You are here: / Plaintiff Arrested Without a Warrant Based Upon Illegally Seized Evidence...

Search Results

/ , ,

Plaintiff Arrested Without a Warrant Based Upon Illegally Seized Evidence Granted Summary Judgment in False Arrest/Imprisonment Action

The Second Department determined plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment on his false arrest/imprisonment cause of action. Plaintiff was arrested without an arrest warrant based upon evidence seized in an illegal search:

“In order to prevail on a cause of action seeking to recover damages for false arrest or imprisonment, a plaintiff must prove that: (1) the defendant intended to confine the plaintiff; (2) the plaintiff was aware of the resulting confinement; (3) the plaintiff did not consent to the confinement; and (4) the confinement was not otherwise privileged” … . ” The existence of probable cause serves as a legal justification for the arrest and an affirmative defense to the claim'” … .When an arrest is made without a warrant, a presumption arises that it was unlawful, and a defendant must then show that a factual question exists as to whether the arrest was based on probable cause … . Evidence which is illegally obtained in violation of a plaintiff’s rights may not be used to establish probable cause … . Fakoya v City of New York, 2014 NY Slip Op 01709, 2nd Dept 3-19-14

 

/ ,

Child’s Out-of-Court Statements Corroborated by Child Abuse Expert/Hearsay Provided Adequate Basis for Finding of Abuse

The Second Department determined Family Court properly ruled that a child’s out-of-court statements were corroborated by a child abuse expert:

A child’s prior out-of-court statements may provide the basis for a finding of abuse, “provided that these hearsay statements are corroborated, so as to ensure their reliability” … . “Any other evidence tending to support the reliability of the previous statements . . . shall be sufficient corroboration” (Family Ct Act § 1046[a][vi]). Validation testimony from an expert that the child’s psychological and behavioral characteristics lead the expert to conclude that the child was sexually abused may supply the corroboration of the child’s out-of-court statements necessary to make out a prima facie case of sexual abuse … . However, as with any expert opinion, the validation testimony must meet a threshold of reliability … . “The Family Court has considerable discretion in deciding whether a child’s out-of-court statements alleging incidents of abuse have been reliably corroborated” … . The Family Court’s credibility findings must be accorded considerable deference on appeal … .Contrary to the father’s contention, the record supports the Family Court’s determination that the testimony of the petitioner’s child sexual abuse expert sufficiently corroborated Alexis S.’s out-of-court disclosures so as to establish a prima facie case of sexual abuse against the father… . Matter of Alexis S 2014 NY Slip Op 01759, 2nd Dept 3-19-14

 

/ ,

Failure to Mention the Rate of Compensation Required Dismissal of the Contract Cause of Action Under the Statute of Frauds/However the Allegation Defendant Employed Plaintiff Was Sufficient to Allow the Quantum Meruit Cause of Action to Go Forward

The First Department determined the contract cause of action must be dismissed under General Obligations Law 5-701(a)(10) because there was no mention of the rate of compensation,  but that there were sufficient allegations to allow the quantum meruit cause of action to go forward:

In Davis & Mamber, this Court held that for a writing evidencing a contract “[t]o satisfy the Statute of Frauds . . . a memorandum must contain expressly or by reasonable implication all the material terms of the agreement, including the rate of compensation if there has been agreement on that matter” … . … Davis & Mamber precluded a contract claim for failure to satisfy the applicable provision of the statute of frauds, because the relied-on writings lacked any reference to the agreed-on compensation; however, it permitted a quantum meruit claim, because the rule for a writing establishing quantum meruit claims is less exacting, requiring only that the writing “evidenced the fact of plaintiff’s employment [by defendant] to render the alleged services” …. Here, as in Davis & Mamber, the emails … fail to make any reference to payment terms, and accordingly fail to satisfy the statute of frauds as to the contract claim … . However, they suffice to show that [defendant] employed plaintiff, and are therefore enough to satisfy the statute for purposes of plaintiff’s quantum meruit claim.  Chapman, Spira & Carson LLC v Helix BioPharma Corp, 2014 NY Slip Op 01685, 1st Dept 3-18-14

 

/ , ,

Hearsay in Medical Records Should Have Been Redacted/Not Relevant to Diagnosis and Not Clearly Attributable to Plaintiff as an Admission

Although the error was deemed harmless, the First Department determined hearsay statements should have been redacted from the plaintiff’s medical records.  The plaintiff alleged the police had pushed him over a fence, causing injury.  The defendants alleged plaintiff jumped.  The medical records included references to the plaintiff’s “jumping.” The jury found for the defendants.  The court explained how hearsay in a medical report should be handled:

Hearsay entries regarding the cause of an injury contained in a medical record come into evidence under the business records exception if they are germane to the treatment or diagnosis of plaintiff’s injuries … . Alternatively, the entry may be admissible as an admission, but only if there is evidence that connects the party to the entry … . The challenged entries were neither germane to treatment or diagnosis, nor were they admissions.

There was simply no evidence supporting defendants’ position that the medical doctors needed to know whether plaintiff jumped or was pushed from the fence in order for doctors to determine what medical testing he needed upon admission to the hospital. No medical expert provided such testimony … . Defendants’ only expert, a biomechanical engineer and accident reconstruction expert, opined that plaintiff’s injuries were consistent with a jump from a height and not a push to a fall. He did not give any opinion on issues relating to treatment or diagnosis. This is not a case where the conclusion is so obvious that no medical testimony is needed to lay the appropriate evidentiary foundation … .

The particular challenged entries cannot be characterized as admissions. Although the Lincoln Medical and Mental Health Center Admission Assessment form has a box checked that “patient” is the source of the information, the particular entry on that record, “he jumped off the fence,” is not clearly a direct statement attributable to or a quote of plaintiff. The Ambulance Call Report form identifies “PO” or the police officer as the source of the information that plaintiff “jumped off a fence.” No other evidence in the record identifies plaintiff as being the source of this information. Nor is there any evidence connecting plaintiff to the 1/21/97 entry in the Progress Record that “s/p fell from a fence after being chased by police officers” or the 1/23/97 entry “fall from 2 storeys [sic]” to make them admissible as admissions by him. These entries should have been redacted from the medical records received in evidence.  Benavides v City of New York 2014 NY Slip Op 01682, 1st Dept 3-18-14

 

/ , , ,

Taxi Owners Not Entitled to Damages After Ruling by NYC Taxi and Limousine Commission (Which Was Alleged to Have Damaged the Taxi Owners in the Amount of Over $15 Million) Was Found Arbitrary and Capricious

The First Department determined a ruling by the NYC Taxi and Limousine Commission (TLC), which was found to be arbitrary and capricious by the Court of Appeals, did not entitle the petitioners (taxi owners who lease their taxis to drivers) to damages. The court determined the damages were not “incidental” within the meaning of Article 78 and were not available in an Article 78 proceeding (under the facts). The court futher determined the TLC was immune from suit because the ruling at issue was an exercise of discretion . The ruling by the TLC had effectively reduced the amount a taxi owner could charge a driver by requiring that tax payments for which the owner is responsible be included in the amount charged for the lease (called a “lease cap”). After that ruling was found arbitrary by the Court of Appeals, the taxi owners sought “incidental damages” of over $15 million:

Petitioners seek damages based on the Court of Appeals’ determination that the TLC’s effective reduction of the taxi “lease cap” had no rational basis. The Court of Appeals’ determination, however, does not lead to a conclusion that the damages are “incidental to the primary relief sought” (CPLR 7806). Contrary to petitioners’ argument, monetary injury incurred as a result of agency action does not necessarily constitute incidental damages simply because a court later finds the action to have been arbitrary and capricious. Certainly, whether damages are characterized as incidental “is dependent upon the facts and issues presented in a particular case” … . Even so, incidental damages are generally confined to monies that an agency either collected from or withheld from a petitioner and then was obligated to reimburse after a court annulled a particular agency determination. * * *

CPLR 7806 explicitly limits the availability of damages in an article 78 proceeding … . That article 78 permits the court, in certain circumstances, to award damages in an action that also reviews the validity of a government determination does not create a right to damages that does not otherwise exist. * * *…

[T]he TLC’s determination in this case, however unjustified it may have been, was an exercise of discretion; the TLC did consider the issue of imposing the tax rule and decided to impose it. Putting aside the merits of its decision, there is no escaping that the TLC exercised its discretion. Indeed, a governmental function such as rulemaking is necessarily an “exercise of judgment and discretion performed in the public interest,” and is protected as a discretionary act … . Accordingly, in a plenary action, governmental immunity would preclude petitioners from recovering incidental damages. Metropolitan Taxicab Bd of Trade v New York City Taxi & Limousine Commn, 2014 NY Slip Op 01683, 1st Dept 3-18-14

 

/

No Need to Allege “the Benefit Was Conferred at the Behest of the Defendant”

In a full-fledged opinion by Justice Acosta, the First Department determined  a 2012 Court of Appeals case (Georgia Malone & Co Inc v Reider, 19 NY3d 511) did not change the law of unjust enrichment and explained the nature of the relationship between the parties which must be alleged in the pleadings:

It is well established that to successfully plead unjust enrichment “[a] plaintiff must allege that (1) the other party was enriched, (2) at that party’s expense, and (3) that it is against equity and good conscience to permit the other party to retain what is sought to be recovered'” … . A claim for unjust enrichment “is undoubtedly equitable and depends upon broad considerations of equity and justice” … . A plaintiff is not required to allege privity. It must, however, “assert a connection between the parties that [is] not too attenuated” … . Thus, although a plaintiff could satisfy this requirement by alleging that the benefit was conferred at the behest of the defendant …, the Court of Appeals has never required such a relationship. Rather, the pleadings merely have to “indicate a relationship between the parties that could have caused reliance or inducement” … . Philips Intl Invs LLC v Pektor, 2014 Slip Op 01700, 1st Dept 3-18-14

 

/

Defendant Entitled to a Hearing On His Motion to Vacate His Conviction/Newly Discovered Evidence Someone Else Confessed to the Crime

The Third Department determined defendant had presented sufficient evidence to warrant a hearing on his motion to vacate his conviction.  The court found no indication the new evidence could have been discovered with due diligence at the time of trial and the new evidence (the confession of another to the crime) was not merely impeachment evidence:

…[W]e find that the affidavit of Maurice Miller proffered by defendant was sufficient to warrant a hearing.Miller’s affidavit was subscribed to in January 2012 and alleged, among other things, that he had witnessed another drug dealer,Alexander Llanos, sell crack to Grimsley on the day of the shooting, that defendant was not present in the area, and thatLlanos later confessed to the shooting. First addressing whether the evidence could have been obtained with due diligence prior to trial, a court must keep in mind “the practicalities of the situation” and weigh the “limited resources generally available” to a defendant … . Miller averred that he had not contacted police at the time of the crime because he feared retaliation. Defendant was 16 years old, incarcerated and had assigned counsel. Under these circumstances, there is no indication that defendant’s failure to discover this witness was the result of a lack of due diligence … .

Turning to the question of whether the evidence proffered was merely impeachment evidence, the confession of Llanos to the crime was material to the ultimate issue of defendant’s guilt or innocence … . Furthermore, a defendant has a fundamental right to offer into evidence the admission of another to the crime with which he or she is charged and, therefore, a hearing should have been held to determine the probative value of Miller’s testimony and its probable effect on the verdict … . Accordingly, we find a hearing necessary to promote justice inasmuch as the issues raised are “‘sufficiently unusual and suggest searching investigation'” … . People v Page, 2014 NY Slip Op 105312, 3rd Dept 3-13-14

 

/

Court Properly Accepted Partial Verdict and Sent the Jury Back to Continue Deliberations on the Remaining Count

The Third Department determined the trial court properly accepted a partial verdict and sent the jury back to deliberate on the remaining count:

After the jury indicated that it had reached a verdict, the court started taking the verdict but, when the jury was polled on the larceny charge, one juror stated that she had made a mistake with her verdict. As a result, and over defendant’s objection, Supreme Court took the verdict on the two counts of criminal contempt and sent the jury back to further deliberate on the larceny charge. In our view, Supreme Court properly followed the procedure outlined inCPL 310.70 (1) (b), and there is no basis in the record to conclude that the court abused its broad discretion in accepting the partial verdict and then directing the jury to continue deliberations… . People v Phoenix, 2014 NY Slip Op 105148, 2nd Dept 3-13-14

 

/ ,

Concise Example of a Weight of the Evidence Review

The First Department reversed defendant’s conviction and dismissed the indictment after a weight of the evidence review. The court found too many inconsistencies in the evidence, especially with respect to the identification of the defendant as the attacker.  The decision is a concise example of the kinds of proof problems which are considered significant under a weight of the evidence analysis:

Here, there were troubling discrepancies in the evidence presented to the jury. Most significantly, the complainant testified that the club was sufficiently well-lit for him to see his assailant’s face while the encounter was ongoing. However, the detective who investigated the incident and interviewed the complainant testified, after having had his recollection refreshed with the DD-5 report he prepared in connection with the investigation, that the complainant told him he “did not have a clear recollection of the suspect because it was somewhat dark” in the Maribella. While the complainant denies he told the detective that, the People do not offer, nor can we perceive of, any reason why the detective would have been untruthful not only on the witness stand, but also in a contemporaneous internal report documenting the investigation.

Further clouding the accuracy of the complainant’s identification of defendant was the photograph he picked out of an array. We acknowledge that the complainant did not represent that the person in the photo he chose was his assailant, but rather that he looked like him. Nevertheless, there is a significant difference in the appearances, especially the complexions, of the people depicted in the two photographs, which calls into question the confidence the complainant had in recalling what his attacker looked like.  People v Diaz, 2014 NY Slip Op 01661, 1st Dept 3-13-14

 

/ ,

Conclusory and Unsupported Affidavit from Plaintiff’s Expert Did Not Raise a Question of Fact/Standard of Care for Doctors and Mental Health Professionals In the Context of a Patient’s Post-Treatment Suicide Described

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Sweeny, reversed Supreme Court and granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the action.  The complaint alleged that plaintiff’s husband’s suicide was the result of negligence on the part of the treating doctors, psychiatrists and other health professionals.  The court noted that in most instances the affidavit from an expert asserting a deviation from the appropriate standard of care will be sufficient to defeat summary judgment.  But here the affidavit from plaintiff’s expert was conclusory and unsupported:

It is well settled that “a doctor is not liable in negligence merely because a treatment, which the doctor as a matter of professional judgment elected to pursue, proves ineffective. . .” … . Liability is imposed “only if the doctor’s treatment decisions do not reflect his or her own best judgment, or fall short of the generally accepted standard of care” … . Although a plaintiff’s expert may have chosen a different course of treatment, “this, without more, represents, at most, a difference of opinion among [medical providers], which is not sufficient to sustain a prima facie case of malpractice'” … . In the context of mental health providers, we have held that “[w]hen a psychiatrist chooses a course of treatment, within a range of medically accepted choices for a patient after a proper examination and evaluation, the doctrine of professional medical judgment will insulate such psychiatrist from liability” … . Where a psychiatrist fails to predict that a …patient will harm his or herself if released, liability will likewise not attach for a mere error in professional judgment … . While it is true that “the line between medical judgment and deviation from good medical practice is not easy to draw” … , the “prediction of the future course of a mental illness is a professional judgment of high responsibility and in some instance it involves a measure of calculated risk. If liability were imposed on the physician or the State each time the prediction of future course of mental disease was wrong, few releases would ever be made and the hope of recovery and rehabilitations of a vast number of patients would be impeded and frustrated” … . However, if a decision to release a patient was less than a professional medical determination, liability may attach … . A decision will not be insulated by the medical judgment rule if it is not based upon a careful examination … .

Generally, ” the opinion of a qualified expert that a plaintiff’s injuries were caused by a deviation from relevant industry standards would preclude a grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants'” … . To suffice, the expert’s opinion “must demonstrate the requisite nexus between the malpractice allegedly committed’ and the harm suffered” … . However, where “the expert’s ultimate assertions are speculative or unsupported by any evidentiary foundation . . . the opinion should be given no probative force and is insufficient to withstand summary judgment” … . Park v Kovachevich, 2014 NY Slip Op 01679, 1st Dept 5-13-14

 

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy