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APPELLATE COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO MAKE A MOTION ALERTING THE APPELLATE COURT TO A COURT OF APPEALS DECISION WHICH CAME DOWN AFTER THE BRIEFS WERE FILED BUT BEFORE THE APPELLATE RULING; MOTION FOR WRIT OF ERROR CORAM NOBIS GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department granted the defendant’s motion for writ of error coram nobis on the ground appellate counsel was ineffective. Although the Court of Appeals decision mandating that sentencing judges consider youthful offender status came down after the briefs were filed, appellate counsel should have made a motion to raise the issue:

Defendant contends that he was denied effective assistance of appellate counsel because counsel failed to raise an issue on direct appeal, specifically, whether Supreme Court failed to determine whether defendant should be afforded youthful offender status. Upon our review of the motion papers and under the circumstances presented here, we conclude that appellate counsel’s representation was not constitutionally adequate. “As held by the Court of Appeals in People v Rudolph (21 NY3d 497, 501 [2013]), CPL 720.20 (1) requires ‘that there be a youthful offender determination in every case where the defendant is eligible, even where the defendant fails to request it, or agrees to forgo it as part of a plea bargain’ ” …  Here, there is nothing in the record demonstrating that the court considered whether to adjudicate defendant a youthful offender, even though defendant, who was convicted of manslaughter in the first degree (Penal Law § 125.20 [1]) was presumably eligible … . Although the Court of Appeals decided Rudolph after appellate counsel filed the briefs on appeal and shortly before this Court affirmed defendant’s judgment on appeal, the standard of meaningful representation required appellate counsel to, after Rudolph was decided, seek to file an appropriate motion in this Court in order to raise the argument that Rudolph requires that the sentence must be vacated and the matter remitted for determination of defendant’s youthful offender status …  The order of July 5, 2013 is vacated and this Court will consider the appeal de novo … . Defendant is directed to file and serve his records and brief with this Court on or before January 23, 2023. People v Nathan, 2022 NY Slip Op 05479, Fourth Dept 9-30-22

Practice Point: A motion for writ of error coram nobis is a post-appeal tool for arguing appellate counsel was ineffective. Here a Court of Appeals decision requiring sentencing judges to consider youthful offender status even if not raised by the defendant came down after the briefs were filed but before the ruling. Appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to make a motion alerting the appellate court to the new law.

 

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TINTED WINDOWS CONSTITUTED A VALID REASON FOR THE VEHICLE STOP; THE VALIDITY OF THE IMPOUNDMENT OF DEFENDANT’S VEHICLE AND THE INVENTORY SEARCH WERE NOT PRESERVED FOR APPEAL; THE DISSENT ARGUED THE TINTED-WINDOWS STOP, THE IMPOUNDMENT AND THE INVENTORY SEARCH WERE INVALID (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, over an extensive two-justice dissent, determined (1) the vehicle stop based upon tinted windows was valid, (2) the impoundment of defendant’s vehicle (defendant did not have a license); was proper, and (3) the inventory search of the vehicle was valid: Marijuana and and a firearm were found in the search of the vehicle:

… [W]indow tint violations are a recognized basis for stopping a motor vehicle. The legal test, according to the Court of Appeals, is whether the police officer reasonably believes the windows to be over-tinted in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 375(12-a)(b) … . Officer Sepulveda’s testimony that he could not see into the defendant’s vehicle meets that test. …

The defendant’s contention on appeal that the impoundment and initial inventory search of the Nissan was unlawful was not raised before the Supreme Court and is therefore unpreserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05[2] …), and we decline to reach that contention in the exercise of our interest of justice jurisdiction…. .

From the dissent:

I respectfully dissent in part and vote to reverse the judgment insofar as reviewed for several reasons. First, the People failed to establish a sufficient basis for the police stop of the defendant’s vehicle. Second, the People failed to establish the legality of the impoundment of the defendant’s vehicle. Third, the People failed to establish the validity of the purported inventory search of the defendant’s vehicle. People v Biggs, 2022 NY Slip Op 05328, Second Dept 9-28-22

Practice Point: Tinted windows is a valid reason for a vehicle stop. The extensive dissent in this case called into question the validity of the tinted-windows stop, the impoundment of the vehicle and the inventory search of the vehicle.

