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THE JUDGE’S PROVIDING A RACE-NEUTRAL REASON FOR THE PEOPLE’S PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE TO A JUROR, WHILE THE PROSECUTOR REMAINED SILENT, WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Rivera, reversing the Appellate Division, determined the judge’s providing a race-neutral reason for the People’s peremptory challenge of a juror, while the prosecutor remained silent, was reversible error:

Here, it is undisputed that defendant established a prima facie case of discrimination with respect to the prosecution’s exercise of a peremptory challenge against K.S., an African-American female, and that the burden then shifted to the prosecution to provide a race-neutral basis for its peremptory strike. The People failed to do so entirely … . Rather, the court stepped in to provide an explanation, speculating that the prosecution had gotten a “bad vibe” from K.S. regarding whether her prior jury service resulted in an acquittal. The prosecution remained silent. The court nevertheless ruled that the prosecution had “given a legitimate race neutral reason” for the strike.

This serious departure from the Batson framework was an error of the highest order. When the court supplied a race-neutral reason for the peremptory strike, it failed to hold the prosecution to its burden and instead, effectively became an advocate for the prosecution, thus abandoning its Batson-specific duty to “consider the prosecutor’s race-neutral explanations in light of all of the relevant facts and circumstances, and in light of the arguments of the parties” … . It is the nonmovant’s expressed explanation for its peremptory challenge—and whether such explanation is mere pretext for a race-based motive—not simply whether a race-neutral reason could theoretically exist—which is the focus of the Batson framework at steps two and three … . The court’s speculation as to the prosecution’s basis for the strike was irrelevant and deprived defendant of any meaningful way to demonstrate pretext in the face of the prosecution’s silence. People v Estwick, 2024 NY Slip Op 02768, CtApp 5-21-24

Practice Point: It is the prosecutor’s actual reason for a peremptory challenge which is required under Batson, not the theoretical existence of a race-neutral reason. Therefore the Batson procedure is violated where, as here, the judge steps in to provide a reason while the prosecutor remains silent.

 

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THE SEARCH OF A SMALL EARBUD CASE IN DEFENDANT-PAROLEE’S POCKET WAS NOT REASONABLY RELATED TO THE CLAIMED PURPOSE OF THE PAROLE OFFICERS’ PRESENCE IN DEFENDANT’S RESIDENCE, I.E., A SEARCH FOR A PAROLE ABSONDER; THE HEROIN FOUND IN THE EARBUD CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Troutman, reversing the Appellate Division, determined the search of defendant-parolee’s person by a parole officer was not rationally and reasonably related to the parole officers’ duty. The parole officers claimed they entered defendant’s residence to look for a parole absconder. The search of a small earbud case found inside defendant’s pocket, which turned up heroin, was not reasonably related to the claimed purpose of the parole officers’ presence:

… [T]he People failed to meet their burden to establish that the search of defendant’s pocket was substantially related to the performance of the parole officers’ duties in the particular circumstances presented, i.e., the search of defendant’s residence for a parole absconder. Nor did the People present any evidence at the hearing that circumstances that developed after the parole officers arrived at defendant’s residence rendered the search of his pocket substantially related to the performance of their duties. On this record, the parole officer had no reason to continue the brief pat-down search of the exterior of defendant’s person by searching his pocket and investigating the contents of an earbud case. People v Lively, 2024 NY Slip Op 02767, CtApp 5-21-24

Practice Point: Here the parole officers claimed to be in defendant-parolee’s residence to search for a parole absconder. Therefore the search of a small earbud case found in defendant-parolee’s pocket was not reasonably related to the parole officers’ duties and the drugs found in the case should have been suppressed.

 

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THE SEARCH OF DEFENDANT-PAROLEE’S RESIDENCE WAS “RATIONALLY AND REASONABLY RELATED TO THE PERFORMANCE OF THE PAROLE OFFICER’S DUTY” AND THEREFORE DENIAL OF THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS THE WEAPON FOUND IN THE RESIDENCE WAS PROPER (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, affirming the Appellate Division, determined the search of defendant-parolee’s residence after a tip from defendant’s mother about defendant’s possession of a firearm was “rationally and reasonably related to the performance of the parole officer’s duty:”

As a condition of his parole, defendant agreed not to “own, possess, or purchase” any firearm without permission from his parole officer. Defendant was given “the most severe” mental health designation from the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision, OMH Level 1-S, indicating there were “serious” concerns regarding his mental health. Shortly after defendant’s release to parole, his parole officer received information from his supervisor that defendant’s mother contacted the parole office to inform them that she saw a photograph of defendant with a firearm, and gave the parole officers permission to search the residence that she shared with defendant … . Acting on this information, defendant’s parole officer, with the assistance of other officers, conducted a search of defendant’s home and recovered an AR-15 style rifle and two thirty-round extended magazines with extra gun parts from defendant’s bedroom.

Based on the foregoing, there is record support for the lower courts’ conclusion … that the search of defendant’s residence by defendant’s parole officer was “rationally and reasonably related to the performance of the parole officer’s duty” and so defendant’s motion to suppress this evidence was properly denied … . The Aguilar-Spinelli test … for evaluating whether a tip provides police with probable cause for a search or seizure does not apply in these circumstances … . People v Spirito, 2024 NY Slip Op 02766, Fourth Dept 5-21-24

Practice Point: The criteria for a search of a parolee’s residence by a parole officer is not subject to the same constitutional restraints as are searches by the police. Here a tip from defendant’s mother about her son’s possession of a weapon was sufficient to justify the parole-officer search.

 

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THE POLICE MAY STOP A VEHICLE IN THE EXERCISE OF THE “COMMUNITY CARETAKING” FUNCTION IF THERE IS CAUSE TO BELIEVE SOMEONE IN THE VEHICLE NEEDS ASSISTANCE; THE QUICK OPENING AND CLOSING OF A PASSENGER DOOR WAS NOT ENOUGH (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, reversing the Appellate Division, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Troutman, over a two-judge concurrence, recognized that a vehicle may be stopped by the police exercising the “community caretaking” function if the police have cause to believe someone in the vehicle needs assistance. Here defendant’s car was stopped after the passenger door opened and closed quickly. The defendant driver was arrested after admitting he possessed ecstasy. The Court of Appels, after describing the criteria for a “community caretaking” vehicle stop, found that the quick opening and closing of the passenger door was not enough to conclude an occupant needed help:

We conclude that the police may stop an automobile in an exercise of their community caretaking function if two criteria exist. First, the officers must point to specific, objective, and articulable facts that would lead a reasonable officer to conclude that an occupant of the vehicle is in need of assistance. Second, the police intrusion must be narrowly tailored to address the perceived need for assistance. Once assistance has been provided and the peril mitigated, or the perceived need for assistance has been dispelled, any further police action must be justified under the Fourth Amendment and Article I, section 12 of the State Constitution. People v Brown, 2024 NY Slip Op 02765, CtApp 5-21-24

Practice Point: The police may stop a vehicle if there is cause to believe someone in the vehicle needs assistance. Here the quick opening and closing of a passenger door was not enough to justify the stop.

 

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THE “RELIGIOUS EMPLOYER” EXEMPTION FROM MANDATED INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR MEDICALLY NECESSARY ABORTIONS DOES NOT VIOLATE THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Wilson, determined the US Supreme Court ruling in Fulton v Philadelphia, 593 US 522 (2021) did not render the “religious employer” exemption to the mandated insurance coverage for medically necessary abortions unconstitutional. The opinion is too detailed and comprehensive to fairly summarize here:

Plaintiffs, the Roman Catholic Diocese of Albany and a variety of entities ranging from churches to religiously affiliated organizations to a single individual, provide medical insurance plans to their employees. They have challenged a regulation promulgated by the Department of Financial Services as violative of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. The challenged regulation requires New York employer health insurance policies that provide hospital, surgical, or medical expense coverage to include coverage for medically necessary abortion services (see 11 NYCRR 52.16 [o] [1]). Their challenge is to the regulation’s exemption for “religious employers,” which is defined by four factors (see 11 NYCRR 52.2 [y]). Plaintiffs’ claim, in essence, is that the exemption is too narrow, such that the First Amendment rights of certain types of religiously affiliated employers are violated because they do not meet the terms of the exemption. * * *

Under Fulton, both the regulation itself and the criteria delineating a “religious employer” for the purposes of the exemption are generally applicable and do not violate the Free Exercise Clause. Neither the existence of the exemption in the regulation nor the defined criteria allow for “individualized exemptions” that are standardless and discretionary, nor do they allow for comparable secular conduct while discriminating against religious conduct. Roman Catholic Diocese of Albany v Vullo, 2024 NY Slip Op 02764, CtApp 5-21-24

Practice Point: The 2021 US Supreme Court ruling in Fulton v Philadelphia did not render the “religious exemption” regulation promulgated by the NYS Department of Financial Services unconstitutional. The regulation exempts certain religious employers from mandated insurance coverage for medically necessary abortions.

 

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CITY RETIREES THREATENED WITH ELIMINATION OF THEIR EXISTING HEALTH INSURANCE AND AUTOMATIC ENROLLMENT IN A MEDICARE ADVANTAGE PLAN ENTITLED TO RELIEF UNDER THEIR PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL CAUSE OF ACTION (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Gesmer, determined the doctrine of promissory estoppel justified a permanent injunction prohibiting the city from “eliminating … retirees’ existing health insurance, automatically enrolling them in a new Aetna Medicare Advantage Plan, enforcing a June 30, 2023 deadline for retirees to opt out of the new plan, and implementing any other aspect of the City’s new retiree healthcare policy:”

… [T]he record shows a clear and unambiguous promise, made for more than 50 years, that upon an employee’s retirement, Medicare would provide the first level of hospital and medical insurance benefits and the City’s benefits program would provide the second level to fill in the gaps. * * *

… [T]he record shows detrimental reliance on the promise. * * *

… [P]etitioners have demonstrated injury. Many City retirees stated that their chosen providers and hospitals, like many healthcare providers, do not accept the MAPs [Medicare Advantage Plans]. The City’s plan to automatically enroll petitioners in the Aetna MAP and terminate their current Medigap coverage would result in injury to retirees whose medical providers do not accept the Aetna MAP. * * *

The particular manner in which the parties chose to litigate this action before Supreme Court resulted in a record with significant evidentiary support for petitioners’ position and very little support for respondents’ position. That record and the arguments the parties chose to make on appeal lead to the conclusion that petitioners are entitled to relief under their promissory estoppel cause of action. Matter of Bentkowski v City of New York, 2024 NY Slip Op 02771, First Dept 5-21-24

Practice Point: Here the promissory estoppel doctrine was applied to permanently enjoin the city from eliminating city retirees’ health insurance and automatically enrolling them in a Medicare Advantage Plan.

 

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HERE THERE WAS NO VALID REASON TO DENY DEFENDANT’S REQUEST TO REPRESENT HIMSELF; NEW TRIAL ORDERED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing defendant’s conviction and ordering a new trial, determined defendant’s request to represent himself should have been granted:

The court deprived defendant of his constitutional right to self-representation when it denied defendant’s motion to proceed pro se despite defendant’s knowing and voluntary waiver of his right to counsel. A defendant may invoke the right to self-representation where “(1) the request is unequivocal and timely asserted, (2) there has been a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel, and (3) the defendant has not engaged in conduct which would prevent the fair and orderly exposition of the issues” … . Here, defendant made a timely and unequivocal request to represent himself, and during an extensive inquiry, at which time the court repeatedly warned defendant of the dangers and disadvantages of proceeding pro se, defendant affirmed that he understood the risks and insisted on representing himself at trial … . Defendant’s lack of familiarity with the law was not a proper basis for the denial of his motion … . Further, nothing in the record indicates that defendant’s motion was calculated to undermine or delay the progress of the trial— indeed, the court determined that defendant was not malingering—and defendant’s purported “outbursts” during two prior pretrial video conferences did not suggest an intent to disrupt the proceedings … . People v Ivezic, 2024 NY Slip Op 02785, First Dept 5-21-24

Practice Point: A defendant’s lack of knowledge of the law is not a valid reason for denying defendant’s request to represent himself at trial.

 

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THE DA HANDLING THE APPEAL WAS A LAW CLERK TO THE JUDGE WHO PRESIDED OVER THE TRIAL; THE CONFLICT OF INTEREST REQUIRES THE APPOINTMENT OF A SPECIAL PROSECUTOR FOR THE APPEAL (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined the District Attorney handling the appeal had a conflict of interest because she was a law clerk to the County Court judge who presided over the trial. A special prosecutor must be appointed to handle the appeal:

During oral argument on this appeal, the Chief Assistant District Attorney (hereinafter ADA) who appeared on behalf of the People confirmed that she served as the confidential law clerk to the County Court Judge who presided over this matter and did so at the time of the underlying trial. Oral argument was permitted to proceed on the merits, but the Court directed the parties to submit letter briefs addressing the impact, if any, of the ADA’s prior position on her ability to represent the People on appeal. Two days later, this Court handed down People v Pica Torres (___ AD3d ___, 2024 NY Slip Op 02345, *1-2 [3d Dept 2024]), which determined that a similar conflict situation required the appointment of a special prosecutor to handle the appeal. In her responding letter brief, the ADA acknowledges that she was personally and substantially involved in this matter as the trial judge’s law clerk, raising a conflict of interest under Rule 1.12 of the Rules of Professional Conduct (see Rules of Prof Conduct [22 NYCRR 1200.00] rule 1.12 [d] [1]). In her responding letter, counsel for defendant acknowledges that the appointment of a special prosecutor is required. Given the foregoing, we remit the matter for the expeditious appointment of a special prosecutor to handle this appeal. People v McNealy, 2024 NY Slip Op 02728, Third Dept 5-16-24

Practice Point: If the DA handling the appeal was a law clerk to the judge presiding over the trial there is a conflict of interest requiring the appointment of a special prosecutor for the appeal.

 

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THE DETECTIVE’S TESTIMONY AT THE SUPPRESSION HEARING THAT THE VEHICLE WAS PULLED OVER BECAUSE OF “EXCESSIVELY TINTED WINDOWS” WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO DEMONSTRATE PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE STOP; SUPPRESSION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, reversing the Appellate Term, determined the police officer’s testimony at the suppression hearing the vehicle in which defendant was a passenger was stopped based on “excessively tinted window” was not sufficient to demonstrate probable cause for the vehicle stop. Therefore the drugs seized from the defendant should have been suppressed:

Vehicle and Traffic Law § 375 (12-a) (b) generally provides that “[n]o person shall operate any motor vehicle upon any public highway, road[,] or street” with windows which have a light transmittance of less than 70%. * * *

When a defendant challenges “the sufficiency of the factual predicate for the stop,” it is the People’s burden “to come forward with evidence sufficient to establish that the stop was lawful” … . “Summary statements that the police had arrived at a conclusion that sufficient cause existed will not do” … . * * *

… Detective Fortunato’s testimony that the tint was “excessive” is … a legal conclusion that the tint violated the Vehicle and Traffic Law. Yet, the People failed to elicit any factual basis for this conclusion. The detective did not testify, for example, that the windows were so dark that he could not see into the vehicle … or that he had training and experience in identifying illegally tinted windows or conducting this type of stop … . Nor did the detective testify that he measured the tint after stopping the vehicle and the results confirmed that the tint level violated the Vehicle and Traffic Law, which could have provided objective, corroborative evidence of the reasonableness of his conclusion … . People v Nektalov, 2024 NY Slip Op 02725, CtApp 5-16-24

Practice Point: To demonstrate probable cause for a vehicle stop based upon “excessively tinted windows” there must be some demonstration the tint violated the Vehicle and Traffic Law (less that 70% light transmittance). Simply testifying the windows were “excessively tinted” is not enough.

 

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AN UNAMBIGUOUS CONTRACT PROVISION CONSTITUTES “DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE” WHICH WILL SUPPORT A MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO CPLR 3211 (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals determined the provision of the contract which prohibited plaintiffs from bringing a breach of contract suit was unambiguous. An unambiguous contract constitutes “documentary evidence” which supports a motion to dismiss:

On a motion to dismiss based on documentary evidence pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (1), dismissal is warranted only if the documentary evidence conclusively establishes a defense as a matter of law … . A motion to dismiss based on a written agreement that contains a material ambiguity must be denied because such an agreement does not conclusively establish the asserted defense as a matter of law … . Ambiguity exists if the agreement, “read as a whole, fails to disclose its purpose and the parties’ intent . . ., or when specific language is ‘susceptible of two reasonable interpretations’ ” … . On the other hand, the agreement is unambiguous and should be enforced on its plain terms “if the language it uses has ‘a definite and precise meaning, unattended by danger of misconception . . ., and concerning which there is no reasonable basis for a difference of opinion’ ” … .

Contrary to plaintiffs’ contention, Section 8.05 unambiguously bars them from commencing an action on their own behalf to enforce their third-party beneficiary rights under the Agreement. Section 8.05 negates any right of the Holders except as “expressly set forth” therein, and it expressly sets forth the right of the Required Holders or the Holder Committee to commence certain types of actions or proceedings. Nothing in Section 8.05 expressly sets forth a right of the Holders to commence an action on their own behalf or otherwise. Mulacek v ExxonMobil Corp., 2024 NY Slip Op 02724, CtApp 5-16-24

Practice Point: Here the contract unambiguously limited the authority to bring a breach of contract action to a certain class of shareholders which did not include plaintiffs. The contract constituted “documentary evidence” which supported dismissal of the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1).

 

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