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Entries by Bruce Freeman

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WHERE A DEFENDANT IS AN “ELIGIBLE YOUTH,” THE SENTENCING COURT MUST CONSIDER YOUTHFUL OFFENDER TREATMENT; IF THE RECORD IS SILENT ON THE ISSUE, THE SENTENCE WILL BE VACATED AND THE MATTER REMITTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, vacating defendant’s sentence and remitting the matter, determined defendant was an “eligible youth” but the record was silent about whether the court considered youthful offender treatment: “Criminal Procedure Law § 720.20(1) requires a court to make a youthful offender determination in every case where the defendant is eligible, even where the defendant […]

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A DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO BE PERSONALLY PRESENT FOR SENTENCING EXTENDS TO RESENTENCING AND TO THE AMENDMENT OF A SENTENCE (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court and remitting the matter, determined defendant had a right to be present at his resentencing: The defendant was not present at the resentencing proceeding in June 2023 because he was incarcerated in Florida. The Supreme Court nonetheless resentenced the defendant to the same sentence as had been previously imposed. […]

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RESTRAINING A PERSON FOR A FEW SECONDS WHILE ATTEMPTING TO PULL THAT PERSON INTO A VEHICLE DOES NOT SATISFY THE CRITERIA FOR KIDNAPPING (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Family Court in this juvenile delinquency proceeding, determined the evidence did not support the kidnapping charge: … Family Court’s determination that the appellant committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crime of kidnapping in the second degree was against the weight of the evidence. “A […]

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WHERE THE ESSENCE OF A MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION IS THE FAILURE TO PROPERLY DIAGNOSE PLAINTIFF’S CONDITION, THE CRITERIA FOR A “LACK OF INFORMED CONSENT” CAUSE OF ACTION ARE NOT MET (SECOOND DEPT

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court in this medical malpractice action, determined the “lack of informed consent” cause of action should have been dismissed because the gravamen of the the allegations was the failure to evaluate the seriousness of plaintiff’s condition: To establish a cause of action to recover damages for medical malpractice based […]

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RECORDING THE DEED IS NOT NECESSARY FOR THE TRANSFER OF TITLE; THEREFORE A FORGED SIGNATURE ON THE TRANSFER DOCUMENT DOES NOT RENDER THE DEED VOID (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department noted that a forged signature on the transfer document necessary to record a deed would not render the deed void: “A deed that is forged is a legal nullity, which conveys nothing, and a mortgage based on such a deed is likewise invalid” … . A deed that is “acquired by fraudulent […]

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BOTH INSURANCE POLICIES WERE DEEMED TO COVER SEXUAL HARASSMENT CLAIMS AGAINST AN EMPLOYER AND ITS EMPLOYEE BROUGHT BY SEVERAL CO-EMPLOYEES SPANNING YEARS AND DIFFERENT WORKPLACES; THE POLICY LANGUAGE DID NOT RESTRICT THE COVERAGE FOR “RELATED” OR “INTERRELATED ACTS” TO A SINGLE PLAINTIFF (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Singh, determined the language of the two insurance policies covered sexual harassment claims against an employer and its employee brought by several co-employees spanning years and different workplaces. The case is fact-specific and turned on the contractual definition of “related wrongful acts” in […]

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DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO VACATE THE 1994 ATTEMPTED MURDER CONVICTION ON “ACTUAL INNOCENCE” GROUNDS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SUMMARILY DENIED; DEFENDANT SUBMITTED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO WARRANT A HEARING, I.E., EVIDENCE A DECEASED COOPERATING WITNESS HAD CONFESSED TO BEING THE SHOOTER (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined the evidence of “actual innocence” submitted in defendant’s motion to vacate the 1994 attempted murder conviction warranted a hearing: The court … should have ordered a hearing on defendant’s actual innocence claim … . Defendant presented evidence, supported by the statements of the Assistant United States Attorneys who handled the cooperator, […]

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ALTHOUGH THE JUDGE APPOINTED STANDBY COUNSEL AS DEFENDANT REQUESTED, THE JUDGE DID NOT CONDUCT AN ADEQUATE INQUIRY TO ENSURE DEFENDANT UNDERSTOOD THE RISKS OF REPRESENTING HIMSELF; GUILTY PLEA VACATED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, vacating defendant’s guilty plea, determined the judge did not conduct an adequate inquiry before granting defendant’s request to represent himself. The appointment of standby counsel is not a substitute for an inquiry to make sure a defendant understands the risks: … [D]efendant repeatedly conditioned his request on proceeding pro se “with standby […]

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THE ONLY EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT’S PARTICIPATION IN THE SHOOTING WAS DNA ON A HANDGUN; THE EVIDENCE OF MURDER AND POSSESSION OF A WEAPON WAS LEGALLY INSUFFICIENT; THE VERDICT WAS AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE; INDICTMENT DISMISSED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, vacating defendant’s murder conviction and dismissing the indictment, determined the circumstantial evidence was legally insufficient and the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. The only evidence against the defendant was DNA on a handgun. No evidence placed defendant at the scene of the shooting or in the vehicle apparently used […]

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THERE WERE QUESTIONS OF FACT OF WHETHER THE FOUR-YEAR-OLD PLAINTIFF UNDERSTOOD AND ASSUMED THE RISKS OF PARTICIPATING IN A YOUTH HOCKEY CLINIC; THE COACH, WHILE SKATING BACKWARDS, FELL ON THE CHILD; DEFENDANT’S CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant town (Oyster Bay), which offered a youth hockey clinic, was not entitled to summary judgment on the ground the four-year-old plaintiff assumed the risk of injury. Defendant coach (Marlow) was skating backwards when he fell on the four-year-old plaintiff: The [assumption of the risk] “doctrine applies where […]

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