Civil Rights Law – New York Appellate Digest

THE ALLEGATION THE LAW ENFORCEMENT DEFENDANTS PRESENTED FALSE TESTIMONY DURING PLANTIFFS’ PROSECUTIONS STATED A VALID FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT DUE PROCESS VIOLATION CAUSE OF ACTION PURSUANT TO 42 USC 1983 (SECOND DEPT).

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined plaintiffs’ cause of action alleging defendants violated 42 USC 1983 by presenting false testimony during the course of plaintiffs’ prosecution should not have been dismissed:

Supreme Court erred in granting that branch of the defendants’ motion which was for summary judgment dismissing so much of the cause of action alleging civil rights violations pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 as was predicated on a violation of the plaintiffs’ due process rights enumerated in the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution insofar as asserted against the individual defendants. The plaintiffs’ allegations that, during the course of their prosecution, the individual defendants presented false testimony were governed by the Fourteenth Amendment … . Thus, contrary to the defendants’ contention, a due process analysis was appropriate … . Batista v City of Yonkers, 2025 NY Slip Op 06592, Second Dept 11-26-25

Practice Point: An allegation that law enforcement officers presented false testimony during plaintiffs’ prosecutions stated a 42 USC 1983 violation-of-due-process cause of action.

November 26, 2025

Civil Procedure, Civil Rights Law, Judges

PETITIONER, A TRANSGENDER INDIVIDUAL, WAS ENTITLED, FOR PERSONAL SAFETY REASONS, TO THE SEALING OF THE RECORD OF HER NAME-CHANGE PROCEEDING (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined petitioner, a transgender individual, was entitled, for her personal safety, to the sealing of the record of her name-change proceeding:

We analyzed Civil Rights Law § 64-a in Matter of Cody VV. (Brandi VV.) (226 AD3d 24 [3d Dept 2024]). There, Supreme Court — the same justice — denied an applicant’s request to seal the record of the applicant’s name-change proceeding … . Reversing the court’s denial and ordering the applicant’s record sealed, we observed, in sum and substance, that the relevant statutory language reflects the Legislature’s determination that transgender individuals face threats to their personal safety that are real, constant and everywhere … . Thus, only in an “extraordinary” case will there be a “substantial basis” to find that an open court record of a name change proceeding would not place a transgender applicant’s safety at risk … .

In a “customary” case like this one, protecting the applicant from the threat of harm posed by an open court record of a name change proceeding necessarily takes priority over the public’s ability to access that court record … . To reverse those priorities is to intrude upon the policymaking authority of the Legislature. To deny a sealing request based upon those inverted priorities is to abuse the limited judicial discretion available under Civil Rights Law § 64-a. To decline to seal the record despite the applicant’s showing of jeopardy is to place the applicant at risk of the very harms the statute is meant to guard against … .

… [P]etitioner affirmed her transgender status and that she was seeking to change her name to one that reflects her female gender identity, which is the name she uses in her personal and professional life. She expressed her fear that public access to her name change would disclose her transgender status and place her at increased risk of hate crimes, harassment and other discrimination. In view of the totality of circumstances … , petitioner has demonstrated that she is entitled to have the record of her name change proceeding sealed pursuant to Civil Rights Law § 64-a … . Matter of Kieran B., 2025 NY Slip Op 06006, Third Dept 10-30-25

Practice Point: In Civil Rights Law 64-a, the legislature recognized the personal safety issues raised when a transgender individual seeks a name-change. Therefore, sealing of the name-change record reflects the legislative intent and should be the general rule.

October 30, 2025

Civil Procedure, Civil Rights Law, Defamation, Evidence

PLAINTIFFS’ REQUEST FOR SPECIFIED DISCOVERY IN OPPOSITION TO AN “ANTI-SLAPP-LAW” MOTION TO DISMISS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, CRITERIA EXPLAINED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the request for specified discovery made by plaintiffs with respect to the SLAPP (strategic lawsuits against public petition and participation) defense should have been granted:

… [I]n opposing defendants’ motion to dismiss … , plaintiffs made an alternative request for specified discovery pursuant to CPLR 3211(g)(3). In essence, a CPLR 3211(g) motion is an accelerated summary judgment motion brought in the context of a SLAPP claim … . The statute makes special provision for discovery upon an application by the party opposing the CPLR 3211(g) motion. Such discovery is tailored to aid a party in summoning “facts essential to justify its opposition” to a SLAPP claim (CPLR 3211[g][3]) and thereby show a substantial basis for their claims … .

As required by the statute, plaintiffs made their request for specified discovery under oath and with a detailed list of the depositions they seek in ascertaining who contacted the FBI, who knew what about the investigation, and when (see CPLR 3311[g][3]). Plaintiffs seek to substantiate their theory that defendants themselves instigated the FBI investigation to provide a predicate for the guardianship proceeding.

Supreme Court incorrectly held that the anti-SLAPP law did not apply, but, if it did, plaintiffs had established a substantial basis for their claims on the existing record. The court thus never reached plaintiffs’ alternative request for discovery. The parties did not brief the issue of specified discovery on the appeal. Under these circumstances, we modify Supreme Court’s denial of the motion to dismiss directed at the SLAPP claims and remand the action for discovery under CPLR 3211(g)(3) prefatory to determination of the dismissal motion. Kohler v West End 84 Units LLC, 2025 NY Slip Op 05042, First Dept 9-23-25

Practice Point: CPLR 3311[g][3] provides for discovery in the face of a motion to dismiss pursuant the anti-SLAPP statute. Here the judge’s failure to grant the discovery request required remittal.

September 23, 2025

Civil Procedure, Civil Rights Law, Defamation

ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT DEMONSTRATED THE POST ON LINKEDIN MET THE CRITERIA FOR THE “STRATEGIC LAWSUIT AGAINST PUBLIC PARTICIPATION” (SLAPP) DEFENSE TO THE DEFAMATION ACTION, PLAINTIFFS DEMONSTRATED THE DEFAMATION ACTION HAS A “SUBSTANTIAL BASIS IN LAW;” THEREFORE THE ACTION SURVIVED THE MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO CIVIL RIGHTS LAW 76-A (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined plaintiffs had stated causes of action for defamation requiring the denial of defendant’s motion to dismiss the action as a strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP, Civil Rights Law section 76-a). Plaintiffs alleged defendant put up a post on Linkedin in which defendant held himself out as a “Nonprofit Leader and Consultant” and referred to a person readily identified as plaintiff Stiloski. The post stated that “[a] Tarrytown extremist who supports neo-Nazi causes and does a ton of business with the Village placed a massive sign on his place showing a graphic middle finger aimed at our Black community:”

… [T]he plaintiffs established that the causes of action alleging defamation and defamation per se had substantial bases in the law. The defendant’s statements in the LinkedIn post, under the circumstances and in the context made, did not constitute nonactionable pure opinion … . The defendant did not call Stiloski a “neo-Nazi,” which arguably can be pure opinion. Rather, the nuanced statements at issue in the LinkedIn post, namely that Stiloski was a “Tarrytown extremist who supports neo-Nazi causes”… , can “readily be proven true or false” and, under these circumstances, in which the defendant held himself out to be a “Nonprofit Leader and Consultant” and the amended complaint alleged that the defendant is a well-known community activist, “signaled to the average reader or listener that the defendant was conveying facts about the plaintiff” … . Alternatively, the statements in the LinkedIn post are those of mixed opinion and, therefore, actionable, as “a reasonable reader would have inferred that the poster had knowledge of facts, unknown to the audience, supporting the assertions made” … . The plaintiffs further sufficiently alleged in the amended complaint that the statements made in the LinkedIn post were detrimental to them. Specifically, the amended complaint alleged that in July 2022, a potential customer refused the plaintiffs’ services and called Stiloski a “racist” and a “white supremacist.” Additionally, the plaintiffs alleged that the automotive business suffered as a result of the defendant’s actions, notably that a local church ceased doing business with the plaintiffs, among [*4]other things … . The plaintiffs further alleged that the defendant’s “actions were taken with malice based on extreme animus and hatred,” and that his conduct was “knowingly malicious, willful and wanton and/or showed reckless disregard” for the plaintiffs’ rights … . Thus, the plaintiffs demonstrated that the causes of action alleging defamation and defamation per se, as well as the other causes of action that were predicated upon the alleged defamatory communication at issue, under these circumstances, had a substantial basis in law … . Stiloski v Wingate, 2025 NY Slip Op 04803, Second Dept 8-27-25

Practice Point: A post on Linkedin meets the criteria for a SLAPP defense to a defamation action. Here however plaintiff demonstrated the defamation action had a “substantial basis in law.” The action therefore survived the motion to dismiss under the SLAPP statute (Civil Rights Law 76-a).

August 27, 2025

Civil Procedure, Civil Rights Law, Defamation

PLAINTIFF STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR DEFAMATION PER SE (DEFENDANT ALLEGEDLY STATED PLAINTIFF ENGAGED IN MONEY LAUNDERING); ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT DEMONSTRATED THE ACTION INVOLVED “PUBLIC PETITION AND PARTICIPATION” WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE SLAPP STATUTE, PLAINTIFF DEMONSTRATED THE DEFAMATION ACTION HAD A SUBSTANTIAL BASIS IN LAW; THEREFORE THE SLAPP STATUTE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN APPLIED TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff had stated a cause of action for defamation and defendant was not entitled to dismissal of the complaint pursuant to the SLAPP statute (strategic lawsuit against public participation—Civil Rights Law section 70-a(1)(a)). Plaintiff operated a marina under a 60-year lease from the National Park Service, a US governmental agency. Defendant allegedly told plaintiff’s customer that plaintiff was engaged in money-laundering:

… [D]efendant satisfied his initial burden of establishing that this action is an action involving public petition and participation, since it involves a claim based upon “lawful conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of free speech in connection with an issue of public interest” (id. § 76-a[1][a][2]). * * * … [T]he defendant established that the causes of action were asserted in connection with an issue of public interest, as the defendant allegedly accused an entity operating with the authority of a governmental agency of criminal conduct … .

Since the defendant established that this action constitutes an action involving public petition and participation, the burden shifted to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the causes of action had a substantial basis in law … .

… [T]he defendant’s alleged statement that the plaintiff “is engaged in money laundering” did not constitute pure nonactionable opinion … . * * * …[T]he complaint alleged that the defendant acted with “actual malice” or reckless disregard as to whether the statements were true or false … . … [T]he complaint was not required to allege special damages, since it asserted a cause of action alleging defamation per se based upon allegations that the defendant made statements charging the plaintiff with a serious crime or tending to injure it in its trade, business, or profession … . Thus, the plaintiff established that the cause of action alleging defamation per se had a substantial basis in law … . Moonbeam Gateway Mar., LLC v Tai Chan, 2025 NY Slip Op 03802, Second Dept 6-25-25

Practice Point: The motion court dismissed the defamation action on the ground it was precluded by the SLAPP statute. However the Second Department held that plaintiff had demonstrated the defamation action had a substantial basis in law. Therefore defendant did not demonstrate entitlement to dismissal under the SLAPP statute.

June 25, 2025

Civil Rights Law, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Evidence, False Arrest, False Imprisonment, Negligence

CONFLICTING EVIDENCE RAISED QUESTIONS OF FACT IN THIS “NEGLIGENT USE OF EXCESSIVE FORCE,” “FALSE ARREST,” AND “UNLAWFUL IMPRISONMENT” ACTION STEMMING FROM THE STREET STOP, SHOOTING AND ARREST OF THE PLAINTIFF; THE DEFENDANT TRANSIT AUTHORITY’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined conflicting evidence precluded summary judgment in this civil action stemming from the street stop and arrest of the plaintiff. Although plaintiff pled guilty, which usually forecloses any argument that the arrest was not supported by probable cause, here evidence submitted the defendant transit authority raised a question of fact about probable cause. The action alleged the negligent use of excessive force (plaintiff was shot through the windshield of his vehicle), false arrest and unlawful imprisonment:

Excessive force claims are evaluated ” ‘under the Fourth Amendment’s “objective reasonableness” standard’ ” … . * * *

“Because of its intensely factual nature, the question of whether the use of force was reasonable under the circumstances is generally best left for a jury to decide” … .

” ‘The fact that a person whom a police officer attempts to arrest resists, threatens, or assaults the officer no doubt justifies the officer’s use of some degree of force, but it does not give the officer license to use force without limit. The force used by the officer must be reasonably related to the nature of the resistance and the force used, threatened, or reasonably perceived to be threatened, against the officer’ ” … . …

Though “[t]he existence of probable cause serves as a legal justification for the arrest and an affirmative defense to the [false imprisonment cause of action]” … , the issue of probable cause is “generally a question of fact to be decided by the jury, and should ‘be decided by the court only where there is no real dispute as to the facts or the proper inferences to be drawn surrounding the arrest’ ” … . Thomas v Niagara Frontier Tr. Auth., 2025 NY Slip Op 02433, Fourth Dept 4-25-25

Practice Point: Consult this decision for an analysis of “negligent use of excessive force,” “false arrest,” and “unlawful imprisonment” causes of action at the summary-judgment stage, in the face of conflicting evidence.

April 25, 2025

Civil Procedure, Civil Rights Law, Contract Law, Employment Law

THE SIX-MONTH STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN THE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT WITH PLAINTIFF WAS REASONABLE AND ENFORCEABLE; THEREFORE PLAINTIFF’S EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION ACTION, WHICH WAS COMMENCED SIX MONTHS AND ONE DAY AFTER PLAINTIFF’S EMPLOYMENT WAS TERMINATED, WAS TIME-BARRED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the six-month statute of limitations in the employment contract with plaintiff was reasonable and enforceable. Therefore plaintiff’s action, which was commenced one day after the six-month limitation period had expired, was time-barred:

“Parties to a contract may agree to limit the period of time within which an action must be commenced to a period shorter than that provided by the applicable statute of limitations” … . “‘[A]n agreement which modifies the Statute of Limitations by specifying a shorter, but reasonable, period within which to [*2]commence an action is enforceable provided it is in writing'” … . CPLR 201 provides that an action “must be commenced within the time specified in this article unless a different time is prescribed by law or a shorter time is prescribed by written agreement.”

Pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(5), “‘a moving defendant must establish, prima facie, that the time within which to commence the action has expired'” … . Once this threshold showing is met, the burden then shifts to the plaintiff to “‘raise a question of fact as to whether the statute of limitations was tolled or was otherwise inapplicable, or whether the action was actually commenced within the applicable limitations period'” … .

Here, the defendants produced the employment application, which contained the provision regarding the six-month limitations period and which was signed by the plaintiff. The plaintiff does not dispute that her employment was terminated on November 23, 2021. The defendants therefore established … that the limitations period expired on May 23, 2022. The plaintiff commenced this action on May 24, 2022, one day after the expiration of the limitations period. Salati v Northwell Health, 2025 NY Slip Op 01660, Second Dept 3-19-25

Practice Point: Here the six-month statute of limitations in plaintiff’s employment contract was deemed reasonable and enforceable. Therefore plaintiff’s employment discrimination action, commenced six months and one day after her employment was terminated, was time-barred.

March 19, 2025

Civil Procedure, Civil Rights Law, Fiduciary Duty

THE ALLEGATION A PLASTIC SURGEON POSTED BEFORE AND AFTER PHOTOGRAPHS OF PLAINTIFF WITHOUT PERMISSION STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Egan, determined plaintiff stated causes of action for both a violation of privacy pursuant to the Civil Rights Law, and breach of a fiduciary duty. Plaintiff alleged defendant plastic surgeon posted before and after photographs of the plaintiff without her consent. The breach of a fiduciary duty claim did not duplicate the violation of privacy claim. Physicians have a fiduciary duty not to disclose a patient’s medical records without authorization:

Plaintiff instead alleges that defendants all had a physician-patient relationship with her and that they breached a distinct duty arising out of that relationship by publicly disclosing photographs of her that had been taken in the course of treatment without her agreement … . “It is well established that a patient may maintain a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty against his or her physician resulting from the physician’s unauthorized disclosure of the patient’s medical records,” broadly defined as essentially any information acquired by the physician that relates to the patient’s diagnosis or treatment, as such disclosure violates “the implied covenant of trust and confidence that is inherent in the physician patient relationship” … . A claim for breach of fiduciary duty, based as it is upon the well-established duty a physician owes to his or her patient as opposed to a purported right of privacy, may be viable where claims based upon a generalized invasion of privacy are not … . Perry v Rockmore, 2025 NY Slip Op 01141, Third Dept 2-27-25

Practice Point: Here the allegation defendant plastic surgeon posted before and after photographs of plaintiff stated distinct causes of action for a violation of privacy pursuant to the Civil Rights Law, and breach of fiduciary duty (unauthorized disclosure of medical records).

February 27, 2025

Civil Rights Law, Freedom of Information Law (FOIL)

THE FOIL PERSONAL PRIVACY EXEMPTION DOES NOT PROVIDE A BLANKET EXEMPTION FOR CIVILIAN COMPLAINTS AGAINST POLICE OFFICERS, INCLUDING UNSUBSTANTIATED COMPLAINTS; WHETHER SUCH A DOCUMENT SHOULD BE REDACTED OR WITHHELD MUST BE DETERMINED DOCUMENT-BY-DOCUMENT (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, affirming the Appellate Division, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Cannataro, determined the personal privacy exemption in FOIL did not provide a blanket exemption for civilian complaints against police officers, including unsubstantiated complaints. Rather, whether the personal privacy exemption applies must be determined on a record-by-record basis:

FOIL’s personal privacy exemption permits an agency to withhold from public access any record that “if disclosed would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy” (Public Officers Law § 87 [2] [b]). We agree with respondents that FOIL, as amended in conjunction with the repeal of Civil Rights Law § 50-a, does not deny law enforcement officers the benefit of this exemption. However, the Appellate Division correctly concluded—consistent with uniform appellate precedent—that there is no categorical or blanket personal privacy exemption for records relating to complaints against law enforcement officers that are not deemed substantiated … . * * *

Rather than withhold all such records, Public Officers Law § 87 (2) requires an agency to evaluate each record individually and determine whether “a particularized and specific justification” exists for denying access on the ground that disclosing all or part of the record would constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy … . Where redactions would prevent such an invasion and can be made without unreasonable difficulty, the agency must disclose the record with those necessary redactions … . The Appellate Division properly directed respondents to undertake this process, subject to further judicial review … . Matter of New York Civ. Liberties Union v City of Rochester, 2025 NY Slip Op 01010, CtApp 2-20-25

Practice Point: The personal privacy exemption in FOIL does not provide a blanket exemption for civilian complaints against police officers, even unsubstantiated complaints. Whether a document should be redacted or withheld under the personal privacy exemption must be determined document-by-document.

February 20, 2025

Civil Rights Law, Freedom of Information Law (FOIL)

THE FORMER EXEMPTION FROM A FOIL REQUEST FOR POLICE DISCIPLINARY RECORDS WAS REPEALED IN 2020; THE REPEAL APPLIES RETROACTIVELY SUCH THAT DISCIPLINARY RECORDS CREATED PRIOR TO THE REPEAL ARE NO LONGER EXEMPT (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, affirming the Appellate Division, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Halligan, determined that the repeal of the exemption from a FOIL request for police disciplinary records applies retroactively to documents created before the repeal:

… [W]e conclude that the Legislature intended for the statutory repeal to have retroactive effect. For starters, there is no indication that the repeal was intended to affect the usual manner in which FOIL operates. FOIL requires agencies to “make available for public inspection and copying all records” (Public Officers Law § 87 [2]), and it defines “records” with reference to whether an agency possesses information, but without reference to the date the information was created (id. § 86 [4] [defining “record” as “any information kept” or “held . . . in any physical form whatsoever”]). The amendments impose various redaction requirements and personal privacy protections for law enforcement disciplinary records specifically, yet they do not, for example, single out records created before a certain date for special treatment, or direct that disclosure of any record is tethered to the date it was created. Had the Legislature intended to deviate from FOIL’s presumption that information kept or held by an agency is disclosable by exempting records created prior to the repeal, or to mandate that an agency responding to a FOIL request ascertain and apply the law that governed when each responsive record was created, then surely it would have said as much. Matter of NYP Holdings, Inc. v New York City Police Dept., 2025 NY Slip Op 01009, CtApp 2-20-25

Practice Point: The exemption from a FOIL request for police disciplinary records was repealed in 2020. The repeal applies retroactively to police disciplinary records created prior to the repeal.