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Complaint Can Not Be Deemed a Late Notice of Claim/Application to File a Late Notice of Claim Can Not Be Granted After the Statute of Limitations Has Run/City Is Not Required to Plead the Failure to File a Notice of Claim as a Defense/Participation in Discovery Did Not Preclude the City from Moving to Dismiss Based Upon Plaintiff’s Failure to File a Notice of Claim (After the Statute of Limitations Had Run)

The Second Department reversed Supreme Court’s determination that the complaint be deemed a late notice of claim against the city in a slip and fall case.  The court noted that Supreme Court did not have the power to accept the complaint as a late notice of claim, did not have the power to grant an application to file a late notice of claim after the statute of limitations had passed, the city was under no obligation to plead the absence of a notice of claim as a defense, and the city was not precluded from raising the defense by participating in discovery:

Here … the Housing Authority … was “under no obligation to plead, as an affirmative defense, the plaintiff’s failure to comply with the statutory notice of claim requirement” … . “Furthermore . . . participation in pretrial discovery did not preclude [it] from raising the untimeliness of the notice of claim” … . In short, there is no evidence in the record demonstrating that the Housing Authority engaged in any misleading conduct which would support a finding of equitable estoppel … . Furthermore, there is no indication in the record that the plaintiff relied upon any alleged act or omission of the Housing Authority or that such reliance caused the plaintiff to change her position to her detriment or prejudice … . Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted the Housing Authority’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff failed to serve a timely notice of claim, and denied that branch of the plaintiff’s cross motion which was to deem the complaint to be a late notice of claim and to deem it to have been timely served nunc pro tunc.  Feliciano v NYC Hous Auth, 2014 NY Slip OP 08807, 2nd Dept 12-17-14

 

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In the Absence of Allegations in the Pleadings Supporting an “Espinal” Exception to the Rule that Tort Liability to Third Persons Does Not Arise from a Contract, No Question of Fact Was Raised About a Duty Owed by the Defendant to the Plaintiff

The Second Department determined the complaint in a slip and fall case was properly dismissed.  There apparently was a contract between the defendant cleaning services company, One-A, and plaintiff’s employer.  Plaintiff slipped and fell on a wet floor. The court explained the Espinal criteria for tort liability to third parties arising from a contract and then found that, because plaintiff was not a party to the cleaning-services contract, the cleaning-services company did not owe her a duty of care:

Generally, a contractual obligation, standing alone, will not give rise to tort liability in favor of a third party … . Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals has recognized three exceptions to this general rule: (1) where the contracting party, in failing to exercise reasonable care in the performance of his or her duties, launches a force or instrument of harm; (2) where the plaintiff detrimentally relies on the continued performance of the contracting party’s duties; and (3) where the contracting party has entirely displaced another party’s duty to maintain the premises safely … . As part of its prima facie showing, a contracting defendant is only required to negate the applicability of those Espinal exceptions that were expressly pleaded by the plaintiff or expressly set forth in the plaintiff’s bill of particulars … . Here, given the allegations in the complaint and the plaintiff’s bill of particulars, One-A established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law simply by offering sufficient proof that the plaintiff was not a party to its contract to clean the floor of the premises, and that it thus owed her no duty of care … . In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact … . Glover v John Tyler Eters Inc, 2014 NY Slip Op 08809, 2nd Dept 12-17-14

 

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Court Must Consider Whether Both Parties, Not Only the Bank, Have Negotiated in Good Faith in the Mandatory Pre-Foreclosure Settlement Conferences (Re: Possible Modification of the Terms of a Mortgage Subject to Foreclosure)—Under the Totality of the Circumstances, Supreme Court’s Finding that the Bank Did Not Negotiate in Good Faith Was Not Supported

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Andrias, determined that Supreme Court should have considered the defendant’s actions in deciding whether the parties had negotiated in good faith during the pre-foreclosure settlement conferences mandated by CPLR 3408 (a) [Subprime Residential Loan and Foreclosure Laws].  The conferences are required to ascertain whether a modification of the terms of a mortgage otherwise subject to foreclosure can be reached in a settlement. Supreme Court’s finding that the plaintiff bank did not negotiate in good faith was not warranted, in large part, because Supreme Court did not take into account the inaccurate and inconsistent information provided by the defendant during the conferences:

CPLR 3408 was enacted in 2008, as part of the omnibus “Subprime Residential Loan and Foreclosure Laws” (L 2008, ch 472, effective August 5, 2008), remedial legislation intended to assist homeowners at risk of losing their homes to foreclosure due to the subprime credit crisis (See Sponsor’s Mem., Bill Jacket (L 2008, ch 472). As part of the protections afforded to homeowners by the legislation, CPLR 3408 requires that conferences be conducted in residential foreclosure actions “for the purpose of holding settlement discussions pertaining to the relative rights and obligations of the parties under the mortgage loan documents, including, but not limited to determining whether the parties can reach a mutually agreeable resolution to help the defendant avoid losing his or her home, and evaluating the potential for a resolution in which payment schedules or amounts may be modified or other workout options may be agreed to, and for whatever other purposes the court deems appropriate” (CPLR 3408[a]).

These mandatory settlement conferences are intended to “provide an opportunity for borrowers and lenders to try to reach a solution that avoids foreclosure” (see Letter of Sen Farley, Bill Jacket, L 2008, ch 472 at 6).

CPLR 3408(f), added in 2009 as part of legislation designed to provide broader protection for homeowners (L 2009, ch 507 effective February 13, 2010), states that “[b]oth the plaintiff and defendant shall negotiate in good faith to reach a mutually agreeable resolution, including a loan modification, if possible.” “The purpose of the good faith requirement is to ensure that both plaintiff and defendant are prepared to participate in a meaningful effort at the settlement conference to reach resolution” (2009 Mem of Governor’s Program Bill, Bill Jacket, L 2009, ch 507 at 11). The language of the statute and legislative history confirm that the obligation to negotiate in good faith is intended to be a two way street, imposing reciprocal obligations on both the lender and the borrower to cooperate with the other to enable achievement of a reasonable resolution … . Towards this end, 22 NYCRR 202.12-a(c)(4) directs the court to “ensure that each party fulfills its obligation to negotiate in good faith.”

The term “good faith” is not defined in the statute. However, this Court has held that compliance with the good faith requirement of CPLR 3408 is not established by merely proving the absence of fraud or malice on the part of the lender and that “[a]ny determination of good faith must be based on the totality of the circumstances,” taking into account that CPLR 3408 is a remedial statute … .

“While the aspirational goal of CPLR 3408 negotiations is that the parties reach a mutually agreeable resolution to help the defendant avoid losing his or her home’ (CPLR 3408[a]), the statute requires only that the parties enter into and conduct negotiations in good faith … . …[T]his Court [has] noted that “there are situations in which the statutory goal is simply not financially feasible for either party” and that “the mere fact that plaintiff refused to consider a reduction in principal or interest rate does not establish that it was not negotiating in good faith. Nothing in CPLR 3408 requires plaintiff to make the exact offer desired by [the] defendant[ ] [mortgagors], and the plaintiff’s failure to make that offer cannot be interpreted as a lack of good faith” … . * * *

…[W]e find that [defendant] has not established that, under the totality of the circumstances, plaintiff failed to engage in a meaningful effort at reaching a solution during the settlement conferences. Although plaintiff presented [defendant] with repeated requests for documentation and, at times, failed to timely comply with deadlines issued by the court, the record establishes that [defendant] created a moving target for plaintiff by repeatedly changing her alleged sources of income in her loan modification applications, and failing to disclose substantial and material liens encumbering the property. Citibank NA v Barclay, 2014 NY Slip Op 08757, 1st Dept 12-11-14

 

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Nature of a “Turn-Key” or “Design-Build” Contract Explained—Three-Year Statute of Limitations for Malpractice Applied to Defendant Architects Who Were Engaged Solely to Design, Not Build, the Renovations

In a lawsuit stemming from the failure of a building facade, the Third Department determined that the contract between plaintiff property-owner and defendant architects was not a “turn-key” or “design-build” contract, which encompassed the entire construction project, but rather was a professional services contract for the design of building renovations.  Therefore the three-year statute of limitations for professional malpractice applied. The Third Department affirmed the dismissal of the complaint, explaining the nature of a “design-build” contract:

In “turnkey” or “design-build” construction projects, “an owner contracts with one entity to both design and build the project [and t]he turnkey builder is responsible for every phase of the construction from final design through subcontracting, construction, finishing and testing” … . The design-builder generally cannot shift liability and is the “single point [of] responsibility” under a design-build contract, because it is “the [d]esign-[b]uilder [who] has the responsibility of the preliminary and construction design, the responsibility of submitting a fixed sum for the construction of the project and the responsibility for holding the contracts with its trade contractors” … . As plaintiff asserts, it follows that nearly every design-build project involves the existence of two or more contracts — at least one among the members of the design-build team and one between the design-builder and the owner. Here, however, it was not defendant, the purported design-builder, who held the separate contract with the general contractor, but plaintiff as the owner. * * *

…[W]e conclude that plaintiff’s … causes of action — alleging that defendant was negligent and breached the parties’ contract by failing to use reasonable care in rendering its professional services — essentially allege professional malpractice … . Such claims “‘come[] within the purview of CPLR 214 (6),'” which sets forth a three-year statute of limitations for nonmedical malpractice, “‘regardless of whether the theory is based in tort or breach of contract'”… . We note that “‘a claim for professional malpractice against an engineer or architect accrues upon the completion of performance under the contract and the consequent termination of the parties’ professional relationship'” … . 797 Broadway Group LLC v Stracher Roth Gilmore Architects, 2014 NY Slip Op 08689, 3rd Dept 12-11-14

 

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Under Liberal Construction of Lien Law Defendant Did Not Waive Its Mechanic’s Lien by Failing to Assert Lien-Based Counterclaims and Cross Claims In Its Initial Answer

The Third Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Lahtinen, determined that the defendant had not waived its mechanic’s lien by failing to assert lien-based counterclaims and cross claims it in its initial answer and therefore could amend its answer accordingly:

“The duration of a lien is prescribed by statute and the right to enforce it, like the right to file and create it, is derived therefrom” … . That statutory framework “is remedial in nature and intended to protect those who have directly expended labor and materials to improve real property at the direction of the owner or a general contractor” … . The law governing mechanic’s liens is thus liberally construed to ensure that its purpose is accomplished, and substantial compliance with its provisions is generally sufficient (see Lien Law §§ 23, 40…).

Lien Law § 44 (5) provides in pertinent part that “[e]very defendant who is a lienor shall, by answer in the action, set forth his [or her] lien, or he [or she] will be deemed to have waived the same, unless the lien is admitted in the complaint, and not contested by another defendant.” * * *

…[H]ere, at the time [defendant] made its motion to amend its answer, plaintiff’s complaint, read in conjunction with [defendant’s] answer as well as the other pleadings, constituted a sufficient substantial admission of [defendant’s] lien such that, had the matter gone to trial on those pleadings, [defendant’s] rights would have been preserved under the statutory language … . Since [defendant’s] lien rights had not been already waived as a matter of law when it made its motion to amend its answer, its proposed counterclaim and cross claims were not wholly devoid of merit. Edwards & Zuck PC v Cappelli Enters Inc, 2014 NY Slip Op 08690, 3rd Dept 12-11-14

 

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Leased Right-of-Way Was an Easement Appurtenant Which Can Only Be Extinguished by Abandonment, Conveyance, Condemnation or Adverse Possession

The Third Department determined a preliminary injunction was properly granted in an action alleging defendant’s interference with plaintiff’s leased right-of-way:

Plaintiff owns an industrial building with deeded easements located within defendant’s industrial park in the City of Schenectady, Schenectady County. Plaintiff also leases from defendant an adjoining parcel with a general right of ingress and egress. Plaintiff commenced this action seeking a declaration that its leased right-of-way entitles it to a general right of passage of commercial vehicles in connection with its heavy steel fabrication business operated on the premises. Plaintiff also seeks a permanent injunction prohibiting defendant from interfering with plaintiff’s use of the general right-of-way and compelling defendant to remove certain obstructions to its right of passage. * * *

Supreme Court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that defendant was unlikely to succeed on its claim that the metes and bounds easement conveyed to plaintiff when it purchased the building from defendant’s predecessor limits and restricts the general right of ingress and egress granted in the lease that was entered into at the same time with that same predecessor. The general right-of-way in the lease is an easement appurtenant that “may be extinguished only by abandonment, conveyance, condemnation or adverse possession” … . Inasmuch as there is no evidence that the general right-of-way was abandoned, conveyed, condemned or adversely possessed, it continues to exist, notwithstanding any easement provided for in connection with the separate conveyance of the building to plaintiff … .