 

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THE TWO-JUSTICE DISSENT DID NOT PRESENT A QUESTION OF LAW REVIEWABLE BY THE COURT OF APPEALS; THE ORDER DENYING SUMMARY JUDGMENT DID NOT NECESSARILY AFFECT THE FINAL JUDGMENT (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, dismissing the appeal, in a brief memorandum decision, held that the two-justice dissent (which would normally require review by the Court of Appeals) did not present a reviewable question of law:

… [A]ppeal dismissed, with costs, upon the ground that the two-Justice dissent at the Appellate Division is not on a question of law which would be reviewable by the Court of Appeals (see CPLR 5601 [a]; 5501 [a] [1]). The dissent was predicated on an order denying partial summary judgment that did not necessarily affect the judgment from which the appeal was taken (see Bonczar v American Multi-Cinema, Inc., 38 NY3d 1023 [2022]). Shaw v City of Rochester, 2022 NY Slip Op 05197, Ct App  9-15-22

Below is the summary of Bonczar v American Multi-Cinema, Ins. (cited by the Court of Appeals in Shaw, supra):

The Court of Appeals determined the Appellate Division order denying summary judgment in this Labor Law 240(1) ladder-fall case did not “affect the final judgment” after trial. Therefore the order was not appealable to the Court of Appeals:

The 2018 Appellate Division order may be reviewed on appeal from a final paper only if, pursuant to CPLR 5501 (a), the nonfinal order “necessarily affects” the final judgment. “It is difficult to distill a rule of general applicability regarding the ‘necessarily affects’ requirement” … and “[w]e have never attempted, and we do not now attempt, a generally applicable definition” … . That said, to determine whether a nonfinal order “necessarily affects” the final judgment, in cases where the prior order “str[uck] at the foundation on which the final judgment was predicated” we have inquired whether “reversal would inescapably have led to a vacatur of the judgment” … . This is not such a case. In other cases, we have asked whether the nonfinal order “necessarily removed [a] legal issue from the case” so that “there was no further opportunity during the litigation to raise the question decided by the prior non-final order” … .

In resolving plaintiff’s summary judgment motion, the Appellate Division held that factual questions existed as to whether a statutory violation occurred and as to proximate cause, or more specifically as to whether plaintiff’s own acts or omissions were the sole proximate cause of the accident … . That nonfinal order did not remove any issues from the case. Rather, the question of proximate cause and liability was left undecided. The parties had further opportunity to litigate those issues and in fact did so during the jury trial. Bonczar v American Multi-Cinema, Inc., 2022 NY Slip Op 02835, CtApp 4-28-22

Practice Point: A nonfinal order is not appealable to the Court of Appeals unless it “affects the final judgment.” If questions of fact remain after the nonfinal order is issued, the order does not “affect the final judgment” and is not appealable. Here the nonfinal order was the Appellate Division’s denial of plaintiff’s summary judgment motion. The order left open factual questions resolved at trial. Therefore the order did not “affect the final judgment.”

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THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE MOTHER PREVIOUSLY FILED FRIVOLOUS VISTATION PETITIONS; THE JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE PROHIBITED HER FROM FILING FUTURE PETITIONS WITHOUT LEAVE OF COURT (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined the judge should have prohibited mother from filing visitation petitions without leave of court:

The Family Court should not have prohibited the mother from filing petitions for visitation after October 22, 2021, without written leave of the court, since there is no basis in the record to demonstrate that the mother filed frivolous petitions or filed petitions out of ill will or spite … . Matter of Genao-Archibald v Archibald, 2022 NY Slip Op 05166, Second Dept 9-14-22

Practice Point: If there is no evidence in the record that mother previously filed frivolous or spiteful petitions for visitation, the appellate court will reverse a judge’s prohibition of future petitions without leave of court.

 

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PARTY ADMISSIONS WERE NOT HEARSAY AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED BY SUPREME COURT IN THIS LABOR LAW 240(1), 241(6), 200 ACTION; THE “PARTY-ADMISSIONS” ARGUMENT, ALTHOUGH NOT RAISED BEFORE SUPREME COURT, CAN BE CONSIDERED AND DEEMED DISPOSITIVE ON APPEAL (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined many of the causes of action in this Labor Law 240(1), 241(6) and 200 action should not have been dismissed. Plaintiff’s decedent, Rosa, was electrocuted when working on live electrical equipment. Rosa’s boss, Cuevas (the building manager), testified he told Rosa not to work on the live equipment until he returned with rubber insulation and shut down the power to the building. Decedent’s daughter, however, testified Cuevas told her Rosa had to do the work with the power on because there was an upcoming inspection. Cuevas’ statement was deemed admissible as a party admission and should have been considered by Supreme Court. The “party-admissions” argument was raised for the first time on appeal:

When “a party raises a legal issue for the first time on appeal, as long as the issue is determinative and the record on appeal is sufficient to permit review, this Court may consider the new argument” … . We may also consider this testimony in our discretion because [defendants] also relied on it in support of their summary judgment motion … . …

… [P]laintiff testified to postaccident conversations that Cuevas had with her when he visited Rosa in the hospital, when he admitted to plaintiff that Rosa had to perform the bus duct work without shutting down the electricity because of the imminently scheduled building inspection, so as not to inconvenience the tenants, and to avoid any complaints attendant to a service interruption, such as a lack of elevator service. Cuevas never denied either having those conversations with plaintiff in the hospital or making those statements…. . In any event, assuming hypothetically that these statements were inadmissible hearsay, they may still be considered as they are not the only evidence in this record that the electricity was not shut down when Rosa performed the duct work … . Rosa v 47 E. 34th St. (NY), L.P., 2022 NY Slip Op 05144, First Dept 9-13-22

Practice Point: Party admissions are not hearsay. A legal issue (here “inadmissible hearsay” versus “party admission”) raised for the first time on appeal may be considered where, as here, the record is sufficient and the issue is determinative.

 

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APPEAL FROM A DENIAL OF A MOTION TO REARGUE CONSIDERED DESPITE THE DISMISSAL OF THE APPEAL FROM THE INITIAL DENIAL OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE; PLAINTIFF’S LABOR LAW240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION STEMMING FROM A FALL INTO A PIT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined: (1) the appeal from the denial of a motion to reargue would be considered even though the appeal from the initial denial of summary judgment was dismissed for failure to prosecute; (2) the Labor Law 240(1) cause of action stemming from plaintiff’s fall into a pit should not have been dismissed:

“As a general rule, we do not consider any issue raised on a subsequent appeal that was raised, or could have been raised, in an earlier appeal that was dismissed for lack of prosecution, although we have the inherent jurisdiction to do so” … . Since the plaintiff appealed from an order superseding the prior order appealed from at a time before the prior appeal was deemed dismissed, we exercise that discretion here. …

… [T]he defendants failed to establish their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the Labor Law § 240(1) cause of action … . Contrary to the defendants’ contention, the risk of falling into a 16-foot pit on an excavation site is a type of elevation-related risk within the purview of protection of Labor Law § 240(1) … . Furthermore, the defendants failed to establish, prima facie, that the plaintiff’s negligence was the sole proximate cause of his injuries. The deposition testimony of the plaintiff and the foreman, which were submitted in support of the defendants’ motion, contain conflicting testimony raising a triable issue of fact as to whether the plaintiff received instructions not to stand within five feet of the pit. The defendants also did not establish, prima facie, that the installation of a protective device “would have been contrary to the objectives of the work” … . Thorpe v One Page Park, LLC, 2022 NY Slip Op 05053, Second Dept 8-24-22

Practice Point: Here the appellate court exercised its discretion to hear an appeal from the denial of a motion to reargue, even though the appeal from the initial denial of summary judgment was dismissed for failure to prosecute.

Practice Point: Plaintiff’s Labor Law 240(1) cause of action stemming from his fall into a pit should not have been dismissed.

 

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HERE DEFENDANT, WHO PLED GUILTY TO BURGLARY AS A SEXUALLY MOTIVATED FELONY, ATTEMPTED TO CHALLENGE HIS CERTIFICATION AS A SEX OFFENDER, PRONOUNCED AT SENTENCING, IN THE SORA RISK-LEVEL ASSESSMENT PROCEEDING; THE SEX OFFENDER CERTIFICATION WAS DEEMED TO BE PART OF THE JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION WHICH CAN ONLY BE CHALLENGED ON DIRECT APPEAL (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Rivera, determined that the defendant could not challenge his certification as a sex offender at the SORA risk-level-assessment proceeding. The sex-offender certification is part of the judgment of conviction which must be challenged on direct appeal. Here the defendant pled guilty to burglary as a sexually motivated felony and was designated a sex offender at sentencing.

… [W]e take this opportunity to pronounce that where, as here, a defendant challenges certification on the ground that the underlying New York conviction is for an offense which does not require registration under SORA, the issue is one which is properly raised on a direct appeal from the judgment of conviction, not on an appeal from an order designating his or her sex offender risk level…. . People v Matos, 2022 NY Slip Op 04984, Second Dept 8-17-22

Practice Point: Here the defendant was certified as a sex offender at sentencing for burglary as a sexually motivated felony. He attempted to challenge the certification at the SORA risk-level-assessment proceeding. The Second Department, like the First Department, held the sex offender certification was part of the judgment of conviction and can only be challenged by direct appeal.

 

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THE DENIAL OF DEFENDANT’S REQUEST FOR A ONE-DAY ADJOURNMENT TO ALLOW HIS DAUGHTER TO TRAVEL TO COURT TO TESTIFY, COUPLED WITH THE RELATED GRANT OF THE PEOPLE’S REQUEST FOR A MISSING-WITNESS JURY INSTRUCTION, DEPRIVED DEFENDANT OF A FAIR TRIAL (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing defendant’s conviction in the interest of justice, determined the judge’s denial of defendant’s request for a one-day adjournment to allow defendant’s daughter to travel to court to testimony, and the grant of the People’s related request for a missing witness jury instruction, deprived defendant of a fair trial:

“[W]hen the witness is identified to the court, and is to be found within the jurisdiction, a request for a short adjournment after a showing of some diligence and good faith should not be denied merely because of possible inconvenience to the court or others” … . Under the circumstances here, the Supreme Court should have granted a one-day continuance for the defendant’s daughter to travel to New York from out of state … . The failure to grant this continuance cannot be considered harmless error, as there was conflicting testimony as to the defendant’s whereabouts at the time of the robbery … . …

Although the defendant’s contention that the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in granting the prosecution’s request for a missing witness charge is unpreserved for appellate review … , this issue is inextricably linked with the denial of the defendant’s request for a continuance, and this Court will consider the issue in the exercise of our interest of justice jurisdiction … .  “The failure to produce a witness at trial, standing alone, is insufficient to justify a missing witness charge, ‘[r]ather, it must be shown that the uncalled witness is knowledgeable about a material issue upon which evidence is already in the case; that the witness would naturally be expected to provide noncumulative testimony favorable to the party who has not called him [or her], and that the witness is available to such party'” … . People v Reeves, 2022 NY Slip Op 04979, Second Dept 8-17-22

Practice Point: The request for a one-day adjournment to allow defendant’s daughter to travel to court to give ostensibly relevant testimony (re: defendant’s whereabouts at the time of the robbery), coupled with the grant of the People’s request to give the missing-witness jury instruction, deprived defendant of a fair trial. The jury-instruction issue was not preserved and was considered in the interest of justice.

 

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MARIJUANA AND GRAVITY-KNIFE CONVICTIONS VACATED IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE BECAUSE THE “OFFENSES” HAVE BEEN DECRIMINALIZED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department vacated defendant’s marijuana and gravity-knife convictions because the “offenses” had been decriminalized:

The defendant’s conviction of criminal possession of marihuana in the third degree “‘became a nullity by operation of law, independently of any appeal, and without requiring any action by this [c]ourt,'” pursuant to CPL 160.50(5) … . Consequently, the appeal from so much of the judgment as convicted the defendant of criminal possession of marihuana in the third degree must be dismissed as academic … . * * *

The defendant contends that the conviction of criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree predicated on the defendant’s possession of a gravity knife should be vacated because Penal Law § 265.01(1) has since been amended to decriminalize the simple possession of a gravity knife. The People, in the exercise of their broad prosecutorial discretion, agree that the judgment should be modified by vacating that conviction. Even though the statute decriminalizing the simple possession of a gravity knife did not take effect until May 30, 2019 … , under the circumstances of this case, we vacate that conviction and the sentence imposed thereon, and dismiss that count of the indictment, as a matter of discretion in the exercise of our interest of justice jurisdiction … . People v Lester, 2022 NY Slip Op 04977, Second Dept 8-17-22

Practice Point: Here the marijuana and gravity-knife convictions were vacated in the interest of justice because the offenses had been decriminalized. The gravity-knife conviction was vacated even though the offense was not decriminalized at the time of its commission.

 

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A JURY NOTE WHICH REQUIRES NO ACTION BY THE COURT NEED NOT BE SHARED WITH DEFENSE COUNSEL (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined there was no need for the judge to notify defense counsel of a jury note which did not require any action by the court, Also, jury notes requesting exhibits did not need to be shared with counsel because counsel agreed at the outset of deliberations that the jury could request exhibits:

In the defendant’s view, the Supreme Court’s failure to read note 6 into the record constituted a mode of proceedings error. We disagree.

Note 6 did not request “further instruction or information with respect to the law, [or] with respect to the content or substance of any trial evidence” (CPL 310.30). Nor did it indicate that the jury was deadlocked or struggling to reach a verdict on any or all of the counts submitted to it, or otherwise apprise the court of a significant development in the deliberations … . All the note conveyed was that the jury was continuing to deliberate on all of the charges, and that they were nearing a verdict on the first count in the defendant’s case, as well as the two counts in the codefendant’s case. Plainly, then, there was no action for the Supreme Court to take, and, concomitantly, no input or participation from defense counsel was necessary to ensure that the defendant’s rights were “adequately protect[ed]” … . Note 6 was, in short, not a substantive communication from the jury. People v Edwards, 2022 NY Slip Op 04818, Second Dept 8-3-22

Practice Point: A jury note which does not require action by the judge need not be shared with defense counsel. Here the note informed the judge that they were near a verdict on certain counts.

 

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