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HOMEOWNER EXEMPTION APPLIED TO THE CHURCH IN THIS LABOR LAW 240 (1), 241 (6) AND 200 ACTION STEMMING FROM A FALL FROM A SCAFFOLD, FAILURE TO PLEAD THE EXEMPTION AS A DEFENSE DID NOT PRECLUDE RAISING IT IN A SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION, ARCHDIOCESE WAS NOT AN AGENT OF THE OWNER, NO LABOR LAW 200 LIABILITY BECAUSE PLAINTIFF’S EMPLOYER SUPERVISED AND CONTROLLED THE MEANS AND MANNER OF WORK (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, modifying Supreme Court, determined defendant church demonstrated it was entitled to the homeowner exemption from liability in this Labor Law 240 (1) and 241 (6) actions stemming from plaintiff's fall from a scaffold. The failure to plead the exemption as a defense did not preclude raising it in the summary judgment motion. The Archdiocese was not an agent of the owner because it did not have the authority to control or supervise plaintiff's work.  And the Labor Law 200 cause of action should have been dismissed because the accident involved the means and methods of work controlled solely by plaintiff's employer:

Defendant Catholic Church of Christ the King made a prima facie showing that the accident in which plaintiff was injured falls within the exemption to Labor Law § 240(1) and Labor Law § 241(6) for “owners of one and two-family dwellings who contract for but do not direct or control the work” (Labor Law § 240[1]; Labor Law § 241). Plaintiff was repairing a detached garage associated with a church rectory used for both residential and church purposes … . Moreover, the certificate of occupancy indicates that the rectory constituted a dwelling and a private garage … . Defendant's failure to plead this affirmative defense in its answer does not mandate the denial of its motion, since plaintiff was not surprised by the defense, and fully opposed the motion (see CPLR 3018[b] … ).

Plaintiff failed to raise issues of fact as to the applicability of the homeowner exemption. His assertion that the garage was exclusively restricted to use by teachers at an elementary school owned by the church is unsupported by the record. Bautista v Archdiocese of N.Y., 2018 NY Slip Op 05959, First Dept 8-30-18

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (HOMEOWNER EXEMPTION APPLIED TO THE CHURCH IN THIS LABOR LAW 240 (1), 241 (6) AND 200 ACTION STEMMING FROM A FALL FROM A SCAFFOLD, FAILURE TO PLEAD THE EXEMPTION AS A DEFENSE DID NOT PRECLUDE RAISING IT IN A SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION, ARCHDIOCESE WAS NOT AN AGENT OF THE OWNER, NO LABOR LAW 200 LIABILITY BECAUSE PLAINTIFF'S EMPLOYER SUPERVISED AND CONTROLLED THE MEANS AND MANNER OF WORK (FIRST DEPT))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, HOMEOWNER EXEMPTION APPLIED TO THE CHURCH IN THIS LABOR LAW 240 (1), 241 (6) AND 200 ACTION STEMMING FROM A FALL FROM A SCAFFOLD, FAILURE TO PLEAD THE EXEMPTION AS A DEFENSE DID NOT PRECLUDE RAISING IT IN A SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION, ARCHDIOCESE WAS NOT AN AGENT OF THE OWNER, NO LABOR LAW 200 LIABILITY BECAUSE PLAINTIFF'S EMPLOYER SUPERVISED AND CONTROLLED THE MEANS AND MANNER OF WORK (FIRST DEPT))/CPLR 3018 (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, HOMEOWNER EXEMPTION APPLIED TO THE CHURCH IN THIS LABOR LAW 240 (1), 241 (6) AND 200 ACTION STEMMING FROM A FALL FROM A SCAFFOLD, FAILURE TO PLEAD THE EXEMPTION AS A DEFENSE DID NOT PRECLUDE RAISING IT IN A SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION, ARCHDIOCESE WAS NOT AN AGENT OF THE OWNER, NO LABOR LAW 200 LIABILITY BECAUSE PLAINTIFF'S EMPLOYER SUPERVISED AND CONTROLLED THE MEANS AND MANNER OF WORK (FIRST DEPT))/HOMEOWNER EXEMPTION (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, HOMEOWNER EXEMPTION APPLIED TO THE CHURCH IN THIS LABOR LAW 240 (1), 241 (6) AND 200 ACTION STEMMING FROM A FALL FROM A SCAFFOLD, FAILURE TO PLEAD THE EXEMPTION AS A DEFENSE DID NOT PRECLUDE RAISING IT IN A SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION, ARCHDIOCESE WAS NOT AN AGENT OF THE OWNER, NO LABOR LAW 200 LIABILITY BECAUSE PLAINTIFF'S EMPLOYER SUPERVISED AND CONTROLLED THE MEANS AND MANNER OF WORK (FIRST DEPT))

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OUT-OF-STATE AFFIDAVIT RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANT WAS AWARE OF THE DOG’S VICIOUS PROPENSITIES IN THIS DOG BITE CASE, THE AFFIDAVIT WAS ADMISSIBLE DESPITE ABSENCE OF A CERTIFICATE OF CONFORMITY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant's motion for summary judgment in this dog bite case should not have been granted. An affidavit from plaintiff's neighbor raised a question of fact whether defendant was aware of the dog's vicious propensities. The Second Department further determined that the fact that the out-of-state affidavit was not accompanied by a certificate of conformity did not render it inadmissible:

…[I]n opposition to the motion, the plaintiff raised triable issues of fact as to whether the defendant's dog had vicious propensities, and whether the defendant knew or should have known of the dog's alleged vicious propensities … . According to an affidavit of the plaintiff's neighbor Michael Walters, submitted in opposition to the motion, on two occasions prior to the incident, the defendant warned Walters to be careful near the dog because he bites. This affidavit was sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the defendant had actual and/or constructive notice that the dog had vicious propensities … . Contrary to the defendant's contention, Walters' affidavit was admissible, notwithstanding that it was subscribed and sworn to out of state and not accompanied by a certificate of conformity as required by CPLR 2309(c), as such a defect is not fatal, and no substantial right of the defendant was prejudiced by disregarding the defect … . Lipinsky v Yarusso, 2018 NY Slip Op 05925, Second Dept 8-29-18

ANIMAL LAW (DOG BITE, (CERTIFICATE OF CONFORMITY, DOG BITE, OUT-OF-STATE AFFIDAVIT RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANT WAS AWARE OF THE DOG'S VICIOUS PROPENSITIES IN THIS DOG BITE CASE, THE AFFIDAVIT WAS ADMISSIBLE DESPITE ABSENCE OF A CERTIFICATE OF CONFORMITY (SECOND DEPT))/DOG BITE (OUT-OF-STATE AFFIDAVIT RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANT WAS AWARE OF THE DOG'S VICIOUS PROPENSITIES IN THIS DOG BITE CASE, THE AFFIDAVIT WAS ADMISSIBLE DESPITE ABSENCE OF A CERTIFICATE OF CONFORMITY (SECOND DEPT))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (CERTIFICATE OF CONFORMITY, DOG BITE, OUT-OF-STATE AFFIDAVIT RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANT WAS AWARE OF THE DOG'S VICIOUS PROPENSITIES IN THIS DOG BITE CASE, THE AFFIDAVIT WAS ADMISSIBLE DESPITE ABSENCE OF A CERTIFICATE OF CONFORMITY (SECOND DEPT))/CPLR 2309 (CERTIFICATE OF CONFORMITY, DOG BITE, OUT-OF-STATE AFFIDAVIT RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANT WAS AWARE OF THE DOG'S VICIOUS PROPENSITIES IN THIS DOG BITE CASE, THE AFFIDAVIT WAS ADMISSIBLE DESPITE ABSENCE OF A CERTIFICATE OF CONFORMITY (SECOND DEPT))/CERTIFICATE OF CONFORMITY (DOG BITE, OUT-OF-STATE AFFIDAVIT RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANT WAS AWARE OF THE DOG'S VICIOUS PROPENSITIES IN THIS DOG BITE CASE, THE AFFIDAVIT WAS ADMISSIBLE DESPITE ABSENCE OF A CERTIFICATE OF CONFORMITY (SECOND DEPT))/OUT-OF-STATE AFFIDAVIT (CERTIFICATE OF CONFORMITY, DOG BITE, OUT-OF-STATE AFFIDAVIT RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANT WAS AWARE OF THE DOG'S VICIOUS PROPENSITIES IN THIS DOG BITE CASE, THE AFFIDAVIT WAS ADMISSIBLE DESPITE ABSENCE OF A CERTIFICATE OF CONFORMITY (SECOND DEPT))

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LETTER DID NOT ACKNOWLEDGE THE DEBT AND THEREBY REVIVE A TIME-BARRED FORECLOSURE ACTION, MORTGAGE PROPERLY CANCELED AND DISCHARGED IN THIS RPAPL 1501 ACTION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined plaintiff was entitled, pursuant to Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL) 1501 and the statute of limitations, to cancel and discharge a mortgage which defendant bank (Deutsche Bank) had accelerated more than six years before. Defendant bank argued that a letter sent by the original property owner, Aird (who had taken out the mortgage), pursuant to General Obligations Law § 17-101, acknowledged the debt and revived the time-barred claim. Supreme Court properly rejected that argument:

“General Obligations Law § 17-101 effectively revives a time-barred claim when the debtor has signed a writing which validly acknowledges the debt” … . To constitute a valid acknowledgment, a “writing must be signed and recognize an existing debt and must contain nothing inconsistent with an intention on the part of the debtor to pay it” … . Contrary to Deutsche Bank's contention, a letter written by Aird that accompanied his second short sale package submitted to Deutsche Bank's loan servicer did not constitute an unqualified acknowledgment of the debt or manifest a promise to repay the debt sufficient to reset the running of the statute of limitations … . Karpa Realty Group, LLC v Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co., 2018 NY Slip Op 05921, Second Dept 8-29-18

Similar issues and result in Yadegar v Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co, 2018 NY Slip Op 05957, Second Dept 8-29-18

FORECLOSURE (LETTER DID NOT ACKNOWLEDGE THE DEBT AND THEREBY REVIVE A TIME-BARRED FORECLOSURE ACTION, MORTGAGE PROPERLY CANCELED AND DISCHARGED IN THIS RPAPL 1501 ACTION (SECOND DEPT))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (FORECLOSURE, LETTER DID NOT ACKNOWLEDGE THE DEBT AND THEREBY REVIVE A TIME-BARRED FORECLOSURE ACTION, MORTGAGE PROPERLY CANCELED AND DISCHARGED IN THIS RPAPL 1501 ACTION (SECOND DEPT))/REAL PROPERTY ACTIONS AND PROCEEDINGS LAW (LETTER DID NOT ACKNOWLEDGE THE DEBT AND THEREBY REVIVE A TIME-BARRED FORECLOSURE ACTION, MORTGAGE PROPERLY CANCELED AND DISCHARGED IN THIS RPAPL 1501 ACTION (SECOND DEPT))/DEBTOR-CREDITOR (FORECLOSURE, GENERAL OBLIGATIONS LAW, LETTER DID NOT ACKNOWLEDGE THE DEBT AND THEREBY REVIVE A TIME-BARRED FORECLOSURE ACTION, MORTGAGE PROPERLY CANCELED AND DISCHARGED IN THIS RPAPL 1501 ACTION (SECOND DEPT))/GENERAL OBLIGATIONS LAW 17-101 LETTER DID NOT ACKNOWLEDGE THE DEBT AND THEREBY REVIVE A TIME-BARRED FORECLOSURE ACTION, MORTGAGE PROPERLY CANCELED AND DISCHARGED IN THIS RPAPL 1501 ACTION (SECOND DEPT))

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SUPREME COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN PRECLUDING PLAINTIFF FROM PRESENTING EVIDENCE OF ITEMS ALLEGEDLY SOLD OR DAMAGED BY DEFENDANTS (OWNERS-OPERATORS OF A STORAGE UNIT) AS A SANCTION FOR PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGED SPOLIATION OF ITEMS IN THE STORAGE UNIT (SECOND DEPT).

In this Lien Law action, the Second Department determined Supreme Court improperly precluded the plaintiff from offering evidence of the value and condition of items allegedly sold or damaged by defendants, the owners/operators of a storage unit plaintiff had rented. Defendants allegedly mistakenly believed plaintiff had failed to pay the rental fees and held an auction. After plaintiff regained control of the unit, plaintiff disposed of most of the contents, despite defendants' requests to inspect the items:

Although the defendants demonstrated that the plaintiff disposed of the majority of the items remaining in the storage unit after he regained control and possession of the unit, the defendants failed to demonstrate that the plaintiff's conduct rose to the level of being intentional or willful … . …

Under the circumstances of this case, the appropriate sanction is to preclude evidence of the items disposed by the plaintiff that were not available for inspection by the defendants … . Heins v Public Stor., 2018 NY Slip Op 05919, Second Dept 8-29-18

CIVIL PROCEDURE (SPOLIATION, SUPREME COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN PRECLUDING PLAINTIFF FROM PRESENTING EVIDENCE OF ITEMS ALLEGEDLY SOLD OR DAMAGED BY DEFENDANTS (OWNERS-OPERATORS OF A STORAGE UNIT) AS A SANCTION FOR PLAINTIFF'S ALLEGED SPOLIATION OF ITEMS IN THE STORAGE UNIT (SECOND DEPT))/EVIDENCE (SPOLIATION, SUPREME COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN PRECLUDING PLAINTIFF FROM PRESENTING EVIDENCE OF ITEMS ALLEGEDLY SOLD OR DAMAGED BY DEFENDANTS (OWNERS-OPERATORS OF A STORAGE UNIT) AS A SANCTION FOR PLAINTIFF'S ALLEGED SPOLIATION OF ITEMS IN THE STORAGE UNIT (SECOND DEPT))/SPOLIATION (SUPREME COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN PRECLUDING PLAINTIFF FROM PRESENTING EVIDENCE OF ITEMS ALLEGEDLY SOLD OR DAMAGED BY DEFENDANTS (OWNERS-OPERATORS OF A STORAGE UNIT) AS A SANCTION FOR PLAINTIFF'S ALLEGED SPOLIATION OF ITEMS IN THE STORAGE UNIT (SECOND DEPT))/LIEN LAW (SPOLIATION, SUPREME COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN PRECLUDING PLAINTIFF FROM PRESENTING EVIDENCE OF ITEMS ALLEGEDLY SOLD OR DAMAGED BY DEFENDANTS (OWNERS-OPERATORS OF A STORAGE UNIT) AS A SANCTION FOR PLAINTIFF'S ALLEGED SPOLIATION OF ITEMS IN THE STORAGE UNIT (SECOND DEPT))

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EMAILS SUBMITTED WITH REPLY PAPERS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED, DEFENDANT’S CROSS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined emails submitted in reply papers should not have been considered:

The purpose of a reply affidavit or affirmation is to respond to arguments made in opposition to the movant's motion and not to introduce new arguments or grounds in support of the relief sought … . There are exceptions to this rule, including when evidence is submitted in response to allegations made for the first time in opposition, or when the other party is given an opportunity to respond to the reply papers … . Neither of those exceptions applies here. The time for the defendant to produce the letters allegedly from the plaintiff transferring his interest in the shares would have been in support of her cross motion, inter alia, for summary judgment declaring that she is the sole owner of the shares. There was no new allegation in the plaintiff's opposition to the cross motion that would have warranted the defendant's submission of the letters in reply. Further, the plaintiff was not given an opportunity to respond by way of surreply or oral argument. An unrecorded, in-chambers discussion of the cross motion cannot be deemed an opportunity to respond, especially in light of the plaintiff's claim on appeal that the letters are forgeries. Moreover, the defendant did not plead a demand for a declaratory judgment in a counterclaim … . The defendant also did not assert a claim to sole ownership of the shares in her pleading. Gelaj v Gelaj, 2018 NY Slip Op 05917, Second Dept 8-29-18

CIVIL PROCEDURE (REPLY, EMAILS SUBMITTED WITH REPLY PAPERS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED, DEFENDANT'S CROSS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/REPLY (EMAILS SUBMITTED WITH REPLY PAPERS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED, DEFENDANT'S CROSS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/EVIDENCE  (REPLY, EMAILS SUBMITTED WITH REPLY PAPERS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED, DEFENDANT'S CROSS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/SUMMARY JUDGMENT (REPLY, EVIDENCE, MAILS SUBMITTED WITH REPLY PAPERS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED, DEFENDANT'S CROSS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))

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ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT CORPORATION WAS NOT PERSONALLY SERVED WITH THE SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT, SUPREME COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO VACATE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT, DEFENDANT DID NOT ADEQUATELY EXPLAIN ITS CLAIM THAT NOTICE BY MAIL WAS NOT RECEIVED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined Supreme Court did not abuse its discretion in refusal to vacate a default judgment. Although the corporate defendant (Greenville) was not served personally, it failed to explain why it did not receive the summons and complaint:

CPLR 317 permits a defendant who has been served with a summons other than by personal delivery to defend the action upon a finding by the court that the defendant did not personally receive notice of the summons in time to defend and has a potentially meritorious defense … . “[S]ervice on a corporation through delivery of process to the Secretary of State is not personal delivery' to the corporation” … . “The mere denial of receipt of the summons and complaint is not sufficient to establish lack of actual notice of the action in time to defend for the purpose of CPLR 317” … . Whether to grant relief pursuant to CPLR 317 is discretionary … , and relief may be denied “where, for example, a defendant's failure to personally receive notice of the summons was a result of a deliberate attempt to avoid such notice” … .

Here, Greenville did not contend that the address it kept on file with the Secretary of State was incorrect, and its shareholders effectively claimed ignorance as to why the summons and complaint were “unclaimed,” without offering any details as to how Greenville ordinarily received mail at that address. Further, Greenville offered no explanation as to why it did not receive any of the other correspondence from the plaintiff, all of which were sent to the same address. Under these circumstances, Greenville's conclusory and unsubstantiated denial of service of the certified mailing card and other correspondence from the plaintiff was insufficient to establish that it did not have actual notice of the action in time to defend … . Stevens v Stepanski, 2018 NY Slip Op 05954, Second Dept 8-29-18

CIVIL PROCEDURE (ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT CORPORATION WAS NOT PERSONALLY SERVED WITH THE SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT, SUPREME COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO VACATE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT, DEFENDANT DID NOT ADEQUATELY EXPLAIN ITS CLAIM THAT NOTICE BY MAIL WAS NOT RECEIVED (SECOND DEPT))/CPLR 317  (ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT CORPORATION WAS NOT PERSONALLY SERVED WITH THE SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT, SUPREME COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO VACATE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT, DEFENDANT DID NOT ADEQUATELY EXPLAIN ITS CLAIM THAT NOTICE BY MAIL WAS NOT RECEIVED (SECOND DEPT))/SERVICE OF PROCESS  (ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT CORPORATION WAS NOT PERSONALLY SERVED WITH THE SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT, SUPREME COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO VACATE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT, DEFENDANT DID NOT ADEQUATELY EXPLAIN ITS CLAIM THAT NOTICE BY MAIL WAS NOT RECEIVED (SECOND DEPT))/DEFAULT JUDGMENT (ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT CORPORATION WAS NOT PERSONALLY SERVED WITH THE SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT, SUPREME COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO VACATE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT, DEFENDANT DID NOT ADEQUATELY EXPLAIN ITS CLAIM THAT NOTICE BY MAIL WAS NOT RECEIVED (SECOND DEPT))/CORPORATION LAW (ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT CORPORATION WAS NOT PERSONALLY SERVED WITH THE SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT, SUPREME COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO VACATE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT, DEFENDANT DID NOT ADEQUATELY EXPLAIN ITS CLAIM THAT NOTICE BY MAIL WAS NOT RECEIVED (SECOND DEPT))

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DEFAMATION PLEADING INSUFFICIENT, STATEMENT ENJOYED QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE, INTERNET POST WAS NONACTIONABLE OPINION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined the defamation action, based upon a complaint made to the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (SPCA) was properly dismissed. The complaint did not include the allegedly defamatory statement (a pleading failure) and the statement enjoyed qualified privilege. A remark posted on the Internet, which stated that defendant (Studer) had “seen and heard” horror stories about plaintiffs' treatment of animals, was nonactionable opinion:

… [W]ith respect to the plaintiffs' contention that Studer was liable for defamation based on the statements she made to the SPCA, since the amended complaint failed to set forth “the particular words complained of,” that branch of Studer's motion which was for summary judgment dismissing so much of the defamation cause of action as was based on those statements should have been granted (CPLR 3016[a]…). In any event, the record supports the Supreme Court's determination that Studer demonstrated, prima facie, that the allegedly defamatory statements enjoyed a qualified privilege. Protection from defamation is afforded where the person making the statements does so fairly “in the discharge of some public or private duty, legal or moral, or in the conduct of his [or her] own affairs, in a matter where his [or her] interest is concerned” …  Here, since the evidence establishes that Studer made the statements to the SPCA in a good faith effort to obtain the aid of a law enforcement agency in addressing a potentially unsafe environment which children in her community frequented, the statements are subject to a qualified privilege … . …

We also agree with the Supreme Court's determination to reject the plaintiffs' contention that Studer was liable for defamation based on the Internet post. Studer established, prima facie, that this post constituted a nonactionable expression of opinion inasmuch as it consisted of imprecise, subjective characterizations which could not be objectively verified … . New York Horse Rescue Corp. v Suffolk County Socy. for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 2018 NY Slip Op 05934, Second Dept 8-29-18

DEFAMATION (DEFAMATION PLEADING INSUFFICIENT, STATEMENT ENJOYED QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE, INTERNET POST WAS NONACTIONABLE OPINION (SECOND DEPT))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (DEFAMATION PLEADING INSUFFICIENT, STATEMENT ENJOYED QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE, INTERNET POST WAS NONACTIONABLE OPINION (SECOND DEPT))/CPLR 3016 (DEFAMATION PLEADING INSUFFICIENT, STATEMENT ENJOYED QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE, INTERNET POST WAS NONACTIONABLE OPINION (SECOND DEPT))/PRIVILEGE (DEFAMATION PLEADING INSUFFICIENT, STATEMENT ENJOYED QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE, INTERNET POST WAS NONACTIONABLE OPINION (SECOND DEPT))

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SIX-MONTH CONTRACTUAL STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS EXPIRED BEFORE THE CLAIM ACCRUED AND WILL NOT BE ENFORCED TO PRECLUDE PAYMENT ON THE CLAIM (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Mazzarelli, reversing Supreme Court, determined that plaintiff's suit for payment on a contract was not precluded by the six-month statute of limitations in the contract. Plaintiff AWI contracted with defendant Whitestone to provide security at construction sites. Both Whitestone and AWI were named in a prevailing wage class action commenced by AWI workers. Whitestone, pursuant to a contractual provision, refused to pay AWI until the wage action was resolved. The case was not resolved within the six-month limitations period:

[AWI argues] on appeal that the contractual limitations provision is unenforceable because it enables the scenario where, even though a claim has not accrued by the time six months have passed since the last time physical work was performed, it is still time-barred. AWI is essentially arguing that, in light of Whitestone's stated position that payment was not due to AWI until such time as the Wage Action was resolved, it should not have been subjected to the “catch-22” of having to file a lawsuit to toll the statute of limitations where the claim was not yet ripe for adjudication. AWI analogizes to Executive Plaza, LLC v Peerless Ins. Co. (22 NY3d 511 [2014]). In that case, the defendant insurer issued a fire policy to the plaintiff insured which required the plaintiff to commence suit under the policy within two years of a fire. The policy further required the plaintiff, if seeking to recover replacement cost, to forbear on making any such claim until the property had actually been replaced. When the plaintiff's property burned down, it diligently acted to replace the property, but it recognized that the process would take more than two years. In an effort to protect its rights, it commenced an action on the two-year anniversary of the fire. The defendant successfully moved to dismiss the action as premature. When the replacement was complete, the plaintiff commenced a new action. The defendant removed the action to federal district court and moved to dismiss on statute of limitations grounds. After the court granted the motion, the Second Circuit certified a question to the Court of Appeals asking whether the limitations period was enforceable.

The Court of Appeals held that it was not. While recognizing the inherent reasonableness of contractually truncated statutes of limitations, the Court held that “[a] limitation period' that expires before suit can be brought is not really a limitation period at all, but simply a nullification of the claim” … . * * *

.. [W]we find that, under the circumstances, the limitations period cannot serve to bar AWI's claim … . AWI Sec. & Investigators, Inc. v Whitestone Constr. Corp., 2018 NY Slip Op 05907, First Dept 8-23-18

CIVIL PROCEDURE (SIX-MONTH CONTRACTUAL STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS EXPIRED BEFORE THE CLAIM ACCRUED AND WILL NOT BE ENFORCED TO PRECLUDE PAYMENT ON THE CLAIM (FIRST DEPT))/STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS (CONTRACT LAW, SIX-MONTH CONTRACTUAL STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS EXPIRED BEFORE THE CLAIM ACCRUED AND WILL NOT BE ENFORCED TO PRECLUDE PAYMENT ON THE CLAIM (FIRST DEPT))/CONTRACT LAW (STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, SIX-MONTH CONTRACTUAL STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS EXPIRED BEFORE THE CLAIM ACCRUED AND WILL NOT BE ENFORCED TO PRECLUDE PAYMENT ON THE CLAIM (FIRST DEPT))

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THE REAL ESTATE BOARD OF NEW YORK, WHOSE MEMBERS OWN HOTELS, HAD STANDING TO CONTEST A LOCAL LAW PLACING A TWO-YEAR MORATORIUM ON THE CONVERSION OF HOTELS TO RESIDENTIAL UNITS, THE BOARD DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE LAW UNDER THE STATE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REVIEW ACT, HOWEVER, BECAUSE IT DID NOT ALLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL HARM AND DID NOT ALLEGE HARM SEPARATE AND APART FROM INJURY TO THE GENERAL PUBLIC (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Moulton, over a partial dissent, reversing Supreme Court, determined that the Real Estate Board of New York (REBNY) had standing to challenge a Local Law which placed a two-year moratorium on the conversion of hotels to condominiums or other residential uses. The court further determined that the REBNY did not have standing to challenge the statute under the State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA). The REBNY alleged that 29 of its members owned hotels subject to the law:

Owners of real property who are subjected to a new zoning classification or other use restriction are “presumptively affected by the change” and “therefore technically have standing” to assert claims … .

Accepted as true for purposes of these CPLR 3211 motions, REBNY’s assertion that its member hotel owners are currently negatively affected by the moratorium is sufficient to establish standing in the plenary action and in the article 78 proceeding under ULURP [the City Charter’s Uniform Land Use Review Process] … . * * *

REBNY’s claimed environmental harm is nothing more than economic harm (i.e., the reduction in property values, the loss of business opportunities and the added expense of applying for a waiver under Local Law 50). REBNY’s own filings reflect that the organization’s constitution mentions the environment only once, and only insofar as the environment relates to economic impact. The affidavit by REBNY’s president does not salvage REBNY’s standing argument. The president claims that “SEQRA is a concern” for all REBNY members in “proximity” to the hotels due to potential impacts on traffic, noise, air quality, waste disposal and demand for public services. This argument … fails to establish injury separate and apart from injury to the general public … . Matter of Real Estate Bd. of N.Y., Inc. v City of New York, 2018 NY Slip Op 05906, First Dept 8-23-18

REAL PROPERTY LAW (THE REAL ESTATE BOARD OF NEW YORK, WHOSE MEMBERS OWN HOTELS, HAD STANDING TO CONTEST A LOCAL LAW PLACING A TWO-YEAR MORATORIUM OF THE CONVERSION OF HOTELS TO RESIDENTIAL UNITS, THE BOARD DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE LAW UNDER THE STATE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REVIEW ACT, HOWEVER, BECAUSE IT DID NOT ALLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL HARM AND DID NOT ALLEGE HARM SEPARATE AND APART FROM INJURY TO THE GENERAL PUBLIC (SECOND DEPT))/MUNICIPAL LAW  (THE REAL ESTATE BOARD OF NEW YORK, WHOSE MEMBERS OWN HOTELS, HAD STANDING TO CONTEST A LOCAL LAW PLACING A TWO-YEAR MORATORIUM OF THE CONVERSION OF HOTELS TO RESIDENTIAL UNITS, THE BOARD DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE LAW UNDER THE STATE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REVIEW ACT, HOWEVER, BECAUSE IT DID NOT ALLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL HARM AND DID NOT ALLEGE HARM SEPARATE AND APART FROM INJURY TO THE GENERAL PUBLIC (SECOND DEPT))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (STANDING, THE REAL ESTATE BOARD OF NEW YORK, WHOSE MEMBERS OWN HOTELS, HAD STANDING TO CONTEST A LOCAL LAW PLACING A TWO-YEAR MORATORIUM OF THE CONVERSION OF HOTELS TO RESIDENTIAL UNITS, THE BOARD DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE LAW UNDER THE STATE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REVIEW ACT, HOWEVER, BECAUSE IT DID NOT ALLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL HARM AND DID NOT ALLEGE HARM SEPARATE AND APART FROM INJURY TO THE GENERAL PUBLIC (SECOND DEPT))/ENVIRONMENTAL LAW  (THE REAL ESTATE BOARD OF NEW YORK, WHOSE MEMBERS OWN HOTELS, HAD STANDING TO CONTEST A LOCAL LAW PLACING A TWO-YEAR MORATORIUM OF THE CONVERSION OF HOTELS TO RESIDENTIAL UNITS, THE BOARD DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE LAW UNDER THE STATE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REVIEW ACT, HOWEVER, BECAUSE IT DID NOT ALLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL HARM AND DID NOT ALLEGE HARM SEPARATE AND APART FROM INJURY TO THE GENERAL PUBLIC (SECOND DEPT)).STATE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REVIEW ACT  (THE REAL ESTATE BOARD OF NEW YORK, WHOSE MEMBERS OWN HOTELS, HAD STANDING TO CONTEST A LOCAL LAW PLACING A TWO-YEAR MORATORIUM OF THE CONVERSION OF HOTELS TO RESIDENTIAL UNITS, THE BOARD DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE LAW UNDER THE STATE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REVIEW ACT, HOWEVER, BECAUSE IT DID NOT ALLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL HARM AND DID NOT ALLEGE HARM SEPARATE AND APART FROM INJURY TO THE GENERAL PUBLIC (SECOND DEPT))/LAND USE (THE REAL ESTATE BOARD OF NEW YORK, WHOSE MEMBERS OWN HOTELS, HAD STANDING TO CONTEST A LOCAL LAW PLACING A TWO-YEAR MORATORIUM OF THE CONVERSION OF HOTELS TO RESIDENTIAL UNITS, THE BOARD DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE LAW UNDER THE STATE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REVIEW ACT, HOWEVER, BECAUSE IT DID NOT ALLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL HARM AND DID NOT ALLEGE HARM SEPARATE AND APART FROM INJURY TO THE GENERAL PUBLIC (SECOND DEPT))/HOTELS  (THE REAL ESTATE BOARD OF NEW YORK, WHOSE MEMBERS OWN HOTELS, HAD STANDING TO CONTEST A LOCAL LAW PLACING A TWO-YEAR MORATORIUM OF THE CONVERSION OF HOTELS TO RESIDENTIAL UNITS, THE BOARD DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE LAW UNDER THE STATE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REVIEW ACT, HOWEVER, BECAUSE IT DID NOT ALLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL HARM AND DID NOT ALLEGE HARM SEPARATE AND APART FROM INJURY TO THE GENERAL PUBLIC (SECOND DEPT))/CORPORATION LAW (THE REAL ESTATE BOARD OF NEW YORK, WHOSE MEMBERS OWN HOTELS, HAD STANDING TO CONTEST A LOCAL LAW PLACING A TWO-YEAR MORATORIUM OF THE CONVERSION OF HOTELS TO RESIDENTIAL UNITS, THE BOARD DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE LAW UNDER THE STATE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REVIEW ACT, HOWEVER, BECAUSE IT DID NOT ALLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL HARM AND DID NOT ALLEGE HARM SEPARATE AND APART FROM INJURY TO THE GENERAL PUBLIC (SECOND DEPT))

, ,

AFFIDAVIT FROM AN EYEWITNESS TO THE ACCIDENT SUBMITTED WITH THE REPLY PAPERS WAS PROPERLY CONSIDERED AS IT DID NOT CONFLICT THE WITNESS’S OTHER AFFIDAVIT OR THE WITNESS’S PRIOR UNSWORN STATEMENT, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION PROPERLY GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The First Department determined plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment on his Labor Law 240 (1) cause of action. Plaintiff alleged his thumb was crushed when attempting to lift a roof cutting machine over a parapet at the edge of the roof in order to drop the machine to insulation material ten feet below. Three affidavits from an eyewitness (Vera) were submitted, including an affidavit submitted with the reply. The defendant argued conflicts in the affidavits created a question of fact. But the court saw no conflicts:

The motion court properly accepted Veras’s second, clarifying affidavit in plaintiff’s submission on reply. The second affidavit merely amplified the factual recitation set forth in Veras’s initial affidavit, which had been procured and drafted by the defense and omitted the pertinent detail that the workers were actually in the process of lowering the machine from the roof, and not engaged in pushing it across the flat roof, when the accident occurred. Veras’s second affidavit was a proper response to defendant’s submission, and did not contradict the statement in his first affidavit …  Nor could Veras’s second affidavit be rejected as raising a feigned issue of fact … , especially since it comported with all of the other eyewitness testimony in the case, as well as with Veras’s own early unsworn statement, and explained the ambiguity arising from the omission of additional details in his first affidavit.

We have recognized the distinction in Labor Law § 240(1) cases between contradictory evidence and evidence that is subject to explanation in granting partial summary judgment on liability to a plaintiff… .

Here, Veras’s three statements, when taken together and along with those of the three other eyewitnesses and that of plaintiff, provided a detailed and consistent recounting of the accident as having occurred during the lowering of the machine. Cuevas v Baruti Constr. Corp., 2018 NY Slip Op 05905, First Dept 8-23-18

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (AFFIDAVIT FROM AN EYEWITNESS TO THE ACCIDENT SUBMITTED WITH THE REPLY PAPERS WAS PROPERLY CONSIDERED AS IT DID NOT CONFLICT THE WITNESS’S OTHER AFFIDAVIT OR THE WITNESS’S PRIOR UNSWORN STATEMENT, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION PROPERLY GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/EVIDENCE (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, CIVIL PROCEDURE, AFFIDAVIT FROM AN EYEWITNESS TO THE ACCIDENT SUBMITTED WITH THE REPLY PAPERS WAS PROPERLY CONSIDERED AS IT DID NOT CONFLICT THE WITNESS’S OTHER AFFIDAVIT OR THE WITNESS’S PRIOR UNSWORN STATEMENT, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION PROPERLY GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/EVIDENCE (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AFFIDAVIT FROM AN EYEWITNESS TO THE ACCIDENT SUBMITTED WITH THE REPLY PAPERS WAS PROPERLY CONSIDERED AS IT DID NOT CONFLICT THE WITNESS’S OTHER AFFIDAVIT OR THE WITNESS’S PRIOR UNSWORN STATEMENT, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION PROPERLY GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (REPLY, AFFIDAVIT FROM AN EYEWITNESS TO THE ACCIDENT SUBMITTED WITH THE REPLY PAPERS WAS PROPERLY CONSIDERED AS IT DID NOT CONFLICT THE WITNESS’S OTHER AFFIDAVIT OR THE WITNESS’S PRIOR UNSWORN STATEMENT, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION PROPERLY GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/REPLY (AFFIDAVIT FROM AN EYEWITNESS TO THE ACCIDENT SUBMITTED WITH THE REPLY PAPERS WAS PROPERLY CONSIDERED AS IT DID NOT CONFLICT THE WITNESS’S OTHER AFFIDAVIT OR THE WITNESS’S PRIOR UNSWORN STATEMENT, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION PROPERLY GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))

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