Given that plaintiff has a general right of ingress and egress, defendant may only alter the passageway “so long as [plaintiff’s] right of passage is not impaired” … . Plaintiff presented photographs and an affidavit from its president establishing that defendant’s placement of steel poles along the easement’s boundaries and a locked gate at one of the entrances restricted plaintiff’s ingress and egress, thereby showing a likelihood of success on the merits of its action … . STS Steel Inc v Maxon Alco Holdings LLC, 2014 NY Slip OP 08694, 3rd Dept 12-11-14

 

Repeated Invitations to Review 60 to 80 Banker’s Boxes of Documents In Response to a Discovery Demand Constituted Willful and Contumacious Behavior Justifying the Striking of the Complaint

The Third Department determined Supreme Court properly struck the pleadings based upon plaintiffs’ failure to comply with discovery demands.  Plaintiffs sued defendants for profits allegedly lost when plaintiffs failed to procure a printing and copying contract with the state.  The defendants sought discovery of documents related to the lost profits (alleged to be $1,500,000). Although plaintiffs supplied some relevant information, the discovery demands were repeatedly met with an invitation to review 60 to 80 banker’s boxes of documents in a warehouse:

We recognize that plaintiffs provided certain documents and that [plaintiff’s principal] appeared at a deposition. This limited cooperation does not necessarily preclude a finding of willful and contumacious behavior… . Plaintiffs had the burden to prove damages and defendants were entitled to review documents supporting the damages claim prior to trial. Notably, plaintiffs were able to create and provide annual sales summaries, but never provided the documents that were used to calculate the sales figures. The record confirms that despite Supreme Court’s frequent intervention and direction to produce the documents in a more organized fashion, plaintiffs continued to insist that their offer to have defendants sift through 60 to 80 boxes of miscellaneous business records was adequate. Indeed, plaintiffs refused to respond otherwise even after defendants narrowed their document request following [a] deposition. * * *

In our view, the record demonstrates “[a] pattern of noncompliance” sufficient to support Supreme Court’s finding that plaintiffs’ conduct was willful … . Under the circumstances, we thus conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in granting defendants’ motion and striking plaintiffs’ complaint. BDS Copy Inks Inc, v International Paper, 2014 NY Slip Op 08692, 3rd Dept 12-11-14

 

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Motion to Strike Errata Sheet “Correcting” Substantive Discrepancies in Deposition Testimony Should Have Been Granted

The Second Department reversed Supreme Court and dismissed the complaint.  In her deposition plaintiff testified at length about where she tripped and fell but identified a very different location from that described in the complaint.  Plaintiff then sought to “correct” the “errors” in the deposition transcript by executing an errata sheet:

Notwithstanding the detailed, consistent, and emphatic nature of the plaintiff’s deposition testimony regarding the location of her accident, she subsequently executed an errata sheet containing numerous substantive “corrections” which conflicted with various portions of her testimony and which sought to establish that she actually fell at 197 Fifth Avenue, not 140 Fifth Avenue. The only reason proffered for these changes was that, prior to her deposition, she was shown photographs of 140 Fifth Avenue that mistakenly had been taken by an investigator hired by her attorney, and that she thereafter premised her testimony on her accident having occurred at the location depicted in those photographs. The defendants … moved, to strike the errata sheet and for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against each of them. The Supreme Court denied the motions. We reverse.

Contrary to the determination of the Supreme Court, the plaintiff failed to provide an adequate reason for the numerous, critical, substantive changes she sought to make in an effort to materially alter her deposition testimony (see CPLR 3116[a]…). Horn v 197 5th Ave Corp, 2014 NY Slip Op 08605, 2nd Dept 12-10-14

 

Plaintiff Did Not Sufficiently Allege Colorado Defendant Had Purposefully Transacted Business In New York—Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction Should Have Been Granted

The Second Department determined Supreme Court should have granted the Colorado defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction.  Plaintiff requested a loan from her uncle (the defendant), a Colorado resident. After her uncle refused, plaintiff brought this action for prima facie tort and slander based upon her communications with the defendant.  The Second Department found that plaintiff had not sufficiently alleged that defendant “purposefully transacted business” within New York:

A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any nondomiciliary who “transacts any business within the state” (CPLR 302[a][1]). Generally, a nondomiciliary will be deemed to be subject to the jurisdiction of a New York court pursuant to CPLR 302(a)(1) if he or she has “engaged in some purposeful activity within the State and there is a substantial relationship’ between this activity and the plaintiff’s cause of action” … . “Purposeful activities are those with which a defendant, through volitional acts, avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws'” … .

Although the ultimate burden of proof regarding personal jurisdiction rests with the plaintiff, to defeat a CPLR 3211(a)(8) motion to dismiss a complaint, the plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing that the defendant is subject to the personal jurisdiction of the court … . Here, accepting as true the allegations set forth in the complaint and in the plaintiff’s opposition papers, and according the plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference … , the plaintiff failed to meet her prima facie burden. The nature and quality of the defendant’s alleged contacts with New York do not demonstrate that he purposefully transacted business within this state … . Whitcraft v Runyon, 2014 NY Slip Op 08634, 2nd Dept 12-10-14

 

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Doctrine of Res Judicata Did Not Preclude Lawsuit Against Defendant Building Inspector In His Individual Capacity After Summary Judgment (In Defendant’s Favor) In an Action Against Defendant In His Official Capacity—Transactional Approach to Res Judicata Explained

The Second Department determined that summary judgment in favor of the defendant (Maikisch) in an action brought against a town and defendant in his capacity as building inspector did not, pursuant to the doctrine of res judicata, preclude a lawsuit against the defendant in his individual capacity. The court explained the analytical criteria:

This State has adopted the transactional analysis approach in deciding the application of the doctrine of res judicata. Under this analysis, “once a claim is brought to a final conclusion, all other claims arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions are barred, even if based upon different theories or if seeking a different remedy” … . “It is not always clear whether particular claims are part of the same transaction for res judicata purposes. A pragmatic' test has been applied to make this determination–—analyzing whether the facts are related in time, space, origin, or motivation, whether they form a convenient trial unit, and whether their treatment as a unit conforms to the parties' expectations or business understanding or usage'” … . “One linchpin of res judicata is an identity of parties actually litigating successive actions against each other: the doctrine applies only when a claim between the parties has been previously brought to a final conclusion'”

…[I]n the prior action, the plaintiff made no claim against Maikisch in his capacity as an individual. Rather, the plaintiff sought relief, in the form of a declaratory judgment, against the Town and Maikisch in his capacity as Building Inspector of the Town. “It has been repeatedly held that persons suing or being sued in their official or representative capacity are, in contemplation of law, distinct persons, and strangers to any right or liability as an individual, and consequently a former judgment concludes a party only in the character in which he was sued” … .

In any event, the differences which exist between the issues raised in the prior litigation and those raised now, namely, the differences in the kind of relief sought, in the kind of facts to be proved, and in the kind of law to be applied, outweigh the similarities to such an extent as to render the doctrine of res judicata inapplicable … . In the prior action, the plaintiff sought a judgment declaring that the subject property was exempt from certain land-use and building code regulations. There, the plaintiff alleged that, for reasons stated, the relevant regulations were inapplicable the subject property. In this action, the plaintiff seeks to recover money damages from Maikisch individually, based on contract and tort theories. In this action, the plaintiff alleges, inter alia, that Maikisch breached an oral contract between the parties, breached a fiduciary duty owed to the plaintiff, and tortiously interfered with the plaintiff's business relations. Specialized Realty Servs LLC v Maickisch, 2014 NY Slip Op 08627, 2nd Dept 12-10-14