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Counsel for Nonparty Witness Cannot Participate in Deposition

The Fourth Department determined that counsel for a nonparty witness cannot object, i.e., participate, in a deposition of that witness.  The Court wrote:

…“[C]ounsel for a nonparty witness does not have a right to object during or otherwise to participate in a pretrial deposition.CPLR 3113 (c) provides that the examination and cross-examination of deposition witnesses ‘shall proceed as permitted in the trial of actions in open court’ ” (id. [emphasis added]), and it is axiomatic that counsel for a nonparty witness is not permitted to object or otherwise participate in a trial (see e.g. id.).We recognize that 22 NYCRR 221.2 and 221.3 may be viewed as being in conflict with CPLR 3113 (c) inasmuch as sections 221.2 and 221.3 provide that an “attorney” may not interrupt a deposition except in specified circumstances.Nevertheless, it is well established that, in the event of a conflict between a statute and a regulation, the statute controls (seeMatter of Hellner v Board of Educ. of Wilson Cent. School Dist., 78 AD3d 1649, 1651).  Justices Fahey and Martoche dissented in a memorandum. Sciara v Surgical Associates of Western New York, P.C., et al, 1466, CA 12-00809, 4th Dept. 3-15-13

 

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Refusal to Allow Carrier to Call Witnesses Warranted Reversal

n an opinion by Justice Rose, the Third Department reversed the decision of the Workers’ Compensation Board because the Workers’ Compensation Law Judge refused to allow the carrier to further develop the record (by calling witnesses). The Court stated:  “It is axiomatic that both the claimant and the employer or its workers’ compensation carrier are entitled to introduce witnesses in compensation proceedings…”.  In the Matter of Mason v Glens Falls Ready Mix, et al, 514744, 3rd Dept. 3-14-13

 

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No Appeal Lies from Direction to Settle Judgment on Notice

After denying a motion to set aside a verdict, the trial court directed the parties to settle judgment on notice.  The appeal of ruling was dismissed.  The Second Department explained: “[N]o appeal lies from a decision, or an appealed paper directing the settlement of a judgment (see CPLR 5512[a]; … . Moreover, plaintiff’s right to a direct appeal from any order denying a motion to set aside the verdict terminated with the entry of a judgment (see CPLR 5501…).”  Ryals v New York City Tr. Auth., 2013 NY Slip Op 01630, 9544 21244/04, 1st Dept. 3-14-13

 

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From the Point When a Director’s Position Becomes Adverse to the Corporation, the Director Is Not Entitled to Discovery of the Corporation’s Attorney-Client Communications

Plaintiff was both a shareholder in and a director of defendant corporation. In her role as a shareholder, plaintiff brought a special proceeding to compel the corporation to pay the fair market value of her shares pursuant to Business Corporation Law section 623.  The special proceeding was prompted by the corporation’s sale of a 65% interest in the business to a third-party investor—a sale to which plaintiff objected.  During the course of discovery, the defendant corporation’s lawyers turned over thousands of documents to the plaintiff.  Included in those documents were attorney-client communications which took place after plaintiff had voiced her strong objection to the sale of the 65% interest in the business. The motion court determined that the plaintiff, as a director, was a corporate insider by definition, and was therefore entitled to all the corporation’s attorney-client communications, even those communications which took place after she voiced her opposition to the sale.  The First Department reversed.  The Court determined that, once plaintiff objected to the sale and hired her own attorney, her interests became “adverse” to those of the corporation, and she was not entitled to the attorney-client communications made after that point. [There is a long dissent arguing that, pursuant to CPLR 5511, the appellants were not aggrieved by the ruling appealed from and, therefore, the First Department did not have jurisdiction to entertain the appeal.] Barasch v Williams Real Estate Co. 2013 NY Slip Op 01613, 7405, 500054/09, 1st Dept. 3-14-13

 

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Records Sealed Pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law 160.50 Can Be Unsealed in “Dangerous Sex Offender” Proceeding Pursuant to Mental Health Law

In a proceeding which determined respondent was a dangerous sex offender requiring confinement, the court ordered the unsealing of records related to three rapes and two robberies for which respondent was indicted in 1968.  The convictions of one count of rape and one count of robbery had been overturned because respondent was found to have been incompetent at the time he pled guilty. In finding the records of the overturned convictions were properly unsealed, the First Department determined that Mental Health Law 10.08 (c), which provides that the State is entitled to all records relating to the respondent’s commission or alleged commission of a sex offense, supersedes Criminal Procedure Law 160.50, which requires that the record of a criminal proceeding that is terminated in favor of the accused be sealed.  State v John S., 2013 NY Slip Op 01622, 9530, 30051/09m 1st Dept. 3-14-13

 

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Failure to Instruct Jury that Medical Practice Guidelines Did Not Set Forth the Applicable Standard of Care Required Reversal

The case turned on whether the defendant failed to recommend and perform a timely colonoscopy (the plaintiff, who had a history of colon polyps, contracted colon cancer).  At trial the defendant doctor was allowed to introduce in evidence guidelines published by the American Gastroenterological Association which included the recommended frequency of colonoscopies.  The plaintiff objected and requested a limiting instruction informing the jury that the guidelines “did not set forth the standards of care with regard to the diagnosis and treatment of plaintiff’s colon cancer.” The trial court gave a cursory limiting instruction at the time the guidelines were admitted, and told the jury another instruction would be forthcoming.  The trial court subsequently declined to give any further instructions on the issue.  In reversing the judgment for the defendant and ordering a new trial, the First Department wrote:

The court erred in failing to give the instruction that plaintiff requested. Although the trial court’s instruction informed the jury that it was to make its determination based on “all the evidence,” this instruction was not sufficient to guide the jury on how to apply the Guidelines to the facts before it. The court’s instruction as rendered failed to make clear to the jury that the Guidelines were simply recommendations regarding treatment, and thus, that compliance with the Guidelines did not, in and of itself, constitute good and accepted medical practice … . The trial court should have given the jury an instruction specifically stating that the Guidelines were not the same as standards of care and that the jury was to make its determination based on the particular circumstances of the case, not on the Guidelines alone. Introducing the Guidelines into evidence without the appropriate limiting instruction allowed the jury to infer that a physician need not exercise professional judgment with regard to individual patients, but could simply abide by the recommendations promulgated in the Guidelines.  Hall v Kiyici, 2013 NY Slip Op 01616, 9067, 23531/05, 1st Dept. 3-14-13

 

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Tape Recording Reflecting Frustration About Treatment of Muslim Inmates Did Not Warrant Punishment

The Third Department annulled the disciplinary hearing determination which found that the petitioner had engaged in prohibited “violent conduct” based on a tape recorded conversation.  After reviewing the tape, the Court ruled that the disciplinary rules prohibiting “conduct involving the threat of violence” and participation in “a work stoppage, sit-in, lock-n, or other actions which may be detrimental to the order of the facility” had not been violated. The evidence revealed only that “petitioner was agitated after incidents in which other Muslim inmates had allegedly been assaulted by correction officers. He indicated to the inmates at the meeting that they needed to do something about it and specifically mentioned ‘starting a paper trail.’ Significantly, he did not advocate violent or disorderly action.”  In the Matter of Murray, v Fischer, 514687, 3rd Dept. 3-14-13

 

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Insufficient Proof to Support “Medical Neglect” Finding

The First Department reversed Family Court’s finding of medical neglect related to a five-month-old’s fractured femur.  Family Court accepted the proof that the baby, for the first time in his life, rolled over and fell off a couch when the father left him briefly to throw away a soiled diaper.  Family Court’s medical-neglect determination was based on testimony that the fracture “would cause the child evident pain…” and the length of time between the accident and when medical attention was sought.  The First Department noted the proof that swelling would not be immediately apparent and that a hairline fracture would not cause much pain until it progressed into a full fracture, as well as a video of the child showing no movement problems or signs of pain. In light of proof the child may not have exhibited symptoms of pain, the First Department determined the finding of neglect was not supported by a preponderance of the evidence. In re Amir L., 2013 NY Slip Op 01617, 9277-9278-9279, 1st Dept. 3-14-13

 

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Punitive Damages Award Not Recoverable in Subsequent “Bad Faith Failure to Settle” Case Against Insurer

A judgment which included punitive damages was assessed against an insured.  The insured sued the insurance company for a bad-faith failure to settle the libel and slander claims within policy limits.  The First Department determined the insurance company was entitled to summary judgment because public policy precludes the insured from recovering the punitive damages portion of any judgment resulting from the insurer’s bad faith.  The Court also noted that the public policy argument could be raised for the first time on appeal because no new facts were alleged and only purely legal arguments were made.  Seldon v Allstate Ins. Co., 2013 NY Slip Op 01628, 9542, 116217/08, 1st Dept. 3-14-13

 

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