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DENIAL OF PAROLE PROPERLY ANNULLED, NEW HEARING BEFORE DIFFERENT COMMISSIONERS ORDERED.

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Gesmer, affirmed Supreme Court’s annulment of parole denial and ordered a new hearing before different commissioners. Petitioner shot and killed her husband. Evidence presented at trial indicated she had been abused by her husband for many years and her husband was threatening severe abuse at the time of the shooting. Petitioner earned two college degrees while in prison, participated in every available rehabilitation program, taught other inmates, served on a grievance committee, successfully worked for the Department of Motor Vehicles and testing indicated it was highly unlikely she would re-offend. Yet she was denied parole three times:

Based on the record before us, we conclude that the motion court correctly determined that the Board acted with an irrationality bordering on impropriety in denying petitioner parole. The Board focused exclusively on the seriousness of petitioner’s conviction and the decedent’s family’s victim impact statements (which it incorrectly described as “community opposition to her release”) without giving genuine consideration to petitioner’s remorse, institutional achievements, release plan, and her lack of any prior violent criminal history.

The Board’s statement that, “[d]espite your assertions of abuse being rejected by a jury after hearing you testify for eight days, and having no corroboration on record of the abuse, you continue to blame your victim for his death,” disregards petitioner’s testimony accepting responsibility and expressing remorse for her actions. It also fails to recognize that petitioner may legitimately view herself as a battered woman, even though the jury did not find that she met New York’s exacting requirements for the defenses of justification (Penal Law § 35.15[2]) and extreme emotional disturbance (Penal Law § 125.25[1][a]). * * * …[W]e agree with the motion court that apologizing for the shooting while steadfastly maintaining that she was an abuse victim does not indicate a lack of remorse for her actions. Matter of Rossakis v New York State Bd. of Parole, 2016 NY Slip Op 07415, 1st Dept 10-10-16

 

CRIMINAL LAW (DENIAL OF PAROLE PROPERLY ANNULLED, NEW HEARING BEFORE DIFFERENT COMMISSIONERS ORDERED)/PAROLE (DENIAL OF PAROLE PROPERLY ANNULLED, NEW HEARING BEFORE DIFFERENT COMMISSIONERS ORDERED)

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RECORDED STATEMENTS MADE TO THE MOTHER OF DEFENDANT’S CHILDREN, WHO WAS ACTING AS A POLICE AGENT AT THE TIME THE STATEMENTS WERE MADE, REQUIRED THE REOPENING OF THE HUNTLEY HEARING, CASE REMITTED.

The Fourth Department sent the case back for a reopened Huntley hearing concerning recorded statements made by the defendant to the mother of defendant’s children, who was acting as a police agent at the time the statements were made. The statements were under a protective order until two weeks before the trial. The defendant was convicted of the murder of a man he mistakenly believed was having a relationship with the mother of his children:

… [T]he court erred in failing to reopen the Huntley hearing at defense counsel’s request with respect to recorded statements that he made to an agent of the police (see CPL 60.45 [2] [b] [i], [ii]), i.e., the mother of his children, which were the subject of a protective order until approximately two weeks before trial. Because the admission of those statements at trial cannot be deemed harmless error … , we hold the case, reserve decision and remit the matter to Supreme Court to reopen the Huntley hearing with respect to those recorded statements … . People v Mitchell, 2016 NY Slip Op 07543, 4th Dept 11-10-16

CRIMINAL LAW (RECORDED STATEMENTS MADE TO THE MOTHER OF DEFENDANT’S CHILDREN, WHO WAS ACTING AS A POLICE AGENT AT THE TIME THE STATEMENTS WERE MADE, REQUIRED THE REOPENING OF THE HUNTLEY HEARING)/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, RECORDED STATEMENTS MADE TO THE MOTHER OF DEFENDANT’S CHILDREN, WHO WAS ACTING AS A POLICE AGENT AT THE TIME THE STATEMENTS WERE MADE, REQUIRED THE REOPENING OF THE HUNTLEY HEARING)/HUNTLEY HEARING (RECORDED STATEMENTS MADE TO THE MOTHER OF DEFENDANT’S CHILDREN, WHO WAS ACTING AS A POLICE AGENT AT THE TIME THE STATEMENTS WERE MADE, REQUIRED THE REOPENING OF THE HUNTLEY HEARING)

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STATEMENT WHICH WAS NOT IN THE 710.30 NOTICE, AND WHICH PROVIDED EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT’S DOMINION AND CONTROL OF THE RESIDENCE WHERE DRUGS WERE FOUND, SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED IN EVIDENCE.

