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BICYCLIST STRUCK BY SIDE OF TRUCK MAKING A LEFT TURN ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT, PLAINTIFF NEED NOT SHOW FREEDOM FROM COMPARATIVE FAULT (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined plaintiff bicyclist was entitled to summary judgment in this traffic accident case. Plaintiff was struck by the passenger side door of a truck making a left turn:

While traveling on a bicycle, plaintiff collided with the passenger side of defendants’ northbound truck as it turned left into plaintiff’s path at the intersection of St. Nicholas Avenue and 155th Street in New York County. Plaintiff submitted evidence showing that defendant was negligent by making a left turn without ensuring that it was safe to do so (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1141…).

Moreover, plaintiff is not required to demonstrate the absence of his own comparative fault to obtain partial summary judgment on defendant’s liability … .  Bermeo v Time Warner Entertainment Co., 2018 NY Slip Op 03927, First Dept 6-5-18

​NEGLIGENCE (TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, BICYCLIST STRUCK BY SIDE OF TRUCK MAKING A LEFT TURN ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT, PLAINTIFF NEED NOT SHOW FREEDOM FROM COMPARATIVE FAULT (FIRST DEPT))/TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS (BICYCLIST STRUCK BY SIDE OF TRUCK MAKING A LEFT TURN ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT, PLAINTIFF NEED NOT SHOW FREEDOM FROM COMPARATIVE FAULT (FIRST DEPT))/BICYCLISTS (TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, BICYCLIST STRUCK BY SIDE OF TRUCK MAKING A LEFT TURN ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT, PLAINTIFF NEED NOT SHOW FREEDOM FROM COMPARATIVE FAULT (FIRST DEPT))/COMPARATIVE FAULT  (TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, BICYCLIST STRUCK BY SIDE OF TRUCK MAKING A LEFT TURN ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT, PLAINTIFF NEED NOT SHOW FREEDOM FROM COMPARATIVE FAULT (FIRST DEPT))

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INJURY FROM SIX INCH FALL OF 500 POUND BEAM COVERED BY LABOR LAW 240 (1), POWER TO STOP WORK FOR SAFETY REASONS INSUFFICIENT BASIS FOR LIABILITY UNDER LABOR LAW 200 (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, modifying Supreme Court, determined plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment on his Labor Law 240 (1) cause of action and the construction manager (Structure Tone), although it had the power to stop work for safety reasons, was entitled to summary judgment on the Labor Law 200 cause of action:

Plaintiff was injured … when he and three other workers were attempting to load a 500-pound steel I-beam into an internal freight elevator at a construction site in order to transport it from the 18th floor to the ground floor. The elevator was four feet wide and five feet deep, with an eight foot ceiling, while the beam was 12 feet long. The workers opened a hatch on top of the elevator, and were attempting to stand the beam on its end, with the high end extending through the open hatch, when the beam fell down half a foot onto plaintiff’s shoulder. …

Plaintiff submitted evidence showing that he was engaged in an activity covered by the statute, that defendants failed to provide an adequate safety device to protect him, and that such violation was a proximate cause of the accident … . The half foot that the steel I-beam dropped onto plaintiff’s shoulder is not de minimis, given the I-beam’s weight and since the hazard was one directly flowing from the application of the force of gravity to a person … . * * *

Although Structure Tone had the authority to stop work at the construction site for safety reasons, this is “insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact with respect to whether [Structure Tone] exercised the requisite degree of supervision and control over the work being performed to sustain a claim under Labor Law § 200 or for common-law negligence” … . Villanueva v 114 Fifth Ave. Assoc. LLC, 2018 NY Slip Op 03928, First Dept 6-5-18

​LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (INJURY FROM SIX INCH FALL OF 500 POUND BEAM COVERED BY LABOR LAW 240 (1), POWER TO STOP WORK FOR SAFETY REASONS INSUFFICIENT BASIS FOR LIABILITY UNDER LABOR LAW 200 (FIRST DEPT))

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HUSBAND ENTITLED TO REVOKE HIS CONSENT TO USE OF A FROZEN EMBRYO, EMBRYO AWARDED TO HUSBAND FOR SOLE PURPOSE OF DISPOSAL IN THIS DIVORCE ACTION (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff husband, in this divorce action, was entitled to the frozen embryo for the sole purpose of disposal:

… [Husband and wife] engaged the services of [New Hope Fertility Center, NHF] in the hope of conceiving a child via implantation of cryopreserved embryos in the wife’s uterus. … [T]hey signed an agreement with NHF entitled “Consent for the Cryopreservation of Human Embryo(s)” (the Consent Agreement). …

Paragraph 7 of the Consent Agreement is entitled “Voluntary Participation” and provides “I/We may withdraw my/our consent and discontinue participation at any time . . . .” Paragraph 16, entitled “Authorization,” provides, “This consent will remain in effect until such time as I notify NHF in writing of my/our wish to revoke such consent.” …

In Kass v Kass (91 NY2d 554 [1998]), the Court of Appeals determined that agreements between donors participating in IVF [in vitro fertilization] should be enforced pursuant to general rules of contract interpretation. … The Consent Agreement specifies that participation in the procedures involving cryopreservation of embryos is voluntary and that either party may withdraw consent at any time. … The provisions permitting either party to revoke consent are not limited to cryopreservation, but permit either party to withdraw consent to participation in the entire IVF process. … [T]he Consent Agreement does not indicate that the court has plenary authority to determine ownership of the embryo in the event of divorce … . Finkelstein v Finkelstein, 2018 NY Slip Op 03926, First Dept 6-5-18

​FAMILY LAW (IN VITRO FERTILIZATION, FROZEN EMBRYO, HUSBAND ENTITLED TO REVOKE HIS CONSENT TO USE OF A FROZEN EMBRYO, EMBRYO AWARDED TO HUSBAND FOR SOLE PURPOSE OF DISPOSAL IN THIS DIVORCE ACTION (FIRST DEPT))/CONTRACT LAW (FAMILY LAW, IN VITRO FERTILIZATION, FROZEN EMBRYO, HUSBAND ENTITLED TO REVOKE HIS CONSENT TO USE OF A FROZEN EMBRYO, EMBRYO AWARDED TO HUSBAND FOR SOLE PURPOSE OF DISPOSAL IN THIS DIVORCE ACTION (FIRST DEPT))/IN VITRO FERTILIZATION (FAMILY LAW. FROZEN EMBRYO, HUSBAND ENTITLED TO REVOKE HIS CONSENT TO USE OF A FROZEN EMBRYO, EMBRYO AWARDED TO HUSBAND FOR SOLE PURPOSE OF DISPOSAL IN THIS DIVORCE ACTION (FIRST DEPT))/EMBRYO, FROZEN (FAMILY LAW, IN VITRO FERTILIZATION, HUSBAND ENTITLED TO REVOKE HIS CONSENT TO USE OF A FROZEN EMBRYO, EMBRYO AWARDED TO HUSBAND FOR SOLE PURPOSE OF DISPOSAL IN THIS DIVORCE ACTION (FIRST DEPT))

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PLAINTIFF’S FAILURE TO SATISFY A NON-MATERIAL CONDITION PRECEDENT DID NOT JUSTIFY THE AWARD OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO DEFENDANT (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the failure to satisfy a non-material condition precedent, which did not prejudice the defendant, did not justify summary judgment in favor of defendant:

It is undisputed that plaintiff failed to satisfy a condition precedent to recovering disputed costs for extra work on which defendant forced price reductions. Although plaintiff gave detailed written statements contesting defendant’s determinations of the fair and reasonable value of the extra work pursuant to section 8.01(B), it failed to give verified statements pursuant to section 11.03(A) of the contractual General Conditions.

Nevertheless, we conclude that plaintiff should be excused from the non-occurrence of that condition, because otherwise it would suffer a disproportionate forfeiture, and the occurrence of the condition was not a material part of the agreed exchange … . Defendant does not argue that plaintiff failed to document the costs of the claimed extra work, to provide timely notice of its claims for extra work, or to provide timely notice of its objections to defendant’s rejections of and price reductions on the claimed extra work. Nor does it contend other than in conclusory terms that plaintiff’s failure to submit verified written statements was prejudicial to it. Moreover, the cases on which defendant relies did not consider whether the failure to strictly comply with a condition precedent should be excused to avoid a disproportionate forfeiture under the circumstances of a case such as this, where the noncompliance is de minimis and defendant has shown no prejudice whatsoever … . Danco Elec. Contrs., Inc. v Dormitory Auth. of the State of N.Y., 2018 NY Slip Op 03935, First Dept 6-5-18

