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ANY CHALLENGE BASED ON A DEFECT IN THE SUPERIOR COURT INFORMATION AND WAIVER OF APPEAL FOR FAILURE TO SET FORTH THE DATE AND TIME OF THE OFFENSE WAIVED BY THE GUILTY PLEA; THE PLEA WAS INVALID BECAUSE OF THE INCOMPLETE COLLOQUY (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, vacating defendant’s guilty plea, determined the plea colloquy did not demonstrate defendant fully understood and voluntarily waived his right to trial. The court noted that the failure to set forth the date and time of the offense in the superior court information (SCI) and the waiver of indictment was not a jurisdictional defect and any related error was not preserved for appeal and was forfeited by the guilty plea:

Notwithstanding the omission of the date and approximate time of the offense, the waiver of indictment and the SCI, together with the underlying accusatory instruments prepared in connection with the incident, gave defendant reasonable notice of the felony sex crime with which he was being charged. In light of this, as well as the absence of any indication that defendant raised an objection before County Court to the sufficiency of the waiver of indictment or the SCI, or requested a bill of particulars, defendant’s challenge to the waiver of indictment and the SCI was forfeited by his guilty plea … . …

Preliminarily, we note that defendant’s challenge to the voluntariness of the plea is not precluded by his appeal waiver … and was preserved by his unsuccessful postallocution motion to withdraw his plea … . During the plea proceedings, County Court advised defendant that he was giving up a number of important rights by pleading guilty, including the right “to take the case to trial,” the “right to cross-examine people who testified against you,” and “the right to testify yourself or call your own witnesses.” The court further explained that he could not be convicted at trial unless the People proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt that he was guilty of the crime. The court, however, failed to mention the privilege against self-incrimination or ascertain whether defendant conferred with counsel regarding the trial-related rights that he was waiving and the constitutional consequences of entering a guilty plea … . Absent an affirmative showing that defendant fully understood and voluntarily waived his trial-related constitutional rights, the plea was invalid and must be vacated … . People v Oliver, 2020 NY Slip Op 03697, Third Dept 7-2-20

 

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ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT COMPLETED HIS SENTENCE HE IS ENTITLED TO A DETERMINATION WHETHER HE SHOULD BE ADJUDICATED A YOUTHFUL OFFENDER; THE ORDER OF PROTECTION EXCEEDED THE STATUTORY TIME LIMIT (SECOND DEPT).

Although defendant had already completed his sentence, the Second Department held he was entitled to a determination whether he should be adjudicated a youthful offender, even if that relief was not requested. In addition, the Second Department noted the order of protection exceeded the maximum time allowed in the Criminal Procedure Law and did not take into account defendant’s jail-time:

In People v Rudolph (21 NY3d 497, 499), the Court of Appeals held that compliance with CPL 720.20(1), which provides that the sentencing court “must” determine whether an eligible defendant is to be treated as a youthful offender, “cannot be dispensed with, even where defendant has failed to ask to be treated as a youthful offender, or has purported to waive his or her right to make such a request.” Compliance with CPL 720.20(1) requires the sentencing court to actually consider and make an independent determination of whether an eligible youth is entitled to youthful offender treatment … .

Here, the record does not demonstrate that the Supreme Court considered whether to adjudicate the defendant a youthful offender. “Generally, under such circumstances, the sentence is vacated, and the matter remitted to the sentencing court for resentencing after determining whether the defendant should be treated as a youthful offender”… . However, in this case, the defendant has served his sentences. Under these circumstances, we remit the matter to the Supreme Court, Kings County, to determine whether the defendant should be afforded youthful offender treatment and thereafter submit a report to this Court advising of its determination, and hold the appeals in abeyance in the interim … . People v Shehi, 2020 NY Slip Op 03676, Second Dept 7-1-20

 

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THE 3RD DEPARTMENT REFUSED TO AMEND THE NOTICE OF APPEAL TO INSERT AN ORDER FROM WHICH NO APPEAL HAD BEEN TAKEN; APPEAL DISMISSED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, dismissing respondent mother’s appeal, determined mother failed to timely appeal the order terminating her parental rights. Mother submitted a notice of appeal after she was served with the April 2018 permanency hearing order, not within 35 days of her being served with the November 2016 order terminating her parental rights:

