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Entries by Bruce Freeman

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EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CASES ARE REVIEWED UNDER “NOTICE PLEADING” STANDARDS WHERE ONLY FAIR NOTICE OF THE NATURE OF THE CLAIM AND ITS GROUNDS ARE REQUIRED; HERE PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATION THAT A SUPERVISOR STATED SHE RECEIVED HIGH EVALUATIONS BECAUSE SHE ENGAGED IN SEXUAL RELATIONS WITH HER SUPERIORS WAS SUFFICIENT TO SURVIVE DISMISSAL (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that a single remark by a supervisor may sustain an employment discrimination or hostile work environment claim. The court noted the more lenient pleading requirement for employment discrimination actions: … [E]mployment discrimination cases are generally reviewed under notice pleading standards … . Indeed, a “plaintiff alleging employment discrimination […]

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ALTHOUGH A JURY TRIAL WAIVER IN A CONTRACT IS NOT ENFORCED WHERE A COUNTERCLAIM ASSERTS FRAUDULENT INDUCEMENT, HERE THE FRAUDULENT-INDUCEMENT COUNTERCLAIM SOUGHT RESCISSION OF THE CONTRACT, EQUITABLE RELIEF WHICH MUST BE TRIED BY THE COURT; THE MOTION TO STRIKE DEFENDANTS’ JURY-TRIAL DEMAND SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing the denial of plaintiff’s motion to strike defendants’ jury demand, determined defendants were not entitled to a jury trial on the counterclaims. Defendants asserted fraudulent inducement and sought rescission of the contract in addition to seeking damages as an alternative. Because rescission in equitable relief, a jury trial is not available: […]

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EVEN WHERE EVIDENCE OF AN UNCHARGED CRIME IS “INEXTRICABLY INTERTWINED” WITH THE NARRATIVE OF CHARGED CRIME, IT MAY BE INADMISSIBLE BECAUSE ITS PREJUDICIAL EFFECT OUTWEIGHS ITS PROBATIVE VALUE; HERE THE COMPLAINANT’S TESTIMONY ABOUT A PRIOR UNCHARGED SEX ACT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED (FIRST DEPT).

The Frist Department, reversing the conviction in this sexual abuse prosecution, determined the evidence of a prior sex act with the complainant was much more prejudicial than probative. The evidence was therefore inadmissible: Prior to the commencement of jury selection for the second trial, the People made a Molineux application to allow the complainant to […]

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DEFENSE COUNSEL LEFT A PROFFER SESSION MIDWAY THROUGH THE PROCEEDINGS; DURING THE PROFFER SESSION DEFENDANT MADE AN INCRIMINATORY STATEMENT WHICH WAS USED TO IMPEACH HIS CREDIBILITY AT TRIAL; DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO VACATE HIS CONVICTION ON INEFFECTIVE-ASSISTANCE GROUNDS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant’s motion to vacate his conviction based upon ineffective assistance of counsel should have been granted. Defense counsel left a proffer session midway through the proceedings: Supreme Court erred in finding that defendant failed to satisfy his burden of establishing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when […]

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THE COURT OF APPEALS CANNOT REVIEW AN APPELLATE DIVISION’S WEIGHT-OF-THE-EVIDENCE RULING ABSENT THE APPELLATE DIVISION’S MANIFEST FAILURE TO CONSIDER THE ISSUE OR THE APPLICATION OF AN INCORRECT LEGAL STANDARD; NOT THE CASE HERE (CT APP). ​

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Troutman, affirming the Appellate Division, determined the record did not support the appellant’s argument that the Appellate Division failed to consider the weight-of-the-evidence or did so using an incorrect legal principle. Therefore the Court of Appeals could not review the weight of the evidence: On […]

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THE JUDGE FAILED TO COMMUNICATE WITH THE OHIO COURT AFTER LEARNING OF ANOTHER CUSTODY-RELATED PROCEEDING THERE AND FAILED TO CONSIDER WHETHER IT SHOULD EXERCISE TEMPORARY EMERGENCY JURISDICTION BASED ON ALLEGATIONS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN MOTHER’S PETITION (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Family Court, determined the judge committed reversible error by failing to communicate with the Ohio court after learning of another custody-related proceeding there. In addition, the judge failed to consider whether to exercise temporary emergency jurisdiction to protect mother and child. Mother’s custody petition alleged serious domestic violence: Family Court failed […]

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THE FOIL REQUEST FOR THE NAMES AND EMAIL ADDRESSES OF THE SUBSCRIBERS TO A TOWN’S ONLINE ALERT SYSTEM SHOULD HAVE BEEN DENIED AS AN UNWARRANTED INVASION OF PRIVACY (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, reversing the Appellate Division, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Rivera, determined the disclosure of the names and email addresses of subscribers to the Town’s online news alert system would constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy: The Town uses a notification system called “E-news” to send subscribers email alerts regarding news, […]

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THE JUDGE COMMITTED A MODE OF PROCEEDINGS ERROR BY FAILING TO ACCURATELY AND FULLY INFORM THE DEFENDANT OF THE CONTENTS OF A JURY NOTE (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Wilson, determined the judge committed a mode of proceedings error by not fully explaining the contents of a jury note. The defendant testified that he was sitting in his parked car, with the engine running for heat, listening to music because he didn’t want to […]

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THE INVOLVEMENT OF A VAN IN A ROAD RAGE SHOOTING THREE WEEKS BEFORE THE TRAFFIC STOP AND AN INCIDENT WHERE A TRAFFIC AGENT WAS NEARLY STRUCK BY THE VAN 24 HOURS BEFORE THE STOP PROVIDED “REASONABLE SUSPICION” THAT THE DRIVER OF THE VAN AT THE TIME OF THE STOP WAS THE DRIVER DURING THE ROAD-RAGE AND TRAFFIC-AGENT INCIDENTS (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Halligan, determined “reasonable suspicion” supported a traffic stop of a van which had been involved in a road rage shooting three weeks before and had sped away from a traffic agent, nearly striking the agent, 24 hours before the stop. The driver who was involved […]

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IF A DEFENDANT’S GUILTY PLEA CASTS DOUBT UPON DEFENDANT’S GUILT OR THE VOLUNTARINESS OF THE PLEA, THE JUDGE MUST “INQUIRE FURTHER;” THIS ISSUE CAN BE APPEALED IN THE ABSENCE OF PRESERVATION BY A MOTION TO WITHDRAW THE PLEA OR VACATE THE CONVICTION; HOWEVER THIS EXCEPTION TO THE PRESERVATION REQUIREMENT DOES NOT APPLY IF A DEFENDANT FIRST RAISES A QUESTION ABOUT HIS GUILT AT SENTENCING (CT APP). ​

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Troutman, over a two-judge concurring opinion, resolving a split of Appellate Division authority, determined that a defendant who pleads guilty but subsequently claims innocence at sentencing must, to preserve the issue for appeal, make a motion to withdraw his plea of vacate his judgment of […]

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