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THE SENTENCE FOR MANSLAUGHTER SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN BASED UPON THE INTENT TO KILL WHICH IS NOT AN ELEMENT OF THE CRIME; THE SENTENCES FOR MANSLAUGHTER AND POSSESSION OF A WEAPON SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN IMPOSED CONSECUTIVELY; REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, remanding the matter for resentencing, determined the judge improperly based the sentence for manslaughter on the belief defendant intended to kill the victim. Intent to kill is not an element of manslaughter. It is an element of murder second degree. Defendant was acquitted of murder second degree. In addition, the judge should not have imposed consecutive sentences for manslaughter and possession of a weapon:

… [T]he court improperly based the sentence on the manslaughter conviction on its stated belief that defendant intended to kill the victim. Intent to kill is an element of murder in the second degree, of which defendant was acquitted, and not manslaughter in the first degree, of which defendant was convicted … . Because the sentence was based on conduct of which defendant had been acquitted, resentencing on the manslaughter conviction is required … . Although defendant’s challenge to this sentence is unpreserved, we reach it in the exercise of our interest of justice power … .

… [t]he imposition of consecutive sentences on the conviction for manslaughter and the conviction for simple possession of a weapon under Penal Law § 265.03(3) was improper. The sentences should have run concurrently, since the People did not demonstrate that the act of weapon possession was separate from the act of manslaughter … . There was no evidence presented at the trial establishing that defendant possessed the firearm before shooting the victim  … . People v Anonymous, 2023 NY Slip Op 05990, First Dept 11-21-23

Practice Point: The defendant was acquitted of second degree murder and convicted of manslaughter. The judge erroneously sentence defendant based on the belief defendant intended to kill the victim. But intent to kill is not an element of manslaughter. Resentencing was required.

Practice Point: There was no evidence the possession of a weapon by defendant was separate from the conduct underlying the manslaughter conviction. Therefore the sentences should not have been imposed consecutively.

 

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DEFENDANT’S CHALLENGES TO THE INVENTORY SEARCH AND THE ADMISSION OF CERTAIN TESTIMONY HE DEEMED PREJUDICIAL, AND HIS CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE TO NEW YORK’S WEAPONS-POSSESSION REGIME REJECTED (CT APP). ​

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Halligan, over a dissent, rejected defendant’s challenges to the inventory search and to purported prejudicial testimony allowed by the trial judge. Defendant’s constitutional challenge to New York’s weapons-possession regime rejected as unpreserved:

Defendant Carlos L. David challenges his conviction for two counts of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (see Penal Law § 265.03 [3]) on several grounds. He argues that the police recovered the handguns that gave rise to his conviction during an invalid inventory search, and that Supreme Court improperly allowed prejudicial testimony at his trial. Neither argument provides grounds for reversal. David additionally argues that Penal Law § 265.03 (3) is facially unconstitutional under New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v Bruen, 142 S Ct 2111 (2022). This argument is unpreserved, and for the reasons set forth below, we do not reach it. People v David, 2023 NY Slip Op 05970, CtApp 11-21-23

Practice Point: The constitutional challenges to New York’s weapons-possession regime rejected as unpreserved.

 

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DEFENDANT’S CHALLENGES TO RESTRICTIONS ON VOIR DIRE, HIS ARGUMENT A PRISON SENTENCE DURING COVID VIOLATED THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT, AND HIS CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO NEW YORK’S WEAPONS-POSSESSION REGIME, REJECTED; THE DISSENT ARGUED THE PRESUMPTION OF AN INTENT TO USE AN UNLICENSED WEAPON IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND VOIR DIRE QUESTIONS RELATED TO GUN CONTROL AND JUSTIFICATION SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Halligan, over an extensive dissent, rejected defendant’s challenges to his conviction:

Defendant George Garcia argues that his conviction for two counts of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree … should be reversed because the trial court impermissibly limited questioning during voir dire. He also argues that his sentence—the statutory minimum term of 3½ years in prison—violates the Eighth Amendment given his risk of serious illness or death from COVID-19, and that the Appellate Division had the power to reduce his sentence below the statutory minimum. None of these contentions provides grounds for reversal. Garcia further argues for the first time in this Court that the statutory provisions under which he was convicted are unconstitutional in light of New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v Bruen, 142 S Ct 2111 (2022). These arguments are unpreserved, and for the reasons set forth in People v Cabrera (decided today), we do not reach them. * * *

From the dissent:

The presumption in Penal Law § 265.03 (1) (b) that unlicensed possession is evidence of intent to use the weapon unlawfully is unconstitutional and therefore defendant’s conviction on this count should be reversed and the count dismissed. Additionally, the court abused its discretion and prejudiced defendant by limiting defendant’s voir dire questions related to gun control and justification. Therefore, his conviction on the single other remaining charge should be reversed and a new trial ordered. People v Garcia, 2023 NY Slip Op 05969, CtApp 11-21-23

Practice Point: Constitutional arguments attacking New York’s weapons-possession regime were not preserved.

Practice Point: The Eighth Amendment challenge to a prison sentence during COVID rejected.

Practice Point: Challenges to restrictions on voir dire about gun control and justification rejected.

 

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UNWARNED STATEMENTS MADE WHEN THE POLICE APPROACHED DEFENDANT GETTING OUT OF HIS CAR AND HANDCUFFED HIM SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED; THE SUBSEQUENT CONSENT TO SEARCH, MADE AFTER MIRANDA WARNINGS, WAS NOT TAINTED BY THE UNWARNED CUSTODIAL QUESTIONING; DEFENDANT’S CONSTITUIONAL CHALLENGES TO NEW YORK’S GUN LICENSING REGIME WERE NOT PRESERVED (CT APP). ​

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Halligan, over a two-judge dissent, reversing (modifying) the Appellate Division, determined defendant was in custody when the police approached him after defendant got out of his car and handcuffed him. Statements made at that time about the presence of weapons in the car should have been suppressed. However defendant’s subsequent consent to search the car, given an hour and a half after the officers initially approached defendant and after the Miranda warnings, was not tainted by the initial custodial questioning. The dissent argued the consent to search was in fact tainted. The court rejected defendant’s constitutional arguments attacking the validity of New York’s gun-licensing regime as unpreserved:

Preservation of a constitutional challenge, in particular, “ensures that the drastic step of striking duly enacted legislation will be taken not in a vacuum but only after the lower courts have had an opportunity to address the issue and the unconstitutionality of the challenged provision has been established beyond a reasonable doubt” … . For these reasons, we have carefully guarded the preservation rule against “erosion” … . * * *

… [A] reasonable innocent person in Cabrera’s {defendant’s] position could not have felt free to leave when three law enforcement officers approached him at night, on a residential street, and handcuffed him before questioning him about the firearms in his vehicle. The level to which the police restricted Cabrera’s movement was of a degree associated with a formal arrest. Nor does the record suggest that the defendant had any reason to believe that he would be handcuffed only for a limited duration. … [T]here is no record support for the conclusion of the courts below that Cabrera was not in custody for Miranda purposes. On appeal, the People have conceded that the defendant was subject to interrogation and that they did not argue below that the public safety exception applied. Custodial status is therefore dispositive; in the absence of warnings, his statements should have been suppressed. People v Cabrera, 2023 NY Slip Op 05968, CtApp 11-21-23

Practice Point: Statements made after police approached defendant on the street and handcuffed him should have been suppressed, but the unwarned custodial questioning did not taint a subsequent consent to search given after Miranda warnings.

Practice Point: Constitutional arguments, here attacking New York’s gun-licensing regime, must be preserved before the Court of Appeals can address them.

 

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FAILURE TO RULE ON A MOTION FOR A TRIAL ORDER OF DISMISSAL IS NOT A DENIAL OF THE MOTION; THE MATTER MUST BE SENT BACK FOR A RULING (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, sending the matter back for a ruling, noted that the failure to rule on motion for a trial order of dismissal is not a denial which can be raised on appeal.  People v Keane, 2023 NY Slip Op 05915, Fourth Dept 11-17-23

 

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THE TOWN ZONING BOARD SHOULD NOT HAVE INTERPRETED THE TERM “SINGLE FAMILY DWELLINGS” SUCH THAT SHORT TERM RENTALS WERE PROHIBITED BECAUSE TRANSIENT TENANTS DO NOT MEET THE DEFINITION OF “FAMILY” (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court and annulling the zoning board’s (ZBA’s) ruling, determined the term “single family dwellings” should not have been interpreted to prohibit short-term rentals. The ZBA reasoned that short-term, transient tenants do not meet the definition of “family:”

