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You are here: Home1 / Police Did Not Have Founded Suspicion of Criminal Activity When Path of...

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/ Criminal Law, Evidence

Police Did Not Have Founded Suspicion of Criminal Activity When Path of Parked Car Was Blocked by Police Vehicle/Suppression of Seized Drugs Should Have Been Granted

The Second Department determined defendant’s suppression motion should have been granted.  After seeing a man approach the window of a parked car, but without seeing what was exchanged, the police blocked the parked car with the police vehicle, approached and ultimately arrested defendant.  The Second Department determined blocking the path of the parked car was a “stop” and the police did not have a “founded suspicion” of criminal activity at that point:

Although the detective who stopped the defendant’s car was trained in identifying narcotics transactions and was aware of numerous drug transactions in the neighborhood, including some involving car deliveries of drugs, he did not see what the defendant and the pedestrian exchanged, could not see if one of the men gave the other something in return for something else, and did not see money pass between the two men …. Moreover, the detective saw only one exchange … , did not describe any furtive conduct on the part of the two men …, or, indeed, any other conduct that would give rise to a reasonable suspicion that he was observing a drug transaction …. The detective’s observations supported only a “founded suspicion that criminal activity [was] afoot” …, which is insufficient to justify the stop of the defendant’s car … . Consequently, that branch of the defendant’s omnibus motion which was to suppress the crack cocaine must be granted. People v Loper 2014 NY Slip Opinion 01771, 2nd Dept 3-19-14

 

March 19, 2014
/ Appeals, Civil Commitment, Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Mental Hygiene Law

Involuntary Mental Health Patient Should Not Have Been Released Pursuant to a Habeas Corpus Petition Without an “Examination Into the Patient’s Alleged Disability and Detention,” Despite the Hospital’s Untimely Request for Continued Detention (in Violation of the Mental Hygiene Law)/Appellate Court’s Ability to Hear a Moot Case Explained (Mootness Doctrine)

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Leventhal, determined that immediate release of an involuntaty patient from a mental health hospital pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus because of the facility’s failure to comply with the Mental Hygiene Law provisions for continued detention was reversible error.  Supreme Court should have conducted an examination into the patient’s alleged disability and detention.  The court discussed the nature and origin of the habeas corpus petition and the relationship between a habeas corpus petition brought under the Mental Hygiene Law and under Article 70 of the CPLR (finding them to be in essence the same). In addition, the Second Department discussed the mootness doctrine which, under certain circumtances, allows an appellate court to hear  a moot case.  The habeas corpus petition here had been rendered moot by the patient’s release:

Generally, courts are precluded “from considering questions which, although once live, have become moot by passage of time or change in circumstances” …. . Typically, “an appeal will be considered moot unless the rights of the parties will be directly affected by the determination of the appeal and the interest of the parties is an immediate consequence of the judgment” … . However, an exception to the mootness doctrine permits a court to review a case if the controversy or issue involved is likely to recur, typically evades review, and raises a substantial and novel question … .Here, the release of the patient renders this appeal academic. We nevertheless exercise our discretion to review the issues raised on this appeal pursuant to the exception to the mootness doctrine because the primary issue raised is an important one which implicates both the patient’s fundamental liberty interest and the State’s interest in protecting the mentally ill, and is one which is likely to recur. Further, the primary issue involved here may typically evade review because “[t]he Mental Hygiene Law contemplates that involuntary hospitalization in a mental health facility is often brief and temporary . . . [and the law] require[s] frequent periodic review of a patient’s status, and the release of the patient unless OMH is granted successive court orders authorizing retention” … . * * *

Here, the patient was initially involuntarily hospitalized pursuant to Mental Hygiene Law article 9 due to his alleged mental illness and, thereafter, the petition for a writ was filed on the patient’s behalf. The purpose of the writ of habeas corpus was to determine whether the patient was being unlawfully detained (see CPLR 7002[a]… ). Therefore, in order to determine the cause and legality of the patient’s detention, the Supreme Court was required to examine the facts of the patient’s alleged mental disability and detention (see Mental Hygiene Law § 33.15[a], [b]; CPLR 7002). The Supreme Court’s failure to conduct the required examination constitutes reversible error. We note that the Hospital supported its untimely retention application with, inter alia, two certificates from the patient’s treating physicians. In those certificates, the physicians asserted that the patient was paranoid, unable to care for himself, and psychotic. Our determination should not be construed as an approval of the Hospital’s dilatory conduct in filing the retention application. There is no dispute that the Hospital failed to comply with Mental Hygiene Law § 9.33. Under the circumstances presented, however, the remedy for such noncompliance is not the immediate release of a patient. We also caution that our reasoning should not be construed to authorize an unlimited violation of article 9 of the Mental Hygiene Law so as to allow a patient to be involuntarily retained, without a hearing, indefinitely. People v Munsey, 2014 NY Slip Op 01782, 2nd Dept 3-19-14

 

March 19, 2014
/ Administrative Law, Environmental Law, Land Use

Challenge to Environmental Impact Statement Premature/Not Ripe for Adjudication Until the Special Use Permit and Site-Plan Approval (which Precipated the Enviromental Review) Are Issued

The Second Department determined a challenge to finding pursuant to the State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA) was not ripe.  The environmental review was precipitatied by an application for a special use permit and site-plan approval.  Although the town board had approved the final environmental impact statement (FEIS), the special use permit and site-plan approval were still pending:

An action taken by an agency pursuant to SEQRA may be challenged only when such action is final (see CPLR 7801[1]). An agency action is final when the decisionmaker arrives at a ” definitive position on the issue that inflicts an actual, concrete injury'” … . The position taken by an agency is not definitive and the injury is not actual or concrete if the injury purportedly inflicted by the agency could be prevented, significantly ameliorated, or rendered moot by further administrative action or by steps available to the complaining party … .Here, the issuance of a SEQRA findings statement did not inflict injury in the absence of an actual determination of the subject applications for a special use permit and site-plan approval and, thus, the challenge to the adoption of the findings statement is not ripe for adjudication… . Matter of Patel v Board of Trustees of Inc Vil of Muttontown, 2014 NY Slip Op 01756, 2nd Dept 3-19-14

 

March 19, 2014
/ False Arrest, False Imprisonment, Municipal Law

Plaintiff Arrested Without a Warrant Based Upon Illegally Seized Evidence Granted Summary Judgment in False Arrest/Imprisonment Action

The Second Department determined plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment on his false arrest/imprisonment cause of action. Plaintiff was arrested without an arrest warrant based upon evidence seized in an illegal search:

“In order to prevail on a cause of action seeking to recover damages for false arrest or imprisonment, a plaintiff must prove that: (1) the defendant intended to confine the plaintiff; (2) the plaintiff was aware of the resulting confinement; (3) the plaintiff did not consent to the confinement; and (4) the confinement was not otherwise privileged” … . ” The existence of probable cause serves as a legal justification for the arrest and an affirmative defense to the claim'” … .When an arrest is made without a warrant, a presumption arises that it was unlawful, and a defendant must then show that a factual question exists as to whether the arrest was based on probable cause … . Evidence which is illegally obtained in violation of a plaintiff’s rights may not be used to establish probable cause … . Fakoya v City of New York, 2014 NY Slip Op 01709, 2nd Dept 3-19-14

 

March 19, 2014
/ Evidence, Family Law

Child’s Out-of-Court Statements Corroborated by Child Abuse Expert/Hearsay Provided Adequate Basis for Finding of Abuse

The Second Department determined Family Court properly ruled that a child’s out-of-court statements were corroborated by a child abuse expert:

A child’s prior out-of-court statements may provide the basis for a finding of abuse, “provided that these hearsay statements are corroborated, so as to ensure their reliability” … . “Any other evidence tending to support the reliability of the previous statements . . . shall be sufficient corroboration” (Family Ct Act § 1046[a][vi]). Validation testimony from an expert that the child’s psychological and behavioral characteristics lead the expert to conclude that the child was sexually abused may supply the corroboration of the child’s out-of-court statements necessary to make out a prima facie case of sexual abuse … . However, as with any expert opinion, the validation testimony must meet a threshold of reliability … . “The Family Court has considerable discretion in deciding whether a child’s out-of-court statements alleging incidents of abuse have been reliably corroborated” … . The Family Court’s credibility findings must be accorded considerable deference on appeal … .Contrary to the father’s contention, the record supports the Family Court’s determination that the testimony of the petitioner’s child sexual abuse expert sufficiently corroborated Alexis S.’s out-of-court disclosures so as to establish a prima facie case of sexual abuse against the father… . Matter of Alexis S 2014 NY Slip Op 01759, 2nd Dept 3-19-14

 

March 19, 2014
/ Family Law, Immigration Law

Mother Entitled to Hearing/Children May Be Eligible for Special Immigrant Status

The Second Department reversed Family Court and sent the mother’s custody petition back for a hearing.  The mother alleged father had abandoned the children and the children, due to their immigration status, could be returned to El Salvador where they could be victimized by family and gangs. Mother argued the children could apply for special immigrant status if she were awarded custody:

The Family Court erred in dismissing the petition in which the mother sought orders of custody for her two teenaged children. A natural parent has standing to seek legal custody of his or her child (see Domestic Relations Law § 70[a]; Family Ct Act § 511…). According to the petitioner, the children’s father has abandoned the children and, due to their immigration status, they could be returned to El Salvador where they have been subjected to abuse by family members and threats by gang members. The petitioner has alleged that awarding her custody would be in the best interests of the children, since it would enable the children to apply for special immigrant juvenile status… . Matter of Sanchez v Bonilla, 2014 NY Slip Op 01761, 2nd Dept 3-19-14 

 

March 19, 2014
/ Contract Law, Family Law

Supreme Court Should Not Have Reformed Settlement Agreement/Criteria for “Mutual Mistake” Not Met

The Second Department determined Supreme Cout should not have found that mutual mistake required reformation of a settlement agreement.  The court explained the operative criteria:

“Marital settlement agreements are judicially favored and are not to be easily set aside” … . Although a mutual mistake by the parties may form the basis for reformation of a marital settlement agreement, “the mistake must be so material that . . . it goes to the foundation of the agreement'” … . “[T]o overcome the heavy presumption that a deliberately prepared and executed written instrument manifested the true intention of the parties, evidence of a very high order is required” … . The party seeking reformation must show clearly and beyond doubt that there has been a mutual mistake, and must show “with equal clarity and certainty the exact and precise form and import that the instrument ought to be made to assume, in order that it may express and effectuate what was really intended by the parties'” … . Hackett v Hackett, 2014 NY Slip Op 01715, 2nd Dept 3-19-14

 

March 19, 2014
/ Municipal Law, Tax Law

County Not Entitled to Dismissal of Suit Seeking Refund of Taxes Declared Wrongly Collected by the Court of Appeals

The Second Department determined that the plaintiffs’ action seeking the refund of taxes wrongfully collected on “mass property” was properly allowed to proceed.  “Mass property” includes things like power lines, poles, transformers, etc. The defendants had been collecting ad valorem taxes on the mass property for garbage collection.  Ultimately the Court of Appeals held that such taxes could not be collected on mass property, which did not produce garbage.  The defendants argued that they were not obligated to refund the taxes paid and moved to dismiss on that ground.  In affirming the denial of that motion, the Second Department explained that the invalidation of the ad valorem tax did not meet the criteria for when a court holding should be given only prospective application in the context of taxation:

…[W]here a municipality has reasonably relied upon a widespread and longstanding practice … or a statute is later invalidated …, and where applying the invalidation retroactively would call into question “a settled assessment roll or property rights based thereon,” a court may exercise its discretion by giving its holding only prospective application … . Here, the County defendants’ submissions have not demonstrated that awarding the plaintiffs the refunds they seek would call into question settled assessment rolls or property rights based thereon. Keyspan Generation LLC v Nassau County, 2014 NY Slip Op 01721, 2nd Dept 3-19-14

 

March 19, 2014
/ Labor Law-Construction Law

“General Supervision” of Work Site Did Not Trigger Liability Under Labor Law 241(6)

The Second Department determined  a company (Draghi) hired by the home builder (Majestic)  to do framing work and general supervision was not liable to plaintiff (who was injured when he tripped while using stilts to work on the ceiling) under Labor Law 241(6):

Draghi demonstrated its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the Labor Law § 241(6) cause of action insofar as asserted against it by establishing that it was not an owner, general contractor, or statutory agent of the owner or general contractor … . Draghi did not hire any contractors and was not charged with “the duty of co-ordinating all aspects of [the] construction project” … . Rather, Draghi merely assumed a role of “general supervision,” pursuant to which it checked the progress of the work and reported to Magestic … . Draghi demonstrated that it did not have the ability to control the activity which brought about the plaintiff’s injury … . Thus, Draghi established that it could not be held liable under Labor Law § 241(6)… . Gonzalez v Magestic Fine Custom Home, 2014 NY Slip Op 01713, 2nd Dept 3-19-14

 

March 19, 2014
/ Negligence

Bicyclist’s Negligence as a Matter of Law Did Not Warrant Summary Judgment to Defendant (Bus Driver, etc.)/There Can Be More than One Proximate Cause of an Accident

The Second Department determined that the fact that the plaintiff was riding his bicycle the wrong way on a one-way street (negligence as a matter of law)  did not mandate summary judgment for the defendant bus driver (Wright).  There can be more than one proximate cause to an accident and defendant failed to demonstrate it was free from fault:

Although the plaintiff concedes that he was negligent as a matter of law by traveling the wrong way on Adams Street in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1127(a) …, there can be more than one proximate cause of an accident, and the proponent of a motion for summary judgment has the burden of establishing freedom from comparative fault as a matter of law … .

Here, the defendants failed to make a prima facie showing as a matter of law that Wright was free from any comparative fault in the happening of the accident. There are triable issues of fact as to whether Wright failed to see what was there to be seen through the proper use of his senses …, failed to exercise due care to avoid the collision (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1146[a]…), or was traveling at a reasonable and prudent speed as he approached the intersection in light of the conditions then present … . Espiritu v Shuttle Express Coach Inc, 2014 NY Slip Op 01707, 2nd Dept 3-1914

 

March 19, 2014
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