The Fourth Department, over a two-justice dissent, determined a statement alleged to have been made during a search, but which was not part of the 710.30 notice, should not have been admitted at trial. The defendant was charged and convicted of constructive possession of drugs found in the searched residence. The statement indicated where defendant’s “own room was.” There was little or no other evidence defendant lived at the searched residence. The court rejected the argument that the statement was “pedigree information” and further rejected the argument that the search consent form, signed by the defendant, was an admission of his dominion and control of the residence:

The People served on defendant a CPL 710.30 notice of their intent to offer defendant’s admissions as evidence at trial and attached a police report to the notice. The police report referenced defendant’s statement to the deputies, during the search, that one of the bedrooms belonged to another person. At trial, however, the court permitted an investigator to testify that defendant “explained where his [own] room was,” referring to another of the bedrooms. Inasmuch as the CPL 710.30 notice did not cover that statement, the court’s ruling on that point was error (see CPL 710.30 [1]…). That error permitted the court to conclude that defendant was an occupant of the residence and, consequently, to find that defendant had constructive possession of the drugs found therein … . People v Buza, 2016 NY Slip Op 07423, 4th Dept 11-10-16

 

CRIMINAL LAW (STATEMENT WHICH WAS NOT IN THE 710.30 NOTICE, AND WHICH PROVIDED EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT’S DOMINION AND CONTROL OF THE RESIDENCE WHERE DRUGS WERE FOUND, SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED IN EVIDENCE)/710.30 NOTICE (STATEMENT WHICH WAS NOT IN THE 710.30 NOTICE, AND WHICH PROVIDED EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT’S DOMINION AND CONTROL OF THE RESIDENCE WHERE DRUGS WERE FOUND, SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED IN EVIDENCE)

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DEFENDANT’S REQUEST TO REPRESENT HIMSELF, MADE DURING JURY SELECTION, WAS TIMELY, SUMMARY REJECTION OF THE REQUEST WITHOUT ANY INQUIRY REQUIRED REVERSAL.

The First Department reversed defendant’s conviction because the trial judge did not make an inquiry into his request to represent himself. Defendant’s request was made during jury selection and was summarily rejected as untimely:

The right to self-representation … is subject to several restrictions … . Thus, “[a] defendant in a criminal case may invoke the right to defend pro se provided: (1) the request is unequivocal and timely asserted, (2) there has been a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel, and (3) the defendant has not engaged in conduct which would prevent the fair and orderly exposition of the issues” … . When a defendant timely invokes the right to self-representation, “the trial court should conduct a thorough inquiry to determine whether the waiver was made intelligently and voluntarily” … .

Judged by these principles, we conclude that defendant’s right to self-representation was violated. Contrary to the trial court’s finding, defendant’s requests to proceed pro se, made during jury selection, were timely asserted … . People v Crespo, 2016 NY Slip Op 07396, 1st Dept 11-10-16

 

CRIMINAL LAW (DEFENDANT’S REQUEST TO REPRESENT HIMSELF, MADE DURING JURY SELECTION, WAS TIMELY, SUMMARY REJECTION OF THE REQUEST WITHOUT ANY INQUIRY REQUIRED REVERSAL)/ATTORNEYS (CRIMINAL LAW, DEFENDANT’S REQUEST TO REPRESENT HIMSELF, MADE DURING JURY SELECTION, WAS TIMELY, SUMMARY REJECTION OF THE REQUEST WITHOUT ANY INQUIRY REQUIRED REVERSAL)/PRO SE (CRIMINAL LAW, DEFENDANT’S REQUEST TO REPRESENT HIMSELF, MADE DURING JURY SELECTION, WAS TIMELY, SUMMARY REJECTION OF THE REQUEST WITHOUT ANY INQUIRY REQUIRED REVERSAL)

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SANDOVAL HEARING HELD IN DEFENDANT’S ABSENCE REQUIRED DISMISSAL OF THE INDICTMENT, PLACING THE RESULTS OF THE HEARING ON THE RECORD IN DEFENDANT’S PRESENCE DID NOT RECTIFY THE DEFECT.

