“The method of service provided for in an order to show cause is jurisdictional in nature and must be strictly complied with …”. US Bank National Association vs Feliciano, 2012-0553, Index No. 3540/09 Second Dept. 2-20-13
In this case the Second Department included a clear discussion of the elements of proof necessary to create a constructive trust: “(1) a confidential or fiduciary relationship, (2) a promise, (3) a transfer in reliance thereon, and (4) unjust enrichment…”. Henning vs Henning, 2011-09955, Index No. 11901/11 Second Dept. 2-20-13
“A written report prepared by a nontestifying doctor interpreting the results of a medical test is not admissible into evidence. …[O]pinion evidence must be based on facts in the record or personally known to the witness …” D’Andria vs Pesce, 2011-03506, Index No. 16320/02 Second Dept. 2-20-13
“Since the [res ipsa loquitur] doctrine merely permits an inference arising from the evidence in a negligence case, the plaintiff’s failure to plead res ipsa loquitur does not foreclose its application on summary judgment or at trial.” Wicks vs Leemilt’s Petroleum, Inc., 2011-01891, Index No. 1843/08 Second Dept. 2-20-13
The Second Department affirmed the dismissal of a complaint because the complaint asserted theories not mentioned in the notice of claim. “A party may not add a new theory of liability which was not included in the notice of claim …”. Williams vs County of Westchester, 2011-10614, Index No. 15002/08 Second Dept. 2-20-13
The Second Department reversed the trial court’s grant of a petition to file a late notice of claim. “The petitioner did not demonstrate a reasonable excuse… . The petitioners’ assertion that they only recently discovered that they had a claim against the City is not an acceptable excuse … . * * * The fact that the … Police Department had knowledge of this accident, without more, cannot be considered actual knowledge of the essential facts underlying the claim against the City …”. Matter of Klass vs City of New York, 2012-00913, Index No. 16699/11 Second Dept. 2-20-13
The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Pigott, over a dissent, determined that the prevailing wage requirement of Labor Law 220 did not apply to construction work for the Bath Volunteer Fire Department (BVFD) which had procured its own funding for a new firehouse:
After an investigation, the Department of Labor (DOL) issued an opinion letter, concluding that the firehouse project was a public work subject to the prevailing wage law. Once the subcontractors learned of the DOL’s determination, work on the project halted. In December 2006, BVFD agreed to indemnify [the contractor] and its subcontractors against any liability resulting from their failure to pay the prevailing wages, and construction resumed and the project was completed. …
The prevailing wage law covers contracts involving each of four specific public entities: the state, a public benefit corporation, a municipal corporation or a commission appointed pursuant to law (see Labor Law § 220 [2]). It is undisputed that BVFD is a fire corporation as defined by the Not-For-Profit Corporation Law, and it is not one of the public entities named in the statute. Nevertheless, the Commissioner determined that BVFD could be deemed “the functional equivalent” of a “municipal department” within the meaning of the Labor Law. …
The “functional equivalent” test, however, was rejected by this Court in Matter of New York Charter School Assn. v Smith (15 NY3d 403 [2010]). There, the DOL deemed charter schools “public benefit corporations” because the schools serve a valuable public purpose and their existence is the result of a charter issued by a state or local municipal entity. Given those factors, the DOL determined that charter schools met the requirements established by the courts of this State for public work projects. We rejected that argument because while charter schools, like volunteer fire corporations, may be “quasi-public” in nature, they are not a specified public entity and thus, do not fit within the ambit of the statute (id. at 410).
Had the legislature intended to include volunteer fire corporations under the statute, it could easily have done so. Notably, in 2007, the legislature expanded the statute’s coverage to include contracts involving other types of entities, but only when it can be shown they were acting on behalf of the public entity … . Matter of M.G.M. Insulation, Inc. v Gardner, 2013 NY Slip Op 01017 [20 NY3d 469], CtApp 2-19-13
The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Smith, determined that defense counsel’s failure to move to suppress based upon a violation of Criminal Procedure Law 710.30, which requires notice of any identification of the defendant as the perpetrator, did not rise to ineffective assistance. Although the People provided notice of an identification of the defendant by the victim at a particular time, they did not provide notice of a subsequent identification by the victim a few minutes later after defendant was in custody:
Assuming that there was a section 710.30 violation, it might not have resulted in exclusion of the evidence in question. CPL 710.30 (2) provides for the possibility of late notice, and a belated suppression hearing, when the People show “good cause.” The belated notice and hearing may occur during the trial …, and if the trial court thought the People had made an excusable error it might have granted such a remedy here.
In short, it is not obvious that defendant’s counsel could have successfully sought preclusion of the evidence of the victim’s post-arrest identification under section 710.30. An argument for preclusion could have been made, but not an argument “so compelling that a failure to make it amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel” … . Counsel’s performance should not be “second-guessed with the clarity of hindsight” … . Any deficiency in her performance was not so great that it can support an ineffective assistance claim.
Nor has defendant shown any serious likelihood that he was prejudiced by trial counsel’s alleged error. Even if the trial court had precluded evidence of the victim’s post-arrest identification, the evidence against defendant would remain strong. People v Vasquez, 2013 NY Slip Op 01016 [20 NY3d 461], CtApp 2-19-13
The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Read, determined the requirement that employees of the School District of the City of Niagara Falls reside in the City of Niagara Falls serves a legitimate purpose and is not related to job performance. Therefore, only notice and an opportunity to respond to the allegation of a violation of the requirement are necessary to comply with due process. Matter of Beck-Nichols v Bianco, 2013 NY Slip Op 01015 [20 NY3d 540], CtApp, 2-19-13
The Court of Appeals determined the “records pertaining to the routine inspection, maintenance and calibration of breathalyzer machines can be offered as evidence in a criminal trial without producing the persons who created the records. …[S]uch records are nontestimonial…” Judge Pigott agreed with that “Confrontation Clause analysis” but wrote a dissent about the nature of the vehicle stop that led to the DWI arrest. The suppression court had ruled that the stop was not supported by probable cause “but for … a Finger Lakes Community College sticker in the rear window…”. Apparently such a sticker violates Vehicle and Traffic Law section 375 (1)(b)(i). Judge Pigott noted that college stickers are common, the statute is rarely if ever enforced, and stopping a car because of a sticker is “not objectively reasonable.” Judge Pigott would have suppressed the evidence which arose from the stop. People vs Pealer, No. 9, CtApp 2-19-13
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