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IN THIS TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE INVOLVING THE DEFENDANT NYC TRANSIT AUTHORITY’S BUS, THE AUTHORITY GAINED TIMELY KNOWLEDGE OF THE POTENTIAL CLAIM WHEN IT INVESTIGATED THE ACCIDENT AND WAS NOT PREJUDICED BY THE DELAY; THE PETITION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, NOTWITHSTANDING THE ABSENCE OF A REASONABLE EXCUSE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the petition seeking leave to file a late notice of claim in this traffic accident case should have been granted. It was alleged defendant NYC Transit Authority’s bus collided with a NYC sanitation truck which then collided with petitioner’s car. The Transit Authority investigated the accident and therefore had knowledge of the essential facts of the claim. Because the defendant had timely actual knowledge of the potential claim and did not demonstrate prejudice from the delay, petitioner did not need to present a reasonable excuse for the late notice:

… [A]s the Authority acquired timely knowledge of the essential facts constituting the petitioner’s claim, the petitioner met his initial burden of showing that the Authority would not be prejudiced by the late notice of claim … . In response to the petitioner’s initial showing, the Authority failed to come forward with particularized evidence demonstrating that the late notice of claim substantially prejudiced its ability to defend the claim on the merits … . Since the Authority had actual knowledge of the essential facts underlying the claim and no substantial prejudice to the Authority was demonstrated, the petitioner’s failure to provide a reasonable excuse for the delay in serving the notice of claim did not serve as a bar to granting leave to serve a late notice of claim … . Matter of Manbodh v New York City Tr. Auth., 2022 NY Slip Op 02544, Second Dept 4-20-22

​Practice Point: Here the defendant NYC Transit Authority investigated the traffic accident involving petitioner’s car and therefore had timely notice of the essential facts of the potential lawsuit. In that situation, in the absence of prejudice to the defendant caused by petitioner’s failure to timely file a notice of claim (none here), petitioner need not provide a reasonable excuse and leave to file a late notice should be granted.

 

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ALTHOUGH THE RPAPL 1304 FORECLOSURE NOTICE, TO BE VALID, MUST ACCURATELY STATE THE DEFAULT AMOUNT AND THE LENGTH OF TIME THE BORROWER HAS BEEN IN DEFAULT, THERE WAS NO SHOWING HERE THE STATED AMOUNT WAS INACCURATE; THE BANK DID NOT DEMONSTRATE IT WAS IN POSSESSION OF THE NOTE AT THE TIME THE ACTION WAS COMMENCED AND THEREFORE DID NOT DEMONSTRATE STANDING TO FORECLOSE; THE EVIDENCE OF A MERGER SUBMITTED IN REPLY COULD NOT BE CONSIDERED ON THE STANDING ISSUE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Dillon, determined the notice of foreclosure required by RPAPL 1304, which, to be valid, must state the default amount and length of time the borrower has been in default, was not shown to be inaccurate. But the plaintiff bank did not demonstrate standing to foreclose. The evidence that the bank’s standing was based on a merger with the holder of the note was not submitted until the reply, and therefore should not have been considered:

Where an RPAPL 1304 notice fails to reflect information mandated by the statute, including but not limited to the duration and an amount of the default, the statute will not have been strictly complied with and the notice will not be valid … . …

… [T]here is no reason for us to conclude at this juncture that the $64,862.12 default sum set forth in the plaintiff’s RPAPL 1304 notice reflects any actual error. The second paragraph of the plaintiff’s 30-day notice explains that the $64,862.12 amount claimed to be due includes principal, interest, escrow payments, and late charges, which would necessarily raise the gross amount due to a sum that exceeds the amount of the missed principal. * * *

… [T]he plaintiff failed to establish, prima facie, that it had standing to commence the action. The plaintiff is not the original lender. The subject note, though attached to the complaint, bears no indorsement. And further, the plaintiff failed to produce evidence in admissible form as part of its prima facie case that the note was assigned to it prior to the date of commencement of the action … . …

The certificate of merger showing that ESB-LI merged into the plaintiff does not demonstrate that the plaintiff is the holder of the subject note. It was submitted to the Supreme Court for the first time in the plaintiff’s reply papers, and therefore, could not be considered as part of the plaintiff’s initial prima facie proof of standing … . Emigrant Bank v Cohen, 2022 NY Slip Op 02532, Second Dept 4-20-22

Practice Point: To be valid, the RPAPL 1304 notice of foreclosure must accurately state the amount of the default and the length of time the borrower has been in default (there was no showing the amount was inaccurate here). If the bank does not demonstrate it was holding the note at the time the foreclosure was commenced in its moving papers, it has not demonstrated standing to foreclose. Evidence of standing submitted in reply papers should not be considered.

 

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ALTHOUGH THE SECOND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE SEEKING LEAVE TO FILE A LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM WAS FILED TWO DAYS AFTER THE ONE-YEAR-NINETY-DAY LIMITATIONS PERIOD, THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS WAS TOLLED FOR THREE DAYS BETWEEN THE FILING AND THE DENIAL OF THE FIRST ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE; THE MEDICAL RECORDS PROVIDED THE MUNICIPALITY WITH NOTICE OF THE ESSENTAL FACTS OF THE CLAIM; THE MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A LATE NOTICE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the motion seeking leave to file a late notice of claim was timely and should have been granted. Although the second order to show cause was submitted two days beyond the one year-and-90-day deadline for suing a municipality. the statute of limitations was tolled for three days between the filing of the first order to show cause and the denial of that first motion:

Since the time to serve a notice of claim upon a public corporation cannot be extended beyond the time limited for commencement of an action against that party … , the court lacks authority to grant a motion for leave to serve a late notice of claim made more than one year and 90 days after the cause of action accrued, unless the statute of limitations has been tolled … . “CPLR 204(a) tolls the statute of limitations while a motion to serve a late notice of claim is pending” … . Where “a court declines to sign an initial order to show cause for leave to serve a late notice of claim on procedural grounds, but a subsequent application for the same relief is granted, the period of time in which the earlier application [was] pending [is also] excluded from the limitations period” … . …

… [T]he medical records provided the defendants with actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the plaintiff’s claim. The records evinced that a stroke code was called shortly after the plaintiff’s presentation to the hospital, that, based on an assessment of her condition, it was decided that a tissue plasminogen activator was not needed, and that it was later determined that the plaintiff had suffered a stroke but that it was too late to administer that drug.

The plaintiff further made an initial showing that the defendants would not suffer any prejudice by the delay in serving the notice of claim, and the defendants failed to rebut the showing with particularized indicia of prejudice … .

Finally, where, as here, there is actual knowledge and an absence of prejudice, the lack of a reasonable excuse will not bar the granting of leave to serve a late notice of claim … . Ahmed v New York City Health & Hosp. Corp., 2022 NY Slip Op 02521, Second Dept 4-20-22

Practice Point: The one-year-ninety-day statute of limitations for suing a municipality is tolled for the time between submitting an order to show cause seeking leave to file a late notice of claim and the judge’s refusal to sign the order to show cause. Here, although the second order to show cause seeking leave to file a late notice was submitted two days after the one-year-ninety-day statute had run, it was timely because of the three-day toll between the filing and denial of first order to show cause. Here the medical records sufficiently notified the municipality of the essential facts of the claim, the municipality did not demonstrate prejudice and there was no need for a reasonable excuse because there was actual knowledge and no prejudice.

 

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THE FOR CAUSE CHALLENGE TO THE PROSPECTIVE JUROR WHO WAS AN ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY IN THE OFFICE PROSECUTING THE DEFENDANT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED; NEW TRIAL ORDERED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, ordering a new trial, determined defense counsel’s for cause challenge to a juror who was an assistant district attorney in the office which was prosecuting the defendant should have been granted:

… [D]uring jury selection, the subject prospective juror informed the Supreme Court that she was presently working as an assistant district attorney, within the Queens County District Attorney’s Office, the same agency that was prosecuting the defendant, and that she was familiar with the prosecutor, the defense attorney, and the Justice. As the People correctly concede, the juror’s contemporaneous working relationship with the agency prosecuting the defendant required that juror’s dismissal for cause … . People v Cortes, 2022 NY Slip Op 02561, Second Dept 4-20-22

Practice Point: The for cause challenge to the prospective juror who was an assistant district attorney in the same office which was prosecuting the defendant should have been granted; new trial ordered.

 

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THE DOCUMENT LABELED A “SUPPLEMENTAL” BILL OF PARTICULARS WAS ACTUALLY AN “AMENDED” BILL OF PARTICULARS BECAUSE IT ADDED NEW INJURIES AFTER THE NOTE OF ISSUE WAS FILED; THE DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STRIKE THE AMENDED BILL OF PARTICULARS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court in this slip and fall case, determined the document labeled a “supplemental” bill of particulars was actually a post-note-of-issue “amended” bill of particulars which should not have been served without leave of the court:

… [T]he document that they denominated a “supplemental bill of particulars” … , was, in reality, an amended bill of particulars, as they sought to add new injuries (see CPLR 3043[b]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court erred in denying that branch of [defendant’s] motion which was to strike the amended bill of particulars … , denominated as a supplemental bill of particulars, which was served without leave of court and after the note of issue had been filed …  . Naftaliyev v GGP Staten Is. Mall, LLC, 2022 NY Slip Op 02556, Second Dept 4-20-22

Practice Point: A “supplemental” bill of particulars which adds new injuries after the note of issue is filed is actually an “amended” bill of particulars which can only be served with leave of the court.

 

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THE LOCAL LAW REQUIRING APPROVAL OF PROPOSED ALTERATIONS TO BUILDINGS IDENTIFIED AS “HISTORIC” IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined a local law requiring permits for changes to buildings designated “historic” was not unconstitutional. The local law, the “Historic Building Preservation Law,” gave the town’s Historic Building Preservation Commission (HBPC) the power to approve or disapprove proposed alterations to historic buildings which were identified as such in a “Survey:”

“Legislative enactments enjoy a strong presumption of constitutionality . . . [and] parties challenging a duly enacted statute face the initial burden of demonstrating the statute’s invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt” … . “The exceedingly strong presumption of constitutionality applies . . . to ordinances of municipalities” … . The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution guarantee due process protections for life, liberty, and property (see US Const Amends V, XIV). “The requirements of procedural due process apply only to the deprivation of interests encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of liberty and property” … .

… Here, the petitioners/plaintiffs failed to identify any constitutionally protected property interest that was implicated in the enactment of the 2017 local law and, thus, the petitioners/plaintiffs were not entitled to a hearing prior to the enactment of that law … . Contrary to the petitioners/plaintiffs’ contention, the 2017 local law did not require property owners to submit to warrantless searches of their properties in order to challenge a property’s classification or inclusion on the Survey. Matter of Santomero v Town of Bedford, 2022 NY Slip Op 02552, Second Dept 4-20-22

​Practice Point: A local law which designates certain buildings as “historic” and requires permits for alterations to the historic buildings is not unconstitutional.

 

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CLASS CERTIFICATION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED ON THE GROUND THE CLASS WAS TOO SMALL; PLAINTIFF-TENANTS ALLEGED THE LANDLORD DEREGULATED APARTMENTS WHILE RECEIVING J-51 TAX BENEFITS (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiffs, tenants of a 49-unit apartment building, should have been certified as a class. The complaint alleged the landlord deregulated apartments while receiving J-51 tax benefits:

Supreme Court erred in denying class certification on the ground that plaintiffs failed to show that “the class is so numerous that joinder of all members . . . is impracticable” (CPLR 901[a][1]). Borden v 400 E. 55th St. Assoc., L.P. (24 NY3d 382, 383 [2014]) and subsequent cases, such as Maddicks v Big City Props., LLC (34 NY3d 116 [2019]), make it clear that qualified plaintiffs may “utilize the class action mechanism to recover compensatory rent overcharges against landlords who decontrolled apartments in contravention of Rent Stabilization Law of 1969 (RSL) (Administrative Code of City of NY) § 26-516 (a) while accepting tax benefits under New York City’s J-51 tax abatement program.” The legislature contemplated classes involving as few as 18 members … . Here, as in Borden, plaintiffs allege defendant deregulated apartments while receiving J-51 tax benefits. Construing the class certification statute liberally … given that the asserted class consists of former and current tenants who lived in the 16 units improperly treated as deregulated after November 15, 2013, while defendant was receiving J-51 tax benefits, it is reasonable to infer that some units in this 49-unit apartment building would have had more than one tenant and several tenants would have moved away, making joinder of all members impracticable … . The identity of class members, i.e., which units were treated as deregulated and who leased them during the relevant time period, is within defendant’s knowledge. Hoffman v Fort 709 Assoc., L.P., 2022 NY Slip Op 02510, First Dept 4-19-22

​Practice Point: Here class certification should not have been denied on the ground the class was too small. The plaintiffs are tenants alleging the landlord improperly deregulated apartments while receiving tax benefits. Classes as small as 18 members were contemplated by the legislature.

 

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QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER PEBBLE-SIZED DEBRIS WHICH FELL ON PLAINTIFF AND ALLEGEDLY SERIOUSLY INJURED HIS EYE GAVE RISE TO LIABILITY UNDER LABOR LAW 240(1) AND 241(6) (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined there were questions of fact about liability pursuant to Labor Law 240(1) and 241(6). Plaintiff was working in a shaft when pebble-sized debris fell on him, allegedly seriously injuring his eye. There were questions of fact whether the distance the debris fell was de minimus and whether the force with which the debris fell was de minimus. There was also a question of fact whether planking should have been installed above the shaft to protect against falling debris:

There are issues of fact as to whether the debris that fell on plaintiff — taking into account the elevation differential, the debris’ weight, and the amount of force it could generate …  — was “a load that required securing for the purposes of the undertaking at the time it fell” … , and whether his injury was a direct consequence of defendants’ “failure to provide adequate protection against a risk arising from a physically significant elevation differential” … . The trier of fact could find that the elevation differential between plaintiff and the level from which the debris fell was de minimis, that the debris’ weight was inconsequential, or that the debris could not have generated any meaningful amount of force, and determine that plaintiff’s “injuries were the result of [a] usual and ordinary danger[] at a construction site” … .. However, the trier of fact could determine that the elevation differential of at least one story was not de minimis, that the weight of the debris and the force it was capable of generating were significant, and that the debris should have been secured for the purpose of the undertaking. Peters v Structure Tone, Inc., 2022 NY Slip Op 02518, First Dept 4-19-22

Practice Point: There were questions of fact whether injury from falling pebble-sized debris is covered under Labor Law 240(1) and 241(6). The force generated by the falling debris could be found to be de minimus.

 

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ALTHOUGH INFORMATION PROVIDED FOUR DAYS BEFORE TRIAL PURSUANT TO A DEFENSE SUBPOENA INCLUDED BRADY MATERIAL, THE MAJORITY CONCLUDED THE DEFENSE HAD A MEANINGFUL OPPORTUNITY TO USE THE INFORMATION TO CROSS-EXAMINE THE PEOPLE’S WITNESSES; THE DISSENTER DISAGREED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, over a dissent, determined that the People’s failure to turn over Brady material in this sexual-offense prosecution, which the defense received four days before trial pursuant to a subpoena, did not require reversal:

“‘[W]hile the People unquestionably have a duty to disclose exculpatory material in their control,’ a defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial is not violated when, as here, he [or she] is given a meaningful opportunity to use the allegedly exculpatory material to cross-examine the People’s witnesses or as evidence during his [or her] case” … .. Defendant, by way of a subpoena, received the records from the victim’s evaluation four days before trial. Defendant asserts that these records contain two pieces of allegedly exculpatory information. The first is that a physical examination of the victim, performed three months after the incident, was “normal” and did not reveal any corporeal injury. The second is that the victim, during an interview related to the physical examination, disclosed allegations of prior sexual abuse by two different individuals, which defendant asserts were fabricated.

From the dissent:

… [I]n my view, the withheld evidence was clearly material and defendant was prejudiced. As a result of the Brady violation, defendant was denied an opportunity to pursue other strategies with defense counsel. He was denied, among other things, the opportunity to investigate and interview other potential defense witnesses well in advance of trial, or to develop a more detailed argument on the issue of whether he could cross-examine the victim and call certain witnesses without running afoul of the Rape Shield Law (see CPL 60.42). With more time, he also could have called the examining physician or retained his own medical expert to review the records. Learning of the existence of potential witnesses such as the victim’s brother and the mother’s landlord a mere four days before trial provided defendant no opportunity to locate and interview these witnesses and possibly incorporate their testimony into his defense. Moreover, as County Court noted, defendant, under these circumstances, was under no obligation to seek an adjournment of the trial. People v Sherwood, 2022 NY Slip Op 02455, Third Dept 4-14-22

Practice Point: Although the Brady material was not provided until four days before trial pursuant to a defense subpoena, reversal was not required because the defense had a meaningful opportunity to use the material in the cross-examination of the People’s witnesses. The dissenter disagreed.

 

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CLAIMANT DELIVERY DRIVER WAS NOT AN EMPLOYEE OF NEL, A BUSINESS LOGISTICS COMPANY WHICH ASSIGNED CLAIMANT TO DELIVER AUTO PARTS FOR ITS CLIENT, ANY-PART AUTO STORES (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, determined claimant was not an employee of NEL, a business logistics company, and NEL was, therefore, not liable for unemployment insurance contributions on remuneration paid to claimant and others similarly situated. Claimant was a delivery driver who was assigned by NEL to deliver auto parts for Any-Part Auto Stores:

The record reflects that, after NEL initially referred claimant to Any-Part, NEL did not retain any supervisory authority over him. NEL did not provide any training, set delivery goals for claimant, conduct performance reviews or evaluations, require any proof of delivery or require any contact from claimant on a day-to-day basis. Any-Part assigned the deliveries to claimant and handled any complaints. Claimant used his own vehicle, NEL did not reimburse him for any expenses and claimant was not restricted from working for others. Under the parties’ written agreement, claimant could refuse an assignment, but, once he accepted an assignment, he was required to complete it. Per the agreement, claimant was permitted to hire other individuals to perform the work if claimant could not, and claimant was responsible for ensuring that those individuals comply with state and federal regulations, including licensing and insurance requirements. … . Matter of Pasini (Northeast Logistics, Inc.–Commissioner of Labor), 2022 NY Slip Op 02464, Third Dept 4-14-22

 

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