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Inmate’s “Employee Assistant” Did Not Provide Meaningful Assistance in Preparation of Inmate’s Defense

In annulling the determination, the Third Department held that the inmate’s employee assistant did not provide meaningful assistance in the preparation of the inmate’s defense:

We agree with petitioner that meaningful employee assistance was not provided in accordance with 7 NYCRR 251-4.2 in order for him to prepare a defense. Although petitioner requested that 19 potential inmate witnesses be interviewed, the record reveals no effort by  the employee  assistant to interview the potential inmate  witnesses, who  were  not only identified but, according to the misbehavior report, were present during the alleged incident. The employee assistant should have interviewed the witnesses and reported back to petitioner with the results of those efforts (see 7 NYCRR 251-4.2); moreover, the Hearing Officer made no attempt to remedy the inadequacies when petitioner raised the issue at the administrative hearing… . Matter of Canty v Fischer, 515267, 3rd Dept, 6-13-13

 

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“Safety Consultant” Liable for Failure to Maintain Safe Work Site

In upholding a jury verdict, the Third Department determined there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that a safety consultant was liable under Labor Law 241 (6) for failing to maintain a safe work site:

Labor Law § 241 (6) “‘requires owners and contractors to provide reasonable and adequate protection and safety for workers and to comply with the specific safety rules and regulations promulgated by the Commissioner of the Department of Labor'”…. Although a safety consultant generally is not liable to an injured worker under the Labor Law…,it is not the title that is dispositive, but whether such defendant had sufficient supervision and control over the activity that resulted in the injury….  We have previously stated that “[s]ubcontractors may be liable as agents under Labor Law § 241(6) when they have been specifically contractually delegated the duty or obligation to correct unsafe conditions or maintain work site safety”… .

The contract …set forth that a representative of defendant would be at the work site daily, make inspections, conduct safety meetings and have authority to require “immediate corrective action for imminent danger situations.” Defendant’s representative was continuously at the site throughout the project, and he exercised his power on several occasions prior to the accident by stopping work and requiring defendant to take specific precautions or actions. He was present when the accident occurred.  Leszczynski v Town of Neversink, 514876, 3rd Dept, 6-13-13

 

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Husband’s Dissipation of His Separate Property Was a Factor in Increasing Wife’s Maintenance and Equitable Distribution

The Third Department increased the wife’s maintenance and equitable distribution awards based in part upon finding the husband had wasted and dissipated assets that were concededly entirely his separate property.  He had purchased an apartment house in New York City prior to the marriage for $130,000 and sold it during the marriage for $6 million.  The Court determined the husband had grossly mismanaged the proceeds of the sale:

Imputing to the husband the substantial income that he would have earned had he not been so cavalier and wasteful in the manner in which he blatantly risked virtually all of his capital …, and affording the wife more time to prepare for and find suitable employment, we extend the wife’s maintenance award of $2,000 per month  for nine months  to a period of 24 months, for a total of $48,000.  We further modify the award of equitable distribution – taking into account the parties’ assets at the commencement of the action and the husband’s economic fault – to award the wife 50%, rather than 40%, of the appreciation in the value of the marital residence.  Owens v Owens, 514022, 3rd Dept, 6-13-13

 

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Religious Organization Vicariously Liable for Negligence of Volunteer Under Agency Theory

The Third Department affirmed Supreme Court’s finding that a volunteer [Strimling] was an agent of the defendant [Gateway], a corporation hosting a religious event, such that the defendant was vicariously liable with respect to an automobile accident involving the volunteer:

A  principal-agent relationship can  include a volunteer when  the requisite conditions, including control and  acting on  another’s behalf, are shown … .Gateways was  operating a program  where  it expected  700  to 800  attendees, who each paid $700 to attend.  Strimling’s fee to attend was waived  as it had  been  previously and, with his fee waived, he helped with various tasks that had to be accomplished to run the event. Strimling’s responsibilities included  arriving early to help set up, and  he was  supposed to remain after the event to pack up items for the return trip. Strimling referred to his responsibilities as work and  a job, reflecting his understanding of control by Gateways. Although he was not paid directly by Gateways, his $700 fee was waived and one of the individuals from Gateways in charge of the event also gave him $200. There was proof that the accident occurred when an individual who had authorized Strimling’s free attendance realized that two-way radios were needed and Strimling was summoned from his room to go to a store to purchase such items. Strimling was given a Gateways’ credit card and embarked on  a trip to a store solely to purchase the requested items for Gateways when  the accident occurred. He did so despite the fact that the timing of the request created a significant likelihood that Strimling would be put in the difficult position of traveling at a time of the evening that was prohibited by his religious beliefs. The proof sufficiently supports Supreme Court’s decision.  Paterno v Strimling…, 515978, 3rd Dept, 6-13-13

 

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Negligence Suit Based Upon Shooting at Shopping Mall Dismissed

The Third Department affirmed the grant of summary judgment to the defendant shopping mall in a negligence suit based upon a shooting at the mall in which plaintiffs were injured.  The Court determined the shooting was not foreseeable and explained the relevant legal principles as follows:

Landowners have a duty to take reasonable precautions to secure their premises from foreseeable harm, including the foreseeable criminal acts of third parties on the premises….    Criminal conduct is foreseeable if it was “reasonably predictable based on the prior occurrence of the same or similar criminal activity at a location sufficiently proximate to the subject location”….   While the prior criminal activity need not have been “at the exact location where [the] plaintiff was harmed or . . . of the same type of criminal conduct to which [the] plaintiff was subjected,” the inquiry of foreseeability depends upon “the location, nature and extent of those previous criminal activities and their similarity, proximity or other relationship to the crime in question”… Haire v Bonelli …, 515494, 3rd Dept, 6-13-13

THIRD PARTY ASSAULT

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Plaintiff’s Lack of Knowledge About Contract Breaches Did Not Toll Statute of Limitations

The Second Department determined plaintiff’s lack of knowledge about alleged annual breaches of contract by the village for which he served as police commissioner was not the result of fraud and, therefore, the 18-month statute of limitations for each breach was not tolled:

Pursuant to CPLR 9802, “no action shall be maintained against the village upon or arising out of a contract of the village unless the same shall be commenced within eighteen months after the cause of action therefor shall have accrued, nor unless a written verified claim shall have been filed with the village clerk within one year after the cause of action shall have accrued.” Where the claim is for the payment of a sum of money allegedly owed pursuant to a contract, the cause of action accrues when the plaintiff possesses a legal right to demand payment…. Here, as the Village correctly contends, the causes of action alleging breach of contract accrued at the end of each year that the plaintiff allegedly was not paid in accordance with his contract…. Since this action was not commenced until September 28, 2011, the Village established, prima facie, that the action was time-barred to the extent that the plaintiff sought to recover damages accruing prior to March 28, 2010, that is, 18 months prior to the commencement of the action…. In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a question of fact as to whether the statute of limitations had been tolled or was otherwise inapplicable, or whether he actually commenced the action within the applicable limitations periods…. Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, his lack of knowledge that the several breaches had occurred did not toll the running of the limitations period… Reid v Incorporated Vil of Flora Park, 2013 NY Slip Op 04321, 2nd Dept, 6-12-13

 

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Submission of Intentional and Depraved Indifference Murder to Jury in Conjunctive Rather than Alternative Okay

The Second Department determined the trial court did not err when it submitted intentional murder and depraved indifference murder to the jury in the conjunctive, rather than the alternative, because more than one potential victim was present:

The defendant, relying on People v Molina (79 AD3d 1371), contends that the submission of the counts of intentional murder (and attempted murder) and depraved indifference murder to the jury in the conjunctive, rather than in the alternative, violated his right to due process. However, the defendant’s contention is without merit. “Where, as here, more than one potential victim was present at the shooting, a defendant may be convicted of both counts because he or she may have possessed different states of mind with regard to different potential victims”…. To the extent that the Appellate Division, [3rd] Department, held differently in Molina, we disagree and decline to follow that holding. People v Dubarry, 2013 NY Slip Op 04354, 2nd Dept, 6-12-13

 

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Relationships Among Subtenancy, Prime Tenancy and Landlord Explained

The Second Department explained the relationships among a subtenancy, the prime tenancy and the landlord as follows:

“As a general rule, where a landlord and prime tenant enter into an agreement to voluntarily terminate the paramount lease, the subtenant becomes the immediate tenant of the original lessor, and the interest of the subtenant and terms of the sublease continue as if no termination had occurred”…. “However, because a sublease is dependent upon and limited by the terms and conditions of the paramount lease from which it is carved, a subtenancy may be terminated by the expiration of the term of the prime tenant, or a re-entry by the landlord for a condition broken”….  380 Yorktown Food Corp v 380 Downing Dr, LLC, 2013 NY Slip Op 04327, 2nd Dept, 6-12-13

 

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Criteria for Award of Support for Education

The Second Department explained the criteria for the award of support for a child’s college education as follows:

“Unlike the obligation to provide support for a child’s basic needs, support for a child’s college education is not mandatory'”…. “Instead, absent a voluntary agreement, whether a parent is obligated to contribute to a child’s college education is dependent upon the exercise of the court’s discretion in accordance with Domestic Relations Law § 240(1-b)(c)(7)’ …, and an award will be made only “as justice requires”‘”…. “[A] court must give due regard to the circumstances of the case and the respective parties, as well as both the best interests of the child and the requirements of justice” ….  Silverstein v Silverstein, 2013 NY Slip Op 04323, 2nd Dept, 6-12-13

 

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Family Court Should Have Granted Father’s Motion to Vacate a Fact-Finding Order

In an abuse and neglect proceeding, the Second Department reversed Family Court’s denial of father’s motion to vacate a fact-finding order after a hearing at which father was not present:

If a parent is not present, the court may proceed to hear a petition pursuant to Family Court Act article 10 if the child is represented by counsel (see Family Ct Act § 1042). However, a timely motion to vacate the resulting fact-finding order shall be granted upon an affidavit showing, inter alia, a potentially meritorious defense to the petition unless the court finds that the parent willfully refused to appear at the hearing….  Under the circumstances presented, the appellant adequately demonstrated that his failure to appear was not willful…. Moreover, the father demonstrated a potentially meritorious defense to the petitions …. Matter of Mark W, 2013 NY Slip Op 04347, 2nd Dept, 6-12-13

 

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