The Fourth Department determined holding the Sandoval hearing in the defendant’s absence required dismissal of the indictment (without prejudice to file another charge):

We agree with defendant that Supreme Court erred in conducting the Sandoval hearing in his absence … . The court’s Sandoval ruling in this case was not wholly favorable to defendant, and thus “it cannot be said that defendant’s presence at the hearing would have been superfluous” … . Contrary to the People’s contention, although the court placed its Sandoval ruling on the record in defendant’s presence the morning after the hearing, “[a] mere repetition or recitation in the defendant’s presence of what has already been determined in [the defendant’s] absence is insufficient compliance with the Sandoval rule” … . People v Gardner, 2016 NY Slip Op 07469, 4th Dept 11-10-16

CRIMINAL LAW (SANDOVAL HEARING HELD IN DEFENDANT’S ABSENCE REQUIRED DISMISSAL OF THE INDICTMENT, PLACING THE RESULTS OF THE HEARING ON THE RECORD IN DEFENDANT’S PRESENCE DID NOT RECTIFY THE DEFECT)/SANDOVAL HEARING (SANDOVAL HEARING HELD IN DEFENDANT’S ABSENCE REQUIRED DISMISSAL OF THE INDICTMENT, PLACING THE RESULTS OF THE HEARING ON THE RECORD IN DEFENDANT’S PRESENCE DID NOT RECTIFY THE DEFECT)

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ADVANCES IN MEDICINE AND SCIENCE CALL INTO QUESTION PREVIOUS OPINIONS ABOUT SHAKEN BABY SYNDROME, MOTION TO VACATE DEFENDANT’S CONVICTION GRANTED AND NEW TRIAL ORDERED.

The Fourth Department affirmed the grant of defendant’s motion to vacate her conviction based on newly-discovered evidence. Defendant, a daycare provider, was convicted in the death of a toddler. Medical testimony at trial attributed the death to shaken baby syndrome. In the motion to vacate her conviction, defendant argued that advances in medicine and science have called into question the prior opinions about shaken baby syndrome, and indicate a short-distance fall can mimic the shaken baby symptoms:

In general, advancements in science and/or medicine may constitute newly discovered evidence … , and we conclude that defendant established, by a preponderance of the evidence (see CPL 440.30 [6]), that “a significant and legitimate debate in the medical community has developed in the past ten years over whether infants [and toddlers] can be fatally injured through shaking alone, . . . and whether other causes [such as short-distance falls] may mimic the symptoms traditionally viewed as indicating shaken baby or shaken impact syndrome” … .

We further conclude that defendant established, by a preponderance of the evidence (see CPL 440.30 [6]), that the newly discovered evidence would probably change the result if a new trial were held today. “A motion to vacate a judgment of conviction upon the ground of newly discovered evidence rests within the discretion of the hearing court . . . The court must make its final decision based upon the likely cumulative effect of the new evidence had it been presented at trial’ ” … . Here, the cumulative effect of the research and findings on retinal hemorrhages, subdural hematomas or hemorrhages and cerebral edemas as presented in SBS/SBIS cases and short-distance fall cases supports the court’s ultimate decision that, had this evidence been presented at trial, the verdict would probably have been different … . People v Bailey, 2016 NY Slip Op 07490, 4th Dept 11-101-6

 

CRIMINAL LAW (ADVANCES IN MEDICINE AND SCIENCE CALL INTO QUESTIONS PREVIOUS OPINIONS ABOUT SHAKEN BABY SYNDROME, MOTION TO VACATE DEFENDANT’S CONVICTION GRANTED AND NEW TRIAL ORDER)/VACATE CONVICTION, MOTION TO (ADVANCES IN MEDICINE AND SCIENCE CALL INTO QUESTIONS PREVIOUS OPINIONS ABOUT SHAKEN BABY SYNDROME, MOTION TO VACATE DEFENDANT’S CONVICTION GRANTED AND NEW TRIAL ORDER)/SHAKEN BABY SYNDROME (ADVANCES IN MEDICINE AND SCIENCE CALL INTO QUESTIONS PREVIOUS OPINIONS ABOUT SHAKEN BABY SYNDROME, MOTION TO VACATE DEFENDANT’S CONVICTION GRANTED AND NEW TRIAL ORDER)

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RECORD SILENT ON WHETHER DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS APPRISED OF A JURY NOTE, MURDER CONVICTION REVERSED.

