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PLAINTIFF, WHO HAD PASSED OUT AT A CONCERT, REFUSED ASSISTANCE IN WALKING TO THE BACK OF THE THEATER SO THE EMERGENCY MEDICAL TECHNICIAN COULD CHECK HIS BLOOD PRESSURE AND PULSE; WHEN HE ATTEMPTED TO WALK TO THE BACK OF THE THEATER HE PASSED OUT AGAIN AND FELL, HIS FACE HITTING THE FLOOR; THE DEFENDANTS DID NOT HAVE A DUTY TO ASSIST PLAINTIFF AFTER HE REFUSED THEIR HELP AND THEIR MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the causes of action against the security company, Beacon, and the EMT provider, Transcare, should have been dismissed. Plaintiff passed out in his seat at a concert and defendants responded. The medical technician found that plaintiff was fully conscious and alert. Because the music was so loud the […]

A HEAVY STONE SLAB SLIPPED OUT OF A SLING AS IT WAS BEING HOISTED AND FELL ON PLAINTIFF; PLAINTIFF DID NOT HAVE TO SHOW THE EQUIPMENT WAS DEFECTIVE AND DID NOT HAVE TO SHOW HE AND A CO-WORKER WERE NOT NEGLIGENT; PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on his Labor Law 240 (1) claim in this falling object case should have been granted. A heavy stone slab which was being hoisted slipped out of a sling and fell on plaintiff. Plaintiff did not have to show the equipment was defective […]

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PLAINTIFF ALLEGED A VALID NEGLIGENCE CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANT INSURANCE BROKER FOR FAILURE TO NOTIFY THE EXCESS CARRIER OF A CLAIM AGAINST PLAINTIFF; IT WAS ALLEGED THAT PLAINTIFF ROUTINELY NOTIFIED DEFENDANT BROKER OF ANY CLAIMS AND DEFENDANT BROKER ROUTINELY NOTIFIED THE AFFECTED CARRIERS, GIVING RISE TO A DUTY TO DO SO (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the complaint against the insurance broker, T & H, stated a cause of action in negligence based on T & H’s failure to notify the excess carrier of its potential exposure to a claim: Under ordinary circumstances, it is understood that “insurance brokers have a common-law duty to […]

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A FINDING DEFENDANT SUFFERS FROM A MENTAL ABNORMALITY CANNOT BE BASED SOLELY ON A FINDING DEFENDANT SUFFERS FROM ANTI-SOCIAL PERSONALITY DISORDER (ASPD); REFUSAL OF DEFENDANT’S REQUEST FOR A JURY INSTRUCTION TO THAT EFFECT WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR; DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE VERDICT ADJUDICATING HIM A SEX OFFENDER REQUIRING CIVIL MANAGEMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the jury in this Mental Hygiene Law sex-offender civil-commitment trial should have been instructed that the anti-social personality disorder (ASPD) diagnosis cannot, standing alone, support a finding defendant has a mental abnormality as defined in the Mental Hygiene Law. The fact that the Pattern Jury Instructions do not […]

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THE TRAFFIC STOP WAS BASED ON A COMPUTER-GENERATED “SIMILARITY HIT;” AT THE SUPPRESSION HEARING THE PEOPLE DID NOT MEET THEIR BURDEN OF GOING FORWARD BECAUSE THE BASIS OF THE “SIMILARITY HIT” WAS NOT DEMONSTRATED; THIS PRESENTED A QUESTION OF LAW REVIEWABLE BY THE COURT OF APPEALS (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Feinman, reversing the Appellate Division, determined the People did not meet their burden of going forward at the suppression hearing because they did not make a minimum showing of reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop. Whether the People meet that burden has been deemed a […]

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EVEN IF THE OFFICER WERE WRONG ABOUT WHETHER A NON-FUNCTIONING CENTER BRAKE LIGHT VIOLATES THE VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW, THE OFFICER’S INTERPRETATION OF THE LAW WAS OBJECTIVELY REASONABLE; THEREFORE THE STOP WAS VALID AND THE SUPPRESSION MOTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, reversing the Appellate Term, over a concurring memorandum, a concurring opinion, and two dissenting opinions, determined the police officer who stopped defendant reasonably believed the non-functioning center brake light violated the Vehicle and Traffic Law. Therefore the stop was valid and the DWI evidence should not have been suppressed. The Vehicle […]

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PROOF OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE NOTICE REQUIREMENTS OF RPAPL 1304 WAS INSUFFICIENT; THE BANK’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the Bank’s motion for summary judgment in this foreclosure action should not have been granted. The proof of the notice required by RPAPL 1304 was insufficient: Notice must be sent both “by registered or certified mail and also by first-class mail” (RPAPL 1304[2]). “‘[P]roper service of RPAPL 1304 […]

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QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER THE CONTRACTOR HIRED TO WORK ON A SIDEWALK WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAKING SURE PEDESTRIANS HAD A SAFE PASSAGEWAY; PLAINTIFFS WERE STRUCK BY A CAR WHEN THEY WALKED IN THE PUBLIC STREET BECAUSE THE SIDEWALK WAS BLOCKED; THE THEORY OF LIABILITY APPEARS TO STEM FROM THE CONTRACTOR’S ALLEGED CREATION OF A DANGEROUS CONDITION UPON A PUBLIC STREET OR SIDEWALK (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined there were questions of fact about whether defendant contractor, CSI, was responsible for providing a safe alternative passageway while construction work blocked the sidewalk. Plaintiffs were struck by a car when they attempted to walk in the street. The CSI was hired by the general construction manager hired by […]

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PLAINTIFF’S KNEE BECAME STIFF AND IMPOSSIBLE TO BEND AFTER SURGERY; PLAINTIFF SUED THE DEFENDANT DOCTOR WHO TREATED HER AT THE POST-SURGERY REHABILITATION CENTER; THE DEFENDANT DOCTOR, WHO DID NOT PERFORM THE SURGERY, HAD CERTIFIED AND RECOMMENDED PHYSICAL AND OCCUPATIONAL THERAPY FOR PLAINTIFF AT THE REHABILITATION CENTER; BECAUSE THE DEFENDANT DOCTOR PLAYED NO ROLE IN THE THERAPY ITSELF, HIS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant doctor’s (Raber’s) motion for summary judgment should have been granted. Dr. Raber treated plaintiff at a nursing and rehabilitation center, Glen Cove, where, after knee surgery, plaintiff voluntarily transferred. After about a month at Glen Cove, plaintiff was seen by her orthopedic surgeon who found plaintiff’s knee had […]

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