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Motion to Vacate Default Based On Lack of Jurisdiction Need Not Demonstrate Reasonable Excuse Meritorious Defense

In finding Supreme Court should have held a hearing on whether defendant [Goldberger] was properly served with a complaint in a foreclosure action (in which the defendant did not appear), the Court noted that the fact defendant had unsuccessfully filed for bankruptcy after the judgment of foreclosure did not prevent him from contesting service of the foreclosure complaint.  The Court explained that where the motion to vacate a default judgment is based on a lack of personal jurisdiction, neither a reasonable excuse nor a meritorious defense need be demonstrated:

The Supreme Court erred in determining the motion without first conducting a hearing. Although the process server’s affidavit constituted prima facie evidence of proper service, Goldberger’s sworn claim that he did not reside at the subject premises, along with his submission of documentary evidence supporting that claim, was sufficient to rebut the prima facie showing, and to necessitate a hearing… . Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, Goldberger is not judicially estopped from seeking vacatur of the judgment as a result of his filing of a bankruptcy petition. …Goldberger did not receive a favorable result in the bankruptcy proceeding by taking a position contrary to one he is taking in this action ….  …[A] party who moves to vacate a judgment entered on default on the ground of lack of personal jurisdiction is not required to demonstrate a reasonable excuse for the default or a potentially meritorious defense  … . Dime Sav Bank of Williamsburg v 146 Ross Realty, LLC, 2013 NY Slip Op 03451, 2nd Dept, 5-15-13

 

 

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Objection to Verification of Answer Too Late 

The Second Department determined plaintiff waited too long before objecting to an insufficient verification in the answer:

A party must “give[ ] notice with due diligence” that he or she intends to treat a pleading as a nullity pursuant to CPLR 3022 on the ground that the pleading was served with an insufficient verification (CPLR 3022;…). Here, the plaintiff …waived any claim that the verification accompanying the answer of the defendant …was defective by waiting approximately eight months after the answer was filed to object to it (see CPLR 3022; …).   Cherubin Antiques, Inc v Matiash, 2013 NY Slip Op 03449, 2nd Dept, 5-15-13

 

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Plaintiff Unable to Demonstrate Freedom from Comparative Negligence as a Matter of Law; Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment in Automobile Accident Case Denied

In affirming the denial of plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on liability in an automobile-accident case, the Second Department explained the plaintiff failed to demonstrate freedom from comparative negligence as a matter of law:

“There can be more than one proximate cause [of an accident] and, thus, the proponent of a summary judgment motion has the burden of establishing freedom from comparative negligence as a matter of law” …. While an operator of a motor vehicle traveling with the right-of-way is entitled to assume that other drivers will obey the traffic laws requiring them to yield…, the operator traveling with the right-of-way still has an obligation to keep a proper lookout and see what can be seen through the reasonable use of his or her senses to avoid colliding with other vehicles…. The issue of comparative fault is generally a question for the trier of fact … .

Here, the plaintiff failed to submit evidence eliminating a triable issue of fact as to whether she contributed to the happening of the accident…. Since the plaintiff failed to establish her prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, her motion was properly denied regardless of the sufficiency of the defendant’s papers in opposition… .  Regans v Baratta, 2013 NY Slip Op 03468, 2nd Dept, 5-15-13

TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS

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Passenger in Car of Which Plaintiff Lost Control in Snowy Conditions Entitled to Summary Judgment

In finding Supreme Court should have granted summary judgment in favor of the passenger-plaintiff, who was injured when the driver-defendant lost control of his car and struck a fence, the Second Department wrote:

The plaintiffs made a prima facie showing of their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by submitting evidence that this was a one-car accident which occurred when Rajput [defendant] lost control of the vehicle he was driving…. “An innocent passenger . . . who, in support of [his or] her motion for summary judgment, submits evidence that the accident resulted from the driver losing control of the vehicle, shifts the burden to the driver to come forward with an exculpatory explanation” ….
In opposition, the defendants failed to raise an issue of fact sufficient to defeat summary judgment. Since Rajput acknowledged in his affidavit that it was snowing heavily at the time of his accident, and that he was aware of wet and icy road conditions, the emergency doctrine is inapplicable …. Furthermore, the affidavit, which failed to specify at what speed Rajput was actually driving before his vehicle skidded, was insufficient to establish that he was driving with reasonable care, and thus raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the skid was unavoidable … .  Mughal v Rajput, 2013 NY Slip Op 03466, 2nd Dept, 5-15-13

TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS

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Assumption of Risk Extends to Construction of Baseball Field

Plaintiff, while playing baseball, fell on a concrete pathway adjacent to the outfield while running to catch a ball.  The Second Department determined the doctrine of primary assumption of risk applied to risks associated with the construction of the playing field:

…[T]he Supreme Court properly granted the defendants’ separate motions for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them based on the doctrine of primary assumption of risk. That doctrine extends to those risks associated with the construction of the playing field and any open and obvious condition thereon…, as well as risks involving less than optimal playing conditions …. The defendants demonstrated their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by establishing that the plaintiff assumed the risk of injury by voluntarily participating in the softball game, thereby consenting to the commonly appreciated risks which are inherent in and arise out of the sport generally and flow from such participation, including those open and obvious risks associated with the construction of and conditions upon the playing field … .  Mattas v Town of Hempstead, 2013 NY Slip Op 03464, 2nd Dept, 5-15-13

 

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Pre-Deposition Motion to Dismiss in Rear-End Collision Case Not Premature

In reversing the denial of summary judgment to the plaintiff in a rear-end collision case, the Second Department determined the pre-deposition motion for summary judgment should not have been dismissed as premature:

The Supreme Court erred in concluding that the plaintiffs’ motion was premature. A party who contends that a summary judgment motion is premature is required to demonstrate that discovery might lead to relevant evidence or the facts essential to justify opposition to the motion were exclusively within the knowledge and control of the movant (see CPLR 3212[f]; … .The defendant’s contention that the plaintiffs’ motion was premature because the plaintiffs had not yet been deposed at the time the plaintiffs’ motion was filed did not establish what information the defendant hoped to discover at the plaintiffs’ depositions that would relieve him of liability in this case. “The mere hope or speculation that evidence sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment may be uncovered during the discovery process is insufficient to deny the motion” … .  Cajas-Romero v Ward, 2013 NY Slip Op 03446, 2nd Dept, 5-15-13

TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS

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No Demonstration Burst Water Pipe Could Have Been the Result of Negligent Inspection or Maintenance; Municipality Immune from Negligent Design

In affirming Supreme Court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendant town with respect to damages allegedly caused by a burst storm water pipe, the Second Department determined plaintiffs did not raise a question of fact concerning negligent inspection or maintenance:

“A municipality is immune from liability arising out of claims that it negligently designed [a] sewerage system” or storm drainage system”… . However, a municipality is not immune from liability arising out of claims that it negligently maintained its storm drainage system…. For the plaintiffs to recover under a theory of negligent inspection or maintenance of the storm drainage system, the plaintiffs must demonstrate that the defendants had ” notice of a dangerous condition or ha[d] reason to believe that the pipes ha[d] shifted or deteriorated and [were] likely to cause injury,’ that the [defendants] failed to make reasonable efforts to inspect and repair the defect,’ and that such failure caused the plaintiffs’ injuries”….  Bilotta v Town of Harrison, 2013 NY Slip Op 03444, 2nd Dept, 5-15-13

 

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Proof of Regular Cleaning Negated Constructive Notice Allegation​

In determining the defendant’s motion for summary judgment in a slip and fall case should have been granted, the Second Department explained defendant had met its burden on the issue of (the absence of) constructive notice by proof of regular weekly cleaning:

In a slip-and-fall case, a defendant moving for summary judgment has the initial burden of making a prima facie showing that it did not create the condition on which the plaintiff slipped, and did not have actual or constructive notice of that condition… . ” To meet its initial burden on the issue of lack of constructive notice, the defendant must offer some evidence as to when the area in question was last cleaned or inspected relative to the time when the plaintiff fell'”… .  A defendant’s submission of evidence of its general cleaning practices is generally insufficient to meet its burden on the issue of lack of constructive notice … . Here, however, the defendant submitted an affidavit from its superintendent indicating that each and every Monday, he would mop the entire building, including the stairwell where the plaintiff allegedly fell, and that this mopping would always occur between the hours of 3:00 p.m. and 4:00 p.m. This affidavit was specific enough to satisfy the defendant’s initial burden. In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact. Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Armijos v Vrettos Realty Corp, 2013 NY Slip Op 03443, 2nd Dept,. 5-15-13

 

 

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Exclusion of Petitioner from Hearing During Testimony of Primary Witness Required Vacation of Award

The exclusion of petitioner from an administrative hearing during the testimony of the only eyewitness to an alleged assault by petitioner required vacation of the arbitrator’s award.  The First Department wrote:

Petitioner’s exclusion from the administrative hearing during the testimony of the only eyewitness to her alleged hitting of a student—the student himself—violated her constitutional right to confront the witnesses against her …. Nothing in the record indicates that a compelling competing interest warranted the exclusion. There is no finding that petitioner’s presence would cause trauma to the student or substantially interfere with his ability to testify. Indeed, the record contains no indication at all of the basis for the exclusion. Petitioner contends that in addition to her constitutional right she had an absolute right to confront witnesses under Education Law § 3020-a. However … there is no such absolute right under § 3020-a… .  Matter of Stergiou v NYC Dept of Educ, 2013 NY Slip Op 03432, 1st Dept, 5-14-13

 

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Whether the “Assault and Battery” Exclusion from Coverage Pertained to an Arson Is a Question of Fact Which Depends Upon the Motives of the Arsonist

A fire in plaintiff’s building left several people dead or injured.  A person was arrested and charged with arson in connection with the fire. The plaintiff brought a declaratory judgment action to determine whether the defendant insurance company was required to defend and indemnify plaintiff.  The main issue was whether the policy exclusion of damages caused by assault and battery applied. The First Department affirmed the trial court’s denial of plaintiff’s motion to dismiss the insurance company’s affirmative defenses, i.e., the assault and battery exclusion and the lack of bodily injury caused by accident or occurrence.  The First Department wrote:

Civil assault and battery are intentional acts, and the assault offenses with which the accused arsonist is charged do not include the intent to harm a specific individual (compare PJI 2d 3:2 [assault]; 3:3 [battery], with Penal Law 120.10[4] [assault in the first degree]; 120.05[6] [assault in the second degree]). Thus, assuming that the insurance policy exclusion is triggered by civil, rather than criminal, assault or battery, the critical inquiry is whether the accused arsonist, in allegedly causing the fire, intended to harm any occupant of the building. Although the determination of the criminal action is therefore not necessary to a determination of the application of the exclusion, the criminal trial may shed light on the accused arsonist’s motives, including whether he intended to harm anyone inside the building. In any event, the criminal trial may enable defendant to obtain access to evidence and witnesses that will assist in determining whether the exclusion applies. Based on representations made at oral argument, the criminal trial has been concluded and, thus, the stay should be lifted. In light of the foregoing, the motion court correctly denied plaintiff’s motion to dismiss the affirmative defenses based on the assault and battery exclusion and the lack of bodily injury caused by an accident or occurrence.  20-35 86th St Realty, LLC v Tower Ins Co of NY, 2013 NY Slip Op 03413, 1st Dept, 5-14-13

 

 

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