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SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE DISMISSED THE FORECLOSURE COMPLAINT IN THE ABSENCE OF THE PRECONDITIONS REQUIRED BY CPLR 3216 (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that the court was without power to dismiss for neglect to prosecute because the preconditions in CPLR 3216 were not met. Supreme Court dismissed the complaint in this foreclosure action, finding that plaintiff bank had not complied with an oral directive issued at a status conference:

Following settlement conferences held pursuant to CPLR 3408, the action was released from the foreclosure settlement conference part without any resolution. In an order … (hereinafter the dismissal order), the Supreme Court directed dismissal of the action on the ground that the plaintiff failed to comply with an oral directive issued at a status conference … , to resume prosecution of the action. …[T]he plaintiff moved to vacate the dismissal order and to restore the action to the calendar. [T]he Supreme Court … denied the plaintiff’s motion. …

“A court may not dismiss an action based on neglect to prosecute unless the statutory preconditions to dismissal, as articulated in CPLR 3216, are met” … . Specifically, issue must have been joined, at least one year must have elapsed since joinder of issue, the defendant or the court must have served on the plaintiff a written demand to serve and file a note of issue within 90 days, and the plaintiff must have failed to serve and file a note of issue within the 90-day period (see CPLR 3216[b] …). Here, the Supreme Court was without power to direct dismissal of the action on the ground of failure to prosecute because the plaintiff was not served with a written demand to serve and file a note of issue within 90 days … . Citimortgage, Inc. v Ferrari, 2019 NY Slip Op 02847, Second Dept 4-17-19

 

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THE PROOF REQUIRED FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, FOR BOTH PLAINTIFFS AND DEFENDANTS, IN FORECLOSURE ACTIONS, ON WHETHER THERE HAS BEEN COMPLIANCE WITH THE RPAPL 1304 NOTICE PROVISIONS, EXPLAINED; PRIOR DECISIONS HOLDING THAT A DEFENDANT’S DENIAL OF RECEIPT OF NOTICE WAS SUFFICIENT SHOULD NO LONGER BE FOLLOWED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Iannacci, reversing Supreme Court, fleshed out the proof required for summary judgment, for both plaintiffs and defendants, with respect to compliance with the notice requirements of Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL). The court noted that prior decisions holding that a defendant’s denial of receipt of notice was enough should no longer be followed:

Here, the plaintiff failed to establish, prima facie, that it complied with RPAPL 1304. Although Crampton [assistant vice president of Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC] stated in her affidavit that the RPAPL 1304 notices were mailed by certified and regular first-class mail, and attached copies of those notices, the plaintiff failed to attach, as exhibits to the motion, any documents to prove that the mailing actually happened. There is no copy of any United States Post Office document indicating that the notice was sent by registered or certified mail as required by the statute. Further, while Crampton attested that she was in receipt of the prior loan servicer’s records, that she had personal knowledge of the business practices for mailing of notices by Wilmington, and that the 90-day notice was sent in compliance with RPAPL 1304, she did not attest to knowledge of the mailing practices of Bank of America, the entity that allegedly sent the notices to the defendant. * * *

Even in the face of a plaintiff’s failure to establish, prima facie, that a notice was properly mailed on a motion for summary judgment on the complaint, this Court has held that a defendant still has to meet its burden, on a cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, of establishing that the condition precedent was not fulfilled … . Here, the defendant provided no particulars supporting her claim that Bank of America never mailed the RPAPL 1304 notice to her last known address. The defendant only stated that she never received the notice. The defendant did not confirm that she still lived at the address shown on the notice on the date it was purportedly mailed, that she had been receiving other mail at that address, and that she was never contacted by the United States Post Office about mail for which she was required to sign. We hold that a simple denial of receipt, without more, is insufficient to establish prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the complaint for failure to comply with the requirements of RPAPL 1304. To the extent that our prior decisions are to the contrary, they should no longer be followed. Citibank, N.A. v Conti-Scheurer, 2019 NY Slip Op 02846, Second Dept 4-17-19

 

