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Entries by Bruce Freeman

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THE ESTATE OF THE HUSBAND WAS NOT A NECESSARY PARTY IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION; THE PROPERTY PASSED TO THE WIFE UPON THE HUSBAND’S DEATH (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the husband’s (Thomas’s) estate was not a necessary party in this foreclosure action because the property passed to the decedent’s wife (Judy) upon Thomas’s death: … [T]he plaintiff’s submission of the deed and Thomas’s death certificate established prima facie that Thomas and Judy had held the subject property […]

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HOMEOWNERS’ ASSOCIATIONS IN THE HAMPTONS DEMONSTRATED OWNERSHIP OF THE BEACH TO THE HIGH WATER MARK; THE TOWNS THEREFORE COULD NOT ISSUE PERMITS ALLOWING VEHICLES ON THE BEACH (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court in this action to quiet title pursuant to RPAPL Article 15,, determined the homeowners’ associations demonstrated ownership of about 4000 feet of beach in the Hamptons on Long Island. Therefore the towns could not allow vehicles to park on the beach: In an action pursuant to RPAPL article 15, […]

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DEFENDANT AND HIS SON WERE REPRESENTED BY THE SAME ATTORNEY; DEFENDANT ALLEGEDLY PLED GUILTY TO ATTEMPTED ASSAULT BECAUSE HE WAS TOLD HIS SON WOULD DO JAIL TIME IF DEFENDANT DID NOT ENTER THE PLEA; BECAUSE OF THE ATTORNEY’S CONFLICT OF INTEREST, DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing County Court, determined defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea should have been granted. Defendant was called to the scene of his son’s (Nicholas’s) arrest for DWI. Defendant was charged with assaulting one of the officer’s at the scene. Both defendant and his son were represented by attorney Ozman. Although defendant […]

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DEFENDANT TOOK THE GUN FROM THE VICTIM AND KILLED THE VICTIM IN SELF DEFENSE; THE DEFENDANT’S BRIEF, TEMPORARY POSSESSION OF THE WEAPON AFTER THE SHOOTING DID NOT CONSTITUTE CRIMINAL POSSESSION OF A WEAPON SECOND DEGREE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing defendant’s possession of a weapon conviction, over a dissent, determined the temporary possession of the gun did not meet the criteria for criminal possession of a weapon second degree. The gun belonged to the victim. During a struggle with the defendant the gun fell to the ground. Both the defendant and […]

THE GRAND LARCENY TOOK PLACE IN NEW JERSEY AND IS NOT A “RESULT OFFENSE;” THEREFORE NEW YORK DID NOT HAVE TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing County Court, determined the grand larceny indictment should have been dismissed because New York did not have territorial jurisdiction. The grand larceny took place in New Jersey and is not a “result offense:” Where New York’s territorial jurisdiction over an offense is in dispute, the People bear the burden of establishing […]

NYC FIRE DEPARTMENT DOCUMENTS COULD HAVE BEEN REDACTED TO PROTECT PRIVACY AND WERE NOT INTER-AGENCY MATERIALS; THEREFORE THE FOIL REQUESTS FOR THESE DOCUMENTS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined certain FOIL requests for NYC Fire Department (FDNY) should have been granted: … [T]he FDNY withheld the records identified in the petitioner’s FOIL request numbers 4, 9, and 16, which sought records concerning requests for religious accommodations and the determinations made thereon, and accommodations from the FDNY dress […]

RATHER THAN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT, SUPREME COURT SHOULD HAVE ORDERED THE NECESSARY PARTIES SUMMONED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the motion to dismiss should not have been granted on the ground plaintiffs failed to join necessary parties. The court should have ordered the parties summoned: Necessary parties are those “who ought to be parties if complete relief is to be accorded between the persons who are parties […]

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A PLENARY ACTION WAS REQUIRED TO SET ASIDE THE STIPULATION OF SETTLEMENT WHICH WAS INCORPORATED BUT NOT MERGED INTO THE JUDGMENT OF DIVORCE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined Supreme Court did not have the authority to declare certain portions of the stipulation of settlement invalid. A plenary action was necessary: … [A] plenary action was required to seek to set aside the stipulation of settlement, which was incorporated but not merged into the judgment of divorce […]

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EVICTION WAS TOO SEVERE A PENALTY FOR PETITIONER’S MOMENTARY LOSS OF CONTROL DURING WHICH SHE STRUCK A NYC HOUSING AUTHORITY EMPLOYEE (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the NYC Housing Authority (NYCHA) should not have penalized petitioner for striking a NYCHA employee by evicting her: The termination of the tenancy of petitioner, a now 64-year-old woman who has been a NYCHA tenant without incident for more than 40 years and will be evicted from her […]

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