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SEXUAL ABUSE FINDINGS IN A FAMILY COURT PROCEEDING COULD NOT BE THE BASIS FOR APPLYING THE COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL DOCTRINE IN THIS CIVIL ACTION UNDER THE CHILD VICTIMS ACT; HEARSAY ADMITTED IN THE FAMILY COURT PROCEEDING IS NOT ADMISSIBLE IN THIS CIVIL ACTION (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, over a substantial dissent, determined defendant in this Child Victims Act action was not collaterally estopped from disputing the sexual abuse allegations based upon the related Family Court proceedings. Hearsay evidence properly admitted in Family Court is not admissible in this civil action in Supreme Court:

… [A]lthough the burden of proof for both the Family Court proceeding and these personal injury actions is the same, i.e., preponderance of the evidence … , hearsay evidence that was admissible in the underlying Family Court proceeding would not be admissible in the instant personal injury actions … . Inasmuch as our determination in the prior Family Court proceeding was based largely on hearsay evidence that would not be admissible in these civil actions, we agree with defendant that he should not be collaterally estopped from defending these actions and that the court erred in granting plaintiffs’ motions for partial summary judgment on liability. Of Doe 44 v Erik P.R., 2022 NY Slip Op 04839, Fourth Dept 8-4-22

Practice Point: Here the sexual abuse findings in a Family Court proceeding could not be the basis for collateral estoppel prohibiting defendant from disputing the child abuse allegation in this Child Victims Act action. Hearsay admitted in the Family Court proceeding is inadmissible in this civil proceeding.

 

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HERE PLAINTIFFS ALLEGED THEY WERE SEXUALLY ABUSED DECADES AGO IN MASSACHUSETTS AND SUED UNDER THE CHILD VICTIMS ACT WHICH SERVES TO EXTEND THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS; ORDINARILY THE BORROWING STATUTE APPLIES TO OUT-OF-STATE TORTS REQUIRING THE ACTION TO BE TIMELY UNDER BOTH NEW YORK AND THE FOREIGN STATE’S LAWS; HERE THE “RESIDENT EXCEPTION” APPLIED BECAUSE THE PLAINTIFF’S WERE NEW YORK RESIDENTS AT THE TIME OF THE ALLEGED ABUSE; THEREFORE THE ACTION NEED ONLY BE TIMELY UNDER NEW YORK’S CHILD VICTIMS ACT (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the “resident exception” to the borrowing statute applied to New-York-resident plaintiffs who allegedly were sexually abused decades ago at a camp in Massachusetts run by Syracuse University. Ordinarily New York’s borrowing statute requires that an action for an out-of-state tort be timely under both New York’s Child Victims Act and the foreign state’s statute of limitations. However, there is an exception to that rule when the plaintiffs, abused in a foreign state, were New York residents at the time of the abuse:

“When a nonresident sues on a cause of action accruing outside New York, CPLR 202 requires the cause of action to be timely under the limitation[s] periods of both New York and the jurisdiction where the cause of action accrued” … . In tort cases, the Court of Appeals has held that “a cause of action accrues at the time and in the place of the injury” … . Thus, for [such] claims to survive, they must be timely under both CPLR 214-g and the applicable [foreign state’s] statute of limitations. …

… [Plaintiffs] were New York residents when the … causes of action accrued. Pursuant to the “resident exception” of the borrowing statute … , a claim that accrues in favor of a New York resident will be governed by the New York statute of limitations regardless of where the claim accrued (see CPLR 202 … . … [Teh Child Victims Act] revival statute applies … . Shapiro v Syracuse Univ., 2022 NY Slip Op 04835, Fourth Dept 8-4-22

Practice Point: Ordinarily an action based on out-of-state sexual abuse of a child decades ago must be timely under both New York’s Child Victim’s Act and the foreign state’s statute of limitations. However, if the child was a New York resident at the time of the out-of-state abuse, only the extended statute of limitations provided by the Child Victims Act applies.

 

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THE CELL PHONE RECORDS OF PLAINTIFF-DRIVER IN THIS TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE HAD BEEN PROVIDED TO DEFENDANTS BUT THERE ARE SEVERAL POSSIBLE USES OF THE CELL PHONE WHICH ARE NOT REVEALED BY THE RECORDS; DEFENDANTS WERE ENTITLED TO DISCOVERY OF THE CELL PHONE TO DETERMINE WHETHER PLAINTIFF WAS USING IT AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendants in this traffic accident case were entitled to access to plaintiff-driver’s (Farrell’s) cell phone to determine whether the phone was being used at the time of the accident. There are certain uses of the phone which were not revealed by the cell phone records already provided to defendants:

Although the cell phone records subsequently obtained from the service provider established that Farrell was not talking on his phone at the time of the accident, they did not indicate whether he opened or sent text messages during the relevant time period. On the phone used by Farrell, texts were sent as encrypted “iMessages” that do not show up on phone records. Moreover, the phone records did not indicate whether Farrell was using any applications on his phone, such as Snapchat or Facebook. * * *

Defendants “satisf[ied] the threshold requirement that the[ir] request [was] reasonably calculated to yield information that [was] ‘material and necessary’—i.e., relevant—” to issues involved in the action … . “The test is one of usefulness and reason” … . In support of the motion … defendants submitted evidence that Farrell was traveling at close to 80 miles per hour seconds before the accident, which occurred on a residential road near an elementary school. Defendants also submitted evidence that Farrell did not brake before colliding with the school bus. Evidence concerning whether Farrell was distracted before the collision is relevant to the issues involved in this negligence action, and defendants’ request for production of or access to his cellular phone is reasonably calculated to yield relevant information … , especially considering that Farrell is unable, due to his injuries, to provide any information regarding his activities in the moments before the accident … . Tousant v Aragona, 2022 NY Slip Op 04871, Fourth Dept 8-4-22

Practice Point: Here defendants were entitled to discovery of plaintiff-driver’s cell phone to determine whether plaintiff was using it at the time of the traffic accident. Although defendants had already been provided with the cell-phone records, there are several uses of the phone which are not revealed by the records.

 

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IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION, THE PLAINTIFF WAS NOT REQUIRED TO IDENTIFY EACH ALLEGEDLY NEGLIGENT EMPLOYEE OF THE DEFENDANT MEDICAL CENTER TO SURVIVE SUMMARY JUDGMENT (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined plaintiff was not obligated to provide the name of every negligent employee of the defendant Erie County Medical Center Corporation (ECMC) to survive summary judgment in this medical malpractice action:

Contrary to the court’s determination, plaintiff was not required to provide the name of every allegedly negligent actor engaging in conduct within the scope of employment for ECMC … inasmuch as ECMC was on notice of the claims against it based on the allegations in the amended complaint, as amplified by plaintiff’s bill of particulars to ECMC, noting failures and omissions by ECMC’s employees. Indeed, ECMC is in the best position to identify its own employees and contractors and, as the creator of decedent’s medical records, ECMC had notice of who treated decedent and of any allegations of negligence by its nursing staff.  Braxton v Erie County Med. Ctr. Corp., 2022 NY Slip Op 04866, Fourth Dept 8-4-22

Practice Point: In this medical malpractice action, the plaintiff was not required to identify each allegedly negligent employee of the medical center to survive summary judgment.

 

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THE TOWN BOARD OF APPEALS’ FAILURE TO ISSUE A DECISION ON PETITIONER’S APPLICATION FOR A SPECIAL EXCEPTION PERMIT AND AN AREA VARIANCE WITHIN THE 62 DAYS PRESCRIBED BY THE TOWN LAW WAS NOT A DENIAL BY DEFAULT; THEREFORE SUPREME COURT DID NOT HAVE SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION AND THE MATTER WAS NOT RIPE FOR REVIEW; SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE ANNULLED THE “DEFAULT DENIAL” AND ORDERED THE TOWN TO ISSUE THE PERMIT AND VARIANCE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined: (1) the town Board of Appeals’ failure to issue a decision on petitioner’s application for a special exception permit and an area variance within the 62 days prescribed by the Town Law was not a denial of the application by default; (2) Supreme Court should not have treated the failure to issue a timely decision as a denial by default. which it then annulled, ordering the town to issue the permit and the variance; and (3) Supreme Court should not have denied the Board’s motion to vacate Supreme Court’s order and judgment (ordering the issuance of the permit and variance):

Pursuant to Town Law § 267-a(8), the Board must render a decision within 62 days after the close of the hearing. The Town Law also contains a default provision which provides that if the Board, in exercising its appellate jurisdiction, fails to render a decision within 62 days of the hearing, the application is deemed denied (see id. § 267-a[13][b]). …

A proceeding to annul a determination by an administrative body “should not be concluded in the petitioner’s favor merely upon the basis of a failure to answer the petition on the return date thereof, unless it appears that such failure to plead was intentional and that the administrative body has no intention to have the controversy determined on the merits” … . Here, there was no evidence demonstrating a deliberate default by the Board … .

Contrary to the petitioner’s contention, its application for a special exception permit was not denied by default. The Board’s failure to comply with the time period prescribed by Town Law § 267-a(8) only results in a denial by default when the Board exercises its appellate jurisdiction (see id. § 267-a[13][b]). The Board exercises its original jurisdiction in special exception cases … , and thus, there was no denial by default of the petitioner’s application for a special exception permit … . With no final determination having been rendered on the application for a special exception permit, that issue was not ripe for judicial review, and the Supreme Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over that issue … . We note that ripeness “is a matter pertaining to subject matter jurisdiction which may be raised at any time, including sua sponte” … . Matter of 999 Hempstead Turnpike, LLC v Board of Appeals of the Town of Hempstead, 2022 NY Slip Op 04721, Second Dept 7-29-22

Practice Point: A town Board of Appeals’ failure to issue a decision on an application for a permit and an area variance within the 62 days prescribed by the Town Law is not a denial of the petition by default. Supreme Court, therefore, did not have subject matter jurisdiction over he purported “denial by default” and the matter was not ripe for review.

 

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THE BANK DID NOT PRESENT EVIDENCE IN ADMISSIBLE FORM TO SUPPORT ITS CLAIM THAT DEFENDANT ACKNOWLEDGED THE MORTGAGE DEBT, STARTING THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS ANEW; DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS THE FORECLOSURE ACTION AS UNTIMELY SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the foreclosure action was commenced after the statute of limitations had run. The bank claimed the defendant acknowledged the debt in a loan modification agreement, starting the statute of limitations anew. But the bank did not present evidence of the agreement in admissible form:

The plaintiff argues that the defendant entered into a loan modification agreement, which constituted an acknowledgment of the mortgage debt under General Obligations Law § 17-101 sufficient to reset the statute of limitations to commence a future foreclosure action on the mortgage. “General Obligations Law § 17-101 effectively revives a time-barred claim when the debtor has signed a writing which validly acknowledges the debt” … . “To constitute a valid acknowledgment, a ‘writing must be signed and recognize an existing debt and must contain nothing inconsistent with an intention on the part of the debtor to pay it'” … . “In order to demonstrate that the statute of limitations has been renewed by a partial payment, it must be shown that the payment was accompanied by circumstances amounting to an absolute and unqualified acknowledgment by the debtor of more being due, from which a promise may be inferred to pay the remainder” … . Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC v Paniagua, 2022 NY Slip Op 04708, Second Dept 7-27-22

Practice Point: Plaintiff bank did not demonstrate defendant acknowledged the mortgage debt in a loan modification agreement (thereby re-starting the statute of limitation for a foreclosure action). The evidence of the debt-acknowledgment presented by the bank did not meet the requirements of General Obligations Law 17-101. Therefore the statute of limitations was not revived. Defendant’s motion to dismiss the foreclosure complaint as untimely should have been granted.

 

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PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS PEDESTRIAN-VEHICLE ACCIDENT CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED: ALTHOUGH A PLAINTIFF’S COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE IS NOT A BAR TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT, THE ISSUE CAN BE DECIDED AT THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT STAGE WHERE PLAINTIFF MOVES FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT DISMISSING DEFENDANT’S COMPARATIVE-NEGLIGENCE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE; PLAINTIFF’S MOTION WAS NOT PREMATURE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined: (1) plaintiff pedestrian was entitled to summary judgment in this pedestrian-vehicle accident case; and (2)  plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment was not premature, The court noted that, although plaintiff’s comparative negligence is not a bar to summary judgment, the issue can still be considered at the summary judgment stage when plaintiff moves for summary judgment dismissing defendant’s comparative-negligence affirmative defense:

The plaintiff submitted evidence demonstrating that she was approximately halfway across the street in a crosswalk with the pedestrian signal in her favor when the defendant, who was making a right turn, failed to yield the right-of-way and struck her, and that the defendant did not see the plaintiff in the crosswalk while making his turn … . The plaintiff also established, prima facie, that she was not at fault in the happening of the accident by demonstrating that, exercising due care, she had confirmed that she had the pedestrian signal in her favor and checked in both directions for approaching vehicles before entering the crosswalk … . In opposition, the defendant failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to his negligence or whether the plaintiff was comparatively at fault in the happening of the accident … .

… [P]laintiff’s motion was not premature, as the defendant failed to offer an evidentiary basis to suggest that additional discovery may lead to relevant evidence, or that facts essential to opposing the motion were exclusively within the knowledge and control of the plaintiff … .The “mere hope or speculation” that evidence sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment may be uncovered during the discovery process is an insufficient basis for denying the plaintiff’s motion … . Xiuying Cui v Hussain, 2022 NY Slip Op 04759, Second Dept 7-27-22

Practice Point: Although summary judgment in a traffic accident case can be awarded without consideration of plaintiff’s comparative negligence, the issue can be considered at the summary judgment stage when the plaintiff moves for summary judgment dismissing defendant’s comparative-negligence affirmative defense.

Practice Point: Here the court found that plaintiff’s summary judgment motion was not premature because the defendant did not demonstrate further discovery would lead to relevant evidence.

 

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PASSING REFERENCES TO DEFENDANTS’ INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE DID NOT WARRANT SETTING ASIDE PLAINTIFF’S VERDICT (FIRST DEPT).

The Frist Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the passing references to defendants’ insurance coverage in this traffic accident case did not warrant setting aside plaintiff’s verdict:

Plaintiff sustained injuries … , when a livery cab in which he was a passenger collided with an SUV driven by defendant Williams. During direct examination by plaintiff’s counsel and cross-examination by Williams’s counsel, no objection was raised when Williams testified that she spoke to her “insurance company” immediately after the accident. On cross-examination, when Williams stated that she “might have asked [codefendant Agyemang] for his insurance information,” Agyemang’s counsel moved to strike. The court did not respond, and counsel made no further objection. On redirect examination, when plaintiff’s counsel asked Williams what she had done with videos of the accident, Williams replied, “I thought I sent everything to Geico.”  …

Evidence that a defendant carries liability insurance is generally inadmissible due to its potential for prejudice, as a jury’s awareness of insurance coverage might make it easier for it to render an adverse verdict against the defendant … . A passing reference to insurance, however, does not necessarily warrant reversal … . Two of the insurance references at issue were elicited by defense counsel, from his own client, and counsel lodged no objection to the reference elicited by plaintiff’s counsel. The record indicates no intention on plaintiff’s part to prompt such information … .Gbadehan v Williams, 2022 NY Slip Op 04703, First Dept 7-26-22

Practice Point: Passing references to defendants’ insurance coverage in this traffic accident case did not warrant setting aside plaintiffs’ verdict.

 

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RENOVATION WORK ON DEFENDANTS’ TOWNHOUSE RENDERED PLAINTIFFS’ TOWNHOUSE, WHICH WAS NEXT DOOR, UNINHABITABLE; A LICENSE AGREEMENT WHICH GRANTED DEFENDANTS ACCESS TO PLAINTIFFS’ TOWNHOUSE INCLUDED A LIQUIDATED DAMAGES PROVISION WHICH WAS VALID AND ENFORCEABLE; PLAINTIFFS’ ACTION SOUGHT SOME EQUITABLE RELIEF BUT PRIMARILY SOUGHT MONEY DAMAGES; THEREFORE PLANTIFFS’ DEMAND FOR A JURY TRIAL SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN STRUCK (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined, among many other issues not summarized here, the liquidated damages provision in the license agreement was enforceable and plaintiffs’ demand for a jury trial should not have been struck. Defendants purchased an historic townhouse next to plaintiffs’ townhouse. In the course of the defendants’ major renovations, plaintiffs’ townhouse was damaged. High levels of lead dust infiltrated plaintiffs’ townhouse forcing plaintiffs to move out. They never returned. The plaintiffs and defendants entered a license agreement giving defendants access to plaintiffs’ townhouse for 18 months. The liquidated damages provision entitled plaintiffs to $1000 a day for every day a temporary certificate of occupancy (TCO) was not obtained after the expiration of the license. The TCO was not obtained for 318 days entitling plaintiffs to $318,000. Although some equitable relief was requested, the suit primarily sought money damages. Therefore plaintiffs’ demand for a jury trial should not have been struck:

“Liquidated damages constitute the compensation which, the parties have agreed, should be paid in order to satisfy any loss or injury flowing from a breach of their contract” … . These provisions “have value in those situations where it would be difficult, if not actually impossible, to calculate the amount of actual damage” … . Liquidated damages will be sustained if, at the time of the contract, “the amount liquidated bears a reasonable proportion to the probable loss and the amount of actual loss is incapable or difficult of precise estimation” … . * * *

The court erred in granting [defendants’] motion to strike plaintiffs’ jury demand. The equitable relief sought by plaintiffs was incidental to their demand for money damages … ; to the extent plaintiffs seek to compel [defendants] to perform certain remediation work, monetary damages will afford full and complete relief … . Further, the claim for “abatement of and damages for a nuisance” is triable by a jury (CPLR 4101[2]). Seymour v Hovnanian, 2022 NY Slip Op 04705, First Dept 7-26-22

Practice Point: This decision includes a good discussion of how the validity of a liquidated-damages provision should be analyzed. The court noted that, although plaintiffs’ action sought some equitable relief, it primarily sought money damages. Therefore plaintiffs’ demand for a jury trial should not have been struck.

 

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ACTIONS PURSUANT TO NEW YORK CITY’S “FREELANCE ISN’T FREE ACT” (FIFA) WHICH ALLEGED DEFENDANTS FAILED TO PAY PLAINTIFFS-FREELANCERS SURVIVED MOTIONS TO DISMISS (FIRST DEPT). ​

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Moulton, in matters of first impression, interpreted the Freelance Isn’t Free Act (FIFA) in the context of motions to dismiss. The opinion is detailed and fact-specific and cannot be fairly summarized here. The plaintiffs alleged they were hired by defendants as freelancers and defendants’ failure pay was the basis of the lawsuits pursuant to FIFA. Most of the actions survived the motions to dismiss:

Enacted November 16, 2016 and effective May 15, 2017, FIFA is the first act of its kind in this country to provide legal protections for freelance workers against nonpayment for work performed … . FIFA defines a “freelance worker” as “any natural person or any organization composed of no more than one natural person, whether or not incorporated or employing a trade name, that is hired or retained as an independent contractor by a hiring party to provide services in exchange for compensation” … . A central issue in this case is whether plaintiffs fit within this definition. Chen v Romona Keveza Collection LLC, 2022 NY Slip Op 04702, First Dept 7-26-22

Practice Point: New York City enacted the “Freelance Isn’t Free Act” (FIFA) in 2017–the first law in the nation to specifically address the failure to pay freelancers.