You are here: / Attorneys
,

FAILURE TO SHOW UP FOR AN INDEPENDENT MEDICAL EXAMINATION (IME) IS A “POLICY ISSUE” WARRANTING DENIAL OF NO-FAULT BENEFITS AND THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY’S FEES TO PLAINTIFF (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing the Appellate Term and disagreeing with other courts, determined the failure to show up for an independent medical exam (IME) is a “policy issue” warranting the denial of no-fault benefits and the award of attorney’s fees to plaintiff:

… [A]n insurer who denies a claim for first-party No-Fault benefits on the basis of the injured person’s failure to attend an IME properly does so by checking box 4 on the denial of claim form, and therefore an injured person’s failure to attend an IME is a “policy issue” both according to the denial of claim form and for purposes of awarding attorneys’ fees under 11 NYCRR 65-4.6(c). Kamara Supplies v GEICO Gen. Ins. Co., 2021 NY Slip Op 01848, First Dept 3-25-21

 

,

PETITIONER SOUGHT ATTORNEY’S FEES AS THE PREVAILING PARTY PURSUANT TO NEW YORK’S EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT UNDER THE “CATALYST THEORY;” THE 4TH DEPARTMENT REJECTED THE CATALYST THEORY, FINDING PETITIONER WAS NOT THE PREVAILING PARTY UNDER THE TERMS OF THE STATUTE (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that the so-called “catalyst theory” did not apply to New York’s Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA). The EAJA, in certain circumstances, allows a prevailing party to recover attorney’s fees against the state. Here petitioner argued that petitioner’s seeking reconsideration of a determination by the NYS Office for People with Developmental Disabilities (OPWDD) prompted the OPWDD to grant petitioner’s application. Petitioner argued the request for reconsideration was the “catalyst” for the OPWDD’s granting the application and petitioner was therefore entitled to attorney’s fees. The Fourth Department determined petitioner was not a “prevailing party” within the meaning of the NYS EAJA:

This Court has yet to address the issue, but we now reject application of the catalyst theory in State EAJA cases. Where, as here, litigation is rendered moot by an administrative change in position, the petitioner or plaintiff has not prevailed “in the civil action” (CPLR 8602 [f]). Matter of Criss v New York State Dept. of Health, 2021 NY Slip Op 01642, Fourth Dept 3-19-21

 

, , , ,

DEFENDANTS WERE NOT ENTITLED TO A DIRECTED VERDICT ON THE EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CAUSE OF ACTION; DEFENSE COUNSEL’S REMARK ABOUT THE FINANCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF A PLAINTIFF’S VERDICT DEPRIVED PLAINTIFF OF A FAIR TRIAL; THE COURT OF CLAIMS HAS EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OVER ACTIONS SEEKING MONEY DAMAGES FROM THE STATE, RELEVANT CAUSES OF ACTION PROPERLY DISMISSED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, over a dissent, determined defendants’ motion for a directed verdict should not have been granted and the defense attorney’s remark in summation warranted a new trial. Plaintiff alleged he was denied promotion at the Central New York Psychiatric Center (CNYPC) because the defendants deemed him mentally unstable due to his status as a veteran of the Iraq war.  The directed verdict awarded defendants on that issue was reversed. The defense counsel’s remark in summation that one of the individual defendants would have to “open up her checkbook and write somebody a check” if plaintiff wins deprived plaintiff of a fair trial (the state is required to indemnify defendants as state officers and employees). This case was brought in Supreme Court. The Fourth Department noted that the Court of Claims has exclusive jurisdiction over actions against the state for money damages (apparently the relevant causes of action were properly dismissed for that reason):

Plaintiff … contends that the court erred in granting defendants’ motion for a directed verdict with respect to plaintiff’s cause of action under the New York Human Rights Law alleging discrimination based on military status … . We agree. * * * Based upon the … testimony that plaintiff was not promoted because “[t]here was a question after [plaintiff’s] military service about his [mental] stability,” the jury could have rationally inferred that defendants refused to promote plaintiff in part because they perceived that combat veterans, such as plaintiff, develop dangerous and disqualifying mental health issues as a result of their military service. Thus, “it cannot be said that ‘it would . . . be utterly irrational for a jury to reach [a verdict in favor of plaintiff]’ ” … . * * *

… [R]emarks about a party’s financial status “have been universally condemned by the courts of this State” … . The defense attorney’s argument that his clients should not be “forced to open [their] checkbook” likely conveyed that the individual defendants would be required to pay any damages out-of-pocket. That remark was “grossly improper” … . Moreover, it misrepresented the law to the jury. The State has a duty to indemnify its employees for judgments that arise out of actions within the scope of their public duties, although that duty does not arise from injury or damage resulting from intentional wrongdoing on the part of the employee (see Public Officers Law § 17 [3] [a]). Hubbard v New York State Off. of Mental Health, Cent. N.Y. Psychiatric Ctr., 2021 NY Slip Op 01661, Fourth Dept 3-19-21

 

, ,

DEFENDANT PRESENTED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AND RECANTATION TESTIMONY TO WARRANT A HEARING ON HIS MOTION TO VACATE HIS CONVICTION, COUNTY COURT REVERSED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing County Court, determined defendant’s motion to vacate his conviction should not have been denied without a hearing. The defendant presented sufficient evidence of ineffective assistance of counsel and newly discovered evidence (recantation testimony), as well as evidence of actual innocence, to warrant a hearing on all three issues:

Defendant avers, in his sworn affidavit, that he repeatedly advised his trial counsel that the victim’s allegation that defendant did not live with her at the time of the incident was false and that this false claim could be easily disproven, but trial counsel “was not interested and did nothing.” Defendant supported this claim with four sworn affidavits of witnesses who all stated that defendant lived with the victim at the time of the incident. These affidavits were not merely conclusory, but rather contained factual allegations based upon firsthand observations by the witnesses … . * * *

… [D]efendant proffered three separate affidavits from witnesses, as well as text messages purportedly from the victim, asserting that they established that the victim had fabricated the allegations against him. * * *

Although we are mindful that recantation testimony is “inherently unreliable” … , the “totality of the circumstances” presented here demonstrates that a hearing is required to scrutinize the circumstances regarding the recantations as well as the credibility of the witnesses, and to create a record … . People v Stetin, 2021 NY Slip Op 01529, Third Dept 3-18-21

 

,

PETITIONER, A JOURNALIST, UNDER THE ELECTION LAW, DID NOT HAVE THE CAPACITY OR STANDING TO EXAMINE 353 BALLOTS CAST IN THE PRIMARY ELECTION FOR QUEENS COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY, WHICH WAS WON BY ONLY 55 VOTES (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Wooten, determined petitioner, a journalist, was not entitled under the Election Law to examine 353 ballots cast in the primary election for Queens County District Attorney which was won by only 55 votes:

Election Law § 16-112 … only empowers the court to direct the examination of a ballot by a candidate whose name appeared thereon (or his or her agent). Thus, insofar as Election Law § 3-222 provides that voted ballots may be examined by court order, the court would not be empowered to direct the examination of ballots by the petitioner, who was not a candidate (or a designated agent of a candidate). Further, the petitioner has not set forth a purpose for examination of the affidavit ballots which could possibly have been intended by the legislature in enacting Election Law § 3-222 … .

Moreover, insofar as the petitioner does not claim to have any interest in the outcome of the primary election, the petitioner has failed to set forth any injury which the subject proceeding is intended to address so as to confer standing. In fact, the petitioner has not set forth any interest different from any other member of the public, aside from his desire to obtain access to information to aid in his career as a journalist. Moreover, any determination that the petitioner has standing to petition the court for access to the affidavit ballots at issue would be in contravention of the legislature’s clear intent “to guard against unjustified erosion of the policies of ballot secrecy and finality” … . Matter of Hamm v Board of Elections in the City of New York, 2021 NY Slip Op 08232, Second Dept 3-17-21

 

, , ,

ALTHOUGH THIS NON-TORT ACTION AGAINST THE NYC DISTRICT ATTORNEY DID NOT TRIGGER THE NOTICE OF CLAIM REQUIREMENT OF THE GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAW, IT DID TRIGGER THE NOTICE OF CLAIM REQUIREMENT OF THE COUNTY LAW (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined County Law 52, not General Municipal Law (GML) 50, applied to a “money had and received” lawsuit against the district attorney of New York County. Although the district attorney is considered a city employee for purposes the General Municipal Law, the district attorney is elected by the citizens of New York County and is subject to the provisions of the County Law. The General Municipal Law notice of claim requirement applies only to tort actions. However, the County Law notice of claim requirement applies to this action for money had and received. No notice of claim was filed:

Defendant falls back on the position that, even if no notice of claim was required under GML section 50-k, one was required under County Law section 52. …

Although this section also refers to GML sections 50-e and 50-i, the Court of Appeals has expressly held that it applies to non-tort claims … . Further, County Law section 52 applies to county employees … . Nevertheless, plaintiffs assert that in arguing for application of the County Law, the District Attorney is trying to have it both ways, since he claims to be a city employee for purposes of the General Municipal Law, but a county employee for purposes of the County Law. It is true that New York City law considers the District Attorney to be a city employee … . However, this is no reason not to apply County Law section 52, since there is no county-level government organization in the City of New York that could be considered the District Attorney’s employer for administrative purposes such as paying his or her salary. Moreover, the District Attorney is elected by the voters of New York County, not New York City. Finally, this Court has cited County Law section 52 in holding that a notice of claim is required before filing an action against the office of a District Attorney in the City of New York … . Slemish Corp. S.A. v Morgenthau, 2021 NY Slip Op 01370, First Dept 3-9-21

 

, ,

THE FORMER SURROGATE, NOW IN PRIVATE PRACTICE, CANNOT REPRESENT A CLIENT IN A CASE WHICH WAS BEFORE HER AS SURROGATE (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Surrogate’s Court, over a two-justice dissent, determined the former Surrogate, who is now in private practice, cannot represent a client in a proceeding which was before her as Surrogate:

Respondent contends that Surrogate’s Court erred in not granting her motion to disqualify petitioner’s counsel. We agree. Just as a judge may not preside over a case that he or she was previously involved in as an attorney (see Judiciary Law § 14; 22 NYCRR 100.3 [E] [1] [b] [i]), an attorney may not appear for a client in a case that he or she previously presided over as a judge (see Judiciary Law § 17; … see also Rules of Professional Conduct [22 NYCRR 1200.0] rule 1.12 [a]). To that end, Judiciary Law § 17 provides that a “former judge or surrogate shall not act as attorney or counsellor in any action, claim, matter, motion or proceeding, which has been before him [or her] in his [or her] official character.” This prohibition is “absolute” and “establishes a bright-line disqualification rule” … . By our reading, this statute clearly operates to disqualify petitioner’s counsel — who previously presided as the Surrogate over the probate of decedent’s will and the issuance of letters testamentary and letters of trusteeship to respondent — from now representing petitioner in his claims against respondent involving the same estate and the same trust … . To the extent that Surrogate’s Court determined that Rules of Professional Conduct (22 NYCRR 1200.00) rule 1.12 (a) would permit the former Surrogate to represent petitioner in this matter — a finding with which we do not agree — this rule cannot be relied upon to permit a representation agreement that is otherwise precluded by Judiciary Law § 17. Matter of Gordon, 2021 NY Slip Op 01294, Third Dept 3-4-21

 

,

DEFENSE COUNSEL’S STATING TO THE COURT THAT DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEA WAS FRIVOLOUS DEPRIVED DEFENDANT OF HIS RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE COUNSEL (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, remitting the matter for a report on defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, determined defense counsel, by stating to the court that defendant’s motion was frivolous, had taken a position adverse to the client:

The defendant pleaded guilty to assault in the first degree, but at sentencing, the defendant stated that he wished to withdraw his plea, which he claimed had been coerced by his counsel. The County Court relieved defense counsel, and assigned new counsel to represent the defendant. Subsequently, the defendant’s new counsel advised the court that after evaluating the evidence, the defendant’s allocution, and after speaking to the defendant and his prior attorney, a motion to withdraw the plea of guilty would be frivolous. The court granted the defendant a number of adjournments to permit him to retain private counsel to pursue his motion to withdraw his plea, but when the defendant failed to do so, the court ultimately sentenced him, while he was still represented by the second assigned counsel. …

We agree with the defendant that his right to counsel was adversely affected, and he received ineffective assistance of counsel, when his counsel took a position adverse to his … . The County Court should have appointed new counsel to represent the defendant with respect to the motion to withdraw his plea of guilty … . People v Fellows, 2021 NY Slip Op 01269, Second Dept 3-3-21

 

, , ,

PLAINTIFF HUSBAND IN THIS DIVORCE ACTION INSTALLED SPYWARE WHICH INTERCEPTED DEFENDANT WIFE’S PHONE CALLS AND THEN DESTROYED THE CONTENTS OF THE INTERCEPTION; THE INTERCEPTION VIOLATED DEFENDANT WIFE’S ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE; SANCTIONS FOR SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE PROPERLY INCLUDED STRIKING THE CAUSES OF ACTION FOR SPOUSAL SUPPORT, EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION AND ATTORNEY’S FEES (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined plaintiff husband in this divorce action was properly sanctioned for spoliation of evidence by striking from the complaint the causes of action seeking spousal support, equitable distribution and attorney’s fees. The husband had installed spyware which allowed interception of defendant wife’s phone calls. Evidence of what was intercepted was destroyed. It was assumed that the interceptions violated defendant wife’s attorney-client privilege:

… Supreme Court properly drew the presumption of relevance in connection with the interception by the plaintiff of privileged communications between the defendant and her attorney in view of the plaintiff’s invocation of his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination when questioned about it at his deposition, his intentional destruction of electronic records, and the evidence that he had utilized spyware to record the defendant’s conversations when she was in the vicinity of her attorney’s office. Although this presumption is rebuttable … the plaintiff did not provide any evidence to rebut it. Further, while the striking of pleadings is a drastic remedy, the court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in striking the causes of action in the plaintiff’s complaint seeking financial relief other than child support. “Under the common-law doctrine of spoliation, a party may be sanctioned where it negligently loses or intentionally destroys key evidence” … . … ” …  Where appropriate, a court can impose the ultimate sanction of dismissing the action or striking responsive pleadings, thereby rendering a judgment by default against the offending party” … . C.C. v A.R., 2021 NY Slip Op 01243, Second Dept 3-3-21

 

, , ,

ALLEGED ATTORNEY MISCONDUCT DID NOT WARRANT SETTING ASIDE THE OVER $21 MILLION VERDICT IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASE; SUPREME COURT REVERSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant’s motion to set aside the verdict based upon the conduct of plaintiff’s counsel should not have been granted in this medical malpractice action. Plaintiff suffered a brain injury rendering him unable to take care of himself and was awarded over $21 million:

… [W]e conclude that the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in ordering a new trial in the interest of justice based upon attorney misconduct. Some of the challenged conduct was improper, and we do not condone it … . However, “where counsel, in summing up, exceeds the bounds of legal propriety, it is the duty of the opposing counsel to make a specific objection and for the court to rule on the objection, to direct the jury to disregard any improper remarks, and to admonish counsel from repetition of improper remarks” … . Here, defense counsel did not object to the challenged remarks during summation or request a curative instruction, thus depriving the court of the opportunity to direct the jury to disregard improper remarks or give other curative instructions, and to avoid further error … . “Where no objection is interposed, a new trial may be directed only where the remarks are so prejudicial as to have caused a gross injustice, and where the comments are so pervasive, prejudicial, or inflammatory as to deprive a party of a fair trial” … . The misconduct of the plaintiff’s counsel in the instant case was not so pervasive or prejudicial as to have deprived the defendant of a fair trial, or to have affected the verdict, particularly in light of the strength of the plaintiff’s case … .  Accordingly, we deny that branch of the defendant’s motion pursuant to CPLR 4404(a) which was to set aside the verdict and for a new trial in the interest of justice, and reinstate the verdict. Yu v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 2021 NY Slip Op 08215, Second Dept 2-24-21

 

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy