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PROOF DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THAT THE VICTIM’S EYE INJURY ROSE TO THE LEVEL OF ‘SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURY;’ BASED UPON A WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE ANALYSIS, ASSAULT FIRST REDUCED TO ASSAULT SECOND (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, applying a weight of the evidence analysis, determined the People did not present sufficient proof to demonstrate the victim’s eye injury rose to the level of “serious physical injury” and reduced the Assault First conviction to Assault Second. Defendant threw a brick from an overpass which struck the windshield of the victim’s car, sending glass into her eye:

Before the incident, the victim had not experienced blurry vision in her left eye. She testified that her overall vision worsened since the incident, and that she has a permanent scar on her cornea. At the time of trial, the victim visited the doctor every six months for evaluation of her corneal scar. She acknowledged, however, that before the incident, she wore eyeglasses. The medical records indicated that she had been diagnosed and treated for an eye condition, blepharitis. The medical records further indicated that, in a follow-up visit in February 2016, the victim reported no pain or change in vision. Notably, the People did not proffer any medical testimony to interpret and explain the medical records; explain the nature, severity, and prognosis of the victim’s eye injury; or to explain whether any preexisting eye condition or conditions were affected by the incident, or whether any such preexisting eye condition was a cause of any of her current complaints … .

Upon the exercise of our factual review power, we conclude that the verdict convicting the defendant of assault in the first degree and assault in the second degree was against the weight of the evidence. Given the lack of medical testimony to explain the nature of the victim’s eye injury, an acquittal on the charges of assault in the first degree and assault in the second degree would have been reasonable. Giving appropriate weight to the evidence submitted on the issue of ” [s]erious physical injury,'” we conclude that the jury was not justified in finding that the People proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the victim’s eye injury created a substantial risk of death or constituted a “serious and protracted disfigurement, protracted impairment of health or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily organ” (Penal Law § 10.00[10] …). People v Palant, 2019 NY Slip Op 07289, Second Dept 10-9-19

 

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UNDER A WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE ANALYSIS, THE PEOPLE DID NOT DISPROVE DEFENDANT’S AGENCY DEFENSE; THE VERDICT WAS REPUGNANT IN THAT GUILTY AND NOT GUILTY FINDINGS CAN NOT BE RECONCILED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department vacated defendant’s convictions in this drug/possession/sale case, finding the People did not disprove the agency defense with respect to one of the two transactions, and the verdict was repugnant in the sense guilty and not guilty findings could not be reconciled.  With respect to the agency defense, the Second Department applied a “weight of the evidence” analysis. The facts are too complex to fairly summarize here:

The following factors are considered in evaluating the strength of an agency defense: “(1) did the defendant act as a mere extension of the buyer throughout the relationship, with no independent desire to promote the transaction; (2) was the purchase suggested by the buyer; (3) did the defendant have any previous acquaintance with the seller; (4) did the defendant exhibit any salesman like behavior; (5) did the defendant use his [or her] own funds; (6) did the defendant procure from many sources for a single buyer; (7) did the buyer pay the seller directly; (8) did the defendant stand to profit; and (9) was any reward promised in advance” … . …

A verdict is repugnant only if, when viewed in light of the elements of each crime as charged to the jury, “it is legally impossible—under all conceivable circumstances—for the jury to have convicted the defendant on one count but not the other” … . The purpose of the rule is to ensure that an individual is not convicted of a crime of which a jury has necessarily decided that one of the essential elements was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt … . People v Cruz, 2019 NY Slip Op 07273, Second Dept 10-9-19

 

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THE STANDARD OF PROOF REQUIRED IN AN ENTIRELY CIRCUMSTANTIAL-EVIDENCE CASE WAS NOT MET IN THIS MURDER PROSECUTION; CONVICTION REVERSED AS AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing defendant’s murder conviction, determined the conviction was against the weight of the evidence. There was no forensic evidence linking defendant to the murder, which occurred 11 years before the trial, and the circumstantial evidence merely raised the possibility defendant committed the murder. The decision recounts the evidence in a level of detail which cannot be fairly summarized here:

Where the prosecution relies entirely on circumstantial evidence, before the fact-finder can draw an inference of guilt, that inference must be the only one that can fairly and reasonably be drawn from the proven facts, and the evidence must exclude beyond a reasonable doubt every reasonable hypothesis of innocence … . The inferences to be drawn from the People’s evidence in this case as to coincidence of time, place, and behavior are sufficient only to create suspicion. The evidence presented at trial is not inconsistent with the defendant’s innocence, and any determination of guilt requires too much speculation to fill the gaps in the People’s evidence to constitute proof beyond a reasonable doubt. * * *