The Fourth Department determined a mode of proceedings error required reversal of a murder conviction. The record was silent about whether defense counsel was apprised of the contents of a jury note requesting further instruction:

… [A] mode of proceedings error occurred and reversal is required because the record fails to show that defense counsel was advised of the contents of a jury note requesting, inter alia, further instruction on reasonable doubt, murder in the second degree and manslaughter in the first degree … . Moreover, because the record does not establish that the court advised defense counsel of the contents of the note, we cannot assume that the court complied with its core responsibilities pursuant to CPL 310.30 and People v O’Rama (78 NY2d 270) … . People v Owens, 2016 NY Slip Op 07431, 4th Dept 11-10-16

 

CRIMINAL LAW (RECORD SILENT ON WHETHER DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS APPRISED OF A JURY NOTE, MURDER CONVICTION REVERSED)/JURY NOTE (RECORD SILENT ON WHETHER DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS APPRISED OF A JURY NOTE, MURDER CONVICTION REVERSED)/MODE OF PROCEEDINGS ERROR (RECORD SILENT ON WHETHER DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS APPRISED OF A JURY NOTE, MURDER CONVICTION REVERSED)

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EXPERT DISCLOSURE NOTICE NEED NOT DISCLOSE FACTS AND OPINIONS ABOUT WHICH EXPERT WILL TESTIFY, LATE EXPERT DISCLOSURE NOTICE FOR A REBUTTAL WITNESS SHOULD HAVE BEEN ACCEPTED.

The First Department, in remanding for a new trial, determined (1) the expert disclosure notice provided by the defense was sufficient, and (2) plaintiff should have been allowed, during the trial, to submit an expert disclosure notice for a rebuttal witness.  Plaintiff alleged his foot was run over by a bus:

After the defense rested, plaintiff’s attorney sought permission to call two rebuttal witnesses. He submitted a CPLR 3101(d)(1) notice for an expert in biomechanical medicine, arguing that the disclosure notice for Dr. Kurtz had provided no indication that the doctor’s opinion was based on the lack of tread marks or injury to the metatarsals and ankle. He argued that the notice’s insufficiency had not allowed him to prepare an expert witness to address these issues directly. His proposed expert would demonstrate, by use of an anatomical model of a foot, that plaintiff’s foot could have been positioned after he fell in such a manner that when the bus wheel rolled over his foot, his ankle and upper foot would not have been injured as Dr. Kurtz claimed. The court denied his request based on the timing of the notice and its reasoning that no rebuttal was needed. …

We find that Dr. Kurtz’s CPLR 3101(d)(1) disclosure notice was legally sufficient; it provided plaintiff with notice that the doctor would question whether a bus would have caused the injuries sustained by plaintiff. It is improper for a party to request the facts and opinions upon which another party’s expert is expected to testify … . * * *

… [N]otwithstanding the delay by plaintiff in providing a CPLR 3101(d)(1) disclosure for his medical expert, the trial court, in the interest of justice, should have permitted the medical expert to testify in rebuttal. The court had allowed Dr. Kurtz to opine that there were inconsistencies between the claim of how the accident occurred and the resulting injuries, and although the testimony was not in his expertise, it was heard by the jury and opened the door to the necessity for plaintiff to produce a medical expert to attempt to rebut those opinions. Tate-Mitros v MTA N.Y. City Tr., 2016 NY Slip Op 07394, 1st Dept 11-10-16

 

CIVIL PROCEDURE (EXPERT DISCLOSURE NOTICE NEED NOT DISCLOSE FACTS AND OPINIONS ABOUT WHICH EXPERT WILL TESTIFY, LATE EXPERT OPINION NOTICE FOR A REBUTTAL WITNESS SHOULD HAVE BEEN ACCEPTED)/EVIDENCE (EXPERT DISCLOSURE NOTICE NEED NOT DISCLOSE FACTS AND OPINIONS ABOUT WHICH EXPERT WILL TESTIFY, LATE EXPERT OPINION NOTICE FOR A REBUTTAL WITNESS SHOULD HAVE BEEN ACCEPTED)/EXPERT OPINION (EXPERT DISCLOSURE NOTICE NEED NOT DISCLOSE FACTS AND OPINIONS ABOUT WHICH EXPERT WILL TESTIFY, LATE EXPERT OPINION NOTICE FOR A REBUTTAL WITNESS SHOULD HAVE BEEN ACCEPTED)/REBUTTAL EXPERT OPINION (EXPERT DISCLOSURE NOTICE NEED NOT DISCLOSE FACTS AND OPINIONS ABOUT WHICH EXPERT WILL TESTIFY, LATE EXPERT OPINION NOTICE FOR A REBUTTAL WITNESS SHOULD HAVE BEEN ACCEPTED)

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ZONING BOARD PROPERLY REJECTED APPLICATION TO EXTEND THE ONE-YEAR DEADLINE FOR A REBUILD OF A FIRE-DAMAGED, NON-CONFORMING HOME.

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, over an extensive dissent, determined the zoning board (ZBA) properly rejected petitioner’s application to rebuild a fire-damaged, non-conforming home after the statutory one-year period for a rebuild had passed. The unambiguous language of the town code provision supported the board’s action (therefore the action was not arbitrary and/or capricious):

The ZBA’s affirmance of the … denial of the complete application for a building permit was based on its interpretation of Town Code § 77-48(A) as then in effect. Since the interpretation of the terms of that section involves a pure legal interpretation of statutory terms, we do not defer to the ZBA’s interpretation, but instead make an independent review of the law … . We conclude that the ZBA correctly interpreted the then-current version of Town Code § 77-48(A). Indeed, the provision “could not be clearer” … ; it enunciated a strict one-year limit for completion of the rebuilding of a destroyed nonconforming residence. Thus, the ZBA’s affirmance of the denial of the … permit application was a correct interpretation of the law. The ZBA correctly concluded that it was not authorized to disregard that clear language. Matter of Warner v Town of Kent Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 2016 NY Slip Op 07332, 2nd Dept 11-9-16

ZONING (ZONING BOARD PROPERLY REJECTED APPLICATION TO EXTEND THE ONE-YEAR DEADLINE FOR A REBUILD OF A FIRE-DAMAGED, NON-CONFORMING HOME)

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ADJACENT PROPERTY OWNERS DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO CHALLENGE VARIANCE, THE CHALLENGE WAS NOT WITHIN THE ZONE OF INTEREST OF THE RELEVANT STATUTE.

The Second Department determined petitioners, who own property adjacent to the property for which the contested variance was granted, did not have standing to challenge the variance. The challenge was deemed not to be within the “zone of interest” encompassed by the relevant statute. Any increase in parking related to the variance affected only the subject property, and not parking on the street:

… [A] petitioner whose property is adjacent to the property that is the subject of the administrative action may rely on a presumption of direct injury for purposes of standing … . Nevertheless, even a petitioner whose property is adjacent to the subject property must demonstrate that its alleged injury is within the “zone of interest” of the statute … . “Simply stated, a party must show that the in-fact injury of which it complains (its aggrievement, or the adverse effect upon it) falls within the zone of interests,’ or concerns, sought to be promoted or protected by the statutory provision under which the agency has acted” … .

Here, we agree with the Supreme Court that the petitioners/plaintiffs did not allege any legally cognizable injury with respect to parking or traffic. Simply put, the only effect that the petitioners/plaintiffs allege the area variances will have with respect to parking is limited to parking actually on the subject property. There is no allegation of impact as to on-street parking … . Matter of Panevan Corp. v Town of Greenburgh, 2016 NY Slip Op 07327, 2nd Dept 11-9-16

 

ZONING (ADJACENT PROPERTY OWNER DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO CHALLENGE VARIANCE, THE CHALLENGE WAS NOT WITHIN THE ZONE OF INTEREST OF THE RELEVANT STATUTE)/VARIANCE (ADJACENT PROPERTY OWNER DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO CHALLENGE VARIANCE, THE CHALLENGE WAS NOT WITHIN THE ZONE OF INTEREST OF THE RELEVANT STATUTE)/STANDING (ZONING, ADJACENT PROPERTY OWNER DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO CHALLENGE VARIANCE, THE CHALLENGE WAS NOT WITHIN THE ZONE OF INTERESTS OF THE RELEVANT STATUTE)/ZONE OF INTERESTS (ZONING, (ADJACENT PROPERTY OWNER DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO CHALLENGE VARIANCE, THE CHALLENGE WAS NOT WITHIN THE ZONE OF INTEREST OF THE RELEVANT STATUTE)

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