Respondent contends that the affidavit submitted with her notice of appeal demonstrates that she intended to appeal the November 2016 order terminating her parental rights, rather than the April 5, 2018 permanency hearing order. Accordingly, respondent asks this Court to “construe [her appeal] as such, and deem it timely filed.” Despite this request, the order terminating respondent’s parental rights was entered and mailed to respondent in November 2016, 18 months before her May 2018 notice of appeal. Thus, even if we were to construe it as respondent requests, because the notice of appeal was not filed and served “within 35 days after the order was mailed” to respondent, it was untimely and we lack jurisdiction to hear the appeal … . Further, despite respondent’s contention that her affidavit accompanying the notice of appeal demonstrates her intent to appeal the order terminating her parental rights, this affidavit explicitly and repeatedly references the permanency hearing order. Although this Court “may treat a notice of appeal which contains an inaccurate description of the judgment or order appealed from as valid,” it may not, as respondent requests, “amend a notice of appeal so as to insert therein an order from which no appeal has in fact ever been taken” … . Matter of Alan VV. (Amanda RR.), 2020 NY Slip Op 03574, Third Dept 6-26-20

 

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THE OPINION CHANGING THE CRITERIA FOR THE DEPRAVED-INDIFFERENCE MENS REA CAME DOWN BEFORE DEFENDANT’S CONVICTION BECAME FINAL; DESPITE THE AFFIRMANCE OF DEFENDANT’S MURDER CONVICTION ON APPEAL, THE DENIAL OF A MOTION TO REARGUE THE APPEAL, THE DENIAL OF THE MOTION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL TO THE COURT OF APPEALS, AND THE DENIAL OF DEFENDANT’S PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS IN FEDERAL COURT, SUPREME COURT SHOULD HAVE GRANTED DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO VACATE HIS CONVICTION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant’s motion to vacate his depraved-indifference murder conviction should have been granted. The Court of Appeals opinion which changed the proof requirements for the depraved indifference mens rea was issued before defendant’s conviction became final. The proof at defendant’s trial demonstrated defendant acted intentionally as opposed acting with “depraved indifference:”

… [T]he defendant moved pursuant to CPL 440.10(1)(h) to vacate so much of the judgment as convicted him of depraved indifference murder, arguing that, in light of People v Payne (3 NY3d 266), which was decided 15 days after this Court affirmed the judgment of conviction on his direct appeal but before his conviction became final (see Policano v Herbert, 7 NY3d at 593), the evidence at trial was legally insufficient to establish that he acted with the requisite mens rea for depraved indifference murder. The Supreme Court denied the motion without a hearing, as both procedurally barred by CPL 440.10(2)(a) and meritless. The court reasoned that the defendant’s legal sufficiency argument based on the change of law set forth in People v Payne had been addressed and rejected by this Court in denying the defendant’s motion for leave to reargue his direct appeal, by the Court of Appeals in denying the defendant’s motion for leave to appeal, and by the federal court in denying the defendant’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. With respect to the merits of the defendant’s motion, the Supreme Court determined that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence was legally sufficient to support the jury’s verdict. * * *

… [T]he trial evidence was not legally sufficient to support a verdict of guilt of depraved indifference murder (see People v Payne, 3 NY3d at 272; People v Hernandez, 167 AD3d at 940). People v Illis, 2020 NY Slip Op 03535, Second Dept 6-24-20

 

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THE MAJORITY HELD THE ISSUES WHETHER MOTHER HAD MADE ALLEGATIONS OF DOMESTIC ABUSE IN A SWORN PLEADING OR WHETHER MOTHER HAD PROVEN DOMESTIC ABUSE ALLEGATIONS AGAINST FATHER WERE NOT PRESERVED FOR APPEAL; THE DISSENT ARGUED THE ISSUES WERE PRESERVED AND WOULD REMIT FOR A BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD ANALYSIS (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, over a detailed and comprehensive dissent, affirmed the award of custody to father, finding that the issues raised on appeal by mother were not preserved. Defendant mother argued she had made allegations of domestic abuse in a sworn pleading (petition) and, therefore, pursuant to Domestic Relations Law 240(1)(a), the court was required to consider the effect of the domestic violence on the best interests of the child:

Defendant failed to preserve her arguments regarding Domestic Relations Law § 240 (1) (a). As a result, the parties never litigated, and Supreme Court did not pass upon, or make any findings with respect to, whether a withdrawn family offense petition constitutes “a sworn petition” for purposes of this statute or whether defendant proved allegations of domestic violence “by a preponderance of the evidence” (Domestic Relations Law § 240 [1] [a]) — issues that are essential to the arguments defendant now raises. Record evidence supports the affirmed custody award. * * *

From the dissent:

Because the issue is preserved, I would reverse and remit to Supreme Court for a new best interest of the child analysis consistent with the framework of Domestic Relations Law § 240 (1) (a), and any development of the record as needed. Cole v Cole, 2020 NY Slip Op 03489, CtApp 6-23-20

 

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DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO COMPEL THE PRODUCTION OF TAX RETURNS AFTER THE PARTIES’ FAILURE TO RESPOND TO THE DEMAND FOR PRODUCTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DENIED; THE FAILURE TO RESPOND TO A PALPABLY IMPROPER DEMAND FOR PRODUCTION, I.E. A DEMAND FOR TAX RETURNS, DOES NOT WAIVE THE ABILITY TO OBJECT TO THE DEMAND ON APPEAL; DEFENDANT MAY RENEW THE MOTION TO COMPEL PRODUCTION OF THE TAX RETURNS IF THE REQUIRED SHOWINGS ARE MADE (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department noted that the failure to respond to defendant-Mazal’s demands for production waived any objections to the demands. Mazal’s motion to compel discovery therefore was properly granted. However objections to demands which are palpably improper are not waived by a failure to respond and Mazal’s demand for tax returns may be in the palpably-improper category. Mazal’s motion to compel the production of tax returns should therefore have been denied. But the First Department denied that portion of the motion to compel without prejudice and granted leave to renew if Mazal can make the required showing of need:

The motion court providently deemed the appealing parties’ objections waived under CPLR 3122 as a result of their failure to respond timely to Mazal’s demands for production … . We modify, however, with respect to Mazal’s demands for the appealing parties’ tax returns, as objections to “palpably improper” demands are not waived … .

A demand for the production of tax returns is disfavored and requires “a strong showing of necessity,” and the inability to obtain the information from other sources … . Here, the failure “to identify the particular information the tax returns . . . will contain and its relevance to the claims made” … should have been sufficient to deny Mazal’s motion to compel. Indeed, the tax returns were not necessary to determine whether plaintiffs acquired an interest in the properties in 1994 or retained it thereafter — the reason the motion court gave for granting the motion. However, Mazal argues that the tax returns could be relevant to its affirmative defenses of laches, estoppel, waiver, ratification, and consent, and the motion court did not pass on this issue. As a result, although Mazal did not sufficiently show the inability to obtain the information sought from other sources or, indeed, what specific information the appealing parties’ tax returns will show, we grant leave to renew upon a proper showing … . Demurjian v Demurjian, 2020 NY Slip Op 03479, First Dept 6-18-20

 

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SELF-EXECUTING CONDITIONAL DISCOVERY ORDER BECAME ABSOLUTE UPON NON-COMPLIANCE; A MOTION TO VACATE, NOT AN APPEAL, IS THE PROPER PROCEDURE TO CONTEST THE ORDER ON THE GROUND OF EXCUSABLE DEFAULT; DEFENDANTS TOOK NO ACTION TO AVOID THE DEFAULT (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department noted that defendants’ failure to comply with a self-executing, conditional order striking the answer became absolute. The proper way to contest such an order is to move to vacate, not appeal:

When defendants failed to comply with the self-executing, conditional order striking their answer if they did not produce a witness for deposition by a date certain, the order became absolute ( … CPLR 3126[3]). Defendants’ proper recourse was to move to vacate the conditional order on the ground of excusable default (… CPLR 5015[a]). They did not seek that relief. In any event, the excuses for failing to comply with the court’s order that defendants asserted in opposition to plaintiff’s motion were not reasonable, and defendants failed to seek an adjournment from the court or take any other action to avoid their knowing default. Humble Monkey, LLC v Rice Sec., LLC, 2020 NY Slip Op 03470, First Dept 6-18-20

 

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THE ORDER WAS NOT ENTERED ON CONSENT AND THEREFORE WAS APPEALABLE; GRANDPARENTS’ PETITIONS FOR VISITATION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED ABSENT A FULL TRIAL (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, after noting the order was not entered on consent and was therefore appealable, determined the grandparents should not have been awarded visitation absent a full trial:

In the absence of consent, Family Court should not have awarded the paternal grandparents visitation without conducting a full trial. The decision was based only on the grandmother’s partial testimony. The separately petitioning grandfather did not testify. The mother was not present due to a medical procedure she was undergoing in North Carolina. Even if the court was justified in drawing a negative inference from her failure to give testimony … , the court failed to afford the attorney for the child (AFC) an opportunity to ascertain the seven-year-old child’s position … . Although the Family Court appropriately appointed an AFC, he did not let her do her job. The child’s position in this case was particularly important because of the mother’s representations that the child did not want to see the grandparents so soon following her father’s death and would be traumatized by such visitation. In addition, each of the grandparents brought separate petitions and each was separately represented in this matter. Although there is some indication that the grandparents are separated, because of the truncated record, there is insufficient information to support the court’s having jointly awarded jointly awarded them visitation with the child. Without a full hearing, the record is insufficient to determine whether visitation with the paternal grandparents is in the child’s best interests … . If after a full hearing upon remand the Family Court determines that grandparental visitation is in the child’s best interest, it should also clarify the award of visitation rights vis-a-vis each grandparent, given that they filed separate petitions and were not jointly represented by counsel, and thus in fact may be separated. Matter of Donna F.T., 2020 NY Slip Op 03469, First Dept 6-18-20

 

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SUPREME COURT WAS BOUND TO FOLLOW A FIRST DEPARTMENT DECISION BECAUSE THERE WERE NO ON-POINT DECISIONS FROM THE THIRD DEPARTMENT OR THE COURT OF APPEALS; HOWEVER THE THIRD DEPARTMENT IS NOT SO BOUND; SUPREME COURT REVERSED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, dealt with the issue of stare decisis in this dispute between defendant employer and plaintiff employee over the “demutualization” proceeds of an insurance policy. Plaintiff was employed as a certified nurse midwife by defendant. As part of the employment agreement defendant was required to maintain and pay the premiums for a malpractice insurance policy. When the insurance company converted from a mutual insurance company to a stock insurance company (demutualization) the policyholder was entitled to nearly $50,000. Plaintiff-employee claimed the money was hers and brought an action for a declaratory judgment. Supreme Court agreed with plaintiff but, because there was no on-point appellate decision by the Court of Appeals or the Third Department, Supreme Court was required to follow a First Department decision and, based on that decision, found in favor of defendant-employer. The Third Department noted that it, unlike Supreme Court, was not bound by stare decisis and reversed:

Initially, Supreme Court was “bound by the doctrine of stare decisis to apply precedent established in another Department,” as no relevant precedent was available from this Court or the Court of Appeals … . However, this Court is not so bound … . We agree with Supreme Court’s inclinations — although that court was constrained by stare decisis not to follow them — and disagree with the First Department’s holding in Matter of Schaffer, Schonholz & Drossman, LLP v Title (171 AD3d at 465 …). Therefore, for the reasons stated in our decision in Schoch v Lake Champlain OB-GYN, P.C. (___ AD3d ___ [decided herewith]), we reverse. Shoback v Broome Obstetrics & Gynecology, P.C., 2020 NY Slip Op 03447, Third Dept 6-18-20

 

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SUPPRESSION COURT’S FAILURE TO EXPLAIN THE BASIS FOR DENYING THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS PRECLUDED DETERMINATION OF THE APPEAL; MATTER REMITTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, holding the appeal and remitting the matter, noted that the suppression court’s failure to provide the basis for its denial of defendant’s suppression motion precluded determination of the appeal:

The defendant’s appeal from the order must be dismissed, as no appeal lies, as of right or by permission, from an order denying a motion to suppress evidence (see CPL 450.10, 450.15 …). The issues raised on the appeal from the order are brought up for review on the appeal from the judgment.

“Upon an appeal to an intermediate appellate court from a judgment, sentence or order of a criminal court, such intermediate appellate court may consider and determine any question of law or issue of fact involving error or defect in the criminal court proceedings which may have adversely affected the appellant” (CPL 470.15[1]). The Court of Appeals “has construed CPL 470.15(1) as a legislative restriction on the Appellate Division’s power to review issues either decided in an appellant’s favor, or not ruled upon, by the trial court” … . “CPL 470.15(1) bars [the Appellate Division] from affirming a judgment, sentence or order on a ground not decided adversely to the appellant by the trial court'” … .

… [W]e must hold the appeal from the judgment in abeyance and remit the matter to the Supreme Court … to articulate the basis or bases for its denial of those branches of the defendant’s omnibus motion which were to suppress physical evidence and his statement to law enforcement officials. People v Rice, 2020 NY Slip Op 03402, Second Dept 6-17-20

 

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