[T]he evidence presented at trial supports the possibility that the defendant was the person who killed Perez. “[H]owever, speculation and conjecture are no substitute for proof beyond a reasonable doubt” … . It is not enough for the jury to determine “that the defendant is probably guilty” … . The People must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is the person who committed the crime. On this record, we find that the jury was not justified in finding the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Clavell, 2019 NY Slip Op 07271, Second Dept 10-10-19

 

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GRANDMOTHER’S APPEAL OF THE DENIAL OF VISITATION HEARD DESPITE THE FACT THAT GRANDMOTHER HAD BEEN GRANTED VISITATION WHILE THE APPEAL WAS PENDING; DISSENT ARGUED THE EXCEPTION TO THE MOOTNESS DOCTRINE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN APPLIED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department affirmed Family Court’s denial of grandmother’s petition for custody and visitation and heard the appeal despite the fact that grandmother was subsequently granted visitation. The majority applied the exception to the mootness doctrine to hear the appeal. An extensive dissent argued the exception to the mootness doctrine did not apply and the appeal should have been dismissed:

We reject the grandmother’s contention that the court erred in denying her petition for custody and granting custody to the mother. “It is well established that, as between a parent and a nonparent, the parent has a superior right to custody that cannot be denied unless the nonparent establishes that the parent has relinquished that right because of surrender, abandonment, persisting neglect, unfitness or other like extraordinary circumstances’ ” … . Here, the grandmother failed to meet her burden of establishing that extraordinary circumstances exist to warrant an inquiry into whether an award of custody to the grandmother is in the best interests of the child … . In particular, we conclude that the grandmother failed to establish her claim that the mother suffered from unaddressed, serious mental health issues that would warrant a finding of extraordinary circumstances … .

Contrary to the grandmother’s further contention, we conclude that, as of the time that the order was entered, the record supports the court’s determination that it was in the best interests of the subject child to deny the grandmother visitation “in view of  grandmother’s failure to abide by court orders, the grandmother’s animosity toward the [mother], with whom the child[ now] reside[s], and the fact that the grandmother frequently engaged in acts that undermined the subject child[]’s relationship with” the mother … . It is well settled that “a court’s determination regarding custody and visitation issues, based upon a first-hand assessment of the credibility of the witnesses after an evidentiary hearing, is entitled to great weight and will not be set aside unless it lacks an evidentiary basis in the record” … , and we perceive no basis for disturbing the court’s determination here … . Matter of Smith v Ballam, 2019 NY Slip Op 07170, Fourth Dept 10-4-19

 

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ATTEMPTED MENACING OF A POLICE OFFICER IS NOT A COGNIZABLE CRIME; CHARGING ATTEMPTED MENACING OF A POLICE OFFICER IS A MODE OF PROCEEDINGS ERROR THAT NEED NOT BE PRESERVED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department determined that attempted menacing of a police officer is not a cognizable crime because “attempt” is included in the offense. This was a mode of proceedings error that did not have to be preserved:

We agree with defendant … that his conviction of attempted menacing a police officer or peace officer must be reversed because that offense is not a legally cognizable crime. As relevant here, Penal Law § 120.18 provides that “[a] person is guilty of menacing a police officer or peace officer when he or she intentionally places or attempts to place a police officer . . . in reasonable fear of physical injury, serious physical injury or death by displaying a deadly weapon, . . . pistol, . . . or other firearm, whether operable or not, where such officer was in the course of performing his or her official duties and the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that such victim was a police officer.” Thus, according to the definition of menacing a police officer or peace officer set forth in the Penal Law, the attempt to commit the crime is already an element of the offense, and “there cannot be an attempt to commit a crime which is itself a mere attempt to do an act or accomplish a result” … . Although defendant failed to raise this issue at trial, preservation is not required inasmuch as this issue constitutes a mode of proceedings error … . People v Dibble, 2019 NY Slip Op 07165, Fourth Dept 10-4-19

 

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APPELLANT WAS NOT AGGRIEVED BY SUPREME COURT’S DECISION WHICH DENIED HER MOTION WITHOUT PREJUDICE PENDING FURTHER DISCOVERY; THEREFORE THE APPEAL MUST BE DISMISSED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined the plaintiff’s Joan and Christopher Porco were not aggrieved by Supreme Court’s ruling and therefore could not appeal it. The underlying action alleges Civil Rights Law (right to privacy) violations related to a film made by defendant about a crime committed by Christopher Porco. The complaint alleged the film had been republished making the action timely. Supreme Court denied the motion without prejudice to try again after discovery:

Christopher Porco is not an aggrieved party. Defendant’s motion sought dismissal of only those claims asserted by Joan Porco. In other words, defendant did not seek any relief against Christopher Porco. Supreme Court likewise did not grant defendant any relief against him. Accordingly, Christopher Porco has no basis to appeal from the February 2018 order.

