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TRIAL JUDGE PRESSURED DEFENDANT INTO PROVIDING A DNA SAMPLE AFTER DEFENSE COUNSEL HAD BEEN RELIEVED, DEFENDANT WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL AT A CRITICAL STAGE, GUILTY PLEAS VACATED AND INDICTMENT DISMISSED.

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Manzanet-Daniels, over a two-justice dissenting opinion, determined defendant was deprived of his right to counsel when, after his attorney had been relieved, the judge pressured defendant into providing a DNA sample. The People’s request for a DNA sample came long after the discovery deadline had passed. The defendant ultimately pled guilty to manslaughter and burglary. The First Department vacated the guilty pleas and dismissed the indictment:

The court rejected defendant’s repeated pleas for a lawyer, pressured him into submitting to the DNA test, and incorrectly advised him that he had no argument against the prosecutor’s untimely discovery. The denial of defendant’s repeated entreaties to consult with a lawyer during this critical stage of the proceedings violated his Sixth Amendment rights. The deprivation of his Sixth Amendment rights is of constitutional dimension and is not subject to a harmless error analysis … . The appropriate remedy under the circumstances is to vacate both pleas, and to dismiss the indictment … . People v Smith, 2016 NY Slip Op 05902, 1st Dept 8-25-16

CRIMINAL LAW (TRIAL JUDGE PRESSURED DEFENDANT INTO PROVIDING A DNA SAMPLE AFTER DEFENSE COUNSEL HAD BEEN RELIEVED, DEFENDANT WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL AT A CRITICAL STAGE, GUILTY PLEAS VACATED AND INDICTMENT DISMISSED)/RIGHT TO COUNSEL (TRIAL JUDGE PRESSURED DEFENDANT INTO PROVIDING A DNA SAMPLE AFTER DEFENSE COUNSEL HAD BEEN RELIEVED, DEFENDANT WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL AT A CRITICAL STAGE, GUILTY PLEAS VACATED AND INDICTMENT DISMISSED)/DNA SAMPLE (TRIAL JUDGE PRESSURED DEFENDANT INTO PROVIDING A DNA SAMPLE AFTER DEFENSE COUNSEL HAD BEEN RELIEVED, DEFENDANT WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL AT A CRITICAL STAGE, GUILTY PLEAS VACATED AND INDICTMENT DISMISSED)

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JUDGE FAILED TO GIVE COUNSEL MEANINGFUL NOTICE OF THE CONTENTS OF A JURY NOTE, CONVICTION REVERSED.

The Second Department, reversing defendant’s conviction, determined the trial judge’s response to a jury note did not comply with Criminal Procedure Law 310.30. The note requested that the court “define clearly acting in concert:”

Here, the jury note requested, among other things, that the Supreme Court “define clearly acting in concert.'” The court did not show the note to the attorneys or read it into the record before formulating a response. In apprising counsel of the contents of that note, the court omitted the words “define clearly” and stated only, “They want acting in concert. I will read that back.” After the jury returned to the courtroom, the court again mischaracterized the note, stating: “[I]t says define acting in concert. Okay, I am going to read my acting in concert and I will read it slow for you.” The court then reread its instructions on acting in concert.

The jury’s request to “define clearly” was not a request for a “mere ministerial readback” of the Supreme Court’s charge … . Meaningful notice of a jury’s note “means notice of the actual specific content of the jurors’ request. Manifestly, counsel cannot participate effectively or adequately protect the defendant’s rights if this specific information is not given” … . The court’s failure to provide counsel with meaningful notice of a substantive jury note was a mode of proceedings error … , which requires reversal of the judgment and a new trial … . People v Gough, 2016 NY Slip Op 05873, 2nd Dept 8-24-16

 

CRIMINAL LAW (JUDGE FAILED TO GIVE COUNSEL MEANINGFUL NOTICE OF THE CONTENTS OF A JURY NOTE, CONVICTION REVERSED)/JURY NOTES (CRIMINAL LAW, JUDGE FAILED TO GIVE COUNSEL MEANINGFUL NOTICE OF THE CONTENTS OF A JURY NOTE, CONVICTION REVERSED)

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GRAND-JUROR BIAS ISSUE IS FORFEITED BY A GUILTY PLEA; ERRONEOUS ADVICE RE APPEALABILITY OF THE ISSUE REQUIRED REMITTAL TO GIVE DEFENDANT OPPORTUNITY TO MOVE TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA.

The Third Department, over an extensive dissent, determined: (1) a claim of grand juror bias is forfeited by a guilty plea; and (2) erroneous advice from defense counsel indicating the issue was appealable the guilty plea provided defendant with a ground for moving to withdraw his plea:

Inasmuch as defendant’s misunderstanding as to his ability to appeal the juror bias issue was brought to County Court’s attention at sentencing, we find that defendant’s challenge to the voluntariness of his plea has been sufficiently preserved for our review … , notwithstanding the absence of an appropriate postallocution motion. Once County Court learned that defendant had been given erroneous advice by counsel, the court should have conducted a further inquiry to ascertain whether defendant wished to go forward with the plea … . Absent such inquiry by County Court, and in light of the fact that the record otherwise presents “a genuine issue of fact as to the knowing, intelligent and voluntary nature of defendant’s guilty plea” … , this matter must be remitted to County Court to afford defendant an opportunity to either accept the plea that was offered or move to withdraw his plea … . People v Clark, 2016 NY Slip Op 05831, 3rd Dept 8-18-16

CRIMINAL LAW (GRAND-JUROR BIAS ISSUE IS FORFEITED BY A GUILTY PLEA; ERRONEOUS ADVICE RE APPEALABILITY OF THE ISSUE REQUIRED REMITTAL TO GIVE DEFENDANT OPPORTUNITY TO MOVE TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA)/APPEALS (CRIMINAL LAW, (GRAND-JUROR BIAS ISSUE IS FORFEITED BY A GUILTY PLEA; ERRONEOUS ADVICE RE APPEALABILITY OF THE ISSUE REQUIRED REMITTAL TO GIVE DEFENDANT OPPORTUNITY TO MOVE TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA)/ATTORNEYS (CRIMINAL LAW, (GRAND-JUROR BIAS ISSUE IS FORFEITED BY A GUILTY PLEA; ERRONEOUS ADVICE RE APPEALABILITY OF THE ISSUE REQUIRED REMITTAL TO GIVE DEFENDANT OPPORTUNITY TO MOVE TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA)

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FAILURE TO PROHIBIT T-SHIRTS MEMORIALIZING THE VICTIM AND THREE UNPRESERVED INSTANCES OF PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT WERE HARMLESS ERRORS INDIVIDUALLY, BUT THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT REQUIRED A NEW TRIAL.

The Second Department, after finding the court’s allowing the wearing of T-shirts memorializing the murder victim and three (unpreserved) instances of prosecutorial misconduct harmless individually, the cumulative effect of the “harmless” errors was deemed sufficient to reversed defendant’s conviction:

On the second day of trial, defense counsel advised the Supreme Court that “quite a few members of the deceased’s family are present in the court, they are all wearing T-shirts with his photograph on it, displayed in a fairly prominent position on the front of their T-shirts.” Defense counsel requested that the court instruct the spectators to remove the T-shirts or turn them inside out. After asking the members of the audience to stand up for a moment so as to view the T-shirts, the court stated that there was no basis to limit their right to wear items or make a statement since they had a First Amendment right to do so. The court also stated: “It should be noted that the Court, in viewing the audience, saw nothing outstanding other than T-shirts with some pictures and some words. One of the picture[s] may be of the [victim], I can’t tell from this distance. But, at any rate, that’s my ruling for the record, over counsel’s objection.” * * *

The prosecutor improperly appealed to the jury’s sympathy by eliciting testimony from the victim’s mother that the victim’s wife was expecting a child and expressing sympathy for her loss … . * * *

That error was compounded when, during summation, the prosecutor improperly appealed to the jury’s sympathy by commenting that when the victim left his house on the night in question, he had no idea that he was “never going to see his family again” and “never going to be able to see his girlfriend again,” and stating that it was a “tragedy” that his “24-year-old life was taken away by this man here (indicating), [the defendant]” … . The prosecutor committed misconduct of a different sort during summation when, while playing a surveillance video introduced into evidence at trial, she identified certain barely visible figures on the screen as the victim and the defendant. Throughout the course of these comments, the Supreme Court repeatedly instructed the jury that it alone should assess the video and not rely on the prosecutor’s comments, but the prosecutor persisted in her characterization of the figures on the screen.  People v Holiday, 2016 NY Slip Op 05816, 2nd Dept 8-17-16

CRIMINAL LAW (FAILURE TO PROHIBIT T-SHIRTS MEMORIALIZING THE VICTIM AND THREE UNPRESERVED INSTANCES OF PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT WERE HARMLESS ERRORS INDIVIDUALLY, BUT THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT REQUIRED A NEW TRIAL)/ATTORNEYS (CRIMINAL LAW, FAILURE TO PROHIBIT T-SHIRTS MEMORIALIZING THE VICTIM AND THREE UNPRESERVED INSTANCES OF PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT WERE HARMLESS ERRORS INDIVIDUALLY, BUT THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT REQUIRED A NEW TRIAL)/PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT (FAILURE TO PROHIBIT T-SHIRTS MEMORIALIZING THE VICTIM AND THREE UNPRESERVED INSTANCES OF PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT WERE HARMLESS ERRORS INDIVIDUALLY, BUT THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT REQUIRED A NEW TRIAL)/HARMLESS ERROR (FAILURE TO PROHIBIT T-SHIRTS MEMORIALIZING THE VICTIM AND THREE UNPRESERVED INSTANCES OF PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT WERE HARMLESS ERRORS INDIVIDUALLY, BUT THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT REQUIRED A NEW TRIAL)/CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF INDIVIDUAL ERRORS (CRIMINAL LAW, (FAILURE TO PROHIBIT T-SHIRTS MEMORIALIZING THE VICTIM AND THREE UNPRESERVED INSTANCES OF PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT WERE HARMLESS ERRORS INDIVIDUALLY, BUT THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT REQUIRED A NEW TRIAL)

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CRITERIA FOR ATTORNEY WORK-PRODUCT PRIVILEGE, WILLFUL AND CONTUMACIOUS CONDUCT DURING DISCOVERY, AND SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE CLEARLY EXPLAINED.

The Second Department determined: (1) information procured by an attorney’s freedom of information law requests was not protected by work-product privilege; (2) defendants’ conduct during discovery was not willful and contumacious; and (3) an adverse inference instruction was an appropriate sanction for spoliation of evidence. The Second Department offered detailed summaries of the criteria for work-product privilege, sanctions for conduct during discovery, and spoliation of evidence which are worth reading. With respect to attorney work-product privilege, the court wrote:

The CPLR exempts attorney work product from disclosure … . However, “the party asserting the privilege that material sought through discovery was prepared exclusively in anticipation of litigation or constitutes attorney work product bears the burden of demonstrating that the material it seeks to withhold is immune from discovery by identifying the particular material with respect to which the privilege is asserted and establishing with specificity that the material was prepared exclusively in anticipation of litigation” … . Furthermore, “[n]ot every manifestation of a lawyer’s labors enjoys the absolute immunity of work product. The exemption should be limited to those materials which are uniquely the product of a lawyer’s learning and professional skills, such as materials which reflect his [or her] legal research, analysis, conclusions, legal theory or strategy” … .

Here, the plaintiffs contend that materials obtained by their attorney via requests pursuant to state and federal freedom of information laws are privileged attorney work product. However, this material cannot be characterized as being “uniquely the product of [the plaintiffs’ counsel’s] learning and professional skills” or as reflecting his “legal research, analysis, conclusions, legal theory or strategy” … . Cioffi v S.M. Foods, Inc., 2016 NY Slip Op 05741, 2nd Dept 8-10-16

 

ATTORNEYS (CRITERIA FOR ATTORNEY WORK-PRODUCT PRIVILEGE, WILLFUL AND CONTUMACIOUS CONDUCT DURING DISCOVERY, AND SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE CLEARLY EXPLAINED)/PRIVILEGE (ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT PRIVILEGE CRITERIA EXPLAINED)/WORK PRODUCT (ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT PRIVILEGE CRITERIA EXPLAINED)/CIVIL PROCEDURE (WILLFUL AND CONTUMACIOUS CONDUCT DURING DISCOVERY, AND SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE CLEARLY EXPLAINED)/DISCOVERY (CIVIL, CRITERIA FOR FINDING WILLFUL AND CONTUMACIOUS CONDUCT DURING DISCOVERY CLEARLY EXPLAINED)/EVIDENCE (CIVIL, CRITERIA FOR SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE CLEARLY EXPLAINED)/SPOLIATION (CRITERIA FOR SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE CLEARLY EXPLAINED)

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DEFENSE COUNSEL’S FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THE PROSECUTOR’S MISCHARACTERIZATION OF DNA EVIDENCE, STANDING ALONE. WARRANTED REVERSAL FOR INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE.

The Third Department reversed defendant’s murder conviction, finding defense counsel ineffective. Counsel’s errors included: (1) failure to object the prosecutor’s mischaracterization of DNA evidence found on defendant’s clothes (this failure alone warranted reversal); (2) failure to object to irrelevant evidence about the victim’s demeanor, education, behavior as a mother, etc. (evidence from as far back as 1998), and an inept summation which misstated the burden and standard of proof and acknowledged the possibility defendant committed the crime:

[The DNA expert] testified … that there were not enough alleles or DNA data to say conclusively that the victim’s DNA was present.

Nevertheless, during summation, the prosecutor repeatedly mischaracterized [the expert’s] testimony and the DNA results by stating multiple times that the victim’s DNA was on the sweatshirt. Specifically, the prosecutor initially stated that “on that sweatshirt is [defendant’s] wife’s DNA.” Later, when discussing [the expert’s] DNA report, the prosecutor incorrectly stated that the report “shows that [the victim’s] DNA was on that area where the bloody spot is.” Even if this last statement could be viewed as asking the jury to make an inference from the evidence at trial, the prosecutor again misstated the testimony by saying, “We have the forensic people who say[] . . . [the victim’s] DNA is on that sweatshirt, to some degree.” Defense counsel made no objections to such characterization of the testimony or DNA analysis. People v Ramsaran, 2016 NY Slip Op 05520, 3rd Dept 7-14-16

CRIMINAL LAW (DEFENSE COUNSEL’S FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THE PROSECUTOR’S MISCHARACTERIZATION OF DNA EVIDENCE, STANDING ALONE. WARRANTED REVERSAL FOR INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE)/ATTORNEYS (CRIMINAL LAW, DEFENSE COUNSEL’S FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THE PROSECUTOR’S MISCHARACTERIZATION OF DNA EVIDENCE, STANDING ALONE. WARRANTED REVERSAL FOR INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE)/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, DEFENSE COUNSEL’S FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THE PROSECUTOR’S MISCHARACTERIZATION OF DNA EVIDENCE, STANDING ALONE. WARRANTED REVERSAL FOR INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE)/DNA EVIDENCE (DEFENSE COUNSEL’S FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THE PROSECUTOR’S MISCHARACTERIZATION OF DNA EVIDENCE, STANDING ALONE. WARRANTED REVERSAL FOR INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE)/INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL (DEFENSE COUNSEL’S FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THE PROSECUTOR’S MISCHARACTERIZATION OF DNA EVIDENCE, STANDING ALONE. WARRANTED REVERSAL FOR INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE)

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DEFENDANT NOT INFORMED OF DEPORTATION CONSEQUENCES OF HIS PLEA, MOTION TO VACATE CONVICTION FOR INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED.

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant’s motion to vacate his conviction because he was not informed his guilty plea would result in deportation should have been granted on “ineffective assistance” grounds. Defendant did not perfect an appeal. However the motion to vacate was a valid vehicle because it depended in part on non-record matters:

Since the defendant’s claim that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel involves a mixed claim that depends, in part, upon matter that would not appear on the record had there been a direct appeal from the judgment, his claims were properly presented in a motion pursuant to CPL 440.10 … .

Under the circumstances of this case, we find that the defendant established that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel, in that there was no “strategic reason” … for his attorney’s failure to advocate for a sentence that would result in the same overall aggregate prison time for the defendant, but which would have resulted in no mandatory immigration consequences … . People v Moore, 2016 NY Slip Op 05509, 2nd Dept 7-13-16

 

CRIMINAL LAW (DEFENDANT NOT INFORMED OF DEPORTATION CONSEQUENCES OF HIS PLEA, MOTION TO VACATE CONVICTION FOR INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED)/INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE (DEFENDANT NOT INFORMED OF DEPORTATION CONSEQUENCES OF HIS PLEA, MOTION TO VACATE CONVICTION FOR INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED)/ATTORNEYS (CRIMINAL LAW, DEFENDANT NOT INFORMED OF DEPORTATION CONSEQUENCES OF HIS PLEA, MOTION TO VACATE CONVICTION FOR INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED

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EVIDENCE COLLECTED AFTER REQUEST FOR COUNSEL SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED, NEW TRIAL ORDERED.

The Third Department determined statements made by and evidence collected from defendant after his request for counsel should have been suppressed in this vehicular homicide case. A new trial was ordered;

The People further conceded at oral argument that defendant invoked his constitutional and limited statutory right to counsel in response to those warnings and that, under the circumstances of this case, valid grounds existed to suppress his post-invocation statements and evidence related to the DRE [drug recognition evaluation], second breathalyzer and blood tests … . The erroneous admission of this evidence is reviewed under the harmless error doctrine, and such an error is considered harmless “when, in light of the totality of the evidence, there is no reasonable possibility that the error affected the jury’s verdict” … . The admissible evidence at trial established that defendant took twice his prescribed dosage of Clonazepam the morning of the accident and that he failed field sobriety tests administered at the scene. Nevertheless, inasmuch as defendant’s inadmissible statements, the recording of the DRE test and the evidence of the inadmissible test results themselves may well have contributed to the conviction, it cannot be said that the erroneous admission of that evidence was harmless … . People v Green, 2016 NY Slip Op 05399, 3rd Dept 7-7-16

 

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PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT WARRANTED REVERSAL IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE.

The Second Department reversed defendant’s conviction in the interest of justice because of the prosecutor’s misconduct. The decision went into great detail describing the substance of the misconduct (not summarized here):

… [T]he judgment of conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered as a result of pervasive prosecutorial misconduct. During opening statements as well as on summation, the prosecutor repeatedly engaged in improper conduct, including misstating the evidence, vouching for the credibility of witnesses with regard to significant aspects of the People’s case, calling for speculation by the jury, seeking to inflame the jury and arouse its sympathy, and improperly denigrating the defense … . Although objections to some of the remarks below were sustained, we nevertheless include them in order to provide a more complete picture of the pervasiveness of the misconduct at issue on this appeal. People v Redd, 2016 NY Slip Op 05392, 2nd Dept 7-6-16

CRIMINAL LAW (PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT WARRANTED REVERSAL IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE)/ATTORNEYS (CRIMINAL LAW, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT WARRANTED REVERSAL IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE)/PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT (PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT, WARRANTED REVERSAL IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE)

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COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN ATTORNEYS IN A LAW FIRM AND THE FIRM’S IN HOUSE COUNSEL CONCERNING ETHICAL ISSUES IN A FORMER CLIENT’S CASE PROTECTED FROM DISCLOSURE IN THE FORMER CLIENT’S MALPRACTICE ACTION.

The First Department, in an extensive full-fledged opinion by Justice Friedman (which cannot be fairly summarized here), determined the communications between attorneys in a law firm and the firm’s in house counsel were protected by attorney-client privilege and were not subject to the fiduciary exception to the privilege. The communications were sought by plaintiff, a former client of the firm, who brought the instant malpractice action against the firm:

The primary issue on this appeal is whether attorneys who have sought the advice of their law firm’s in-house general counsel on their ethical obligations in representing a firm client may successfully invoke attorney-client privilege to resist the client’s demand for the disclosure of communications seeking or giving such advice. We hold that such communications are not subject to disclosure to the client under the fiduciary exception to the attorney-client privilege … because, for purposes of the in-firm consultation on the ethical issue, the attorneys seeking the general counsel’s advice, as well as the firm itself, were the general counsel’s ” real clients'” … . Further, we decline to adopt the “current client exception,” under which a number of courts of other jurisdictions … have held a former client entitled to disclosure by a law firm of any in-firm communications relating to the client that took place while the firm was representing that client. Because we also find unavailing the former client’s remaining arguments for compelling the law firm and one of its attorneys to disclose the in-firm attorney-client communications in question, we reverse the order appealed from and deny the motion to compel. Stock v Schnader Harrison Segal & Lewis LLP, 2016 NY Slip Op 05247, 1st Dept 6-30-16

 

ATTORNEYS (PRIVILEGE, COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN ATTORNEYS IN A LAW FIRM AND THE FIRM’S IN HOUSE COUNSEL CONCERNING A FORMER CLIENT’S CASE PROTECTED FROM DISCLOSURE IN THE FORMER CLIENT’S MALPRACTICE ACTION)/PRIVILEGE (ATTORNEY-CLIENT,COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN ATTORNEYS IN A LAW FIRM AND THE FIRM’S IN HOUSE COUNSEL CONCERNING A FORMER CLIENT’S CASE PROTECTED FROM DISCLOSURE IN THE FORMER CLIENT’S MALPRACTICE ACTION)/ATTONNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE (COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN ATTORNEYS IN A LAW FIRM AND THE FIRM’S IN HOUSE COUNSEL CONCERNING A FORMER CLIENT’S CASE PROTECTED FROM DISCLOSURE IN THE FORMER CLIENT’S MALPRACTICE ACTION)/FIDUCIARY EXCEPTION (ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE, COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN ATTORNEYS IN A LAW FIRM AND THE FIRM’S IN HOUSE COUNSEL CONCERNING A FORMER CLIENT’S CASE PROTECTED FROM DISCLOSURE IN THE FORMER CLIENT’S MALPRACTICE ACTION)/MALPRACTICE (ATTORNEYS, COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN ATTORNEYS IN A LAW FIRM AND THE FIRM’S IN HOUSE COUNSEL CONCERNING A FORMER CLIENT’S CASE PROTECTED FROM DISCLOSURE IN THE FORMER CLIENT’S MALPRACTICE ACTION)

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