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THE FAILURE TO TIMELY FILE THE CERTIFICATE OF MERIT IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION WAS NOT A GROUND FOR DIMSISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined, under the facts, plaintiff had not abandoned this medical malpractice action and plaintiff’s failure to timely file the certificate of merit was not a ground for dismissal of the complaint:

… [P]laintiff’s attorney filed an alternative certificate with the complaint that he was unable to timely procure the required consultation in view of the impending statute of limitations in accord with CPLR 3012-a (a) (2). In such an instance, the certificate of merit must be filed within 90 days of commencement, a deadline that plaintiff did not meet … . The mere failure to meet that deadline, however, does not require a dismissal of the action … . … [P]laintiff expressly identified his medical expert in the … discovery response. In his opposing affidavit, plaintiff’s counsel explained that the failure to file the certificate of merit was an oversight, i.e., basic law office failure, and further affirmed that he duly consulted with the physician in accord with the requirements of CPLR 3012-a (a) (1). In any event, plaintiff did not formally move for leave to file a late certificate of merit and, therefore, whether plaintiff established good cause under CPLR 2004 for such leave is not at issue … . … [W]e find no basis to dismiss the complaint based on the certificate of merit issue. Duvernoy v CNY Fertility, PLLC, 2022 NY Slip Op 01084, Third Dept 2-17-22

 

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THE BREACH OF THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED AS DUPLICATIVE OF THE BREACH OF CONTRACT CAUSE OF ACTION (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, modifying Supreme Court, determined the breach of the implied covenant of good faith should have been dismissed as duplicative of the breach of contract action:

Supreme Court … erred by denying that part of defendants’ motion seeking dismissal of the cause of action alleging breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. A review of the allegations in the amended complaint discloses that this cause of action is based upon the same set of facts and seeks similar damages as the breach of contract cause of action. In view of this, the breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing cause of action is duplicative of the breach of contract cause of action and, therefore, it should have been dismissed … . Shmaltz Brewing Co., LLC v Dog Cart Mgt. LLC, 2022 NY Slip Op 01086, Third Dept 2-17-22

 

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THE ROLLED UP MAT WHICH CAUSED PLAINTIFF TO SLIP AND FALL WAS KNOWN TO THE PLAINTIFF AND WAS OPEN AND OBVIOUS; DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the rolled up map which caused plaintiff’s slip and fall was open and obvious and therefore nonactionable:

While a possessor of real property has a duty to maintain that property in a reasonably safe condition … , “there is no duty to protect or warn against an open and obvious condition that, as a matter of law, is not inherently dangerous” … . “A condition is open and obvious if it is ‘readily observable by those employing the reasonable use of their senses, given the conditions at the time of the accident'” … .

Here, the defendants established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by submitting evidence demonstrating that the rolled-up mat, which was known to the plaintiff prior to the accident, was open and obvious, and was not inherently dangerous … . Williams v E & R Jamaica Food Corp., 2022 NY Slip Op 01065, Second Dept 2-16-22

 

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NO ONE MOVED TO QUASH THE NONJUDICIAL SUBPOENA SERVED ON A NONPARTY; SUPREME COURT SHOULD HAVE GRANTED THE MOTION TO COMPEL THE NONPARTY’S APPEARANCE AT A DEPOSITION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined Supreme Court should have compelled the former Town Supervisor (St. Lawrence) to appear for depositions in this slip and fall case:

… [T]he plaintiff served nonparty Christopher St. Lawrence, former Town Supervisor for the Town, with a nonjudicial subpoena directing him to appear for a deposition. St. Lawrence failed to appear for the deposition as directed in the subpoena, and the plaintiff moved … to compel him to comply with that subpoena by appearing for a deposition … . … Supreme Court denied the motion, and the plaintiff appeals.

Since the Supreme Court found that the subpoena was proper, that no one had moved to quash it, and that St. Lawrence had failed to comply with it, the court should have directed St. Lawrence to comply with the subpoena (see CPLR 2308[b] …). … [T]he court should have granted that branch of the plaintiff’s motion which was to compel St. Lawrence to comply with the subpoena by directing him to appear for a deposition …  Thus, we remit the matter to the Supreme Court, Rockland County, to schedule the deposition in compliance with the subpoena and for further proceedings to compel compliance with the subpoena. Schiller v Town of Ramapo, 2022 NY Slip Op 01061, Second Dept 2-16-22

 

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THE JUDGE WAS REQUIRED TO DETERMINE WHETHER DEFENDANT IS AN “ELIGIBLE YOUTH,” AND, IF SO WHETHER DEFENDANT SHOULD BE ADJUDICATED A YOUTHFUL OFFENDER; THE JUDGE WAS NOT AUTHORIZED TO ACCEPT A GUILTY PLEA TO SECOND DEGREE MURDER FROM THE JUVENILE DEFENDANT; THE WAIVER OF APPEAL WAS INVALID (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined: (1) because defendant pled guilty to “armed felonies,” the judge was required to determine on the record whether defendant was an “eligible youth” and, if so, whether he should be afforded youthful offender status; (2) the judge was not authorized to accept a guilty plea for second degree murder from the juvenile defendant; and (3) the waiver of appeal was invalid:

… Supreme Court was required to determine on the record whether the defendant was an “eligible youth” (CPL 720.10[2][a][ii]), by considering the presence or absence of the factors set forth in CPL 720.10(3), and, if so, whether he should be afforded youthful offender status … . …

… Supreme Court was not authorized to accept a plea of guilty to count 3 [second degree murder]. As a juvenile offender, the defendant cannot be held criminally responsible for felony murder where the underlying felony, attempted robbery, is a crime for which he cannot be held criminally responsible (see CPL 1.20[42][2]; Penal Law § 30.00[2]; People v Stowe, 15 AD3d 597, 598; Matter of Tracy C., 186 AD2d 250, 251; People v Smith, 152 AD2d 56, 61). Accordingly, … the defendant’s plea of guilty to murder in the second degree … must be set aside … .

… Supreme Court’s oral colloquy and written appeal waiver mischaracterized the nature of the appeal waiver as an absolute bar to the taking of a direct appeal and a forfeiture of the attendant right to counsel and poor person relief … . People v Shelton, 2022 NY Slip Op 01050, Second Dept 2-16-22

 

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THE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT MEANINGFULLY RESPOND TO A NOTE FROM THE JURY; RE-READING THE ORIGINAL INSTRUCTIONS WAS NOT SUFFICIENT; CONVICTION REVERSED, NEW TRIAL ORDERED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department reversed the judgment of conviction and ordered a new trial because the trial judge did not meaningfully respond to a note from the jury. Under the facts here, re-reading the original instructions was not sufficient:

… [W]hen the jury was deliberating, the County Court failed to meaningfully respond to one of the jury’s notes. “Pursuant to CPL 310.30, the trial court has an obligation to meaningfully respond to all questions from the jury during deliberations” … . “Although simply rereading the original instructions may, under the appropriate circumstances, constitute a meaningful response” … , here, it was error for the court to respond to the jury’s last question about the elements of one of the charges by simply rereading its original instructions. The jury had previously sent a note about that charge demonstrating its initial confusion about that instruction … . The record reflects that defense counsel and the court perceived that, with respect to the jury note at issue, the jury may have been asking whether the defendant was required to know of the falsity of the information in the document that was alleged to contain false information at the time she submitted it to the Department of Health investigator. Notwithstanding its perception about the jury’s inquiry, the court did not seek any further clarification from the jury about that note. Under these circumstances, at a minimum, the court should have asked the jurors to again clarify their request … . People v Manzano, 2022 NY Slip Op 01040, Second Dept 2-16-22

 

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THE PETITIONERS DEMONSTRATED THAT THE OPERATION OF A CONCRETE PLANT WOULD CAUSE INJURIES TO THEM DIFFERENT FROM THOSE SUFFERED BY THE PUBLIC AT LARGE; SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE DETERMINED PETITIONERS DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO CONTEST THE RENOVATION AND OPERATION OF THE PLANT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined petitioners had standing to contest the renovation and operation of a concrete plant:

Supreme Court improperly determined that the Hill & Dale petitioners and the Veteri petitioners lacked standing to challenge the ZBA’s determination. The Hill & Dale petitioners alleged environmental injuries to a private lake owned by Hill & Dale, which was situated directly across from the subject property, as well as interference with recreational activities enjoyed in and around the lake, and impacts to their properties from increased noise, truck traffic, dust, and pollutants from the concrete manufacturing use. These alleged injuries were different from those suffered by the public at large … , and fell within the zone of interests protected by the Town’s zoning laws … . Similarly, the Veteri petitioners sufficiently alleged that they would be adversely affected by the ZBA’s determination and that their alleged injuries fell within the zone of interests protected by the zoning laws. Matter of Veteri v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of the Town of Kent, 2022 NY Slip Op 01030, Second Dept 2-16-22

 

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THE SUPPORT MAGISTRATE DID NOT ENSURE THAT FATHER KNOWINGLY, INTELLIGENTLY AND VOLUNTARILY WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN THIS CHILD SUPPORT PROCEEDING; ORDER OF COMMITMENT REVERSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Family Court’s order of commitment for father’s failure to pay child support, determined the Support Magistrate did not ensure that father’s waiver of counsel was knowing, intelligent and voluntary:

… [A]t the beginning of the hearing, the Support Magistrate asked the father what he “want[ed] to do about legal representation,” to which the father responded, “I’m speaking for myself at this point.” The Support Magistrate did not make any further inquiries regarding counsel. The Support Magistrate also failed to advise the father about the potential pitfalls of proceeding pro se. Thus, the Support Magistrate failed to conduct a sufficiently searching inquiry to ensure that the father’s waiver of his right to counsel was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary … . Under these circumstances, the father was deprived of his right to counsel at the hearing. Contrary to the mother’s contention, this violation was not cured by the fact that the father was later represented by assigned counsel during the confirmation hearing … . Matter of Sylvester v Goffe, 2022 NY Slip Op 01028, Second Dept 2-16-22

 

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THE PETITION STATED CAUSES OF ACTION FOR A VIOLATION OF REAL PROPERTY TAX LAW (RPTL) 305 AND VIOLATION OF EQUAL PROTECTION; THE PETITION ALLEGED LARGER HOMES WERE ASSESSED AT LESS THAN 100% OF MARKET VALUE AND SMALLER HOMES WERE ASSESSED AT 100% OF MARKET VALUE (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the petition stated causes of action for improper assessment of property values and violation of equal protection. It was alleged that the methodology use to assess the value of home for property tax purposes resulted in less than 100% assessment for the larger homes and 100% assessment for the smaller homes:

Under RPTL 305(2), real property within an assessing unit must “be assessed at a uniform percentage of value”… . “[R]egardless of the methodology adopted by the [a]ssessor, the result must reflect the realistic value of the property so that the tax burden of each property is equitable” … . Although there is a presumption that a tax assessor’s property valuations are valid, property owners may rebut the presumption through submission of substantial evidence of overvaluation … .

… The petition, as supplemented by affidavits from the petitioner’s members and empirical and statistical analyses, sufficiently stated a cause of action for violation of RPTL 305. …

Accepting as true the facts alleged in the petition and according the petitioner the benefit of every favorable inference, the petition, as supplemented by the petitioner’s submissions, sufficiently stated a claim for violations of the equal protection clauses of the State and Federal Constitutions. Matter of Scarsdale Comm. for Fair Assessments v Albanese, 2022 NY Slip Op 01027, Second Dept 2-16-22

 

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PETITIONER’S NOTICE OF CLAIM DEMONSTRATED HE HAD SUFFICIENT INFORMATION TO FORMULATE A COMPLAINT IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE; HIS REQUEST FOR PRE-JOINDER DISCOVERY AND PRESERVATION OF THE ACCIDENT SCENE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined pre-joinder discovery and preservation of the accident site was not necessary in this slip and fall case:

The petitioner alleges … he slipped and fell due to an accumulation of water leaking from the ceiling onto the landing at the top of an escalator in a subway station. The petitioner commenced this proceeding against the New York City Transit Authority (hereinafter the Transit Authority) seeking to direct the Transit Authority to preserve and produce any surveillance videos or records prepared in the regular course of business concerning the accident, or to provide an affidavit explaining the absence of any such videos or records. The petitioner also moved pursuant to CPLR 3102(c), in effect, to compel the Transit Authority to permit an inspection of the location of the accident upon certain conditions and to refrain from performing alterations or modifications to the location pending that inspection. …

CPLR 3102(c) provides, as relevant, that “[b]efore an action is commenced, disclosure to aid in bringing an action, to preserve information or to aid in arbitration, may be obtained, but only by court order.” Here, the petitioner’s notice of claim demonstrates that the petitioner possessed sufficient information to enable him to formulate his complaint and commence an action … . Therefore, under the circumstances, the only purpose of the pre-action discovery sought by the petitioner would be to “explore alternative theories of liability, which is not a proper basis for invoking CPLR 3102(c)” … . Moreover, considering, inter alia, the evidence already in the petitioner’s possession, the order directing the Transit Authority to preserve the condition of the site of the accident until completion of an inspection was unduly burdensome …”. Matter of Neham v New York City Tr. Auth., 2022 NY Slip Op 01026, Second Dept 2-16-22

 

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