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Neglect Allegations Not Proven by Hearsay Testimony Based On Statements Made by Mother

The Third Department affirmed the dismissal of a neglect petition after a hearing where the only evidence was the hearsay testimony of the caseworker based on what the caseworker was told by the mother:

“To establish neglect, [a] petitioner must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a child’s physical, mental or emotional condition was harmed or is in imminent danger of harm as a result of a failure on the part of the parent to exercise a minimum degree of care”… . At a fact-finding hearing, only “competent, material and relevant evidence” may be admitted (Family Ct Act § 1046 [b] [iii]…).Here, the only proof offered by petitioner was the testimony of its caseworker, who had no personal knowledge of the events that led to the filing of the petition.  Rather, the caseworker’s testimony concerning the alleged acts constituting neglect consisted entirely of what he was purportedly told by the mother.  Upon our review of the record and notwithstanding the absence of any contrary testimony, we discern no error in Family Court’s determination that the testimony of the caseworker was insufficient to sustain petitioner’s burden of proof… .  Matter of Lydia DD…, 515237, 3rd Dept 10-31-13

 

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Abuse Was Not Demonstrated; Non-Testifying Child’s Out-Court-Statements Not Corroborated by Witnesses Who Testified About What the Child Told Them

The Third Department affirmed Family Court’s determination that the petitioner had not met its burden of proof that respondent had abused a child (Kaelynn).  The child did not testify and petitioner relied entirely on the testimony of four people to whom the child had disclosed abuse, and the observations of the child’s demeanor during the disclosures. No medical proof was submitted.  In finding the out-of-court allegations made by the child had not been corroborated, the court explained:

…[T]he record contains insufficient evidence to corroborate Kaelynn’s allegations.  Significantly here, a child’s uncorroborated unsworn allegations of abuse alone are insufficient to sustain a finding of abuse (see Family Ct Act § 1046 [a] [vi]) and, although “a child’s out-of-court statement ‘may be corroborated by any evidence tending to support its reliability, and a relatively low degree of corroborative evidence is sufficient in abuse proceedings'” …, there is “a threshold of reliability that the evidence must meet” … .  “Whether this corroboration requirement has been satisfied is a ‘fine judgment’ entrusted in the first instance to Family Court, which has the advantage of having heard and seen the various witnesses” … .

Under established law, Kaelynn’s repetition of the allegations of abuse to the testifying witnesses, however consistent and believable, is not sufficient to corroborate these prior out-of-court statements … .  Petitioner presented no expert testimony to “objectively validate [Kaelynn’s] account” or to “relate[] any of her past or present conduct or characteristics to the alleged sexual abuse” … .  While a police investigator who interviewed Kaelynn testified that he conducted a “truth versus lie” inquiry of her and concluded that she understood the consequences of lying, he did not explain his methodology for reaching this conclusion nor did he relate whether her account fit any profile for truthful testimony from abused children … .  Moreover, there was no physical evidence of sexual abuse …, and Kaelynn – in light of her young age — did not give sworn testimony nor was she questioned in camera … . Matter of Dezarea T …, 514693, 3rd Dept 10-31-13

 

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Seizure of Property for Construction of Firehouse Okay

The Second Department affirmed the eminent-domain seizure of petitioner’s property (under EDPL article 2) for construction of a firehouse:

“The principal purpose of EDPL article 2 is to insure that an agency does not acquire property without having made a reasoned determination that the condemnation will serve a valid public purpose” … . Judicial review of a condemnation determination is limited to whether the proceeding was constitutional, whether the proposed acquisition is within the condemnor’s statutory jurisdiction or authority, whether the determination and findings were made in accordance with the procedures set forth in EDPL article 2 and the State Environmental Quality Review Act, and whether a public use, benefit, or purpose will be served by the proposed acquisition (see EDPL 207[C]…). Here, the petitioner has failed to demonstrate any basis for setting aside the Common Council’s determination.

Contrary to the petitioner’s contention, the record shows that the determination to condemn a portion of its property is rationally related to the stated public purpose and that such public purpose is dominant … . ” [T]he fact that an intended public use confers incidental benefit to private persons or entities will not invalidate the condemnation'” … . Matter of Peekskill Hgts Inc v City of Peekskill Common Council, 2013 NY Slip Op 07046, 2nd Dept 10-30-13

 

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Failure to Serve Superintendent of Schools in Accordance with RPTL Required Dismissal of Property Tax Certiorari Proceeding

The Second Department determined Supreme Court properly vacated an order which directed the school district to repay back taxes for 2006 through 2010 on the ground that the superintendent of schools was not properly served in the tax certiorari proceeding:

It is undisputed that the petitioner failed to comply with the requirements of RPTL 708(3) which provide, in pertinent part, that in a tax certiorari proceeding, within 10 days after service upon the Assessor, “one copy of the petition and notice shall be mailed . . . to the superintendent of schools of any school district within which any of part of the real property on which the assessment to be reviewed is located.” RPTL 708(3) further provides that “[f]ailure to comply with the provisions of this section shall result in the dismissal of the petition, unless excused for good cause shown.” RPTL 708(3) requires a petitioner to show good cause to excuse its failure to notify the appropriate school district, and not merely to demonstrate the absence of prejudice to that school district … . Contrary to the petitioner’s contention, it failed to establish good cause for its failure to serve the petitions on the School District … . Accordingly, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the petitioner’s cross motion [for leave to make late service] (see CPLR 2004, 2005; RPTL 708[3]…). Matter of Cornwall Yacht Club, Inc. v Assessor, 2013 NY Slip Op 07039 [110 AD3d 1070], 2nd Dept 10-30-13

 

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No Justification for Vacation of Arbitration Award—Strict Standard Applies

The Second Department determined Supreme Court erred in vacating an arbitration award in a case involving an uninsured motorist endorsement. Petitioner had won a $25,000 (default) civil judgment against the driver, but in the arbitration under the uninsured motorist endorsement, the arbitrator awarded $10,000:

The Supreme Court erred in vacating the arbitration award. “[J]udicial review of arbitration awards is extremely limited” … . ” An arbitration award must be upheld when the arbitrator “offer[s] even a barely colorable justification for the outcome reached”‘” … . In addition, an “arbitrator’s award should not be vacated for errors of law and fact committed by the arbitrator and the courts should not assume the role of overseers to mold the award to conform to their sense of justice” … . “An arbitrator is not bound by principles of substantive law or rules of evidence, and may do justice and apply his or her own sense of law and equity to the facts as he or she finds them to be” … . Insofar as is relevant to the instant proceeding, pursuant to CPLR 7511(b)(1)(iii), a court may only vacate an arbitration award if the rights of the party moving to vacate the award were prejudiced by the arbitrator “exceed[ing] his [or her] power or so imperfectly execut[ing] it that a final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.” “Such an excess of power occurs only where the arbitrator’s award violates a strong public policy, is irrational or clearly exceeds a specifically enumerated limitation on the arbitrator’s power” … .

Here, the terms of the SUM endorsement clearly provide that any sum [the insurer] was obligated to pay the petitioner, which the petitioner was legally entitled to recover, was subject to arbitration, and that the parties agreed to be bound by the arbitrator’s award.  Matter of Aftor v Geico Ins Co, 2013 NY Slip Op 07032, 2nd Dept 10-30-13

 

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No Fiduciary Duty Re: Purchase of One Shareholder’s Stock by Another in a Close Corporation

In affirming Supreme Court’s dismissal of a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty based on one shareholder’s purchase of another shareholder’s stock in a close corporation, the Second Department noted that the status of an officer, director or shareholder of a close corporation does not, without more, create a fiduciary relationship:

“The elements of a cause of action to recover damages for breach of fiduciary duty are (1) the existence of a fiduciary relationship, (2) misconduct by the defendant, and (3) damages directly caused by the defendant’s misconduct” … . “A fiduciary relationship exists between two persons when one of them is under a duty to act for . . . the benefit of another upon matters within the scope of the relation” …

Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, [the purchaser’s] status as an officer, director, or shareholder of a close corporation “does not, by itself, create a fiduciary relationship as to his individual purchase of [another shareholder’s] stock” … .  Varveris v Zacharakos, 2013 NY Slip Op 07028, 2nd Dept 10-30-13

 

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People Could Not Appeal Judge’s Vacation of Defendant’s Conviction and Sentencing as a Youthful Offender—No Statute Allows Such an Appeal

In dismissing the People’s appeal, the Second Department explained that there was no statutory right for an appeal of the judge’s vacating defendant’s conviction and sentencing defendant as a youthful offender.  The only vehicle for the People was an article 78 prohibition proceeding:”

The Criminal Procedure Law expressly enumerates and describes the orders appealable by the People to the Appellate Division in a criminal case (see CPL 450.20…), and “[n]o appeal lies from a determination made in a criminal proceeding unless specifically provided for by statute” … . As no statute authorizes an appeal by the People to the Appellate Division from an order, in effect, vacating a conviction and adjudicating a defendant a youthful offender (see CPL 450.20), the People’s appeal must be dismissed …. The proper vehicle for challenging the Supreme Court’s determination is a CPLR article 78 proceeding in the nature of prohibition… . People v Tony C, 2013 NY Slip Op 07055, 2nd Dept 10-30-13

 

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Anders Brief Rejected

In finding an “Anders” brief insufficient, the Second Department wrote:

The brief submitted by the appellant’s assigned counsel pursuant to Anders v California (386 US 738) is deficient because it fails to adequately recite the underlying facts in the case and analyze potential appellate issues or highlight facts in the record that might arguably support the appeal … . Since the brief does not demonstrate that assigned counsel acted “as an active advocate on behalf of his . . . client” …, we must assign new counsel to represent the appellant… . People v Francis, 2013 NY Slip Op 07058, 2nd Dept 10-30-13

 

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Admission of Cell-Phone-Location Data Did Not Required Frye Hearing; Prior Crime Evidence Properly Admitted to Prove Defendant’s Identity as Perpetrator of Charged Crime

In a full-fledged opinion by Justice Mastro, the Second Department affirmed the defendant’s murder conviction.  One piece of evidence against the defendant was location-data based on the use of defendant’s cell phone.  The Second Department determined there was no need for a Frye hearing before expert testimony about cell-phone location was presented because no novel scientific theory was involved. The Second Department also determined prior crimes demonstrating a similar unique pattern to that of the charged offense were admissible to prove identity.  With respect to some of the prior crime evidence, which did not sufficiently match the pattern of the charged crime to be admissible on the issue of identity, the erroneous admission of that evidence was deemed harmless. In discussing the prior-crime evidence, the court wrote:

In this case, the evidence of other crimes was offered to establish the defendant’s identity as [the victim’s] killer. Such evidence may be admitted if, as a threshold matter, the defendant’s identity is in issue and is not “conclusively established” by other evidence …, and it is demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant is the same person who committed the other crimes …. Here, it cannot be said that the defendant’s identity as the killer was conclusively established so as to warrant the preclusion of other crimes evidence to prove identity. Indeed, while the evidence that the defendant was the person who killed [the victim] was compelling, it was also entirely circumstantial. Moreover, the defendant vigorously contested the identification issue and presented as a defense the assertion that his employer… had been the actual killer. Thus, the identity of the murderer was a disputed issue in the case, and any admissible evidence tending to establish identification was relevant… . People v Littlejohn, 2013 NY Slip Op 07063, 2nd Dept 10-30-13

 

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