​CONTRACT LAW (PLAINTIFF’S FAILURE TO SATISFY A NON-MATERIAL CONDITION PRECEDENT DID NOT JUSTIFY THE AWARD OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO DEFENDANT (FIRST DEPT))/CONDITION PRECEDENT (CONTRACT LAW, PLAINTIFF’S FAILURE TO SATISFY A NON-MATERIAL CONDITION PRECEDENT DID NOT JUSTIFY THE AWARD OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO DEFENDANT (FIRST DEPT))

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CLAIMANT WAS ASSAULTED ON TRANSIT AUTHORITY PROPERTY WHILE WEARING HER TRANSIT AUTHORITY UNIFORM, ALTHOUGH SHE WAS COMMUTING TO WORK, HER COMMUTE HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH HER WORK, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BENEFITS PROPERLY DENIED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined claimant, who worked for the NYC Transit Authority, was not entitled to Workers’ Compensation benefits for injuries suffered in an assault on the way to work. Although she was wearing her uniform and was on Transit Authority property when she was assaulted, her commute to her work station was deemed to have no connection to her work for the Transit Authority:

“An injury is only compensable under the Workers’ Compensation Law if it arose out of and in the course of a worker’s employment and, in general, injuries sustained in the course of travel to and from the place of employment do not come within the statute” … . Injuries incurred while commuting to work are generally not covered because “the risks inherent in traveling to and from work relate to the employment only in the most marginal sense” … . There are recognized exceptions but, here, substantial evidence supports the Board’s determination that claimant’s injuries sustained while commuting are not compensable, as none of the relevant exceptions to this rule applies … .

According to claimant, the assault occurred almost an hour before the start of her shift, on her way to work, before signing in at her assigned station as required at the start of her shift. The employer neither encouraged nor benefitted from her commute route. Thus, at the time of the assault, claimant was not yet on duty or at her assigned station and was not performing any duties of her employment or undertaking an errand for the employer … . Although claimant had opted to wear her work uniform on her commute, she was not required to do so, nor was she required to use public transportation to get to work. The employer provided a transportation pass, but there was no evidence that it was contractually bound to provide free transit, and the use of the pass did not make claimant’s commute a part of her employment… . Rather, at the relevant time, claimant was a commuter using the subways like the general public and, while she was on property owned and operated by the employer, substantial evidence supports the Board’s determination that this did not establish a casual connection between her employment and the assault … . Matter of Rodriguez v New York City Tr. Auth., 2018 NY Slip Op 03887, Third Dept 5-31-18

​WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW (CLAIMANT WAS ASSAULTED ON TRANSIT AUTHORITY PROPERTY WHILE WEARING HER TRANSIT AUTHORITY UNIFORM, ALTHOUGH SHE WAS COMMUTING TO WORK, HER COMMUTE HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH HER WORK, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BENEFITS PROPERLY DENIED (THIRD DEPT))/COMMUTE (WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW, CLAIMANT WAS ASSAULTED ON TRANSIT AUTHORITY PROPERTY WHILE WEARING HER TRANSIT AUTHORITY UNIFORM, ALTHOUGH SHE WAS COMMUTING TO WORK, HER COMMUTE HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH HER WORK, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BENEFITS PROPERLY DENIED (THIRD DEPT))

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UNDER PENNSYLVANIA LAW PLAINTIFF ASSUMED THE RISK OF INJURY ON A TRAMPOLINE WITH MULTIPLE JUMPERS (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined defendant’s motion for summary judgment in this Pennsylvania trampoline injury case was properly granted. Under Pennsylvania law, plaintiff assumed the risk of injury on the trampoline:

The record demonstrates conclusively that defendant cannot be held liable under Pennsylvania law for the injuries that plaintiff alleges she sustained while a guest at his Pennsylvania home when another guest jumping on a trampoline lost control and fell on her. A property owner may be held liable to “social guests,” as opposed to “business visitors” … , only if he “knows or has reason to know of the [dangerous] condition and should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm” and “fails to exercise reasonable care to make the condition safe, or to warn the licensees of the condition and the risk involved,” and the guests “do not know or have reason to know of the condition and the risk involved” … . Plaintiff’s deposition testimony and affidavit demonstrate that she understood the risks involved in using the trampoline, including the risks of using it with multiple jumpers. Ramos v Hamelburg, 2018 NY Slip Op 03913, First Dept 5-31-18

​NEGLIGENCE (ASSUMPTION OF THE RISK, UNDER PENNSYLVANIA LAW PLAINTIFF ASSUMED THE RISK OF INJURY ON A TRAMPOLINE WITH MULTIPLE JUMPERS (FIRST DEPT))/ASSUMPTION OF THE RISK (TRAMPOLINES, UNDER PENNSYLVANIA LAW PLAINTIFF ASSUMED THE RISK OF INJURY ON A TRAMPOLINE WITH MULTIPLE JUMPERS (FIRST DEPT))/TRAMPOLINES (ASSUMPTION OF THE RISK, UNDER PENNSYLVANIA LAW PLAINTIFF ASSUMED THE RISK OF INJURY ON A TRAMPOLINE WITH MULTIPLE JUMPERS (FIRST DEPT))

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PLAINTIFF ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION, UNTIMELY CROSS MOTION CAN BE CONSIDERED ONLY TO THE EXTENT THE ISSUES RAISED ARE THE SAME AS THE ISSUES RAISED IN PLAINTIFF’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment on his Labor Law 240 (1) cause of action. Plaintiff was standing on a scaffold when a masonry stone fell on the scaffold and the planks collapsed. The court noted that defendants’ untimely cross motion for summary judgment was properly considered only to the extent the issues were identical to the issues raised in plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment:

This Court may consider the merits of defendants’ untimely cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint to the extent it sought dismissal of the Labor Law § 240(1) claim, because it is based on the same issues raised in plaintiff’s motion … However, the remainder of the motion, seeking dismissal of Labor Law § 241(6), Labor Law § 200 and common law negligence claims cannot be considered because it does not address issues nearly identical to those raised in the timely motion and defendants did not demonstrate good cause for the delay … .

Plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment as to liability on his Labor Law § 240(1) claim. He established, prima facie, that he was engaged in an activity falling within the statute, and that defendants failed to provide him proper safety equipment, either in the form of a scaffold that could withstand the force of a falling masonry stone … , or any other appropriate safety device. Plaintiff further demonstrated that defendants’ failure to provide an appropriate safety device was the proximate cause of the accident, and defendants have failed to raise an issue of fact. Jarama v 902 Liberty Ave. Hous. Dev. Fund Corp., 2018 NY Slip Op 03897, First Dept 5-31-18

​LABOR LAW -CONSTRUCTION LAW (PLAINTIFF ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION, UNTIMELY CROSS MOTION CAN BE CONSIDERED ONLY TO THE EXTENT THE ISSUES RAISED ARE THE SAME AS THE ISSUES RAISED IN PLAINTIFF’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION (FIRST DEPT))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (SUMMARY JUDGMENT, UNTIMELY CROSS MOTION CAN BE CONSIDERED ONLY TO THE EXTENT THE ISSUES RAISED ARE THE SAME AS THE ISSUES RAISED IN PLAINTIFF’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION (FIRST DEPT))/SUMMARY JUDGMENT ( UNTIMELY CROSS MOTION CAN BE CONSIDERED ONLY TO THE EXTENT THE ISSUES RAISED ARE THE SAME AS THE ISSUES RAISED IN PLAINTIFF’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION (FIRST DEPT))

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PLAINTIFF ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION, PLAINTIFF FELL THROUGH AN OPENING COVERED BY A PIECE OF PARTICLE BOARD (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on his Labor Law 240 (1) cause of action should have been granted. Plaintiff fell through an opening covered by a piece of particle board:

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There is no issue of fact as to whether it was foreseeable that the particle board covering an escape hatch on top of the elevator car where plaintiff was required to work would collapse when traversed by him … . It is not dispositive that the escape hatch covering was not intended to serve as a safety device protecting workers from elevation-related risks. Rather, since plaintiff’s work exposed him to such risks, he was required to be provided with adequate safety devices in compliance with Labor Law § 240(1) … . Giancola v Yale Club of N.Y. City, 2018 NY Slip Op 03901, First Dept 5-31-18

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LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (PLAINTIFF ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION, PLAINTIFF FELL THROUGH AN OPENING COVERED BY A PIECE OF PARTICLE BOARD (FIRST DEPT))

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CORRECTION LAW DOES NOT REQUIRE SEX OFFENDER TO DISCLOSE HIS OR HER USE OF FACEBOOK, IT IS ENOUGH THAT THE SEX OFFENDER DISCLOSE EMAIL ADDRESSES AND SCREEN NAMES (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Pritzker, reversing defendant’s conviction, determined the indictment charging defendant sex offender with a violation of the Correction Law for failing to disclose his use of Facebook was jurisdictionally defective. Disclosure of his Facebook use is not required by the Correction Law and, therefore, failure to disclose is not a crime. Defendant had complied with the requirements of Correction Law §§ 168-f (4) and 168-a (18) by disclosing his email address and screen names:

… [W]e conclude that the social media website or application — be it Facebook or any other social networking website or application — does not constitute a “designation used for the purposes of chat, instant messaging, social networking or other similar [I]nternet communication” (Correction Law § 168-a [18]). An Internet identifier is not the social networking website or application itself; rather, it is how someone identifies himself or herself when accessing a social networking account, whether it be with an electronic mail address or some other name or title, such as a screen name or user name. Defendant’s failure to disclose his use of Facebook is not a crime, rendering the indictment jurisdictionally defective … . People v Ellis, 2018 NY Slip Op 03873, Third Dept 5-31-18

CRIMINAL LAW (SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION ACT (SORA), CORRECTION LAW DOES NOT REQUIRE SEX OFFENDER TO DISCLOSE HIS OR HER USE OF FACEBOOK, IT IS ENOUGH THAT THE SEX OFFENDER DISCLOSE EMAIL ADDRESSES AND SCREEN NAMES (THIRD DEPT))/SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION ACT (SORA) (CORRECTION LAW DOES NOT REQUIRE SEX OFFENDER TO DISCLOSE HIS OR HER USE OF FACEBOOK, IT IS ENOUGH THAT THE SEX OFFENDER DISCLOSE EMAIL ADDRESSES AND SCREEN NAMES (THIRD DEPT))/CORRECTION LAW  (SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION ACT (SORA), CORRECTION LAW DOES NOT REQUIRE SEX OFFENDER TO DISCLOSE HIS OR HER USE OF FACEBOOK, IT IS ENOUGH THAT THE SEX OFFENDER DISCLOSE EMAIL ADDRESSES AND SCREEN NAMES (THIRD DEPT))/FACEBOOK (SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION ACT (SORA), CORRECTION LAW DOES NOT REQUIRE SEX OFFENDER TO DISCLOSE HIS OR HER USE OF FACEBOOK, IT IS ENOUGH THAT THE SEX OFFENDER DISCLOSE EMAIL ADDRESSES AND SCREEN NAMES (THIRD DEPT))/SOCIAL NETWORKING (SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION ACT (SORA), CORRECTION LAW DOES NOT REQUIRE SEX OFFENDER TO DISCLOSE HIS OR HER USE OF FACEBOOK, IT IS ENOUGH THAT THE SEX OFFENDER DISCLOSE EMAIL ADDRESSES AND SCREEN NAMES (THIRD DEPT))

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PAROLE BOARD PROPERLY CONSIDERED PETITIONER’S YOUTH AT THE TIME HE COMMITTED SERIOUS CRIMES, PAROLE PROPERLY DENIED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, in a comprehensive decision, determined the parole board had properly considered petitioner’s youth at the time of the commission of the crimes and had properly denied parole. Petitioner was a few weeks from his eighteenth birthday when he committed the crimes and was 44 years old at his 2016 appearance before the parole board:

… [R]eview of the record leads us to the conclusion that the Board did consider the necessary statutory factors, as well as petitioner’s youth at the time of the crimes. Specifically, at the hearing, the Board explored the facts underlying petitioner’s crimes in detail and his insight into his crimes, as well as his release plans, prior criminal record, educational and institutional achievements, lengthy prison disciplinary record, sentencing minutes, COMPAS Risk and Needs Assessment instrument and numerous letters of support. Also, the hearing transcript demonstrates that petitioner’s youth at the time that he committed the crimes was adequately explored. * * *

A thorough review of the Board’s decision evinces that all necessary statutory factors, as well as petitioner’s youth and its attendant characteristics, were considered. Although the Board assigned greater weight to the seriousness of petitioner’s crimes, his history of violence, his failure to complete recommended programming and his lengthy prison disciplinary record, we find that the ultimate determination is rational and, therefore, we will not disturb it … . Matter of Allen v Stanford, 2018 NY Slip Op 03888, Third Dept 5-31-18

CRIMINAL LAW (PAROLE BOARD PROPERLY CONSIDERED PETITIONER’S YOUTH AT THE TIME HE COMMITTED SERIOUS CRIMES, PAROLE PROPERLY DENIED (THIRD DEPT))/PAROLE (PAROLE BOARD PROPERLY CONSIDERED PETITIONER’S YOUTH AT THE TIME HE COMMITTED SERIOUS CRIMES, PAROLE PROPERLY DENIED (THIRD DEPT))

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