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HERE DEFENDANT’S FAILURE TO UPDATE HIS ADDRESS WITH THE DMV OR USPS WAS NOT “AFFIRMATIVE CONDUCT” DESIGNED TO AVOID SERVICE OF PROCESS; THEREFORE DEFENDANT SHOULD HAVE BEEN AFFORDED A HEARING ON WHETHER HE WAS PROPERLY SERVED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, over a partial dissent, determined the fact that defendant did not update his address with the Department of Motor Vehicles or the United States Postal Service did not demonstrate “affirmative conduct” designed to mislead a party into serving process at an incorrect address. Here the service was by “nail and mail” and defendant contended he no longer resided at that address. Defendant was entitled to a hearing:

“A defendant may be estopped from contesting the propriety of an address where service was attempted when the defendant has engaged in ‘affirmative conduct which misleads a party into serving process at an incorrect address'” … . However, as the Court of Appeals has recognized, “potential defendants ordinarily have no affirmative duty to keep those who might sue them abreast of their whereabouts” … . Thus, a defendant’s mere inaction—such as failing to update his or her address with the plaintiff, the Department of Motor Vehicles (hereinafter DMV), or the United States Postal Service (hereinafter USPS)—without more, may not be equated with affirmative or deliberate conduct designed to avoid service … . Here, the defendant’s failure to update his address with the plaintiff, DMV, or USPS, or to update his voting records with a new address, did not constitute “affirmative conduct” … , and such failure was insufficient to establish, without a hearing, that the defendant should be estopped from contesting service as a matter of law … . Citimortgage, Inc. v Goldstein, 2024 NY Slip Op 04453, Second Dept 9-18-24

Practice Point: Failure to update one’s address with the DMV or USPS is not affirmative conduct designed to avoid service of process, therefore defendant was not estopped from contesting service.

 

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THE PRE-ANSWER MOTION TO DISMISS CERTAIN CAUSES OF ACTION BASED UPON DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED; THE CAUSES OF ACTION WERE PRECLUDED BY CONTRACT PROVISIONS (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined certain causes of action should have been dismissed based upon documentary evidence, I.e., the purchase agreement and warranty. The plaintiff Board of Managers sued the sponsor and developer of defendant condominium alleging defective construction in common areas:

“On a pre-answer motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211, the pleading is to be afforded a liberal construction and the plaintiff’s allegations are accepted as true and accorded the benefit of every possible favorable inference” … . “‘A motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPR 3211(a)(1) may be granted only if the documentary evidence submitted by the moving party utterly refutes the factual allegations of the complaint and conclusively establishes a defense to the claims as a matter of law'” … . “On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court must afford the complaint a liberal construction, accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord the plaintiff[ ] the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” … . “[T]he criterion is whether the proponent of [a] pleading has a cause of action, not whether he [or she] has stated one” … .

… [T]he defendants submitted, among other things, a limited warranty that had been incorporated into the purchase agreements between the sponsor and unit owners, which expressly stated, “[t]he [s]ponsor’s [l]imited [w]arranty excludes all consequential, incidental, special damages and indirect damages.” This documentary evidence conclusively established a defense to so much of that cause of action as sought consequential damages as a matter of law … .

… [D]efendants’ motion … to dismiss the … causes of action, sounding in unjust enrichment, breach of implied housing merchant warranty, and negligence [should have been granted}. … [T]he defendants conclusively established that these causes of action are precluded by the purchase agreement and limited warranty … . Board of Mgrs. of the 37, 39 Madison St. Condominium v 31 Madison Dev., LLC, 2024 NY Slip Op 04451, Second Dept 9-18-24

Practice Point: Here the pre-answer motion to dismiss based on documentary evidence should have been granted. The relevant causes of action were precluded by the terms of a purchase agreement and warranty.

 

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TO BE ENTITLED TO A CHANGE OF VENUE AS OF RIGHT, THE DEMAND MUST BE SERVED WITH THE ANSWER OR BEFORE THE ANSWER IS SERVED; TO BE ENTITLED TO A DISCRETIONAY CHANGE OF VENUE, THE MOTION MUST BE MADE PROMPTLY AFTER LEARNING OF THE GROUND FOR THE CHANGE; HERE THE MOTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DENIED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendants’ motion to change venue should not have been granted. The summons indicated plaintiff’s residence was the basis of venue in Kings County.  Defendants did not serve a demand to change venue with their answer or before the answer was served. The motion to change venue was based upon plaintiff’s deposition testimony that he lived at an address in Richmond County. The defendants were not entitled to a change of venue as of right (because the demand was not served with the answer or before the answer was served), and the defendants were not entitled to a discretionary change of venue because the motion to change venue was not made promptly after plaintiff’s deposition testimony:

A demand to change venue based upon the designation of an improper county must be “served with the answer or before the answer is served” (CPLR 511[a]). Here, since no demand to change venue was served with the answer or before the answer had been served, that branch of the defendants’ motion which was to change venue on the ground that the county designated was improper (see CPLR 510[1]) was untimely (see CPLR 511[a] …). Thus, the defendants were not entitled to change venue as of right, and their motion became one addressed to the Supreme Court’s discretion … .

Contrary to the defendants’ contention, the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in granting that branch of their motion which was to change venue, since the defendants failed to demonstrate that they moved promptly for a change of venue after the plaintiff testified at his deposition that he lived at an address in Richmond County … . Aguilar v Reback, 2024 NY Slip Op 04444, Second Dept 9-18-24

Practice Point: For a change of venue as of right the demand must be served with the answer or before the answer is served.

Practice Point: For a discretionary change of venue, the motion must be made promptly after learning of the ground for the change.

 

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HERE PLAINTIFF DID NOT IDENTIFY AN EXPERT WITNESS AS REQUIRED BY CPLR 3101 AND THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED; HOWEVER PLAINTIFF ALLEGED SCARRING AND BURNING DURING LASER HAIR REMOVAL AND MAY STILL BE ABLE TO PROVE ORDINARY NEGLIGENCE THROUGH THE TESTIMONY OF HIS TREATING PHYSICIAN AND OTHER EVIDENCE; THE NEGLIGENCE CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that, although plaintiff was precluded from offering expert evidence and therefore could not prove medical malpractice, the negligence cause of action should not have been dismissed. Plaintiff alleged scarring and burns caused by laser hair removal:

The Supreme Court erred in dismissing the negligence cause of action on the ground that the plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case in the absence of the testimony of an expert witness. At trial, the plaintiff may, through the testimony of his treating physician, records, or “other evidence,” be able to establish “the standard of care in performing laser hair removal and the known risks of the procedure” … . Therefore, contrary to the court’s determination, although the plaintiff is precluded from offering the testimony of an expert witness whose identity must be disclosed pursuant to CPLR 3101(d)(1)(i), at this juncture, it cannot be determined that the plaintiff will be unable to establish a prima facie case of negligence … . Mishli v Advanced Dermatology Laser & Cosmetic Surgery, P.C., 2024 NY Slip Op 04386, Second Dept 9-11-24

Practice Point: In this case alleging scarring and burning during laser hair removal, the dismissal of a medical malpractice cause of action because the identity of an expert witness has not been disclosed did not necessarily preclude a negligence cause of action proven by the testimony of plaintiff’s treating physician.

 

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DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE ADDRESS FOR DEFENDANT CORPORATION ON FILE WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE WAS INCORRECT, DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO VACATE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT ON THE GROUND DEFENDANT WAS NOT MADE AWARE OF THE ACTION IN TIME TO DEFEND (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant’s motion to vacate a default judgment should have been granted. Defendant’s address on file with the Secretary of State was incorrect and defendant alleged it did not receive actual notice of the action in time to defend. There was no evidence the failure to update the address on file with the Secretary of State was intentional, and defendant demonstrated a potentially meritorious defense:

Pursuant to CPLR 317, a party that was not personally served may defend against an action if it demonstrates that it did not have notice of the action in time to defend and that it has a meritorious defense … . “Service upon a corporation through delivery of the summons and complaint to the Secretary of State is not ‘personal delivery’ to the corporation” … .

Here, the defendant established its entitlement to relief from its default under CPLR 317 by demonstrating that the address on file with the Secretary of State at the time the summons and complaint were served was incorrect and, consequently, that it did not receive actual notice of the action in time to defend itself … . Further, “the evidence does not suggest that the defendant’s failure to update its address with the Secretary of State constituted a deliberate attempt to avoid service of process” … , and there is some evidence in the record suggesting that the plaintiff had knowledge of the defendant’s actual business address … . Galatro v Lake Pointe Owners, Inc., 2024 NY Slip Op 04375, Second Dept 9-11-24

Practice Point: Here defendant corporation’s failure to update its address for service of process on file with the Secretary of State was deemed unintentional. The corporation’s motion to vacate the default judgment on the ground it was not aware of the action should have been granted.

 

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DEFENDANTS OFFERED A REASONABLE EXCUSE FOR DEFAULT IN THIS EVICTION ACTION, INCLUDING THE COVID-19-RELATED DELAYS; THE COVID-19 EMERGENCY RENTAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (CERAP) APPLIES TO EVICTION PROCEEDINGS IN SUPREME COURT, AS WELL AS HOLDOVER PROCEEDINGS IN CIVIL COURT (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendants’ motion to vacate the default judgment in this eviction action should have been granted. In addition, the Second Department held the COVID-19 Emergency Rental Assistance Program (CERAP) applied to eviction actions in Supreme Court (not just to holdover proceedings in Civil Court) and remitted the matter for consideration of the merits of defendants’ motion for a stay pursuant to CERAP:

“A defendant seeking to vacate a default in answering a complaint and to compel the plaintiff to accept an untimely answer . . . must provide a reasonable excuse for the default and demonstrate a potentially meritorious defense” … . “Whether there is a reasonable excuse for a default is a discretionary, sui generis determination to be made by the court based on all relevant factors, including the extent of the delay, whether there has been prejudice to the opposing party, whether there has been willfulness, and the strong public policy in favor of resolving cases on the merits” … . Under the circumstances of this case, including the lack of prejudice to the plaintiff, the minor delay when accounting for the COVID-19-related stays, the plaintiff’s failure to disclose the related holdover proceeding, and the strong public policy of resolving cases on the merits, the defendants’ proffered excuse was reasonable … . In addition, the defendants demonstrated a potentially meritorious defense to the action. ZG Palmetto, LLC v Alongi, 2024 NY Slip Op 04419, Second Dept 9-11-24

Practice Point: In this eviction action, the COVID-19-related delays, the lack of prejudice to plaintiff, plaintiff’s failure to disclose the related holdover proceeding, and the potentially meritorious defense warranted vacation of the default judgment.

Practice Point: The COVID-19 Emergency Rental Assistance Program (CERAP) applies to eviction actions in Supreme Court, not just to holdover proceedings in Civil Court.

 

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IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION, PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL’S AFFIDAVIT, WHICH WAS BASED SOLELY UPON READING THE COMPLAINT, DID NOT DEMONSTRATE DEFENDANT’S DEFAULT (SECOND DEPT).

he Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the affidavit by plaintiff’s counsel in this foreclosure action did not demonstrate defendant’s default:

Generally, in moving for summary judgment in an action to foreclose a mortgage, a plaintiff establishes its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law through the production of the mortgage, the unpaid note, and evidence of default … . “A plaintiff may establish a payment default by an admission made in response to a notice to admit (see CPLR 3212[b]; 3123), by an affidavit from ‘a person having [personal] knowledge of the facts’ (CPLR 3212[b]), or by other evidence ‘in admissible form'” … .

Here, in support of its motion, the plaintiff submitted the affirmation of its counsel, Jennie Shnayder, who attested to the borrower’s default in payment. However, Shnayder stated that the basis of her knowledge was her review of the complaint, and she did not attest that she had personal knowledge of the defendants’ alleged default in payment or annex to her affirmation any other evidence thereof in admissible form. Wilmington Sav. Fund Socy., FSB v E39 St., LLC, 2024 NY Slip Op 04417, Second Dept 9-11-24

Practice Point: A recurring evidentiary issue in foreclosure proceedings where the bank is seeking summary judgment is the sufficiency of evidence presented in the supporting affidavits. Unless the plaintiff’s affiant’s assertions are based on first-hand knowledge, or on business records that are attached, summary judgment is not supported.

 

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EVIDENCE THAT PLAINTIFF DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO FORECLOSE, SUBMITTED AFTER A JURY TRIAL AND JUDGMENT FOR THE PLAINTIFF, WARRANTED REVERSAL AND A NEW TRIAL (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court in this foreclosure action, determined defendant’s evidence that plaintiff did not have standing to foreclose, submitted after a jury trial and a judgment of foreclosure, raised a question of fact requiring a new trial:

The defendant cross-moved … pursuant to CPLR 4404(b) … for judgment … dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against him, submitting evidence that Fannie Mae purchased the note subsequent to the assignment of the note to the plaintiff and prior to the commencement of this action. …

“A plaintiff establishes its standing in a mortgage foreclosure action by demonstrating that, when the action was commenced, it was either the holder or assignee of the underlying note. Either a written assignment of the underlying note or the physical delivery of the note prior to the commencement of the foreclosure action is sufficient to transfer the obligation, and the mortgage passes with the debt as an inseparable incident” … . …

The evidence submitted by the defendant raised issues of fact warranting a new trial on the issue of standing, and the plaintiff does not contend that it was improper for the defendant to submit this evidence for the first time after the conclusion of the original trial … . Wendover Fin. Servs. Corp. v Steinman, 2024 NY Slip Op 04416, Second Dept 9-11-24

Practice Point: Here evidence submitted by defendant, after a jury trial and judgment for the plaintiff, raised a question of fact about whether plaintiff had standing to foreclose requiring a new trial. Plaintiff did not object to the post-trial submission.

 

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THE RELATION-BACK DOCTRINE APPLIES EVEN WHERE A NEW ACTION HAS BEEN COMMENCED AND CONSOLIDATED WITH A PRIOR ACTION (FIRST DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Rosado, determined the relation-back doctrine applied to the wrongful death action against Dr. Ozcan and reinstated that cause of action. The court noted that the relation-back doctrine applies where, as here, a new action has been commenced and consolidated with a prior action:

Dr. Ozcan does not substantively dispute that the claims in the prior and instant actions arose out of the same conduct or that she is united in interest with Montefiore [Medical Center]. Therefore, the only question to be decided, is whether the third prong of the relation-back doctrine has been established.

Dr. Ozcan, who was named as a defendant in the First Action, should have known that, but for a mistake, the wrongful death claim would have been brought against her as well … .

Application of the relation-back doctrine is proper even where, as here, a new action has been commenced and consolidated with a prior action … . Picchioni v Sabur, 2024 NY Slip Op 04362, First Dept 9–5-24

Practice Point: The relation-back doctrine applies to render an action timely brought even where a new action has been commenced and consolidated with a prior action.

 

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STATE DESIGN DEFECT AND FAILURE TO WARN ACTION IS PREEMPTED BY THE FEDERAL HAZARDOUS MATERIALS TRANSPORTATION ACT (HMTA), CRITERIA EXPLAINED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Rodriguez, determined the state defective-design and failure-to-warn action stemming from an allegedly defective compressed gas cylinder was preempted by the federal Hazardous Materials Transportation Act (HMTA). …”…  [T]he HMTA’s express preemption provision encompasses state law claims ‘about’ ‘the designing, manufacturing, fabricating, inspecting, marking, maintaining, reconditioning, repairing, or testing [of] a package, container, or packaging component that is represented, marked, certified, or sold as qualified for use in transporting hazardous material in commerce’ … “:

… Federal preemption is based on the US Constitution’s Supremacy Clause …  …

The issue of federal preemption is a question of law …, since it concerns whether, as a matter of statutory interpretation … , Congress has enacted a law for which a particular state rule is “to the Contrary”  … .

An “inquiry into the scope of a statute’s pre-emptive effect is guided by the rule that ‘the purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone’ in every pre-emption case” … .. “If a federal law contains an express pre-emption clause,” as here, “it does not immediately end the inquiry because the question of the substance and scope of Congress’ displacement of state law still remains” …

Whether dealing with “express or implied pre-emption, we begin our analysis ‘with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States [are] not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress'” … . “That assumption applies with particular force when Congress has legislated in a field traditionally occupied by the States” … . “Thus, when the text of a pre-emption clause is susceptible of more than one plausible reading, courts ordinarily ‘accept the reading that disfavors pre-emption'” … .

Notwithstanding the above, “[i]f the statute contains an express pre-emption clause, the task of statutory construction must in the first instance focus on the plain wording of the clause, which necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress’ pre-emptive intent” … .

Accordingly, although courts will not hesitate to hold that state common-law claims are preempted by federal legislation, the analysis in each express preemption case must turn on the precise language of the relevant preemption provision … .

… [T]he defense of preemption may be raised at any time  … .Malerba v New York City Tr. Auth., 2024 NY Slip Op 04344, First Dept 8-29-24

Practice Point: Consult this opinion for the analysis of and criteria for preemption of a state action by a federal statute.

 

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