You are here: / OMISSIONS FROM COMPLAINT SUPPLIED BY AFFIDAVIT IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION...

Search Results

/ ,

OMISSIONS FROM COMPLAINT SUPPLIED BY AFFIDAVIT IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISMISS, COMPLAINT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED.

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the omissions from the complaint against defendant insurance company were remedied by an affidavit submitted in opposition to the motion to dismiss:

A complaint must “be sufficiently particular to give the court and parties notice of the transactions, occurrences, or series of transactions” that form the basis of the complaint and “the material elements of each cause of action” (CPLR 3013). The factual allegations of the complaint are accepted as true, and afforded “every possible favorable inference” … . “[A] court may freely consider affidavits submitted by the plaintiff to remedy any defects in the complaint and the criterion is whether the proponent of the pleading has a cause of action, not whether he has stated one … . When such affidavits are considered, dismissal should not result unless “a material fact as claimed by the pleader to be one is not a fact at all and unless it can be said that no significant dispute exists regarding it” … .

Here, the complaint standing alone failed to apprise defendant insurance companies of basic pertinent information to put them on notice of the claims against them, such as the patients treated and the insurance policies issued by defendant, under which plaintiff submitted claims for treatment rendered. However, in opposition to defendant insurance companies' motion to dismiss, plaintiff submitted an affidavit from its principal with an exhibit attached providing such information. Thus, the complaint and affidavit submitted in opposition sufficiently apprise defendant insurance companies of the “transactions, occurrences, or series of transactions” that form the basis of the complaint (CPLR 3013). High Definition MRI, P.C. v Travelers Cos., Inc., 2016 NY Slip Op 02027, 1st Dept 3-22-16

CIVIL PROCEDURE (OMISSIONS FROM COMPLAINT SUPPLIED BY AFFIDAVIT IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISMISS, COMPLAINT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED)/COMPLAINTS (OMISSIONS FROM COMPLAINT SUPPLIED BY AFFIDAVIT IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISMISS, COMPLAINT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED)

/ ,

INADEQUATE WAIVER OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL REQUIRED REVERSAL; PRESERVATION OF THIS ISSUE NOT NECESSARY.

The Fourth Department reversed Family Court's finding respondent had willfully violated a court order because of an insufficient waiver of the right to counsel. The court noted that a prior decision requiring preservation of the right-to-counsel issue should no longer be followed:

Although the Support Magistrate properly advised respondent that he had the right to counsel (see Family Ct Act § 262 [a] [vi]), we agree with respondent that the Support Magistrate failed to make a ” searching inquiry' ” to ensure that his waiver of the right to counsel was a knowing, voluntary and intelligent choice, and thus that he was denied his right to counsel … . We therefore reverse the order and remit the matter to Family Court for a new hearing. To the extent that our decision in Matter of Huard v Lugo (81 AD3d 1265… requires preservation of a contention that the Support Magistrate erred in allowing the respondent to proceed pro se at a fact-finding hearing, that decision is no longer to be followed. Matter of Girard v Neville, 2016 NY Slip Op 01947, 4th Dept 3-18-16

FAMILY LAW (INADEQUATE WAIVER OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL REQUIRED REVERSAL, PRESERVATION OF THIS ISSUE NOT NECESSARY)/RIGHT TO COUNSEL (FAMILY LAW, INADEQUATE WAIVER OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL REQUIRED REVERSAL, PRESERVATION OF THIS ISSUE NOT NECESSARY)/APPEALS (FAMILY LAW, INADEQUATE WAIVER OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL REQUIRED REVERSAL, PRESERVATION OF THIS ISSUE NOT NECESSARY)

/ ,

EXPRESSION OF OPPOSITION TO A PROPOSED DEVELOPMENT PROJECT DID NOT CREATE A CONFLICT OF INTEREST PRECLUDING VILLAGE OFFICIALS FROM PARTICIPATING IN A SEQRA REVIEW; PLANNING BOARD DID NOT HAVE AUTHORITY TO RESCIND A NEGATIVE DECLARATION AFTER PERMITS WERE ISSUED.

The Fourth Department determined two village officials did not have a conflict of interest which would preclude their participation in a State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA) review of a development project. The two had expressed opposition to the project before and after their elections, but expression of opinion does not create a conflict of interest. The Fourth Department upheld the annulment of resolutions which stated the proposed project would adversely affect the environment. The planning board had previously found no adverse impact (a negative declaration) and had issued permits. The board did not have the authority to rescind the negative declaration at that point:

… [T]he Board lacked authority to rescind its negative declaration under the circumstances of this case. Here, the Board was authorized to rescind its negative declaration “prior to its decision to undertake, fund, or approve an action,” and the Board made its decision to approve the action, i.e., the Project, when it issued the requisite special permits … . Matter of Pittsford Canalside Props., LLC v Village of Pittsford, 2016 NY Slip Op 01929, 4th Dept 3-18-16

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (EXPRESSION OF OPPOSITION TO A PROPOSED DEVELOPMENT PROJECT DID NOT CREATE A CONFLICT OF INTEREST PRECLUDING VILLAGE OFFICIALS FROM PARTICIPATING IN SEQRA REVIEW)/ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (PLANNING BOARD DID NOT HAVE AUTHORITY TO RESCIND NEGATIVE DECLARATION AFTER PERMITS ISSUED)/STATE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REVIEW ACT (SEQRA) (EXPRESSION OF OPPOSITION TO A PROPOSED DEVELOPMENT PROJECT DID NOT CREATE A CONFLICT OF INTEREST PRECLUDING VILLAGE OFFICIALS FROM PARTICIPATING IN SEQRA REVIEW)/STATE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REVIEW ACT (SEQRA) (PLANNING BOARD DID NOT HAVE AUTHORITY TO RESCIND NEGATIVE DECLARATION AFTER PERMITS ISSUED)

/ ,

JURY SHOULD HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED ON THE DEADLY-FORCE JUSTIFICATION DEFENSE, NEW TRIAL ORDERED.

The Fourth Department reversed defendant's assault and manslaughter convictions and ordered a new trial, finding the jury should have been charged on the “deadly force” justification defense. There was evidence defendant acted to defend her brother who was struck with a champagne bottle. The assault with the bottle could constitute deadly force, justifying the use of deadly force in defense:

… [T]he court erred in denying her request to charge the jury on justification using deadly physical force in defense of a third party for the assault count. There was a reasonable view of the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to defendant, that the first victim was using deadly physical force by striking defendant's brother in the head with a champagne bottle when defendant assaulted her … . We further agree with defendant that the error in failing to give the justification charge on the assault count requires reversal of the manslaughter count as well. Although the court instructed the jury on justification for that count, there was a “significant factual relationship” between the two counts … , particularly on the issue whether defendant was the initial aggressor (see Penal Law § 35.15 [1] [b]). We therefore reverse the judgment and grant a new trial on both … . People v James, 2016 NY Slip Op 01946, 4th Dept 3-18-16

CRIMINAL LAW (JURY SHOULD HAVE BEEN CHARGED ON THE DEADLY-FORCE JUSTIFICATION DEFENSE, NEW TRIAL ORDERED)/EVIDENCE (ASSAULT WITH A CHAMPAGNE BOTTLE CONSTITUTED USE OF DEADLY FORCE, JURY SHOULD HAVE BEEN CHARGED ON THE DEADLY-FORCE JUSTIFICATION DEFENSE)/JUSTIFICATION DEFENSE (CRIMINAL LAW, JURY SHOULD HAVE BEEN CHARGED ON THE DEADLY-FORCE JUSTIFICATION DEFENSE, NEW TRIAL ORDERED)

/ ,

GRAND LARCENY CONVICTION REDUCED TO PETIT LARCENY, PROOF OF VALUE OF STOLEN PROPERTY INSUFFICIENT.

The Fourth Department, in the interest of justice, reduced defendant's grand larceny to petit larceny because of insufficient proof of the value of the stolen property:

The value of stolen property is “the market value of the property at the time and place of the crime, or if such cannot be satisfactorily ascertained, the cost of replacement of the property within a reasonable time after the crime” (Penal Law § 155.20 [1]). It is well settled that “a victim must provide a basis of knowledge for his [or her] statement of value before it can be accepted as legally sufficient evidence of such value” … . Furthermore, “[c]onclusory statements and rough estimates of value are not sufficient” to establish the value of the property … . “Although a victim is competent to supply evidence of original cost' . . . , evidence of the original purchase price, without more, will not satisfy the People's burden' ” … .

Here, the victim testified that several specific items were taken, but the only evidence of the value of those items was the victim's testimony regarding the purchase price of some of them, and her hearsay testimony regarding a purported expert's appraisal of some of the property, which was based solely on her description of certain jewelry to the purported expert. Based on the evidence of value in the record, we cannot conclude “that the jury ha[d] a reasonable basis for inferring, rather than speculating, that the value of the property exceeded the statutory threshold” of $3,000 … . People v Slack, 2016 NY Slip Op 01930, 4th Dept 3-18-16

CRIMINAL LAW (GRAND LARCENY CONVICTION REDUCED TO PETIT LARCENY, PROOF OF VALUE INSUFFICIENT)/EVIDENCE (GRAND LARCENY CONVICTION REDUCED TO PETIT LARCENY, PROOF OF VALUE INSUFFICIENT)/GRAND LARCENY (GRAND LARCENY CONVICTION REDUCED TO PETIT LARCENY, PROOF OF VALUE INSUFFICIENT)

/

PLAINTIFF SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO AMEND THE AD DAMNUM CLAUSE OF THE COMPLAINT.

The Fourth Department determined plaintiff in a breach of contract action should have been allowed to amend its ad damnum clause:

… Supreme Court abused its discretion in denying its motion to amend the ad damnum clause from $77,585.50 to $111,331.13, and we therefore modify the order by granting the motion. It is axiomatic that ” [l]eave to amend a pleading should be freely granted in the absence of prejudice to the nonmoving party where the amendment is not patently lacking in merit' ” … . * * *

… “[I]n the absence of prejudice . . . , a motion to amend the ad damnum clause, whether made before or after the trial, should generally be granted” … . Putrelo Constr. Co. v Town of Marcy, 2016 NY Slip Op 01949, 4th Dept 3-18-16

CIVIL PROCEDURE (AMENDMENT OF AD DAMNUM CLAUSE OF THE COMPLAINT SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED)/AD DAMNUM CLAUSE (AMENDMENT OF AD DAMNUM CLAUSE OF THE COMPLAINT SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED)

/

STATUTORY PRESUMPTION THAT UNWITNESSED ACCIDENT AROSE FROM EMPLOYMENT DID NOT CREATE A PRESUMPTION THE ACCIDENT HAD HAPPENED, DENIAL OF CLAIM AFFIRMED.

The Third Department determined there was insufficient evidence to support claimant's allegation he was injured in an accident which no one witnesses and for which claimant did not seek immediate attention medical attention. The court noted that the presumption that unwitnessed accidents arose from employment did not create a presumption that an accident had happened:

… Workers' Compensation Law § 21, “which affords a presumption that an unwitnessed or unexplained workplace accident arose out of the injured person's employment, . . . cannot be utilized to demonstrate that an accident occurred in the first place”… . Matter of Siennikov v Professional Grade Constr., Inc., 2016 NY Slip Op 01889, 3rd Dept 3-17-16

WORKERS' COMPENSATION (STATUTORY PRESUMPTION INJURY AROSE FROM EMPLOYMENT DID NOT CREATED A PRESUMPTION THE ACCIDENT HAD HAPPENED)

/

CARRIER’S INABILITY TO CONDUCT AN INDEPENDENT MEDICAL EXAMINATION OF CLAIMANT WARRANTED SUSPENSION OF COMPENSATION PAYMENTS.

The Third Department determined the carrier's inability to conduct an independent medical examination (IME) of claimant, ostensibly due to claimant's medical restrictions, warranted suspending claimant's compensation payments:

… [W]e note that “refusal by the claimant to submit to [an IME] at such time or times as may reasonably be necessary in the opinion of the [B]oard, shall bar the claimant from recovering compensation for any period during which he or she has refused to submit to such examination” (Workers' Compensation Law § 13-a [4] [b]). Whether suspending compensation payments on account of a claimant's attempt to frustrate a carrier's right to engage in an IME is a question of fact for the Board to resolve … . Here, there are opposing views as to why claimant did not submit to an IME. It was within the Board's purview to credit the carrier's assertion that it has engaged in extraordinary efforts to schedule the IME … and that such efforts were thwarted by claimant's perpetual requests and demands of rescheduling and relocating the IME … . As such, we find that substantial evidence supports the Board's finding that claimant frustrated the carrier's right to engage an independent consultant by unreasonably refusing to attend an IME so as to warrant suspension of her benefits (see Workers' Compensation Law § 13-a [4] [b]…). Matter of Duncan v John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2016 NY Slip Op 01881, erd Dept 3-17-16

WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW (CARRIER'S INABILITY TO CONDUCT AN INDEPENDENT MEDICAL EXAMINATION OF CLAIMANT WARRANTED SUSPENSION OF COMPENSATION PAYMENTS)/INDEPENDENT MEDICAL EXAMINATION (IME) (WORKERS' COMPENSATION, CARRIER'S INABILITY TO CONDUCT AN INDEPENDENT MEDICAL EXAMINATION OF CLAIMANT WARRANTED SUSPENSION OF COMPENSATION PAYMENTS)

/

NEWSPAPER CARRIER WAS AN EMPLOYEE ENTITLED TO BENEFITS.

The Third Department determined claimant, who delivered newspapers for CFHI using her own car, was an employee entitled to unemployment benefits. Claimant ended her contract because of problems with her car:

Here, claimant responded to a newspaper advertisement soliciting motor route carriers and was retained by CFHI after meeting with its district manager. Claimant signed an independent contractor distributor agreement that (1) assigned her specific routes, (2) required her to furnish her own vehicle with proof of insurance, (3) set forth specific rates governing her compensation, (4) required her to deliver newspapers in a dry condition by specified times, (5) imposed a penalty upon her if CFHI had to make a delivery due to a subscriber complaint, and (6) provided for termination of the contract by CFHI in the event that claimant received more than 10 subscriber complaints. Although no formal training was provided by CFHI, its district manager reviewed a checklist with claimant containing detailed information that she needed to know to perform her duties. In addition, CFHI provided claimant with optional property damage and personal injury insurance for purchase through an independent carrier, made available supplies, such as rain bags and rubber bands, for claimant to purchase, prohibited claimant from placing any inserts or other materials in the newspapers to be delivered and fielded customer complaints before referring them to claimant. As in many of the other newspaper delivery carrier cases, the record as a whole contains substantial evidence to support the conclusion that CFHI retained a sufficient indicia of control over the performance of claimant's duties to establish the existence of an employment relationship … . Matter of Rosenfelder (Community First Holdings, Inc.–Commissioner of Labor), 2016 NY Slip Op 01888, 3rd Dept 3-17-16

UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE (NEWSPAPER CARRIER WAS AN EMPLOYEE ENTITLED TO BENEFITS)

/

CLAIMANT DID NOT PROVOKE HER DISCHARGE AND IS THEREFORE ENTITLED TO BENEFITS.

The Third Department determined claimant was entitled to unemployment insurance benefits because attempted in good faith to comply with the residency requirement for her position with the city and therefore did not provoke her discharge:

“Provoked discharge . . . is a narrowly drawn legal fiction designed to apply where an employee voluntarily engages in conduct which transgresses a legitimate known obligation and leaves the employer no choice but to discharge him [or her]” … . “Whether [a] claimant's actions constituted a voluntary leaving of employment without good cause by provoking his [or her] discharge is a factual determination for the [B]oard” … . Here, claimant's testimony established that she began living with her cousin in an apartment in New York City in an attempt to comply with the employer's residency requirements, as well as to accommodate her school schedule. Although claimant also spent time with her husband in an apartment outside New York City, the employer acknowledged that an individual could maintain more than one residence, even if one was outside New York City, and still be in compliance with the residency requirement. Claimant pays her cousin money to live in the apartment and to help offset expenses, and she receives mail at that address, including bank account and credit card statements. Claimant also pays New York City income taxes. Moreover, claimant testified that, because she did not fully understand the residency requirement, she inquired to both her supervisor and the employer's personnel department as to whether she was considered to be in compliance with the necessary requirement; however, those inquiries went unanswered. Under these circumstances, substantial evidence supports the Board's finding that claimant did not voluntarily engage in conduct that transgressed the employer's mandate so as to find that she provoked her discharge … . Matter of Rosseychuk (City of New York–Commissioner of Labor), 2016 NY Slip Op 01885, 3rd Dept 3-17-16

UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE (CLAIMANT DID NOT PROVOKE HER DISCHARGE)

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy