THE ACTION WAS NOT BROUGHT UNTIL SIX YEARS AFTER THE FIRE; PLAINTIFF’S FAILURE TO PROVIDE ANY DETAILS DEMONSTRATING WHY THE RESTORATION COULD NOT BE COMPLETED WITHIN THE TWO-YEAR LIMITATION PERIOD REQUIRED DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT; THREE-JUDGE DISSENT (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Singas, over an extensive three-judge dissent, determined plaintiff’s complaint in this fire-damage case was properly dismissed because the contractual two-year limitation period was exceeded and plaintiff made only conclusory allegations that the repairs could not be made within that two-year period:

On this motion to dismiss, the Tower/AmTrust defendants met their burden of establishing, by reference to the contract’s two-year suit limitation provision, that the action was time-barred because plaintiff did not commence it within two years of the fire, utterly refuting plaintiff’s factual allegations … . Nothing in plaintiff’s response raised any issue as to whether the provision should bar her claims. Plaintiff’s allegation that “[g]iven the massive structural damage wrought by the fire, the restoration of [plaintiff’s] property would have been [a] multi-year process under even the best of circumstances” is a conclusory statement that the suit limitation provision was unreasonable and is not logically inconsistent with the replacement of the property within the two-year limitation period. Here, plaintiff failed to allege actions that she took to complete the repairs within two years; she did not provide any details regarding the extent of the damage, other than that the damage was “massive” and the fire set off four alarms, or why complete restoration within two years was an impossibility. This bare-bones allegation stands in stark contrast to the plaintiff’s factual assertions in [Executive Plaza, LLC v Peerless Ins. Co. (22 NY3d 511)]. There, the plaintiff pleaded the specific remedial actions taken to restore the property, including retaining an architect and construction company, submitting a variance application, and seeking and obtaining building permits, which were not issued until 20 months after the property damage … . Most importantly, that plaintiff provided that these remedial actions were taken within the limitation period. All of this information is notably absent from plaintiff’s pleadings and motion response here. Farage v Associated Ins. Mgt. Corp., 2024 NY Slip Op 05875, CtApp 11-26-24

Practice Point: Here the insurance contract imposed a two-year limitation on claims for the cost of fire-damage repair. Plaintiff did not bring the action until six years after the fire. The complaint was properly dismissed because it did not provide any details explaining why the repairs could not have been made during the two-year limitation period.

 

, ,

BY CLICKING ON CONTRACT TERMS ON HER SMART PHONE, PLAINTIFF AGREED TO ARBITRATE HER PERSONAL INJURY CLAIM AGAINST UBER; PLAINTIFF ALLEGED INJURY AFTER AN UBER DRIVER LEFT HER OFF IN TRAFFIC (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Cannataro, over a two-judge dissent, determined that plaintiff, by clicking on notifications of contract terms from Uber on her smart phone, agreed to submit her personal injury action against Uber to arbitration. Plaintiff alleged the Uber driver left her off in traffic and she was injured as a result. The opinion is too detailed to fairly summarize here. The precise language of the notifications from Uber are laid out:

On this appeal, we apply centuries-old principles of contract law to a web-based “terms of use” update containing an arbitration agreement. The parties dispute the validity of that agreement and its applicability to this personal injury action, which plaintiff commenced two months before she indicated her assent to the updated terms of use by means of a series of clicks on her smartphone.

We conclude that the “clickwrap” process Uber used to solicit plaintiff’s assent resulted in the formation of an agreement to arbitrate. Moreover, a key term of that agreement expressly delegates to an arbitrator the exclusive authority to resolve all disputes as to the applicability and enforceability of the agreement. Because plaintiff has not established that the delegation provision is invalid, her challenges to the portions of the agreement that purportedly apply to pending legal claims were properly directed to the arbitrator. Wu v Uber Tech., Inc., 2024 NY Slip Op 05869, CtApp 11-25-24

Practice Point: Here plaintiff was notified by Uber of updated contract terms in a message sent to her smart phone. By “clicking” agreement to the terms on her phone’s screen, plaintiff agreed to arbitrate her personal injury action against Uber.

 

, , ,

THE PARTY SEEKING TO ENFORCE A VENUE CONTRACT PROVISION HAS THE BURDEN OF DEMONSTRATING THE AUTHENTICITY OF THE SIGNATURE IN THE FACE OF AN ALLEGATION OF FORGERY; HERE DEFENDANT DEMONSTRATED THE SIGNATURE WAS AUTHENTIC AND PLAINTIFF FAILED TO RAISE A QUESTION OF FACT RE: THE FORGERY ALLEGATION (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Garcia, reversing the Appellate Division, determined the defendant demonstrated the contract which included a venue provision was signed by the decedent and the plaintiff failed to raise a triable question of fact about whether the signature was forged. The court noted that contractual choice of venue provisions are generally enforceable and provided some insight into how a forgery question-of-fact can be raised:

Forum selection clauses may designate a jurisdiction, such as the federal or state court system, or the clause may designate a venue within the State, as was done here by specifying Nassau County as the proper venue … .* * *

… [T]he party moving for a change of venue under CPLR 501 is in effect seeking to enforce a contractual provision. For that reason, … the proponent of the motion bears the initial burden to establish the authenticity of the writing for purposes of a motion to enforce a contractual venue provision … . This may be done through any of the recognized methods of authentication, including, but not limited to, the testimony of a witness who was present at the time of the signing, an admission of authenticity, proof of handwriting, and, as particularly relevant here, through circumstantial evidence … . * * *

Although an expert opinion is not required to raise an issue of fact as to forgery , the movant must nevertheless offer “[s]omething more than a bald assertion,” and in this regard conclusory or self-serving affidavits are inadequate … . Plaintiff offered only an affidavit in which he claimed to be “familiar” with decedent’s handwriting. Based on a summary of certain perceived inconsistencies in the signatures and initials on the agreements, plaintiff asserted that “whoever the person or people who signed and initialed these pages may have been, it was not my mother.” Attached to the affirmation is an undated “exemplar” of what is purportedly decedent’s signature, but no effort is made to establish that the exemplar represents decedent’s signature at the relevant time. Furthermore, the exemplar is purportedly decedent’s handwritten signature, and … electronic signatures may naturally differ from handwritten one … . Knight v New York & Presbyt. Hosp, 2024 NY Slip Op 05870, CtApp 

Practice Point: Contractual provisions designating venue are enforceable.

Practice Point: To enforce a contractual venue provision, in the face of a forgery allegation, the moving party must demonstrate the signature is authentic.

Practice Point: Bald assertions of forgery unsupported by any evidence will not raise a triable question of fact on the forgery issue.

 

THE COMPLAINT STATED CAUSES OF ACTION FOR BREACH OF THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALINGS, AS WELL AS PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the complaint stated a cause of action for breach of contract based on the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. In addition, the Second Department held that the promissory estoppel and unjust enrichment causes of action did not duplicate the breach of contract causes of action:

Even if a party is not in breach of its express contractual obligations, it may be in breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing when it exercises a contractual right as part of a scheme to deprive the other party of the benefit of its bargain … . “While the duties of good faith and fair dealing do not imply obligations inconsistent with other terms of the contractual relationship, they do encompass any promises which a reasonable person in the position of the promisee would be justified in understanding were included” … . “Technically complying with the terms of a contract while depriving the plaintiff of the benefit of the bargain may constitute a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing” … .

* * *  “‘[E]ven an explicitly discretionary contract right may not be exercised in bad faith so as to frustrate the other party’s right to the benefit under the agreement'” … . The defendant failed to utterly refute the allegations in the complaint that the defendant terminated the consulting agreement without justification or good cause at a time when the completion of the subdivision of the property was only weeks away, despite the plaintiff’s alleged expenditure of hundreds of hours managing the process over the course of two years, and that the defendant acted in derogation of the consulting agreement, including by selling the property for less than its fair market value.

… Where “there is a bona fide dispute as to the existence of a contract or where the contract does not cover the dispute in issue, a plaintiff may proceed upon a theory of quantum meruit as well as contract, and will not be required to elect his or her remedies” … . JLO Dev. Corp. v Amalgamated Bank, 2024 NY Slip Op 05577, Second Dept 11-13-24

Practice Point: A complaint alleging breach of contract based on a violation of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing will survive a motion to dismiss, despite there being no specific provision of the contract which was alleged to have been breached.

Practice Point: Where there is an issue as to the existence of a contract or where the contract does not cover the issue in dispute, the plaintiff may plead promissory estoppel and unjust enrichment, in addition to breach of contract.

 

, ,

A CONTRACT BETWEEN A LANDOWNER AND A TOWN THAT PURPORTS TO BIND TOWN BOARDS ELECTED IN THE FUTURE WITH RESPECT TO A PETITION FOR REZONING VIOLATES THE TERM LIMITS RULE; A CONTRACT WHICH PURPORTS TO LIMIT A TOWN’S REZONING REVIEW PROCESS VIOLATES THE PROHIBITION AGAINST CONTRACT ZONING (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Christopher, determined the contract entered into between plaintiff property owner and the town board and town planning board violated the term limits rule and the prohibition against contract zoning. The contract purported to prohibit the town from terminating its review of the petition to rezone the land (to allow construction of multi-family residences) until the final determination on the merits. The contract purported to bind town boards elected in the future, which violates the term limits rule. And the contract purported to commit the town board to a specific course of action for review of the zoning petition, which violates the prohibition of contract zoning:

The provision of the [contract] states in relevant part that the Town Board “shall not terminate its review of the [plaintiff’s] Zoning Petition, and the Project in general, until it reaches a final determination on the merits in its legislative judgment regarding the best interests of the Town based upon empirical data and other objective factual bases.” This provision, which attempts to constrain the Town Board’s decision-making process regarding its zoning responsibilities, implicates the Town Board’s governmental and legislative powers, as enacting zoning ordinances is a significant function of local government … . * * *

