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THE SUBROGATION ACTION BY THE INSURER OF THE PROPERTY OWNER IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE WAS NOT PRECLUDED BY THE RES JUDICATA DOCTRINE AFTER A GLOBAL SETTLEMENT WITH THE INJURED PARTY (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the subrogation action by plaintiff-insurer of the property owner, 60 LBC, in this slip and fall case was not precluded by the res judicata doctrine:

The court determined that plaintiff is barred by res judicata from pursuing 60 LBC’s [the property owner’s] coverage claim against defendant [the insurer of the landscaping business hired by 60 LBC to remove ice and snow] because it was resolved in the global settlement [with the injured party] reached during mediation. We disagree. Defendant [insurer of the landscaping company] was not a party to the underlying personal injury action or the third-party action, and the release resulting from the settlement of those actions makes no mention of any claims directly against defendant by 60 LBC or anyone else. Nor does the stipulation of discontinuance. The breach of contract claim asserted by 60 LBC against Red Cedar [the landscaping company] in the third-party action is separate and distinct from plaintiff’s breach of contract cause of action against defendant [insurer of the landscaping company] here. Cincinnati Ins. Co. v Acadia Ins. Co., 2021 NY Slip Op 07351, Fourth Dept 12-23-21

 

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DEFENDANT-ATTORNEY DEMONSTRATED THE RETAINER AGREEMENT IN THE DRUNK-DRIVING AND VEHICULAR HOMICIDE CASE WAS NOT PROCEDURALLY UNCONSCIONABLE (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant-attorney’s motion for summary judgment on the “unconscionable retainer agreement” cause of action should have been granted:

… [D]efendant met his initial burden on the motion by establishing that the retainer agreement is not procedurally unconscionable. Plaintiff’s deposition testimony, which defendant submitted in support of the motion, demonstrated that plaintiff had ample opportunity to become fully informed about the retainer agreement and to make a meaningful choice about representation. Plaintiff did not dispute in his deposition that, as defendant averred, defendant previously represented plaintiff in relation to a charge of driving while intoxicated for which a similar fixed-fee retainer agreement was used. Indeed, plaintiff admitted that defendant previously represented him at least once. Defendant’s submissions on the motion also established that the retainer agreement here was not presented to plaintiff until nine days after the drunk-driving incident giving rise to the criminal charges against him and several days after plaintiff had been released from the hospital. By that time, plaintiff had been arraigned on the felony complaint, and therefore was aware of the charges of aggravated vehicular homicide against him for the deaths of two persons. Before signing the retainer agreement, plaintiff’s family had contacted at least one other attorney on plaintiff’s behalf, and plaintiff negotiated terms of the agreement with defendant. Furthermore, although defendant submitted plaintiff’s interrogatory answers in which plaintiff stated that he relied on defendant’s statements that defendant had never had a client go to prison and that he would work on plaintiff’s case “24/7,” plaintiff conceded during his deposition that defendant never guaranteed that he would avoid prison and that plaintiff understood defendant’s statements regarding the amount of time defendant would spend on plaintiff’s case to be hyperbole. Divito v Fiandach, 2021 NY Slip Op 07350, Fourth Dept 12-23-21

 

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ALTHOUGH THE JUDGE IN THIS BENCH TRIAL DID NOT EXPLICITLY RULE ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR A TRIAL ORDER OF DISMISSAL, THE MAJORITY DETERMINED THE DENIAL OF THE MOTION WAS IMPLICIT IN THE VERDICT AND THEREFORE THE LEGAL INSUFFICIENCY ARGUMENT COULD BE CONSIDERED ON APPEAL; THE DISSENT DISAGREED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, over a dissent, determined the judge in this bench trial implicitly ruled on defendant’s motion for a trial order of dismissal when rendering the verdict. The dissent argued an explicit ruling on the motion was a necessary prerequisite to an appeal:

From the dissent:

… [D]uring the nonjury trial, the court expressly reserved decision on defendant’s motion for a trial order of dismissal. Although the Criminal Procedure Law requires a court to determine a motion on which it has reserved decision (see CPL 290.10 [1]; 320.20 [4]), the court here never again addressed that motion by name on the record. Rather, in rendering its verdict, the court stated merely that, “based upon the credible trial evidence, this [c]ourt finds the defendant guilty of . . . attempted assault in the second degree [because] there was legally sufficient proof that the defendant intended to cause the victim serious physical injury based upon his conduct, and [in] consideration of all the surrounding circumstances.”

In reaching the merits of defendant’s legal sufficiency contention, the majority tacitly concludes that the court implicitly denied defendant’s motion when it rendered its guilty verdict, likely due to the court’s reference to the “legally sufficient proof” supporting its finding of guilt. I respectfully disagree with this approach … . People v Dubois, 2021 NY Slip Op 07364, Third Dept 12-23-21

 

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THE INSURER PRESENTED EVIDENCE THE BOARD’S RULING THAT THE INSURER WAS THE RESPONSIBLE CARRIER WAS BASED UPON FRAUDULENT DOCUMENTATIOIN; IT WAS ABUSE OF DISCRETION TO DENY THE INSURER’S APPLICATION FOR REVIEW (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing the Workers’ Compensation Board, determined the Board abused its discretion when denying an insurer’s (Everest’s) application for a review of a ruling that the insurer was the responsible carrier. That ruling was plausibly argued to have been based upon fraudulent documentation:

… [T]he proof submitted by Everest in support of its administrative appeal strongly suggests that the certificate of insurance provided to the Board was not authentic, and, based upon the limited record before us, the certificate appears to have been an important, if not the only, factor in the WCLJ’s [Workers’ Compensation Law Judge’s] decision as to Everest. In other words, Everest has brought to the Board’s attention the strong possibility that it has issued a decision based perhaps entirely upon fraudulent documentation. … Under these facts, “[i]t is not an adequate answer to say that this kind of determination is usually discretionary” … , and, in our view, the very purpose of the discretion afforded to the Board is to grant relief in circumstances such as these … . … [W]e find that the Board abused its discretion in denying Everest’s application for review … . Matter of Salinas v Power Servs. Solutions LLC, 2021 NY Slip Op 07321, Third Dept 12-23-21

 

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AN APPELLATE COURT HAS THE POWER TO CONSIDER A REQUEST FOR A DECLARATORY JUDGMENT WHICH WAS NOT BEFORE THE MOTION COURT; THE REGULATION MANDATING CERTAIN VACCINES DOES NOT VIOLATE THE SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE OR EXCEED THE REGULATORY POWERS OF THE NYS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, in a full-fledged, comprehensive opinion by justice NeMoyer which cannot be fairly summarized here, held the appellate court had the power to determine a request for a declaratory judgment which was not raised in the motion court, and the regulation mandating certain vaccines, 10 NYCRR 66-1.1(1) , does not violate the separation of powers doctrine or exceed the regulatory powers of the NYS Department of Health:

The legislature has determined that vaccines save lives. It has therefore established a mandatory “program of immunization . . . to raise to the highest reasonable level the immunity of the children of the state against communicable diseases” (Public Health Law § 613 [1] [a]). And by promulgating 10 NYCRR 66-1.1 (l), respondents-defendants-appellants (defendants) merely implemented the legislature’s policy in a manner entirely consistent with the legislative design. We therefore hold that 10 NYCRR 66-1.1 (l) is valid, does not violate the separation of powers doctrine, and does not exceed the authority of its promulgator. Matter of Kerri W.S. v Zucker, 2021 NY Slip Op 07349, Fourth Dept 12-23-21

 

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FAMILY COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE DELEGATED ITS AUTHORITY TO SET UP A VISITATION SCHEDULE TO THE CHILD AND MOTHER (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing (modifying) Family Court and remitting the matter for a visitation schedule, determined Family Court should not have delegated its authority by allowing the child and mother to agree to a visitation schedule:

… Family Court improperly delegated its authority to the younger child when it ordered that the mother’s visitation would be only as she and the younger child could agree.

“Generally, the best interests of a child lie in having healthy and meaningful relationships with both the custodial and noncustodial parent” … . Thus, “[u]nless [visitation] is inimical to the child[]’s welfare, the court is required to structure a schedule which results in frequent and regular access by the noncustodial parent” … . The court cannot delegate to anyone, including a child, its authority to do so … , as such delegation can have “the practical effect of denying [a parent] his [or her] right to visitation with his [or her] child indefinitely without the requisite showing that visitation would be detrimental to the child’s welfare” … . Matter of Cecelia BB. v Frank CC., 2021 NY Slip Op 07323, Third Dept 12-23-21

 

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FALSE ARREST AND FALSE IMPRISONMENT COMPLAINT PROPERLY DISMISSED AFTER A DEFENSE VERDICT; TWO JUSTICE DISSENT (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, over an extensive two-justice dissent, determined the false arrest and false imprisonment action was properly dismissed after a defense verdict at trial. The police were informed that plaintiff, who was walking away, was involved in an altercation. The officer stood in front of plaintiff to inquire. The plaintiff did not respond and walked into the officer. The officer then made a warrantless arrest for obstruction of justice:

We conclude that the officer’s act of “stepping in front of [plaintiff] in an attempt to engage him was a continuation of the officer’s own common-law right to inquire, not a seizure” … . …

… [W]hile “[a]n individual to whom a police officer addresses a question has a constitutional right not to respond” … , that person does not have the right to attempt to “walk through”—and thereby make physical contact with—the officer … . * * *

From the dissent:

… [T]he officer was not authorized to forcibly stop plaintiff and lacked probable cause to arrest plaintiff for obstructing governmental administration in the second degree for plaintiff’s purported obstruction of such an unauthorized forcible stop. Shaw v City of Rochester, 2021 NY Slip Op 07346, Fourth Dept 12-23-21

 

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THE REQUIREMENTS FOR AN APPEALABLE ORDER IN A SORA RISK-LEVEL PROCEEDING EXPLAINED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, withholding a decision on the merits of the SORA risk-level determination by County Court until the People enter and serve an appealable order, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Garry, explained the “appealable order” requirements for SORA proceedings:

Despite the statutory requirement that the court render a written SORA “order setting forth its determinations and the findings of fact and conclusions of law on which the determinations are based” (Correction Law § 168-n [3]), the lack of such orders is a recurring problem … . In some cases, as here, the court states during a bench decision that a so-ordered provision will be provided on the transcript but that does not occur … . In others, the court signs a standard form designating the defendant’s risk level classification without “so-ordered” language or specific findings and conclusions … . In each of these situations, this Court generally dismisses the appeal, as we must, because it is not properly before us due to the lack of an appealable order … . This creates a confusing situation in which no proper order exists regarding the defendant’s status under SORA (see Correction Law § 168-n [3]).

… Generally, in any civil case, upon a clerk’s entry of a written order, the prevailing party should serve a copy of the order, together with notice of entry, upon the losing party (see CPLR 2220 [b]; 5513 [a] … ). The losing party, once served with a copy of that entered order and notice of entry, has 30 days to take an appeal as of right (see CPLR 5513 [a]; see also Correction Law § 168-n [3]). Pursuant to SORA, “the district attorney, or his or her designee,” is statutorily required to appear at the SORA hearing on behalf of the state and bears the burden of proving the facts supporting the risk level determination being sought (Correction Law § 168-n [3]). Thus, the People bear the responsibility of ensuring that a written SORA order is entered and that notice of entry, along with a copy of that written order, is served on the defendant. People v Lane, 2021 NY Slip Op 07324, Third Dept 12-23-21

 

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THE FOR CAUSE CHALLENGE TO A PROSPECTIVE JUROR WHO SAID HE WOULD BE INCLINED TO BELIEVE THE TESTIMONY OF POLICE OFFICERS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing defendant’s conviction, determined the for cause challenge to a juror who said he would tend to believe the testimony of police officers should have been granted, despite the assurances elicited by the judge:

… [T]he statement of the prospective juror during voir dire with respect to the credibility of the testimony of police officers or bias in favor of the police cast serious doubt on his ability to render an impartial verdict, and the prospective juror failed to provide “unequivocal assurance that [he could] set aside any bias and render an impartial verdict based on the evidence” … . Specifically, after the prospective juror stated that he was a former correction officer and had “a lot of friends and family members” in law enforcement, he agreed that he would “be inclined to give more credibility to an officer than [he] would a lay person,” explained that, based on his experiences, he found police to be “honest people,” and specifically described one of the officers who would later testify for the People as “an honest person.” Although the court inquired further of the prospective juror, we conclude that the prospective juror’s answers to the questions asked by the court were “insufficient to constitute . . . an unequivocal declaration” that he could set aside any bias and render an impartial verdict … . People v Harrison, 2021 NY Slip Op 07445, Fourth Dept 12-23-21

 

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THE JUDGE’S THREAT TO IMPOSE A MUCH HARSHER SENTENCE SHOULD THE DEFENDANT BE CONVICTED AT TRIAL AMOUNTED TO COERCION RENDERING THE PLEA INVOLUNTARY; ALTHOUGH THE ISSUE WAS NOT PRESERVED FOR APPEAL, THE PLEA WAS VACATED IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, vacating defendant’s guilty plea in the interest of justice, determined the judge’s threat to impose a much harsher sentence if the defendant were to be convicted at trial amounted to coercion:

During a court appearance at which County Court extended a plea offer that called for an aggregate sentence of 15 years to life imprisonment, the court informed defendant that “my policy is if a defendant gets convicted at trial, that means that individual has not accepted responsibility for the conduct that they’ve been convicted of, and . . . [i]n all likelihood the sentence [after trial] would not even be close to the 20 years [to life sought by the People], it would be much more — — many more years and you are looking at a potential [of] 100 years to life.” The court issued a virtually identical admonition at the next appearance, and defendant subsequently accepted the court’s offer of 15 years to life imprisonment.

… [T]he court’s statements during plea negotiations did “not amount to a description of the range of the potential sentences but, rather, they constitute[d] impermissible coercion, ‘rendering the plea involuntary and requiring its vacatur’ ” … . People v Goodwin, 2021 NY Slip Op 07418, Fourth Dept 12-23-21

 

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