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TENANT DID NOT DEMONSTRATE IT DID NOT EXACERBATE THE CONDITION OF THE SIDEWALK BY ITS EFFORTS TO REMOVE SNOW AND THE PROPERTY OWNER AND MANAGER DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THEY DID NOT HAVE CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF THE CONDITION, DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the tenant, the landowner and the property manager did not submit sufficient evidence to warrant summary judgment in their favor in this sidewalk slip and fall case. The tenant (PCM) did not demonstrate that it did not exacerbate the danger by its snow removal and the property owner (2248) and the property manager (Solil) did not demonstrate they did not have constructive notice of the condition. [Defendants moving for summary judgment must address every theory of liability in their papers or the motion will be denied without the need to consider the opposing papers]:

PCM failed to eliminate triable issues of fact as to whether it undertook snow and ice removal efforts on the date of the accident to clear the area of the sidewalk where Pilar allegedly slipped and fell, or whether any snow and ice removal efforts undertaken by it created or exacerbated the icy condition that allegedly caused Pilar to fall … . …

2248, as owner of the premises abutting the sidewalk where Pilar allegedly slipped and fell, and Solil, its managing agent, failed to establish, prima facie, that they lacked constructive notice of the alleged icy condition. Section 7-210 of the Administrative Code imposes a nondelegable duty on 2248 to maintain the sidewalk abutting the premises, where Pilar allegedly fell … . In a premises liability case, a defendant real property owner or a party in possession or control of real property who moves for summary judgment has the initial burden of making a prima facie showing that it neither created the allegedly dangerous or defective condition nor had actual or constructive notice of its existence … . Here, neither 2248 nor Solil established when the subject portion of the sidewalk was last inspected relative to when Pilar slipped and fell … . Accordingly, 2248 and Solil failed to establish, prima facie, that they did not have constructive notice of the condition that allegedly caused the plaintiff decedent’s fall … . Branciforte v 2248 Thirty First St., LLC, 2019 NY Slip Op 02845, Second Dept 4-17-19

 

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UNSIGNED DEPOSITIONS WERE ADMISSIBLE AND EVIDENCE SUBMITTED IN REPLY SHOULD HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, although affirming the denial of defendants’ motion for summary judgment in this slip and fall case on other grounds, noted that the depositions were admissible and evidence submitted in reply should have been considered:

Although the plaintiff’s deposition transcript, which the defendants submitted in support of their motion, was unsigned, it was nonetheless admissible as the plaintiff raised no objection to its submission or accuracy and, in fact, requested that the Supreme Court “incorporate” his transcript into his opposition … . Regarding the deposition transcript of the decedent’s niece, which the defendants also submitted in support of their motion, the defendants demonstrated that they had submitted the unsigned transcript to the decedent’s niece for review, but that she failed to sign and return it within 60 days. Thus, the niece’s deposition transcript could have been used by the defendants as fully as though signed (see CPLR 3116[a] …). Furthermore, even though the evidence demonstrating the defendants’ compliance with CPLR 3116(a) was submitted by the defendants in reply, the court should have considered it, because it was in direct response to allegations raised for the first time in the plaintiff’s opposition papers … . The unsigned deposition transcript of the defendants’ property manager was admissible under CPLR 3116(a) since it was submitted by the defendants themselves and thus adopted as accurate … . Baptiste v Ditmas Park, LLC, 2019 NY Slip Op 02844, Second Dept 4-17-19

 

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DENIAL OF DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO VACATE HIS DEFAULT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION DID NOT PRECLUDE DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS BASED UPON PLAINTIFF BANK’S FAILURE TO MOVE FOR A JUDGMENT OF FORECLOSURE WITHIN ONE YEAR AS REQUIRED BY KINGS COUNTY LOCAL RULE 8 (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the denial defendant’s motion to vacate a default judgment did not preclude defendant’s motion to dismiss the foreclosure action based upon plaintiff bank’s failure to comply with Rule 8 (Kings County Supreme Court Uniform Civil Rules) :

In August 2013, the plaintiff commenced this mortgage foreclosure action against the defendant Andy McAlpin (hereinafter the defendant) and others. The defendant did not answer or appear in the action, and in February 2014, the plaintiff moved, inter alia, for leave to enter a default judgment and for an order of reference. In an order dated October 24, 2014, the Supreme Court granted the plaintiff’s motion. The plaintiff did not move for a judgment of foreclosure and sale, and in May 2016, the defendant moved, inter alia, pursuant to CPLR 5015(a)(4) to vacate the order of reference and to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against him on the ground that he had not been served with the summons and complaint, for leave to serve a late answer, and to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff failed to comply with Part F, rule 8, of the Kings County Supreme Court Uniform Civil Term Rules (hereinafter Rule 8). Rule 8 requires a plaintiff in a foreclosure action to file a motion for a judgment of foreclosure within one year of entry of the order of reference. …

Contrary to the Supreme Court’s determination, the defendant was not precluded from seeking relief under Rule 8 by the denial of that branch of his motion which was to vacate his default … . Bank of Am., N.A. v McAlpin,b2019 NY Slip Op 02843, Second Dept 4-17-19

 

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JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE, SUA SPONTE, DISMISSED THE ACTION FOR NEGLECT TO PROSECUTE WITHOUT MEETING THE REQUIREMENTS OF CPLR 3216 (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the judge should not have, sua sponte, dismissed the case for neglect to prosecute in the absence of the prerequisites mandated by CPLR 3216:

… [T]he court directed the plaintiff to file a note of issue within 90 days, and warned that “[i]f plaintiff does not file a note of issue within 90 days this action is deemed dismissed without further order of the Court (CPLR 3216).” Five months later … the court, sua sponte, in effect, directed dismissal of the action … . …

“A court may not dismiss an action based on neglect to prosecute unless the statutory preconditions to dismissal, as articulated in CPLR 3216, are met” … . “Effective January 1, 2015, the Legislature amended, in several significant respects, the statutory preconditions to dismissal under CPLR 3216” … . One such precondition is that where, as here, a written demand to resume prosecution of the action is made by the court, “the demand shall set forth the specific conduct constituting the neglect, which conduct shall demonstrate a general pattern of delay in proceeding with the litigation” … . Here, the certification order did not set forth any specific conduct constituting neglect by the plaintiff … .

Additionally, before issuing an order dismissing the case based on a party’s failure to comply with the 90-day demand, the court must give the party notice so that the party has an opportunity to “show a justifiable excuse for the delay and a good and meritorious cause of action” … . Here, the Supreme Court failed to give the parties notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to, in effect, directing dismissal of the action pursuant to CPLR 3216 … . Sadowski v W. David Harmon, 2019 NY Slip Op 02918, Second Dept 4-17-19

 

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DEFENDANT STORE DEMONSTRATED IT TOOK ADEQUATE MEASURES TO MOP UP RAIN WATER IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE, THE STORE’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined defendant store (7-Eleven) demonstrated it took adequate steps to mop up rain water in this slip and fall case. The store’s motion for summary judgment was properly granted:

It is undisputed that it was raining heavily on the day of the accident, and that there was a mat just inside the front entrance to the store. Said testified at her deposition that store employees were instructed to dry-mop water from the floor every 15 minutes on days it rained. At his deposition, one of Said’s employees testified that he mopped water as soon as he observed it. Moreover, the evidence submitted in support of the defendants’ motion demonstrated that the employee dry-mopped the area of the floor where the injured plaintiff allegedly fell approximately 15 to 25 minutes before the accident occurred. Said and her employees were not obligated to provide a constant remedy to the problem of water being tracked into the store in rainy weather … . Further, the defendants demonstrated that the condition was not present for a sufficient period of time for the defendants to have discovered and remedied it, and therefore, there is no basis for an inference that they had constructive notice … . Radosta v Schechter, 2019 NY Slip Op 02916, Second Dept 4-17-19

 

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911 CALL PROPERLY ADMITTED AS PRESENT SENSE IMPRESSION OR EXCITED UTTERANCE, DEFENDANT PROPERLY GIVEN CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES FOR WOUNDING ONE VICTIM WITH THE INTENT TO SHOOT ANOTHER VICTIM (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined a 911 recording was properly admitted under the present-sense-impression and excited-utterance exceptions to the hearsay rule and defendant was properly sentenced to consecutive sentences where, intending to shoot one victim, another victim was also hit:

We agree with the Supreme Court’s determination allowing the admission of a recording of a call to the 911 emergency number made by the father of the then-15-year-old victim. The record established that the declarant made the call within seconds of the shooting after his son cried out that he had been shot, and the father saw his neighbor, who was also shot and who the father thought was dying, fall to the ground in a pool of blood. Although the declarant’s statements to the 911 operator were hearsay, they were nevertheless admissible under the exception for excited utterances ” made contemporaneously or immediately after a startling event'” … or present sense impressions made while he was “perceiving the event as it is unfolding or immediately afterward” which are “corroborated by independent evidence establishing [their] reliability” … . …

