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Insufficient Break Between “Unwarned” Statement and Statement Made Subsequently After the Miranda Warnings Were Given—Entire Statement Should Have Been Suppressed

The Fourth Department determined there was an insufficient break (10 minutes) between an “unwarned” inculpatory statement made by the defendant and a subsequent statement made after the Miranda warnings were given.  The entire statement should have been suppressed:

“When, as part of a continuous chain of events, a defendant is subjected to custodial interrogation without Miranda warnings, any statements made in response as well as any additional statements made after the warnings are administered and questioning resumes must be suppressed” … . Where, however, “there is such a definite, pronounced break in the interrogation that the defendant may be said to have returned, in effect, to the status of one who is not under the influence of questioning,” his or her statements in response to renewed questioning after he or she has received Miranda warnings and waived his or her constitutional rights may be admitted … . Here, the initial questioning by the second officer, although brief, produced an inculpatory statement directly related to the instant crime… , and the second interrogation, which produced another inculpatory statement, occurred less than 10 minutes later and in the same location … . Moreover, contrary to the People’s contention, the record does not establish that “a reasonable suspect in defendant’s position would have perceived a marked change in the tenor of his engagement with [the] police” … . We thus conclude that “it cannot be said that there was such a definite, pronounced break’ in the interrogation that defendant was returned to the position of one who was not under the influence of the initial improper questioning” … . People v Walker, 2015 NY Slip Op 05313, 4th Dept 6-19-15

 

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Supreme Court Properly Annulled New York Division of Human Rights’ Determination there Was No Probable Cause to Believe the School District Discriminated against Petitioner When It Refused to Hire Her Because of Her Anticipated Absence (Due to Pregnancy)

The Fourth Department affirmed Supreme Court’s annulment of the New York Division of Human Rights’ (SDHR’s) finding, without a hearing, there was no probable cause to believe the school district discriminated against the petitioner. Petitioner was not hired because of her anticipated absence due to pregnancy. The school district’s stated reason for not hiring petitioner was that she was going to be unavailable to counsel students and there was concern about the resulting lack of continuity of counseling services for the students.  However, the petitioner’s unavailability was due to her pregnancy and discrimination could therefore be inferred:

“Where, as here, a determination of no probable cause is rendered [by SDHR] without holding a public hearing pursuant to Executive Law § 297 (4) (a), the appropriate standard of review is whether the determination was arbitrary and capricious or lacking a rational basis’ ” … . “Probable cause exists only when, after giving full credence to the complainant’s version of the events, there is some evidence of unlawful discrimination” … . “There must be a factual basis in the evidence sufficient to warrant a cautious [person] to believe that discrimination had been practiced” … . The complainant’s factual showing must be accepted as true on a probable cause determination … . While our standard of review is highly deferential to the agency’s determination …, we agree with the court that SDHR’s determination “was not rationally based upon the evidence presented” … .

Executive Law § 296 prohibits an employer from refusing to hire or employ an individual based on, inter alia, the individual’s sex. In opposition to the petition, the District argued that it decided not to rehire petitioner because of her unavailability and its concern for continuity of counseling services for its students. Petitioner was unavailable to work, however, because of her pregnancy, and we conclude that discrimination could be inferred from the record before us … . The District relies on Roslyn Union Free Sch. Dist. v State Div. of Human Rights (72 AD2d 808) in support of its argument that it did not discriminate against petitioner. To the extent that Roslyn holds that a decision not to hire an individual because the individual is pregnant is not a form of discrimination (see id. at 809-810), we decline to follow it. Matter of Mambretti v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 2015 NY Slip Op 05384, 4th Dept 6-19-15

 

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Failure to Strictly Comply With Notice Requirement in the Civil Service Law Rendered the Involuntary Leave Imposed Upon the Petitioner-Firefighter a Nullity—Petitioner Entitled to Back Pay for Leave Period—Petitioner Properly Deemed Unfit for Active Duty Due to His Inability to Manage Diabetic Symptoms

The Fourth Department determined a firefighter was properly deemed unfit for active duty as a firefighter because of his inability to manage diabetic symptoms. During the course of the decision, the Fourth Department held that the city’s failure to strictly comply with the notice requirements of the Civil Service Law rendered the involuntary leave imposed on petitioner a nullity (entitling him to back pay for the leave period):

We conclude that the procedural protections contained in Civil Service Law § 72 (1) apply to proceedings brought pursuant Civil Service Law § 72 (5) based on the language in subdivision (1) that the provisions of notice and hearing therein apply to employees “placed on leave of absence pursuant to this section” (emphasis added), “which includes Civil Service Law § 72 (5)” … . These procedures are necessary “to afford tenured civil servant employees . . . procedural protections prior to involuntary separation from service” … . “Because of the significant due process implications of the statute, strict compliance with its procedures is required” … . Here, it is undisputed that respondents did not strictly comply with the procedures pursuant to section 72 for placing petitioner on immediate involuntary leave inasmuch as it was not until April 2012 that petitioner was provided with “[w]ritten notice of the facts providing the basis for the judgment of the appointing authority that [petitioner was] not fit to perform the duties of” his position (§ 72 [1]). Although the parties had engaged in negotiations during the period before respondents provided petitioner with written notice, respondents concede that at no time did petitioner waive his rights under section 72 … . Additionally, petitioner did not receive the final notice of determination within 75 days from the receipt of his request for review (see § 72 [1]). The absence of strict compliance with these procedural requirements renders petitioner’s alleged leave a nullity prior to September 30, 2013, when Linnertz issued his final determination after reviewing the Hearing Officer’s decision … , and petitioner is entitled to back pay and the restoration of benefits from August 26, 2011 until September 30, 2013. Matter of Williams v Troiano, 2015 NY Slip Op 05318, 4th Dept 6-19-15

 

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Pilot Assumed the Risk of a Take-Off from a Wet, Grass Field

The Fourth Department determined plaintiff-pilot’s complaint should have been dismissed because the pilot, injured attempting to take off from a grass field, assumed the risk associated with a take-off from a wet field.  The airport is a designated venue for the recreational activity of private aviation.  Therefore the recreational use of the airport was a qualifying activity under the doctrine of primary assumption of the risk. The pilot was aware of the wet conditions prior to his attempt to take off:

We agree with defendant that its airport is a designated venue for the recreational activity of private aviation and that plaintiff’s use thereof was in furtherance of his pursuit of that activity … . We thus conclude, as defendant contends, that plaintiff’s recreational use of defendant’s airport was a qualifying activity under the doctrine of primary assumption of the risk … . Primary assumption of the risk applies when a consenting participant in a qualified activity “is aware of the risks; has an appreciation of the nature of the risks; and voluntarily assumes the risks” … . “If the risks of the activity are fully comprehended or perfectly obvious, plaintiff has consented to them and defendant has performed its duty” …  . “[A]wareness of risk is not to be determined in a vacuum. It is, rather, to be assessed against the background of the skill and experience of the particular plaintiff” … . The primary assumption of the risk doctrine also encompasses risks involving less than optimal conditions… . “It is not necessary to the application of assumption of [the] risk that the injured plaintiff have foreseen the exact manner in which his or her injury occurred, so long as he or she is aware of the potential for injury of the mechanism from which the injury results” … .

Here, the undisputed facts establish that plaintiff, an experienced pilot, was well aware of the risk inherent in taking off from a soft, wet grass runway with the type of landing gear with which his aircraft was equipped. Plaintiff’s awareness of the risk was amply established by his admitted preflight concern about the condition of the grass runway, and by his personal inspection thereof generated in part by his encounter with wet and muddy conditions while towing his aircraft to the runway by motor vehicle. Bouck v Skaneateles Aerodrome, LLC, 2015 NY Slip Op 05300, 4th Dept 6-19-15

 

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Construction at County Airport Was a Governmental Function—County is Therefore “Immune” from a Suit Alleging the Construction Caused a Highway White-Out Condition Which Resulted in Plaintiff’s-Decedent’s Death in a Collision

Plaintiffs alleged that construction by the defendant-county caused snow to blow across the highway leading to the “white-out” which resulted in plaintiff’s decedent’s death in a collision. The Fourth Department determined the county was immune from suit because the relevant construction was a governmental, not proprietary function, and the county did not owe a special duty to the plaintiffs:

… “[I]f the [municipal defendant] acted in a proprietary role, i.e., when its activities essentially substitute for or supplement traditionally private enterprises . . . , ordinary rules of negligence apply. If, however, the [defendant] acted in a governmental capacity, i.e., when its acts are undertaken for the protection and safety of the public pursuant to general police powers . . . , the court must undertake a separate inquiry to determine whether the [defendant] owes a special duty to the injured party. In the event that the plaintiff fails to prove such a duty, the [defendant] is insulated from liability” … . A municipal defendant can therefore establish entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by showing that its allegedly negligent acts were undertaken in a governmental rather than a proprietary capacity, and that it did not owe the plaintiff a special duty.

We conclude that defendants established on their motion that the construction of the tunnels and retaining wall was undertaken in a governmental capacity … , inasmuch as the construction was the result of defendants’ discretionary decision-making after defendants consulted with experts to determine how to make improvements to the Airport property in compliance with, inter alia, safety regulations of the Federal Aviation Administration … . We further conclude that plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact whether defendants owed a special duty to plaintiffs or were acting in a proprietary capacity … . Klepanchuk v County of Monroe, 2015 NY Slip Op 05323, 4th Dept 6-19-15

 

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Only an “Unexcused” Violation of a Provision of the Vehicle and Traffic Law Constitutes Negligence Per Se—Damages May Include Cost of Demolition of a Building Which Has Been Deemed a Safety Hazard

In the course of a decision finding questions of fact precluded summary judgment, the Fourth Department explained the doctrine of negligence per se as it relates to a violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, and the recoverable damages when property damage requires demolition of a building which was rendered a safety hazard.  The defendant-driver here struck plaintiff’s building which was then destroyed by fire.  The cost of demolition, which the town had ordered because the building was a safety hazard, exceeded the fair market value of the building prior to the accident. The court noted that the demolition costs could be recoverable damages. The court further noted that only the “unexcused” violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law constitutes negligence per se.  Therefore the defendant’s guilty plea to a Vehicle and Traffic Law violation could be excused by the jury if the jury determined the driver acted to avoid an object in the road. In that situation, the violation would only constitute “some evidence” of negligence:

It is well settled that “the fact that [the] driver entered a plea of guilty to a Vehicle and Traffic Law offense is only some evidence of negligence and does not establish his negligence per se” … . Rather, it is the “unexcused violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law [that] constitutes negligence per se” … . If a trier of fact accepts as true the position that the driver swerved to avoid an object in the road, the jury may excuse the driver’s alleged negligence, in which case defendant would not have any vicarious liability for the accident … . * * *

It is well settled that the standard for assessing damages to property is the lesser of replacement cost or diminution in market value … . Here, it is undisputed that the cost of the required demolition exceeds the fair market value of the property before the accident. Defendant contends that plaintiffs’ damages are limited to the market value of the property before the accident, with no consideration of demolition costs, inasmuch as the full market value of the property before the accident is less than the repair or replacement cost. We agree with plaintiffs, however, that demolition costs are recoverable where the property to be demolished constitutes a “safety hazard beyond repair” … . There are also situations in which a property may be deemed to have a negative market value, i.e., where the cost to remediate the property exceeds the market value of the property … . Shaw v Rosha Enters., Inc., 2015 NY Slip Op 05305, 4th Dept 6-19-15

 

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Court Deferred to the Agency’s Interpretation of a Statute Because the Interpretation Involved Knowledge and Understanding of the Underlying Operational Practices (In the Usual Case, a Court Will Not Defer to an Agency’s Interpretation of a Statute)/The Term “Business Enterprise” in Tax Law 14 (a) Refers to the Taxable Entity, Not the Legal Entity

The Third Department deferred to the interpretation of a statute by the Tax Appeals Tribunal which found that petitioners were not entitled to Qualified Enterprise Zone Enterprise (QEZE) tax reduction credits and refundable Empire Zone (EZ) wage credits.  The case turned on the Tribunal’s definition of a business enterprise.  The Tribunal determined the term refers to the taxable entity, not the legal entity. Because the interpretation of the relevant statute, Tax Law 14 (a), involved knowledge and understanding of the underlying operational practices, the court deferred to the agency’s determination. (In the usual case a court need not defer to an agency’s interpretation of a statute):

The parties’ primary disagreement here centers on whether the term business enterprise under Tax Law § 14 (a) refers to the taxable entity or the legal entity. The Tax Law does not define business enterprise, and this Court will “defer to the governmental agency charged with the responsibility for administration of [a] statute in those cases where interpretation or application involves knowledge and understanding of underlying operational practices” … . While, as a general rule, courts will not defer to administrative agencies in matters of pure statutory interpretation, where, as here, the question is “‘one of specific application of a broad statutory term in a proceeding in which the agency administering the statute must determine it initially,'” deference is appropriate … . To prevail over the Tribunal’s construction of the statute, petitioners must establish that their “interpretation of the statute is not only plausible, but also that it is the only reasonable construction”… .

In our view, it cannot be said that the Tribunal acted irrationally in construing the term business enterprise in accordance with an entity’s classification for state and federal income tax purposes. Matter of Ayoub v Tax Appeals Trib. of the State of N.Y., 2015 NY Slip Op 05240, 3rd Dept 6-18-15

 

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Lien for Attorney’s Fees (Re: Workers’ Compensation Award) Can Be Satisfied Before Reimbursing Municipality for Benefits Paid by the Municipality to the Injured Corrections Officer Pursuant the General Municipal Law

The Third Department determined that a lien for attorney’s fees could be attached to Workers’ Compensation benefits prior to reimbursing a municipality for benefits paid to the municipal employee pursuant to the General Municipal Law. Claimant corrections officer was injured on the job. Under General Municipal Law 207-c municipal employers are required to pay full wages to corrections officers injured in the performance of their duties.  Workers’ Compensation Law 30 (3) provides that the amount of the payments made under the General Municipal Law shall be credited against any award of compensation pursuant to the Workers Compensation Law. The municipality argued it was entitled to the entire amount paid to the employee and the amount should not be reduced by the attorney’s fees (a lien on the Workers’ Compensation award).  The Third Department disagreed:

General Municipal Law § 207-c requires municipal employers to pay full wages to correction officers who are injured in the performance of their duties. Workers’ Compensation Law § 30 (3) provides that the amount of such payments “shall be credited against any award of compensation” that may also be made to such an officer. The employer contends that the mandatory language of the Workers’ Compensation Law provision entitles employers to full credit for such payments and, thus, precludes the attachment of a lien for counsel fees. However, Workers’ Compensation Law § 24 likewise uses mandatory language in providing that, when approved by the Board, counsel fees “shall become a lien upon the compensation awarded . . . [and] shall be paid therefrom only in the manner fixed by the [B]oard” (emphasis added). The lien attaches when the compensation is awarded “and takes precedence over the employer’s right to reimbursement of funds previously paid to the claimant-employee” … . The purpose of enacting Workers’ Compensation Law § 30 (3) was not to preclude counsel fees, but “to avoid duplicate benefits to an injured [officer], the combined total of which might exceed the salary [the officer] would have received for the period” if the injury had not occurred … . Workers’ Compensation Law § 30 (3) must be harmoniously interpreted with the Workers’ Compensation Law as a whole and with General Municipal Law § 207-c … . We find nothing in the statutory language indicating a legislative intent to treat employees who receive benefits under General Municipal Law § 207-c differently from other injured employees by departing from the statutory scheme for payment of counsel fees set forth in Workers’ Compensation Law § 24. Matter of McCabe v Albany County Sheriff’s Dept., 2015 NY Slip Op 05236, 3rd Dept 6-18-15

 

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Zoning Board’s Interpretation of Village Ordinances Upheld—Keeping of Chickens Is Not an Allowed “Residential Use”

The Third Department determined the village zoning board of appeals’ interpretation of a zoning ordinance had a rational basis.  Petitioner sought a ruling allowing him to keep chickens in a residential zone. Because “poultry husbandry” was specifically mentioned in the zoning ordinances as an agricultural use, and was not mentioned as an allowed residential use, the board’s interpretation was upheld as “neither irrational nor unreasonable:”

Here, Village of Champlain Zoning Code § 119-20 (B) states that the permitted uses in an R1 residential district are “one- and two-family dwellings” and “accessory uses.” The code allows for accessory uses that are “of a nature customarily incidental and subordinate to the principal use of the structure, such as garages, outbuildings, swimming pools, energy collection devices and the keeping of domesticated animals” (Village of Champlain Zoning Code § 119-16). The code also defines “agriculture” as “[t]he use of land for agricultural purposes, including tilling of the soil, dairying, pasture, apiculture, arboriculture, horticulture, floriculture, viticulture, forestry, animal and poultry husbandry and the necessary accessory uses for packing or storing of products” (Village of Champlain Zoning Code § 119-16). The code further states that “[a]ny use not listed as permitted [w]ithin a [z]oning district is assumed to be prohibited in that [z]oning district” (Village of Champlain Zoning Code § 119-191). Matter of Meier v Village of Champlain Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 2015 NY Slip Op 05245, 3rd Dept 6-18-15

 

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