Constitutional Law – Page 14 – New York Appellate Digest

Attorneys, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

A CROSS-RACIAL IDENTIFICATION JURY INSTRUCTION IS NOW MANDATORY UPON REQUEST; AT THE TIME OF DEFENDANT’S TRIAL THE CHARGE WAS DISCRETIONARY; DEFENSE COUNSEL’S FAILURE TO REQUEST THE INSTRUCTION DID NOT AMOUNT TO CONSTITUTIONAL INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Halligan, affirming defendant’s conviction, over a concurring opinion and two dissenting opinions, determined defense counsel’s failure to request a cross-racial identification jury instruction, which is now mandatory upon request (but was not at the time of trial), did not amount to constitutional ineffective assistance of counsel:

Defendant Mark Watkins contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a cross-racial identification instruction at the close of his July 2017 trial. Under our decision in People v Boone—decided after Watkins’ trial—such an instruction is now mandatory upon request “when identification is an issue in a criminal case and the identifying witness and defendant appear to be of different races,” in light of the higher “likelihood of misidentification” and the “significant disparity between what the psychological research shows and what uninstructed jurors believe” regarding the impact of this cross-race effect (30 NY3d 521, 526, 528-529, 535-536 [2017]). At the time of Watkins’ pre-Boone trial, however, a defendant was not entitled to a cross-racial identification instruction upon request; rather, the charge was discretionary. Thus, counsel’s failure to request such a charge did not give rise to a single-error ineffective assistance of counsel claim. * * *

Today, as in Boone, we reiterate the importance of instructing jurors “to examine and evaluate the various factors upon which the accuracy of identification depends,” including the cross-racial nature, if applicable … . We continue to view the cross-racial identification charge as a powerful tool for assisting juries in determining whether there has been a mistaken identification, thereby reducing the risk of wrongful convictions caused by the cross-race effect. Still, Watkins has not shown that, as of July 2017, the failure to request a cross-racial instruction rendered his counsel’s performance constitutionally deficient … . People v Watkins, 2024 NY Slip Op 02842, CtApp 5-21-24

Practice Point: A cross-racial identification jury instruction is now mandatory upon request based upon the Court of Appeals’ 2017 ruling in People v Boone.

Practice Point: At the time of this 2017 trial, the cross-racial jury instruction was discretionary. Here defense counsel’s failure to request the charge did not rise to constitutional ineffective assistance.

Practice Point: It remains an open question whether the failure to request the charge in a post-Boone trial would amount to constitutional ineffective assistance.

May 23, 2024

Constitutional Law, Employment Law, Religion

THE “RELIGIOUS EMPLOYER” EXEMPTION FROM MANDATED INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR MEDICALLY NECESSARY ABORTIONS DOES NOT VIOLATE THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Wilson, determined the US Supreme Court ruling in Fulton v Philadelphia, 593 US 522 (2021) did not render the “religious employer” exemption to the mandated insurance coverage for medically necessary abortions unconstitutional. The opinion is too detailed and comprehensive to fairly summarize here:

Plaintiffs, the Roman Catholic Diocese of Albany and a variety of entities ranging from churches to religiously affiliated organizations to a single individual, provide medical insurance plans to their employees. They have challenged a regulation promulgated by the Department of Financial Services as violative of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. The challenged regulation requires New York employer health insurance policies that provide hospital, surgical, or medical expense coverage to include coverage for medically necessary abortion services (see 11 NYCRR 52.16 [o] [1]). Their challenge is to the regulation’s exemption for “religious employers,” which is defined by four factors (see 11 NYCRR 52.2 [y]). Plaintiffs’ claim, in essence, is that the exemption is too narrow, such that the First Amendment rights of certain types of religiously affiliated employers are violated because they do not meet the terms of the exemption. * * *

Under Fulton, both the regulation itself and the criteria delineating a “religious employer” for the purposes of the exemption are generally applicable and do not violate the Free Exercise Clause. Neither the existence of the exemption in the regulation nor the defined criteria allow for “individualized exemptions” that are standardless and discretionary, nor do they allow for comparable secular conduct while discriminating against religious conduct. Roman Catholic Diocese of Albany v Vullo, 2024 NY Slip Op 02764, CtApp 5-21-24

Practice Point: The 2021 US Supreme Court ruling in Fulton v Philadelphia did not render the “religious exemption” regulation promulgated by the NYS Department of Financial Services unconstitutional. The regulation exempts certain religious employers from mandated insurance coverage for medically necessary abortions.

May 21, 2024

Attorneys, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Judges

HERE THERE WAS NO VALID REASON TO DENY DEFENDANT’S REQUEST TO REPRESENT HIMSELF; NEW TRIAL ORDERED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing defendant’s conviction and ordering a new trial, determined defendant’s request to represent himself should have been granted:

The court deprived defendant of his constitutional right to self-representation when it denied defendant’s motion to proceed pro se despite defendant’s knowing and voluntary waiver of his right to counsel. A defendant may invoke the right to self-representation where “(1) the request is unequivocal and timely asserted, (2) there has been a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel, and (3) the defendant has not engaged in conduct which would prevent the fair and orderly exposition of the issues” … . Here, defendant made a timely and unequivocal request to represent himself, and during an extensive inquiry, at which time the court repeatedly warned defendant of the dangers and disadvantages of proceeding pro se, defendant affirmed that he understood the risks and insisted on representing himself at trial … . Defendant’s lack of familiarity with the law was not a proper basis for the denial of his motion … . Further, nothing in the record indicates that defendant’s motion was calculated to undermine or delay the progress of the trial— indeed, the court determined that defendant was not malingering—and defendant’s purported “outbursts” during two prior pretrial video conferences did not suggest an intent to disrupt the proceedings … . People v Ivezic, 2024 NY Slip Op 02785, First Dept 5-21-24

Practice Point: A defendant’s lack of knowledge of the law is not a valid reason for denying defendant’s request to represent himself at trial.

May 21, 2024

Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Judges

FORMER PRESIDENT TRUMP’S PETITION FOR A WRIT OF PROHIBITION CHALLENGING A RESTRAINING ORDER RESTRICTING HIS ABILITY TO MAKE STATEMENTS DIRECTED AT POTENTIAL WITNESSES IN A CRIMINAL TRIAL DENIED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined the restraining order restricting former President Donald Trump’s speech during his criminal trial was valid. Trump’s petition for a writ of prohibition was denied:

The Federal Restraining Order is nearly identical to the Restraining Order issued against petitioner in the underlying criminal case … .

Petitioner brings this petition because he disagrees with where the circuit court drew the line in balancing the competing considerations of his First Amendment rights to free expression and the effective functioning of the judicial, prosecutorial and defense processes … . Weighing these concerns, the circuit court ultimately concluded that, given the record, the court had “a duty to act proactively to prevent the creation of an atmosphere of fear or intimidation aimed at preventing trial participants and staff from performing their functions within the trial process” … . This Court adopts the reasoning in the circuit court’s Federal Restraining Order Decision.

The Federal Restraining Order Decision properly found that the order was necessary under the circumstances, holding that “Trump’s documented pattern of speech and its demonstrated real-time, real-world consequences pose a significant and imminent threat to the functioning of the criminal trial process” … . First, the circuit court concluded that petitioner’s directed statements at potential witnesses concerning their participation in the criminal proceeding posed a significant and imminent threat to their willingness to participate fully and candidly, and that courts have a duty to shield witnesses from influences that could affect their testimony and undermine the integrity of the trial process … . Justice Merchan properly determined that petitioner’s public statements posed a significant threat to the integrity of the testimony of witnesses and potential witnesses in this case as well. Matter of Trump v Merchan, 2024 NY Slip Op 02680, First Dept 5-14-24

Practice Point: A court has the power to restrict speech by a defendant in a criminal trial which is directed at potential trial witnesses and which could threaten the witnesses’ willingness to testify.

May 14, 2024

Constitutional Law

THE EXECUTIVE LAW WHICH CREATED THE NYS COMMISSION ON ETHICS AND LOBBYING IN GOVERNMENT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL; THE LAW CREATED AN AGENCY WITH EXECUTIVE POWERS WHICH USURPED THE GOVERNOR’S POWER TO ENSURE FAITHFUL EXECUTION OF ETHICS LAWS (THIRD DEPT)

The Third Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Powers. determined the Executive Law provision which created the New York State Commission on Ethics and Lobbying in Government is unconstitutional. The law was challenged by former governor Andrew Cuomo after ethics charges were brought against him by the Commission stemming from a book by Governor Cuomo entitled “American Crisis: Leadership Lessons from the COVID-19 Pandemic:”

Pursuant to the Governor’s authority to execute the laws, she is afforded wide discretion in determining the proper methods of enforcement … . However, Executive Law § 94 revokes the Governor’s enforcement power with respect to the ethics laws, thereby depriving her of all discretion in determining the methods of enforcement of these laws. Instead, it places this power into the hands of defendant [Commission], an entity over which she maintains extremely limited control and oversight, as she appoints a minority of members and has no ability to remove members. Moreover, appointments must be approved by the IRC [independent review committee], an external nongovernmental entity made up of people who are in that position solely by virtue of their employment and do not answer to the populace. As such, Executive Law § 94 creates an agency with executive power, in that it has the authority to investigate and impose penalties for the violation of the ethics laws, while being entirely outside the control of the executive branch. Thus, it usurps the Governor’s power to ensure the faithful execution of the applicable ethics laws … . Cuomo v New York State Commn. on Ethics & Lobbying in Govt., 2024 NY Slip Op 02568, Third Dept 5-9-24

May 9, 2024

Constitutional Law, Election Law

THE NEW YORK EARLY MAIL VOTER ACT, EFFECTIVE JANAURY 1, 2024, IS CONSTITUTIONAL (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Lynch, determined the 2923 New York Early Mail Voter Act (Election Law 8-700 et seq) is constitutional:

In 2023, the Legislature passed the New York Early Mail Voter Act (Election Law § 8-700 et seq), permitting all registered voters in New York to apply to “vote early by mail . . . in any election . . . in which the voter is eligible to vote” … . To be considered for processing, an application to vote early by mail must be received by a local Board of Elections (hereinafter BOE) no later than 10 days before the election … . Once received, the BOE confirms that the applicant is “a registered voter of the county or city at the address listed in the application and is eligible to vote in the election or elections for which the application is filed” … . A ballot is then issued to the applicant, along with a postage-paid return envelope, which must be cast and counted by the BOE if received by the close of polls on election day or postmarked by that date and received no later than seven days thereafter … . The Act contains safeguards to protect against fraud, requiring the State BOE to maintain “an electronic early mail ballot tracking system” that records, among other information, whether it “received such voter’s completed early mail ballot” and “counted or rejected” it … . Correspondingly, each local BOE is required to “maintain an early mail ballot tracking system integrated with the [S]tate [BOE’s] system” … . Concomitant with the Act’s passage, the Legislature also amended Election Law § 9-209 to make the canvass procedures set forth in that section — which contain substantial protections to ensure election integrity — applicable to early mail ballots. The express purpose of the Act is to ensure “ease of participation” in elections and to “make New York State a leader in engaging the electorate, meeting voters where they are and opening up greater opportunities for people to have their choices made on the ballot” … . It was signed into law on September 20, 2023 and became effective January 1, 2024. Stefanik v Hochul, 2024 NY Slip Op 02569, Second Dept 5-9-24

May 9, 2024

Appeals, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Judges

DEFENDANT WAS NOT INFORMED OF THE PERIOD OF POSTRELEASE SUPERVISION, GUILTY PLEA VACATED; THE WAIVER OF APPEAL WAS NOT DISCUSSED UNTIL AFTER THE GUILTY PLEA, WAIVER INVALID (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, vacating defendant’s guilty plea and finding the waiver of appeal invalid, held that the judge’s failure to inform defendant of the period of postrelease supervision rendered the guilty plea involuntary. In addition, the judge did not discuss the waiver of appeal until after the guilty plea:

… County Court did not specify the period of postrelease supervision to be imposed and did not explain that a term of postrelease supervision would be imposed even if the defendant successfully completed a substance abuse diversion program. … [T]he court’s failure to so advise the defendant prevented his plea from being knowing, voluntary, and intelligent … . …

… County Court did not discuss the appeal waiver until after the defendant had already admitted his guilt … , and the court failed to ascertain whether the defendant “understood the nature of the appellate rights being waived” and the consequences of waiving those rights … . People v Reyes, 2024 NY Slip Op 02547, Second Dept 5-8-24

Practice Point: Failure to inform defendant of the period of postrelease supervision renders the guilty plea involuntary.

Practice Point: Failure to discuss the waiver of appeal until after the defendant pleads guilty renders the waiver invalid.

May 8, 2024

Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Judges, Vehicle and Traffic Law

FAILURE TO INFORM DEFENDANT A FINE IS PART OF THE SENTENCE RENDERED THE GUILTY PLEA INVOLUNTARY (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, vacating defendant’s guilty plea, determined the failure to inform defendant that a fine was part of the sentence rendered the plea involuntary:

“[I]n order for a plea to be knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently entered, a defendant must be advised of the direct consequences of that plea” … . “The direct consequences of a plea—those whose omission from a plea colloquy makes the plea per se invalid—are essentially the core components of a defendant’s sentence: a term of probation or imprisonment, a term of postrelease supervision, a fine” … , and the failure to advise a defendant at the time of the guilty plea of a direct consequence of that plea “requires that [the] plea be vacated” … . Here, the court failed to advise defendant that the sentence imposed on a person convicted of aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in the first degree must include a fine in an amount between $500 and $5,000 (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 511 [3] [b] [i]). People v Carmichael, 2024 NY Slip Op 02427, Fourth Dept 5-3-24

Practice Point: A judge’s failure to inform the defendant that a fine is part of the sentence renders the guilty plea involuntary.

May 3, 2024

Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Education-School Law, Human Rights Law, Municipal Law

COMPLAINT ALLEGING THE NEW YORK CITY PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEM DISCRIMINATES AGAINST STUDENTS OF COLOR AND SEEKING INJUNCTIVE RELIEF SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Moulton, reversing Supreme Court, determined the complaint alleging the New York City public school system discriminates against Black and Latinx students and seeking injunctive relief was justiciable and stated valid causes of action. Therefore the complaint, which had been dismissed, is now reinstated. The opinion is comprehensive and far too detailed to fairly summarize here:

Plaintiffs allege that State and City policies create a “racialized” admission pipeline. According to plaintiffs, the pipeline begins with a single standardized test for the City’s Gifted & Talented (G&T) programs taken by children as young as four-years-old. The G&T test, plaintiffs assert, disproportionately benefits “privileged” white students and their “in-the-know” parents, who have the “navigational capital” to understand the admissions process and the economic capital to pay for expensive test preparation. The G&T programs, plaintiffs allege, provide superior academic preparation, which allows primarily white and Asian students to continue through the pipeline to academically screened middle and high schools, relegating Black and Latinx students to unscreened schools, often in poorly maintained buildings with limited extracurricular programs. The end of the pipeline, or “zenith” as plaintiffs describe it, is admission to one of eight New York City specialized high schools based on the results of the Special High School Admissions Test (the SHSAT).* * *

The pipeline, plaintiffs claim, is designed to exclude Black and Latinx students from the City’s prime educational opportunities. According to plaintiffs, the State and the City “intentionally adopted” and “for decades have intentionally retained—with no pedagogical basis—testing-based sorting that they know excludes students of color from equal educational opportunities.” This knowledge was acquired, plaintiffs allege, “through decades of experience and reflected in [defendants] own admissions” including the knowledge of the public school system’s “racist character and outcomes.” Despite this knowledge, plaintiffs allege that the State and the City “intentionally refuse to dismantle . . . its racialized channeling system.” IntegrateNYC, Inc. v State of New York, 2024 NY Slip Op 02369, First Dept 5-2-24

Practice Point: Here Supreme Court’s conclusion that the suit seeking injunctive relief from discriminatory education policies and procedures in the New York City public school system was not “justiciable” was rejected.

May 2, 2024

Appeals, Constitutional Law, Disciplinary Hearings (Inmates)

HERE THE FACILITY REVIEW OFFICER VIEWED THE VIDEO EVIDENCE AND EXPRESSED THE CONCLUSION PETITIONER HAD VIOLATED PRISON RULES BEFORE THE DISCIPLINARY HEARING; THAT SAME OFFICER DECIDED PETITIONER’S ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL; THAT SCENARIO VIOLATED DUE PROCESS; THE MISBEHAVIOR DETERMINATION WAS ANNULLED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, annulling the determination petitioner had violated prison rules, determined the fact that the facility review officer reviewed petitioner’s misbehavior report and decided the administrative appeal violated due process:

Petitioner contends … he was denied due process because the facility review officer that reviewed his misbehavior report … also decided petitioner’s administrative appeal of the guilty determination as the facility superintendent’s designee … . … Generally, the facility review officer is charged with reviewing each misbehavior report issued and, considering the seriousness of the alleged violations in the report, determining the appropriate tier level classification … . Here, petitioner, both during the hearing and in his administrative appeal, challenged certain actions taken by the facility review officer concerning his review of the misbehavior report. … [I]n reviewing the misbehavior report, the facility review officer viewed the video that was to be presented as evidence of guilt at the hearing. Based upon his viewing of the video, the facility review officer informed petitioner in a memorandum prepared prior to the disciplinary hearing that the video shows “you and your visitor acting in an unacceptable manner in the visit room.” The review officer further states “that the video does not show your penis being exposed as stated in the [misbehavior] report that’s why I downgraded the tiering, . . . it does clearly show your visitor with her right hand between your legs in the groin area and her hand moving in a stroking motion.” In light of the fact that certain challenges to the review officer’s actions were raised by petitioner in his administrative appeal, as well as the facility review officer’s expressed predeterminations regarding petitioner’s guilt, we conclude that his serving as the superintendent’s designee to decide the appeal denied petitioner a fair and impartial administrative appeal. Matter of Williams v Panzarella, 2024 NY Slip Op 02118, Third Dept 4-18-24

Practice Point: In the context of prison disciplinary proceedings, the prisoner’s right to due process of law is violated when the same officer who viewed the evidence and indicated the prisoner was guilty prior to the hearing also decided the prisoner’s administrative appeal.

April 18, 2024