“[L]ocal zoning boards have broad discretion, and [a] determination of a zoning board should be sustained on judicial review if it has a rational basis and is supported by substantial evidence” … . So long as a zoning board’s interpretation of its governing code “is neither ‘irrational, unreasonable nor inconsistent with the governing [code],’ it will be upheld” … . However, where, as here, the issue presented “is one of pure legal interpretation of [the code’s] terms, deference to the zoning board is not required” … . * * *

… [U]nder the Zoning Ordinance, the transient or temporary nature of a group is but one factor that “may” be considered to determine whether four or more persons who are not related by blood, marriage, or adoption are the “functional equivalent” of a “traditional family.” … [I]f petitioner rented her property to three or fewer persons, or to four or more persons who are related by blood, marriage, or adoption, those groups would meet the Zoning Ordinance’s definition of a “[f]amily” without regard to whether their tenancy was transient or temporary in nature. The ZBA’s determination to the contrary lacked a rational basis … , and the court erred in sustaining the determination. Matter of Friedman v Town of Dunkirk, 2023 NY Slip Op 05912, Fourth Dept 11-17-23

Practice Point: Where a zoning board purports to make a pure legal interpretation of terms used in the zoning code, a court’s deference to the zoning board is not required.

Practice Point: Here the zoning board’s interpretation of the term “family” within the phrase “single family residences” to exclude short-term rentals to transient tenants was irrational.

 

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MOTHER’S PETITION FOR SOLE CUSTODY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED UPON FATHER’S FAILURE TO APPEAR; FATHER’S ATTORNEY EXPLAINED FATHER’S ABSENCE AND REQUESTED AN INQUEST; AN APPEAL FROM AN ORDER ENTERED UPON A PARTY’S DEFAULT BRINGS UP FOR REVIEW ONLY THE CONTESTED MATTERS BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined mother’s petition for sole custody should not have been granted upon father’s failure to appear. Father’s attorney explained father’s absence and asked that the matter be set down for an inquest. The Second Department noted that, upon appeal from an order made upon a party’s default, only the contested matters before the trial court can be heard:

“A custody determination, whether made upon the default of a party or not, must always have a sound and substantial basis in the record” … . Generally, the court’s determination should be made only after “a full and plenary hearing and inquiry” … or, where a party failed to appear, after an inquest … .

Here, the Family Court granted the mother’s petition to modify the prior order, upon the father’s default, without receiving any testimony or other evidence, despite the fact that the father’s attorney proffered a reasonable explanation for the father’s absence and that the father did not have a history of missing court dates … . Under the circumstances, the court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying the application of the father’s attorney to set the matter down for an inquest … .  Matter of Otero v Walker, 2023 NY Slip Op 05607, Second Dept 11-8-23

Practice Point: Generally where a party defaults in a custody matter, an inquest should be held before any ruling.

Practice Point: Upon appeal from an order made upon a party’s default, only the contested matters before the trial court come up for review.

 

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ON APPEAL DEFENDANT CHALLENGED THE VOLUNTARINESS OF HIS GUILTY PLEA BUT THE PLEA MINUTES WERE NOT AVAILABLE; DEFENDANT DID NOT SHOW THAT RECONSTRUCTION OF THE 2013 PLEA PROCEEDING WAS IMPOSSIBLE; THEREFORE THE MATTER WAS REMITTED FOR A RECONSTRUCTION HEARING (SECOND DEPT),

The Third Department determined a reconstruction hearing, rather than reversal of defendant’s conviction by guilty plea in 2013, was required before the appellate court could rule on the voluntariness of the plea. The transcript of the plea proceeding was not available:

Defendant also challenges the voluntariness of his guilty plea, which he claims was defective in several respects. However, the transcript of the … plea proceeding is unavailable, and we are therefore unable to determine whether defendant’s plea was knowing and voluntary. Without the plea minutes, we are also unable to conclusively determine whether defendant preserved his claim with an appropriate postallocution motion or “whether his claim falls within the narrow exception to the preservation doctrine”. We therefore hold the case in abeyance, reserve decision, and remit the matter to County Court for a reconstruction hearing with respect to the plea proceedings … . Contrary to his claim, defendant is not entitled to summary reversal as he has not demonstrated that reconstruction is impossible … . People v Cox, 2023 NY Slip Op 05552, Second Dept 11-1-23

Practice Point: Here defendant pled guilty in 2013 and challenged the voluntariness of his plea on appeal. The minutes of the plea proceeding were not available and defendant argued he was entitled to reversal. Because the defendant did not show that reconstruction of the plea proceeding was impossible, the matter was remitted for a reconstruction hearing.

 

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AFTER FINDING SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE BY DEFENDANTS, THE JUDGE FASHIONED AN ADVERSE INFERENCE JURY INSTRUCTION TO BE GIVEN AT TRIAL; THE CHARGE IMPROPERLY REQUIRED, RATHER THAN PERMITTED, THE JURY TO FIND SPOLIATION; THE JUDGE WAS ORDERED TO REVISE THE CHARGE (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the adverse inference jury charge was inappropriate because it requires, rather than permits, the jury to draw an adverse inference from the spoliation of evidence. The appeal was from the judge’s ruling on plaintiff’s motion for an adverse inference charge. The judge was directed to fashion a new adverse inference charge:

Upon its determination that defendants’ spoliation of evidence amounted to gross negligence, the court directed that the jury be instructed that “had the evidence been preserved the evidence would have been against defendants’ position that [defendant] Marom and/or his workers did not cut down branches or trees or inserted rotting garbage in the barriers on [plaintiff’s] property.” This adverse inference charge is inappropriate because it “requires, rather than permits, the jury to draw an adverse inference” … . In any event, because the conflicting testimony in the record raises questions concerning the existence of the purportedly spoliated evidence, the issues of whether any spoliation had occurred and whether any adverse inference is warranted should be presented to the jury in the first instance … . Children’s Magical Garden, Inc. v Marom, 2023 NY Slip Op 05464, First Dept 10-31-23

Practice Point: With respect to spoliation of evidence, an adverse inference charge should permit, rather than require, the jury to find spoliation.

Practice Point: It appears that this appeal was brought before trial to address the erroneous adverse inference charge fashioned by the judge. The appeal successfully required the revision of the erroneous charge before the jury heard it.

 

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THE QUESTIONNAIRES FILLED OUT BY APPLICANTS FOR CITY JUDICIAL POSITIONS WERE PROTECTED FROM THE FOIL REQUEST BY THE PERSONAL PRIVACY EXEMPTION; AN APPELLATE COURT DOES NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO CONSIDER AN UNPRESERVED ISSUE IN AN ARTICLE 78 PROCEEDING (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined judicial questionnaires filled out by applicants for city judicial positions were protected from the FOIL request by the personal privacy exemption. The First Department noted that it did not have the authority in an article 78 proceeding to consider an unpreserved issue in the interest of justice:

… [T]he City properly applied the personal privacy exemption (Public Officer’s Law § 89[2][a]) to deny petitioner’s FOIL request in its entirety, as the City sustained its burden of establishing that disclosure of the records sought in this case — “all Uniform Judicial Questionnaires for applicants . . . under review by the Mayor’s Advisory Committee on the Judiciary” as of October 21, 2020 — would “constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy” (Public Officers Law § 87[2][b] …). Disclosure of the questionnaire, which states the word “CONFIDENTIAL” in upper-case letters and boldface near the top of its first page, would undermine the assurances of confidentiality provided to candidates for judicial office … .

Moreover, disclosure would create a chilling effect, thus potentially diminishing the candor of applicants and causing others to decide against applying for judicial positions. The questionnaire contains extensive questions touching on highly personal and sensitive matters, such as personal relationships, reasons for leaving jobs, reasons for periods of unemployment, substance abuse, arrests, criminal convictions, testifying as a witness in criminal cases, and reasons for anticipated difficulty in handling the stresses involved in being a judge, as well as a catch-all question at the end of the questionnaire asking for any other information, specifically including unfavorable information, that could bear on the evaluation of the judicial candidate. In addition to the particular contents of the questionnaires, disclosure of the very fact that certain candidates submitted the questionnaires could harm those persons’ reputations by revealing that they sought to leave their jobs, or were unsuccessful in their applications for judicial positions … . Matter of Fisher v City of N.Y. Off. of the Mayor, 2023 NY Slip Op 05468, First Dept 10-31-23

Practice Point: Here the questionnaires filled out by applicants for city judicial positions were protected from the FOIL request by the personal privacy exemption.

Practice Point: In an article 78 proceeding an appellate court cannot consider an unpreserved issue in the interest of justice.

 

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