… [T]he defendant fired multiple shots with the intent of hitting the older victim and one of those shots hit the 15-year-old victim. However, “[t]he test is not whether the criminal intent is one and the same and inspiring the whole transaction, but whether separate acts have been committed with the requisite criminal intent” … . The shots which hit the two victims “were the result of separate and distinct acts of pulling a trigger to discharge a firearm” and “repetitive discrete acts, such as successive shots . . . [do not] somehow merge such that they lose their individual character where the same criminal intent . . . inspir[es] the whole transaction” … . Accordingly, the imposition of consecutive sentences for the two counts of attempted murder in the second degree was legal. People v Smith, 2019 NY Slip Op 02911, Second Dept 4-17-19

 

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RECORDS KEPT BY A VOLUNTEER AMBULANCE NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORPORATION NOT SUBJECT TO DISCLOSURE PURSUANT TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION LAW (FOIL) BECAUSE THE CORPORATION IS NOT A GOVERNMENTAL ENTITY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that, Volunteer Ambulance, a not-for-profit corporation, was not a government agency, and therefore was not subject to the Freedom of Information Law (FOIL) (Public Officers Law 86). “The petitioner, an emergency medical technician, made requests under the Freedom of Information Law (Public Officers Law art 6; hereinafter FOIL) for the production of certain records pertaining to the rejection of her application to be reinstated as a member of the Cortlandt Community Volunteer Ambulance Corps, Inc. (hereinafter Volunteer Ambulance):”

Volunteer Ambulance was formed and incorporated without any participation or assistance of public officials in the Town. Neither the Town nor the District has the authority to select or appoint directors, officers, or members of Volunteer Ambulance. Volunteer Ambulance is not required to submit its budget to the Town or District for review, and neither the Town nor the District has authority to approve Volunteer Ambulance’s budget. Neither the Town nor the District has any authority to review or audit Volunteer Ambulance’s financial books and records. Volunteer Ambulance receives the majority of its funding from sources other than the payment it receives from the District pursuant to the contract, and purchases all of its equipment, supplies, and services from its own assets. Volunteer Ambulance receives no funding from the Town or District apart from the contract payment. Volunteer Ambulance is solely responsible for the maintenance and expenses related to its buildings. Volunteer Ambulance has the authority to hire staff, who are employees of Volunteer Ambulance, not of the District or Town, and it obtains its own workers’ compensation policy for coverage of its employees and members; these persons are not covered by the workers’ compensation policy maintained by the District or the Town for its employees or volunteers. Neither the District nor the Town has authority to review or approve contracts entered into by Volunteer Ambulance for professional or other services necessary for its operation.

Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that Volunteer Ambulance is a “governmental entity performing a governmental . . . function” so as to render it an agency subject to the mandates of FOIL (Public Officers Law § 86[3] … . Matter of Outhouse v Cortlandt Community Volunteer Ambulance Corps, Inc., 2019 NY Slip Op 02881, Second Dept 4-17-19

 

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RECORDS OF COMPLAINTS ABOUT A FORMER DETECTIVE MADE TO THE CIVILIAN COMPLAINT REVIEW BOARD (CCRB) PROTECTED FROM DISCLOSURE BY THE CIVIL RIGHTS LAW (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined the records of complaints about a now-retired detective (Scarcella) made to the Civilian Complaint Review Board (CCRB) were protected by Civil Rights Law 50-a and not subject to disclosure pursuant to the Freedom of Information Law (FOIL) (Public Officers Law 87):

The CCRB’s records of civilian complaints, “regardless of where they are kept,” could be used to harass or embarrass police officers, which is exactly what Civil Rights Law § 50-a was intended to prevent … . Indeed, the Court of Appeals has recently held that disciplinary records arising from civilian complaints against police officers are the very sort of record presenting a potential for abusive exploitation and intended to be kept confidential under Civil Rights Law § 50-a … . …

A retired police officer might “still [be] involved in an open or pending case and . . . , in that context, the requested documents have the potential to be used to degrade, harass, embarrass or impeach his integrity” … . Here, the petitioner’s own submissions show that Scarcella has been called to testify numerous times since his retirement. The CCRB met its burden of showing a substantial and realistic potential for the abusive use of the requested material against Scarcella … . Matter of Hughes Hubbard & Reed, LLP v Civilian Complaint Review Bd., 2019 NY Slip Op 02875, Second Dept 4-17-19

 

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