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Entries by Bruce Freeman

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PLAINTIFF COULD BE HELD IN CONTEMPT FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH A COURT ORDER TO POST A BOND, EVEN THOUGH THE BOND REQUIREMENT WAS LATER ELIMINATED ON APPEAL, HOWEVER PLAINTIFF PRESENTED CREDIBLE EVIDENCE HE WAS UNABLE TO OBTAIN THE BOND WHICH IS A DEFENSE TO CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CONTEMPT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that plaintiff father was required to comply with a court order to post a bond even though the order was modified on appeal to eliminate the bond requirement. However plaintiff provided credible evidence he was not able to obtain the required bond, which is a defense to the contempt […]

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PLAINTIFF RETAILER ATTEMPTED TO RECOVER PAYMENTS MADE TO A BANK STEMMING FROM THE HACKING OF MASTERCARD CREDIT CARD INFORMATION FROM THE RETAILER’S ACCOUNTS UNDER EQUITABLE SUBROGATION, MONEY HAD AND RECEIVED AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT THEORIES, COMPLAINT PROPERLY DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department determined MasterCard’s motion to dismiss this equitable subrogation and unjust enrichment action by plaintiff (Jetro) stemming from the the alleged hacking or attempted hacking of MasterCard credit card information from Jetro computer systems was properly granted. MasterCard has a contract with PNC, a bank, which provided that MasterCard could recover assessments against […]

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QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANT WAS NEGLIGENT IN THIS REAR END COLLISION CASE, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment in this rear-end collision case should not have been granted. Plaintiff submitted defendant’s deposition in which defendant testified plaintiff stopped abruptly for no apparent reason: A rear-end collision with a stopped or stopping vehicle establishes a prima facie case of negligence on the […]

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QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE ABSENCE OF A SECOND HANDRAIL, A VIOLATION OF THE BUILDING CODE, WAS A PROXIMATE CAUSE OF PLAINTIFF’S SLIP AND FALL IN A STAIRWAY, DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined there was a question of fact whether the absence of a handrail on a stairway, a violation of the Building Code, was a proximate cause of plaintiff’s slip and fall. Therefore defendants motion for summary judgment should not have been granted: … [P]laintiff argued … that the absence […]

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CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF LIQUID ON THE FLOOR IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE NOT DEMONSTRATED WITH RESPECT TO THE BUILDING OWNER, NO ESPINAL FACTORS ALLEGED WITH RESPECT TO THE CLEANING SERVICE, DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the defendants’ motions for summary judgment in this slip and fall case should have been granted. Constructive notice of the liquid on the floor was not demonstrated with respect to the building owner (Berkshire) and none of the Espinal factors were alleged with respect to the cleaning service […]

SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE GRANTED PLAINTIFF PERMISSION TO SERVE AN AMENDED COMPLAINT AND SIMULTANEOUSLY AWARDED PLAINTIFF SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON SEVERAL CAUSES OF ACTION, THE AMENDED COMPLAINT SUPERSEDES THE ORIGINAL AND MUST BE ANSWERED BEFORE FURTHER PROCEEDINGS (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined Supreme Court should not have simultaneously granted plaintiff permission to amend the complaint and granted summary judgment on several causes of action. An amended complaint supersedes the original complaint and should be answered before any further proceedings: … Supreme Court should not have awarded the plaintiff summary judgment […]

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DAMAGES FOR FRAUD SHOULD HAVE BEEN BASED UPON OUT OF POCKET LOSS, NOT PROFITS THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN EARNED ABSENT THE FRAUD, EVEN THOUGH RESPONDENT WAS ENTITLED TO MORE DAMAGES UNDER THE OUT OF POCKET RULE, NO RELIEF CAN BE AFFORDED TO THE NONAPPEALING PARTY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined that the trial court used the wrong criteria for assessing damages for fraud, but further determined the damages should be reduced and, even though the respondent was entitled to a higher damages award, no relief could be afforded to a nonappealing party. Damages for fraud must be based on out-of-pocket losses, not […]

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MOTION TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION FOR FAILURE TO TIMELY SERVE WITHIN THE 120 DAY WINDOW SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, CRITERIA FOR ALLOWING LATE SERVICE EXPLAINED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendants’ motion pursuant to CPLR 306-b to dismiss the complaint in this foreclosure action (with regard to defendant Joseph) because it was not served within 120 days of filing should have been granted. The court explained the criteria for allowing extra time to serve: As relevant here, CPLR […]

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STATEMENTS IN A NEWSPAPER ARTICLE ABOUT PLAINTIFF’S DIVORCE WHICH REFERRED TO PLAINTIFF’S CONVICTION STEMMING FROM A BOILER ROOM PENNY STOCK OPERATION WERE ABSOLUTELY PRIVILEGED UNDER THE CIVIL RIGHTS LAW (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined the defamation action against a newspaper was properly dismissed. A newspaper article about plaintiff’s divorce referred to plaintiff’s criminal conviction stemming from a “boiler room” penny-stock operation and stating that plaintiff “tried to use his old tricks to swindle his estranged wife out of millions of dollars…”. Plaintiff stock operation inspired […]

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