The plaintiff fails to acknowledge that while [the contract] may indicate that nothing … limits the Town Board in the exercise of its legislative power, that statement is qualified by the language that states “except as otherwise provided herein,” thus eviscerating the import of the preceding language. The fact that the [contract] may not mandate a particular outcome does not mean … that it fails to violate the term limits rule. * * *

… [T]he plain language of the [contract] commits the Town Board to a review of the plaintiff’s zoning petition, and purports to forbid termination of the review process until the Town Board reaches a final determination on the merits. Such determination must be based upon “empirical data and other objective factual bases.” Such language evidences that the [contract] was clearly meant to commit the Town Board to a specific course of action with respect to the review process of the zoning petition. Hudson View Park Co. v Town of Fishkill, 2024 NY Slip Op 05332, Second Dept 10-30-24

 

, ,

THE OPTION TO PURCHASE THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT WHEN IT BECAME VACANT DID NOT VIOLATE THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES; ALTHOUGH THE TENANT IN THE UNIT WAS NOT NAMED, REFERENCE TO THE TENANCY WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPLY A “LIFE IN BEING” (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the contract giving plaintiff the option to purchase a condominium unit when the unit became vacant did not violate the rule against perpetuities (Estates, Powers and Trusts Law [EPTL] 9-1.1):

The court’s determination that there was no relevant life in being specifically named in the option, and therefore, the option was required to vest [*2]within 21 years, is too rigid an application of the rule. Rather, “[i]t is sufficient if a plain implication arises that a certain class or number of lives mentioned or referred to are selected for a limitation of the gift or trust” (61 Am Jur 2d, Perpetuities, Etc. § 16; see also Fitchie v Brown, 211 US 321, 333 [1908]).

Here, the … rider expressly stated:

“As Seller is unable to deliver vacant possession of Unit 5SR at the closing hereof, the Purchaser shall only purchase Unit 5SF . . . and the Purchaser shall have the option to purchase Unit 5SR at the time the Seller shall be able to deliver vacant possession thereof on all of the same terms and conditions as contained herein . . .”

Although the tenant is not expressly named in the option, the language of the option expressly makes the termination of his tenancy the relevant date upon which the option can be exercised … . Therefore, the court should not have determined that the reference to the tenant is too indefinite to serve as the relevant life in being. In addition, the interpretative canon set forth in EPTL 9-1.3(b), under which it is “presumed that the creator intended the estate to be valid,” applies. Protetch v Jocar Realty Co., Inc., 2024 NY Slip Op 05317, First Dept 10-29-24

Practice Point: This decision includes a rare discussion of the how the rule against perpetuities should be interpreted and applied.

 

, , ,

DEFENDANTS RAISED QUESTIONS OF FACT SUPPORTING A “FRAUD IN THE INDUCEMENT” DEFENSE TO THE ACTION BASED UPON AN EXECUTED PROMISSORY NOTE (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendants raised a valid “fraud in the inducement” defense to the action seeking payment on an executed promissory note. Defendants executed the note to purchase protein powder from plaintiffs. Plaintiffs described the powder as having 23 to 25 grams of protein per 33/5 grams of powder. After the purchase defendants had the powder tested which revealed the powder contained a significantly lower percentage of protein:

“When an action is based upon an instrument for the payment of money only . . . , the plaintiff may serve with the summons a notice of motion for summary judgment and the supporting papers in lieu of a complaint” (CPLR 3213). Therefore, “[t]o prevail on [their] motion for summary judgment in lieu of complaint based on a promissory note, plaintiff[s] w[ere] required to present evidence that defendant[s] executed the note and defaulted thereon” … . Plaintiffs demonstrated their prima facie burden by supplying the note at issue, signed by [defendant], and evidence of defendant’s failure to pay; therefore, the burden shifted to defendants to establish the existence of a triable issue of fact as to a bona fide defense to liability … . …

Fraud in the inducement is a defense to the enforcement of a promissory note … , and, as such, defendants were required to “allege that (1) the plaintiff made a representation or a material omission of fact which was false and the plaintiff knew to be false, (2) the misrepresentation was made for the purpose of inducing the defendant to rely upon it, (3) there was justifiable reliance on the misrepresentation or material omission, and (4) injury” … . * * *

Generally, “what constitutes reasonable reliance is always [a] nettlesome” inquiry best left to the trier of fact … . Furthermore, “[s]ummary judgment is a drastic remedy that should not be granted where there is any doubt as to the existence of triable issues of fact” … . Panessa v Lederfeind, 2024 NY Slip Op 05252, Third Dept 10-24-24

Practice Point: Fraud in the inducement is a valid defense to an action for summary judgment based upon an instrument for the payment of money only (CPLR 3213), here a promissory note.

 

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy