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THE JUDGMENT OF FORECLOSURE AND SALE WAS REVERSED ON APPEAL; THE DEFENDANT IN THE FORECLOSURE ACTION DID NOT SEEK A STAY PENDING APPEAL; THE FACT THAT THE NOTICE OF PENDENCY, FILED BY THE BANK AT THE OUTSET OF THE FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS, WAS STILL IN EFFECT AT THE TIME OF THE FORECLOSURE SALE DID NOT AFFECT THE TRANSFER OF TITLE TO A GOOD FAITH PURCHASER AT THE FORECLOSURE SALE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Brathwaite Nelson, determined the defendant in the foreclosure action, Yesmin, upon reversal of the judgment of foreclosure and sale on appeal, was not entitled to cancel and discharge the referee’s deed transferring title to a good faith purchaser of the foreclosed property. It is significant here that the defendant in the foreclosure action did not seek a stay pending appeal. The notice of pendency, filed by the bank in the foreclosure action, which was still in effect at the time of the foreclosure sale, did not affect the title acquired by the good faith purchaser:

This appeal raises the question of what effect an extant notice of pendency has on the title to real property acquired by a third party from a judicial foreclosure sale when the judgment of foreclosure and sale is reversed on the appeal of a defendant to the foreclosure action. For the reasons that follow, we hold that a notice of pendency that was unexpired at the time of the foreclosure sale has no effect on the title acquired by a good faith purchaser for value from a sale conducted pursuant to the judgment of foreclosure and sale. * * *

Once a judgment is entered, the need to obtain a stay pending appeal in order to protect the right to restitution of the property is shared equally by a defendant or a plaintiff against whom the judgment is entered. Where a judgment has been entered against a plaintiff, “the plaintiff’s right to impair the marketability of the property during the pendency of an appeal [is conditioned] upon the issuance of a discretionary CPLR 5519(c) stay” … . Thus, regardless of whether the judgment is issued in favor of a defendant or the plaintiff, once a judgment is entered, a stay is necessary to protect the property, and in the absence of a stay, the winning party is free to transfer the property as it sees fit. * * *

Since [the good faith purchaser of the foreclosed property] established that it is “a purchaser in good faith and for value” whose title would be affected by restitution of Yesmin’s property rights lost by the judgment of foreclosure and sale, Yesmin may not seek restitution by canceling the referee’s deed and, instead, is limited to monetary relief against the plaintiff to the foreclosure action (CPLR 5523 …). Yesmin v Aliobaba, LLC, 2025 NY Slip Op 02964, Second Dept 5-14-25

Practice Point: If the defendant in a foreclosure action which is appealed does not seek a stay pending appeal, the reversal on appeal does not affect title transferred to a good faith purchaser at the foreclosure sale.

 

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IN THIS CHILD VICTIMS ACT CASE, THE ALLEGED FREQUENCY OF THE ABUSE BY A TEACHER RAISED QUESTIONS OF FACT ABOUT THE SCHOOL DISTRICT’S CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF THE ABUSE AND WHETHER ITS SUPERVISION OF PLAINTIFF STUDENT WAS NEGLIGENT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined this Child Victims Act action alleging the negligent hiring, retention and supervision of a teacher, as well as negligent supervision of plaintiff student, should not have been dismissed. The defendant school district did not eliminate questions of fact about whether it had constructive notice of the abuse based upon the alleged frequency of the abuse:

… [T]he defendants failed to establish, prima facie, that they lacked constructive notice of the teacher’s alleged abusive propensities and conduct … . Considering, among other things, the frequency of the alleged abuse, which occurred over the course of two school years, inter alia, in a classroom and inside the teacher’s vehicle, the defendants did not eliminate triable issues of fact as to whether they should have known of the alleged abuse … . The defendants also failed to demonstrate, prima facie, that their supervision of both the teacher and the plaintiff was not negligent … . Trunco v Eastport- S. Manor Cent. Sch. Dist., 2025 NY Slip Op 02951, Second Dept 5-14-25

Practice Point: In a Child Victims Act action against a teacher, allegations of the frequency and the locations of the abuse of a student may be sufficient to raise questions of fact about whether the school district had constructive notice of the abuse and whether the supervision of the student was negligent.

 

A SEPARATE CAUSE OF ACTION FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES WILL BE DISMISSED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, dismissing the cause of action for punitive damages, noted that “a separate cause of action for punitive damages is not legally cognizable…”. Domen Holding Co. v Sanders, 2025 NY Slip Op 02871, First Dept 5-13-25

 

 

 

 

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PLAINTIFF’S TRANSLATED AFFIDAVIT WAS NOT ACCOMPANIED BY THE TRANSLATOR’S AFFIDAVIT AND WAS THEREFORE INADMISSIBLE; THE ROADWAY WHERE THE COLLISION OCCURRED WAS NOT DIVIDED INTO TWO OR MORE CLEARLY MARKED LANES; THEREFORE THE “UNSAFE LANE CHANGE” STATUTE (VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW 1128(A)) DID NOT APPLY (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined summary judgment should not have been awarded to plaintiff in this traffic accident case. Plaintiff submitted his affidavit which had been translated but did not submit an affidavit from the translator attesting to the translator’s qualifications and the accuracy of plaintiff’s affidavit. In addition, the roadway where the accident occurred was not divided into two or more clearly marked lanes. Therefore the unsafe-lane-change provision of the Vehicle and Traffic Law did not apply to the facts:

In support of his motion for summary judgment, plaintiff submitted his translated affidavit and dashcam footage from defendants’ vehicle. He argued that defendant driver made an unsafe lane change in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1128(a), which provides that “[w]henever any roadway has been divided into two or more clearly marked lanes for traffic . . . [a] vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane and shall not be moved from such lane until the driver has first ascertained that such movement can be made with safety.”

Plaintiff failed to demonstrate his entitlement to summary judgment. His affidavit, which was not accompanied by an affidavit from a translator attesting to the translator’s qualifications and the accuracy of the affidavit, does not comply with CPLR 2101(b) and is therefore inadmissible … . Even if the affidavit could be considered, the dashcam video does not “conclusively establish” that defendant driver violated Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1128(a) or eliminate issues of fact as to how the accident occurred … .

The dashcam video shows that Zerega Avenue was not divided into lanes in the southbound direction, and that neither vehicle was driving within a “clearly marked” lane of traffic when plaintiff’s vehicle drove up on the right side of defendants’ tractor-trailer. Moreover, the dashcam footage does not establish that defendant driver caused the accident by moving into plaintiff’s lane of traffic when it was not safe to do so. Richards v Walls, 2025 NY Slip Op 02889, First Dept 5-13-25

Practice Point: Where an affidavit submitted to support a summary judgment motion has been translated, it is not admissible unless it is accompanied by the translator’s affidavit attesting the the translator’s qualifications and the accuracy of the translation.

Practice Point: The unsafe-lane-change statute, Vehicle and Traffic Law 1128(a), does not apply unless there are two or more clearly marked lanes of travel.

 

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THE CRITERIA FOR JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL WERE NOT MET HERE (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, over a dissent, determined plaintiff was not precluded by judicial estoppel from seeking attorney’s fees deemed uncollectible in a bankruptcy proceeding:

Supreme Court incorrectly dismissed the complaint on the ground that judicial estoppel bars plaintiff from seeking attorneys’ fees that were deemed uncollectible in a bankruptcy proceeding. Judicial estoppel applies where it is shown that a debtor omitted or concealed the existence of an asset and later brought suit to collect on that asset … . Here, the court made no such findings, and in fact assumed that plaintiff had not misled the bankruptcy trustee. Nor does the record establish that plaintiff obtained a benefit in the bankruptcy proceeding by taking one position in that proceeding and then assuming a contrary position in this action “simply because [his] interest changed” … . We respectfully disagree with our dissenting colleague that the record establishes that plaintiff unequivocally adopted a conflicting legal position to obtain a bankruptcy discharge. Bohn v Tekulsky, 2025 NY Slip Op 02848, First Dept 5-8-25

Practice Point: In the context of a bankruptcy proceeding, the doctrine of judicial estoppel precludes a debtor from concealing the existence of an asset and subsequently bringing suit to collect on that asset. Although there was a dissent, the majority concluded plaintiff had not misled the bankruptcy court and therefore judicial estoppel did not apply.

 

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PLAINTIFF SUBMITTED AN AFFIDAVIT TO REMEDY DEFECTS IN THE COMPLAINT IN RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS; SUPREME COURT SHOULD HAVE CONSIDERED THE AFFIDAVIT; THE MOTION TO DISMISS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the complaint alleging that defendants improperly influenced the decedent to name them as beneficiaries of two bank accounts should not have been dismissed. The allegations in the complaint were supplemented by plaintiff’s affidavit. The Second Department noted that the affidavit should have been considered in assessing the sufficiency of the complaint:

The defendants moved pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the complaint on the ground, among others, that it failed to state a cause of action. In opposition to the motion, the plaintiff submitted an affidavit in which she made statements to supplement the causes of action alleged in the complaint. … Supreme Court granted the defendants’ motion. …

“On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), a court must accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” … . “‘Whether the complaint will later survive a motion for summary judgment, or whether the plaintiff will ultimately be able to prove its claims, of course, plays no part in the determination of a prediscovery CPLR 3211 motion to dismiss'” … . Where a cause of action is based upon, inter alia, fraud, breach of trust, or undue influence, the circumstances constituting the wrong shall be stated in detail (see CPLR 3016[b]).

Here, the Supreme Court should have considered the plaintiff’s affidavit to remedy any defects in the complaint when it assessed the defendants’ motion … . Rauch v Rauch, 2025 NY Slip Op 02802, Second Dept 5-7-25

Practice Point: Here the court held that an affidavit submitted by the plaintiff to remedy defects in the complaint in response to a motion to dismiss should have been considered by the motion court. The complaint as supplemented by the affidavit was deemed to state a cause of action for undue influence.

 

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PETITIONER JUDGMENT-CREDITOR WAS ENTITLED TO THE TURNOVER OF CERTAIN REAL PROPERTY WHICH HAD BEEN FRAUDULENTLY TRANSFERRED TO A TRUST BY THE RESPONDENT JUDGMENT-DEBTORS, AS WELL AS THE CONTENTS OF RESPONDENTS’ SAFETY DEPOSIT BOX (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined petitioner was entitled to real property which was fraudulently transferred by respondents to a trust, as well as to the contents of respondents’ safety deposit box, to satisfy a judgment against respondents in the approximate amount of $338,000:

… [P]etitioner commenced this proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 52, seeking … the turnover of a safety deposit box maintained by the respondents Zakhar Brener and Ninel Krepkina and of certain residential real property owned by the respondent B and K Trust. * * *

… [P]etitioner established her prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the cause of action seeking relief pursuant to Debtor and Creditor Law former § 273 by submitting evidence that Brener was insolvent at the time of the conveyance of the property, which was made without fair consideration … .  * * *

… [P]etitioner established her prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the cause of action seeking relief pursuant to Debtor and Creditor Law former § 276. “Pursuant to Debtor and Creditor Law former § 276, every conveyance made with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud either present or future creditors is fraudulent. The requisite intent required by this section need not be proven by direct evidence, but may be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the allegedly fraudulent transfer” … . “In determining whether a conveyance was fraudulent, the courts consider the existence of certain common ‘badges of fraud,’ which include ‘a close relationship between the parties to the alleged fraudulent transaction; a questionable transfer not in the usual course of business; inadequacy of the consideration; the transferor’s knowledge of the creditor’s claim and the inability to pay it; and retention of control of the property by the transferor after the conveyance'” … . “A prime example of this type of fraud is where a debtor transfers his property to another while retaining the use thereof so as to continue . . . free from the claims of creditors” … . Here, the petitioner submitted, among other things, the Brener respondents’ answer, wherein they admitted that Brener continued to occupy and use the property with Krepkina. …

… [P]etitioner established her prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the cause of action to direct Chase Bank to turn over of the contents of the safe deposit box maintained by Brener and Krepkina by submitting a letter establishing that Brener and Krepkina jointly held a safe deposit box at one of Chase Bank’s branches in Brooklyn … . Matter of Schiffman v Affordable Shoes, Ltd., 2025 NY Slip Op 02786, Second Dept 5-7-25

Practice Point: Consult this decision for a concise description of a CPLR Article 52 turnover proceeding by a judgment creditor against judgment debtors based in part upon respondents’ fraudulent transfer of real property to avoid creditors (Debtor and Creditor Law sections 273 and 276).

 

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PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST TO PROCEED UNDER THE PSEUDONYM “JANE DOE” SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s request to proceed using the pseudonym “Jane Doe” should have been granted. Plaintiff is apparently suing her former employer, a charter school, contesting her termination, which apparently was based upon a video depicting plaintiff masturbating:

As to the merits, Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying plaintiff’s request to proceed in this litigation under the pseudonym “Jane Doe” … . This action concerns information of a highly sensitive, intimate, and personal nature — namely, a video depicting plaintiff masturbating. Plaintiff’s affidavit establishes the serious psychological harm that disclosure of her role in this video caused her and would continue to cause her, as well as the potential impact on her career in education … . That plaintiff was able to obtain a new job in education after her termination by defendants is of no moment, as she may still need to apply for other jobs in future and it is not clear whether her current employer is aware of the circumstances of her termination.

Defendants do not identify any source of prejudice to them from allowing plaintiff to proceed by pseudonym, as they know who she is and therefore are not impeded in mounting a defense … . The public interest in disclosure of plaintiff’s identity is also minimal. Even if the charter school defendants were deemed public entities for these purposes (see Education Law § 2854[3][a], [c] …), that fact would not be dispositive, especially because plaintiff is not requesting that court records be sealed or public access denied … . Furthermore, the termination decision at issue here is not claimed to be the result of any government policy.

Plaintiff’s privacy interest outweighs the reputational interest of the individual defendants’ anonymity … . Jane Doe v KIPP N.Y., Inc., 2025 NY Slip Op 02718, First Dept 5-6-25

Practice Point: Consult this decision for a brief discussion of the factors which control whether a plaintiff can sue under a pseudonym, “Jane Doe” in this case.​

 

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ALTHOUGH FATHER IS INCARCERATED FOR ASSAULTING MOTHER WHEN SHE WAS SEVEN MONTHS PREGNANT, FATHER IS ENTITLED TO A HEARING ON WHETHER VISITATION WITH THE CHILD, WHICH NEED NOT INCLUDE CONTACT VISITATION, IS IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD; IT IS THE MOTHER’S BURDEN TO DEMONSTRATE VISITATION WOULD BE HARMFUL (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing (modifying) Family Court, determined the incarcerated father was entitled to a hearing on whether visitation would be in the best interests of the child. Father was convicted of assaulting mother when mother was seven months pregnant. Family Court had granted mother’s summary judgment motion precluding father’s contact until the child turns 18. The Third Department found that summary judgment in the absence of a hearing was inappropriate:

… [W]e agree with the father’s contention that a hearing was required regarding the issue of visitation. Plainly stated, we do not find that, given the specific circumstances of this case, denying the father any contact with the child until the child’s 18th birthday was appropriate on a summary judgment motion … . This is especially so given that “visitation . . . need not always include contact visitation at the prison” … . As such, the father is entitled to a hearing to determine what, if any, visitation is in the best interests of the child. By way of reminder, at this hearing, it is not the father’s burden to demonstrate that visitation is in the child’s best interests, but rather it is the mother, as the party opposing visitation, who has the burden of demonstrating, by a preponderance of the evidence, “that visitation with [the father] would, under all of the circumstances, be harmful to the child[‘s] welfare or contrary to [her] best interests” … . This includes a consideration of whether updates, photographs and/or letters may be appropriate and in the best interests of the child … . Matter of Jaime T. v Ryan U., 2025 NY Slip Op 02638, Third Dept 5-1-25

Practice Point: Once again it is Family Court’s failure to hold a hearing which results in reversal. Here the incarcerated father is entitled to a hearing on whether visitation, which need not include contact visitation, would be in the best interests of the child. At the hearing, it is mother’s burden to demonstration visitation would be harmful to the child.

 

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“LAW OFFICE FAILURE” WAS NOT A REASONABLE EXCUSE FOR FAILING TO ANSWER THE COMPLAINT; DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO COMPEL THE PLAINTIFF TO ACCEPT A LATE ANSWER SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND D

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff did not present a reasonable excuse for failing to timely answer the complaint. Therefore, plaintiff’s motion to compel defendant to accept the late answer should not have been granted:

A defendant seeking to compel the plaintiff to accept a late answer “must show both a reasonable excuse for the default and the existence of a potentially meritorious defense” … . “Generally, the determination of what constitutes a reasonable excuse for a default lies within the sound discretion of the court; however, reversal is warranted where the court improvidently exercises that discretion” … .

Here, the defendant failed to establish a reasonable excuse for its defaults based upon law office failure. “[T]he movant must provide a detailed and credible explanation for the purported law office failure” … . “[A] conclusory, undetailed, and uncorroborated claim of law office failure does not amount to a reasonable excuse” … . Here, the defendant’s counsel asserted in a conclusory and undetailed manner that the initial deadline to serve an answer and the extension consented to by the plaintiff’s former counsel were missed due to an office backlog and miscalendaring, and that the plaintiff’s motion for leave to enter a default judgment was “misplaced” in the office … . Raphael v City of Peekskill, 2025 NY Slip Op 02616, Second Dept 4-30-25

Practice Point: Here allegations of “law office failure” did not warrant compelling the plaintiff to accept a late answer.

 

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