Regarding Joan Porco, Supreme Court held that she could not rely on the relation back doctrine for her claims in the amended complaint to be timely asserted. The court nonetheless denied defendant’s motion without prejudice to renew upon completion of discovery after considering plaintiffs’ republication argument. … Accordingly, the court neither granted defendant any affirmative relief against Joan Porco nor withheld any affirmative relief requested by Joan Porco. Indeed, the only affirmative relief sought by Joan Porco was for leave to serve a second amended complaint, which the court granted and is not contested on appeal. Because Joan Porco was not granted incomplete relief, the exception to the aggrievement requirement … does not apply in this case.

Furthermore, a party is not aggrieved when his or her interests are only remotely or contingently affected by the order appealed from … . Although Joan Porco’s claims are subject to dismissal in the future given that Supreme Court denied defendant’s motion without prejudice to renew, it is possible that defendant may never seek to renew its motion. And, even if defendant did move to renew, we can only surmise at this juncture how the court would decide it. Finally, to the extent that Joan Porco is dissatisfied with the court’s rationale concerning the relation back doctrine, such dissatisfaction does not make her an aggrieved party … . Porco v Lifetime Entertainment Servs., LLC, 2019 NY Slip Op 07122, Third Dept 10-3-19

 

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NO APPEAL LIES FROM THE DENIAL OF A MOTION TO WITHDRAW A PLEA OF NOT RESPONSIBLE BY REASON OF MENTAL DISEASE OR DEFECT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined that no appeal lies from the denial of a motion to withdraw a plea of not responsible by reason of mental disease or defect:

… [A] motion pursuant to CPL 220.60 seeking to withdraw a plea to an indictment is part of a criminal action or, at the least, “related to a . . . completed criminal action,” so as to come within the statutory definition of a “[c]riminal proceeding” (CPL 1.20[18]; … ). Moreover, in light of the nature of the relief sought in the motion, the motion is, by its nature, criminal, rather than civil … . Accordingly, proper statutory authority under the Criminal Procedure Law must exist in order for the defendant to appeal from the denial of the motion … .

Such statutory authority does not exist. CPL 450.10 only provides that a defendant may appeal as of right from a judgment, sentence, or order made pursuant to specified provisions of CPL article 440, and thus, does not provide for appellate review, as of right, from an order denying a motion pursuant to CPL 220.60, to withdraw a plea of not responsible by reason of mental disease or defect. Nor does CPL 450.15 allow for such an appeal by permission, as that statute only permits an appeal from orders made pursuant to specified provisions of CPL article 440, and “[a] sentence . . . not otherwise appealable as of right” (CPL 450.15[3]). Finally, there is no avenue for appeal through CPL 330.20, which permits a party “to proceedings conducted in accordance with the provisions of this section” to appeal, by permission, from certain orders rendered under CPL 330.20 (CPL 330.20[21]). The orders specified do not include an order denying a motion pursuant to CPL 220.60 to withdraw the plea … . People v Delano F., 2019 NY Slip Op 07089, Second Dept 10-2-19

 

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DEFENDANT’S DRUG SALE CONVICTION WAS AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department reversed defendant’s drug-sale conviction as against the weight of the evidence. The police saw a woman approach defendant and the woman had a $10 bag of crack cocaine in her mouth when the police stopped her. The defendant had $10 in his pocket but no drugs on him. No exchange between the two was observed:

Two police officers testified that they observed defendant in a high drug trafficking area. They both saw defendant approach a man and talk to him. The man gave defendant money and there was an “exchange,” but the officers did not see what was exchanged. Shortly thereafter, one of the officers witnessed a woman approach defendant. The officer saw the woman speak to defendant and then touch his hand, but the officer did not see any money or drugs exchanged. Defendant and the woman separated, and the officer approached the woman. The officer identified herself, said that she just saw what happened, and heard the woman chewing on something. She asked the woman to spit out the object, which turned out to be a small bag containing $10 worth of crack cocaine. The officer never saw the woman put the bag in her mouth or even bring her hand to her mouth. The police then arrested the woman and defendant. Defendant did not have any drugs on him, but had $10 in his sweatshirt pocket and other denominations of cash in his pants pocket.

In the exercise of our factual review power, we conclude that the People did not prove beyond any reasonable doubt that defendant sold cocaine to the woman, which was the only crime charged. The officer who witnessed the transaction acknowledged she did not observe an exchange of anything, including money, drugs or unidentified objects, between defendant and the woman. In addition, the People’s theory that the woman put the bag in her mouth after purchasing it from defendant was contradicted by the officer’s testimony that she never saw the woman put anything into her mouth, or even put her hand to her mouth. Furthermore, the People’s theory that defendant sold two $10 bags, one to the man and the other to the woman, was inconsistent with the cash found on defendant. People v Correa, 2019 NY Slip Op 07017, First Dept 10-1-19

 

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WAIVER OF APPEAL INVALID; MATTER REMITTED FOR THE STATUTORILY REQUIRED FINDINGS FOR THE DENIAL OF DEFENDANT’S SUPPRESSION MOTION; APPEAL HELD IN ABEYANCE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined defendant’s waiver of appeal was invalid. He therefore could challenge the denial of his suppression motion on appeal. However, Supreme Court did not make the statutorily required findings of fact and conclusions of law. The matter was remitted for findings on all the issues raised by the suppression motion, and the appeal is held in abeyance:

When the Supreme Court attempted to explain to the defendant the waiver of the right to appeal, it improperly conflated the right to appeal with rights automatically forfeited by a plea of guilty … . As such, the record does not demonstrate that the defendant understood the nature of the right he was being asked to waive or the distinction between the right to appeal and the other trial rights which are forfeited incident to a plea of guilty … . Moreover, although the record of the proceedings reflects that the defendant executed a written waiver of his right to appeal, the court did not ascertain on the record whether the defendant had read the waiver or discussed it with defense counsel … . …

“[T]he CPL article 710 suppression procedure involves an adjudication based on mixed questions of law and fact”… . “The suppression court must make findings of fact, often requiring it to assess the credibility of witnesses” … . “Regardless of whether a hearing was conducted, the court, upon determining [an article 710] motion, must set forth on the record its findings of fact, its conclusions of law and the reasons for its determination” (CPL 710.60[6] …). People v Harris, 2019 NY Slip Op 06795, Second Dept 9-25-19

 

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THE PEOPLE’S APPEAL FROM THE DENIAL OF ITS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF COUNTY COURT’S DISMISSAL OF THE INDICTMENT WAS NOT AUTHORIZED BY STATUTE AND MUST THEREFORE BE DISMISSED (THIRD DEPT). ​

The Third Department determined the People’s appeal from dismissal of the indictment and the denial of their motion for reconsideration, which was not authorized by statute, must be dismissed. County Court had determined the victim’s testimony at the grand jury was unsworn and could not be considered. The People then made a motion for reconsideration with proof the victim had been properly sworn:

… [D]efendant, an inmate at Greene County Correctional Facility, was charged by indictment with aggravated harassment of an employee by an inmate, stemming from an April 2016 incident wherein defendant was transported to Columbia Memorial Hospital for medical treatment and thereafter allegedly drank his own urine and spat it in the face of a correction officer (hereinafter the victim). The parties thereafter entered into a stipulation in lieu of motions and, pursuant thereto, County Court reviewed, among other things, the grand jury minutes to determine whether there was legally sufficient evidence to support the indictment. In December 2016, County Court dismissed the indictment, determining that the evidence before the grand jury was legally insufficient inasmuch as the People’s sole witness — the victim — had not been administered the correct oath and, as such, had presented unsworn testimony to the grand jury. The People thereafter moved for reconsideration, averring that the court reporter had erroneously omitted reference to the correct oath which had, in fact, been appropriately given by the jury foreperson to the victim, and the People affixed to the motion a corrected copy of the grand jury minutes reflecting same.

… [I]t is well settled that “no appeal lies from a determination made in a criminal [action] unless specifically provided for by statute” … . Here, the People’s underlying motion purports to be one for “reconsideration”; however, even construing such motion as a motion to reargue and/or renew, there is no statute authorizing the People to appeal from the denial of such a motion in a criminal action … . People v Overbaugh, 2019 NY Slip Op 06546, Third Dept 9-12-19

 

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